


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VOLUME XIII

NUMBER 1

THE  
HARVARD  
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

JANUARY, 1920

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**VOLUME XIII**



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The *Harvard Theological Review* has been partially endowed by a bequest of the late Miss Mildred Everett, "for the establishment and maintenance of an undenominational theological review, to be edited under the direction of the Faculty of the Divinity School of Harvard University. . . . I make this provision in order to carry out a plan suggested by my late father, the Rev. Charles Carroll Everett." During the continuance of *The New World*, Dr. Everett was on its editorial board, and many of his essays, now collected in the volume entitled *Essays, Theological and Literary*, appeared first in its pages. Sharing his belief in the value of such a theological review, and in devotion to his honored memory, the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, of which he was a member from 1869, and its Dean from 1878 until his death in 1900, has accepted the trust, and will strive to make the *Review* a worthy memorial of his comprehensive thought and catholic spirit.

The *Review* is edited by a committee of the Faculty of the Harvard Divinity School, consisting of Professors William W. Fenn and Henry W. Foote and Dr. Frederic Palmer.

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# HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME XIII

JANUARY, 1920

NUMBER 1

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## CRAWFORD HOWELL TOY

DAVID G. LYON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

“The earliest trace of the Toy family is found in England in the person of Robert Toy, bookseller in Saint Paul’s Churchyard in 1640. Members of the family came to America about 1720, and settled first in New Jersey and then in Baltimore, whence Professor Toy’s grandfather moved to Virginia about the beginning of this century” [19<sup>th</sup>]. This grandfather died in 1814 leaving an infant son, Thomas Dallam Toy, 1814–1879.

Thomas Dallam’s childhood was spent with his mother at Ferry’s Point. At the age of fourteen his school days closed, and he was apprenticed to a druggist in Norfolk. But this was not the end of his intellectual growth. His evenings were devoted to study, and he became a man of unusual attainments and high standing in the community. He had special talent for languages, and was able to act as interpreter when foreign ships came into port. He even began the study of Hebrew, and cultivated the taste for good reading in his family. He was a member of the firm of King & Toy, wholesale and retail druggists of Norfolk. The firm did an extensive business before the Civil War, and was subsequently carried on under the name of Thomas D. Toy & Sons.

Mr. Toy was one of the constituent members of the Freemason Street Baptist Church of Norfolk, founded in 1848, its first treasurer, first Sunday School superintendent, a member of the first group of deacons, and leader of the choir. When the church edifice was built he gave liberally of his means and time, and in order to reduce the costs he cut with his own hands all the glass for the windows. He had a wide and accurate knowledge of the Scriptures, and it was his custom to read from the Bible with his family at breakfast and at supper. At noon he spent an hour in prayer and meditation. Such was the father of Crawford Howell Toy.<sup>1</sup>

Crawford's mother, Amelia Ann Rogers, was the granddaughter of a Revolutionary officer, named Stanhope. The Stanhope family are said to have settled in Virginia about the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Crawford Howell Toy, the first of nine children, four sons and five daughters, was born at Norfolk on the 23d of March, 1836, and died in Cambridge, Mass., on the 12th of May, 1919. He came, as we have seen, of excellent stock, was inheritor of the best traditions in regard to learning, enjoyed rare opportunities for education, and was endowed with the ability and the will to make the most of these. Like his father, he was slight of figure, but not frail, as appears from his fondness for mountain climbing and from his power to endure long and arduous study.

Crawford received his elementary training at the Norfolk Academy, which at the time was organized on the military basis. He was captain of one of the companies. On his graduation he received from the school a copy of the works of Shakespeare "for excellence." In 1852, at the age of sixteen, he entered the University of Virginia,

<sup>1</sup> For the foregoing details I am indebted mainly to *The University of Virginia, its History, Influence, etc.*, II, 50, N. Y., 1904, and to the *History of the Freemason Street Baptist Church, Norfolk, Va.*, by Ella M. Thomas, Norfolk, 1917.



the most illustrious of educational institutions in the South. Among his teachers were such eminent men as Gessner Harrison, J. Lawrence Smith, and William B. Rogers. Besides the ordinary subjects attractive to students Mr. Toy took a course in constitutional and international law, and devoted some attention to the study of medicine. His attainments in music, which was one of his lifelong interests, led to his selection as leader of a student choir.

Graduating from the university with the degree A.M. in 1856, Toy spent the next three years in teaching English in the Albemarle Female Institute, which had recently been established at Charlottesville. It may seem strange that he did not at once proceed to special study for his professional career. He may have been in doubt what to choose, he was so young, and had so many aptitudes and interests. In 1859 was founded another school which was to have most important relations to young Toy's future. This was the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, at Greenville, South Carolina, now one of the greatest of American schools. It was the first fully equipped divinity school among southern Baptists, and was intended to provide not only for men of college training, but also for those who in the South enter the ministry in large numbers without such training. One of the requirements of all teachers is a declaration of doctrine embracing the essential tenets of the faith.

The founder and president of the Seminary was James P. Boyce (1827-1888). The most eminent scholar in the new faculty was John Albert Broadus (1827-1895), who was settled at Charlottesville during all of Toy's residence there, first as pastor of the Baptist church (1851-55) and assistant professor of Latin and Greek in the university (1851-53), then chaplain to the university (1855-57), and finally pastor again (1857-59). When Dr. Broadus was considering a call to the new institution at Greenville,

Toy was one of the signers of a protest against his acceptance, the ground being that another man might be found to supply the place at Greenville, whereas no other could fill his important position as pastor at Charlottesville. A yet stronger illustration is seen in the words of another correspondent,<sup>2</sup> who wrote to Dr. Broadus that it would be better to choose as theological professors men "who cannot hold out in preaching." "To take valuable ministers," he continues, "from prominent positions to teach twenty or thirty young men to become preachers, many of whom are made worse by it, and none benefited, . . . is too great a sacrifice. . . . Then here is a female institute, which in my humble opinion will do more good than all the theological schools in the United States."

Toy certainly did not share this extreme view, for he was one of the twenty-six students in attendance at the opening session, of whom ten were from his native state. He completed in one year about three-fourths of the entire three years' course of study. A letter from Professor Broadus, dated March 28, 1860, mentions Brother Toy's purpose to go to Japan (as missionary), and adds, "Toy is among the foremost scholars I have ever known of his years, and an uncommonly conscientious and devoted man."<sup>3</sup> He was then just twenty-four. The decision to become a missionary may have been reached during this year at Greenville, for the Seminary has from its beginning always devoted great attention to fostering the missionary spirit. One day in each month is set apart for the meetings of the Society of Missionary Inquiry, and on this day no other exercises are held.

At Charlottesville in June, 1860, Toy and three of his friends were ordained to the ministry. The "charge"

<sup>2</sup> A. T. Robertson, *Life and Letters of John Albert Broadus*, Philadelphia, 1901. P. 148.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* P. 173.

to the young men was delivered by Professor Broadus. The first half of 1860-61 he spent at home, probably engaged in study preparatory to his missionary work. During the second half he was professor of Greek at Richmond College. On December 17, 1860, J. William Jones in a letter to Dr. Broadus says that the Board have decided not to send out any missionaries for the present, and adds: "Toy talks of going out anyway and taking the chances."<sup>4</sup> The outbreak of war in 1861 interfered with the plan of becoming a missionary.

That Toy should have a part in the war was under all the circumstances inevitable. In October, 1861, he entered the Confederate service with the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues. He declined the request that he should stand for election to a captaincy, and he served first as private in artillery and later as chaplain in infantry in General Lee's army. The strenuousness of the service could not dampen the ardor of the student. There is a tradition that spare moments were given to the Arabic language. In March, 1863, a friend wrote of him: "I saw Toy ten days ago. He is chaplain in the 53d Georgia regiment . . . . Is looking very well and seems to be enjoying himself. His Syriac books are in Norfolk and he has, therefore, been compelled to fall back on German for amusement."<sup>5</sup>

On July 4th, 1863, he was captured at Gettysburg. The conditions at Fort McHenry, where he was imprisoned, were rigorous in the extreme. The tedium of this confinement was relieved by the glee club, the daily mock dress parade with tin pans for drums, and the class in Italian, organized and taught by him. In December he was exchanged, joined the army again, and remained in service till the middle of 1864, when, quite without expectation on his part, he was appointed professor of Natural Philosophy at the University of Alabama, at the time a military training-school of the Confederacy.

<sup>4</sup> Robertson, *Life*. P. 180.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* P. 197.

Here he remained teaching applied mathematics till the close of the war in 1865. In the Federal cavalry raid which burned the University buildings all of his books were destroyed.

In 1865-66 he was again with his Alma Mater teaching Greek, with the title "licentiate." Two years were then spent in Berlin, where he studied theology with Dorner, Sanskrit with Weber, and Semitic with Roediger and Dieterici. Among his anecdotes from the Berlin period is one about the professor who said of the royal family, "Die Allerhöchsten sind in die Kirche gegangen, um den Höchsten anzubeten."

In January, 1869, Toy was chosen professor of Greek in Furman University at Greenville, South Carolina, and in the following May he was elected professor of Old Testament Interpretation and Oriental Languages in the Seminary where he had been a student ten years before. This position he held for ten years, two of them at Louisville, Kentucky, whither the Seminary was removed in 1877. After two years the words "Oriental Languages" were dropped from the name of the professorship, which was thus restored to its original form. During his connection with the Seminary Professor Toy was known to his colleagues, the student body, and wider circles as the most learned member of the faculty, and indeed as a man of extraordinary learning.

My acquaintance with Dr. Toy dates from the autumn of 1876, when I became a student at the Seminary, though I had been familiar with the report of his omnivorous reading and prodigious knowledge. I soon learned that the report was no exaggeration. In the class room he seemed to know everything about the subjects which he taught. He criticized the text-book with freedom, and sought not to fill the mind of the students with facts, though he never minimized the value of fact, but to stir up the mind to the exercise of its own powers.

In his course on the English Bible many a student heard views expressed which were both novel and disturbing; as when the lecturer told him that the word "day" in the first chapter of Genesis means a day of twenty-four hours, whereas we know that the world was not made in six such days but is the result of ages of evolution; or when he said that the author of the book of Daniel was not a contemporary of Nebuchadnezzar but lived in the second century B.C. These commonplaces in the teaching of today were startling to many minds in the South four decades ago. Dr. Toy never demanded that his views on any subject should be accepted without question. With transparent fairness he gave the arguments pro and con on any disputed question that came up, and stated his own preference or conviction, but preferred that the student in the presence of all the facts should form his own judgment. And it was ever his method to set the student at work gathering facts for himself, and thus acquiring at first hand the materials for reaching conclusions. While his opinions were based on careful study and were firmly held, no man was ever more ready to revise them in the light of additional knowledge. Needless to say, he exercised a profound influence on the thinking of his students.

While every utterance of Dr. Toy regarding the Scriptures was reverent and considerate, his classes became aware of a difference between him and his colleagues, and as time went on he found it increasingly difficult not to give expression to his most mature thought on Biblical questions. This leads to one of the most important episodes in his life, which is entitled to be presented with some fulness.

When Dr. Toy began his teaching in the Seminary his orthodoxy seems to have been above all ground of suspicion. The subject of his inaugural lecture in 1869 was "The Claims of Biblical Interpretation on Baptists."

Baptists, he says, must "cling close to the word of God as our sole guide. . . . A fundamental principle of our hermeneutics must be that the Bible, its real assertions being known, is in every iota of its substance absolutely and infallibly true."<sup>6</sup> He certainly held no such view ten years later. What had taken place in the interval?

In the *Memoir* just cited Dr. Broadus informs us that Dr. Toy had entered on his Seminary career with the idea that it was important to harmonize Scripture references to physical phenomena with the results of physical science, and had tried various methods, but without satisfactory results. In Greenville under the influence of Darwin's work he gave a popular lecture on the origin of man. He had also become profoundly interested in the Biblical researches of Kuenen and Wellhausen. "Near the end of the first session at Louisville it became known to his colleagues that Dr. Toy was teaching views in conflict with the full inspiration and accuracy of the Old Testament writings. By inquiry of him it was learned that he had gone very far in the adoption and varied application of the evolutionary theories above indicated. Dr. Boyce was not only himself opposed, most squarely and strongly, to all such views, but he well knew that nothing of that kind could be taught in the Seminary without doing violence to its aims and objects, and giving the gravest offence to its supporters in general" (*Memoir*, p. 261). At the request of President Boyce, Dr. Broadus tried to persuade Dr. Toy to let "theoretical questions alone, and teach the students what they needed," that is, instruction in "the Old Testament history as it stands." Dr. Broadus reports that Dr. Toy promised to do this, and that he tried faithfully the next season to keep the promise. But "as the session went on, he frankly stated that he found it impossible to leave out those inquiries, or abstain from teaching the opinions he held." Dr. Toy

<sup>6</sup> John A. Broadus, *Memoir of James Petigru Boyce*, New York, 1893. P. 211.

decided to lay a statement of his views before the Seminary trustees' meeting at Atlanta in May, 1879 (in connection with the annual meeting of the Southern Baptist Convention), and "in order to relieve the Board from restraints of delicacy, he tendered his resignation."<sup>7</sup>

The resignation was almost unanimously accepted, but "the regret at this necessity was universal and profound," because "Dr. Toy had shown himself not only a remarkable scholar and a most honorable and lovable gentleman, but also a very able and inspiring teacher, and a colleague with whom, as to all personal relations, it was delightful to be associated." Elsewhere Broadus wrote on May 10: "The mournful deed is done. . . . Toy's resignation is accepted. . . . We have lost our jewel of learning, our beloved and noble brother, the pride of the Seminary."<sup>8</sup> As evidence of the high character of all concerned in this painful affair, it may be stated that the personal relations continued to be warm and friendly to the end of life. Dr. Toy accepted the decision without

<sup>7</sup> It seems not unlikely that the episode of the Sunday School Times had something to do with Dr. Toy's resignation. Though not mentioned by Dr. Broadus, this episode must have made him and Dr. Boyce anxious lest the Seminary should become involved in suspicion of heterodoxy, a suspicion which, for a variety of reasons, they would be loth to have it bear. In the light of subsequent events it is now evident that this anxiety was not without foundation. But to the incident itself: In the first half of 1878 and 1879 the Sunday School lessons were based on selected portions of the Old Testament, and Dr. Toy furnished weekly to the Sunday School Times an article under the title "Critical Notes." In 1879 the lessons published in the issues of April 12 and 19 were based on Isaiah 42 1-10 and 53 1-12. In the first of these passages Dr. Toy held that "servant" of verse 1 means, as elsewhere in the book, Israel. In regard to Isaiah 53 he held that the subject is still the same. "The reference is throughout to Israel immediately, with a final complete fulfilment in the Messiah." The Christian Intelligencer, an organ of the Reformed Church in America, scented danger in these articles, and on April 24, denounced Dr. Toy and the Sunday School Times in unmeasured terms. The Sunday School Times in an editorial on May 10, for the benefit of those of its readers "who may have been misled by the hasty and erroneous statements of the Christian Intelligencer," shows that Dr. Toy's interpretation of Isaiah 53 is not heretical but is held by other reputable Biblical scholars. Dr. Toy's last "Critical Note" was in the issue of May 24. For two or three weeks after that date the critical articles appear with no name attached. The selections then passed from the Old Testament to the New.

<sup>8</sup> Robertson, *Life*. P. 313.

reproaches or bitterness, supported by the consciousness of rectitude, and by that catholic, philosophic spirit which never failed him in any crisis.

When it became known that the resignation had been accepted by the trustees, some of the delegates to the Convention, former students of Dr. Toy, urged him to lay the matter before the Convention, assuring him of their cordial support. But he politely declined to enter into any controversy. Referring to this incident, one of the members of that Convention has recently written of Dr. Toy as follows: "The spirit of Dr. Toy was always pacific. In him was more light than heat. He relied upon the sweet reasonableness of his statements of belief, and disdained the arts of the rhetorician or the debater. Not a word of unkindness did he speak of his adversaries, who sometimes, swayed by the *odium theologicum*, forgot the amenities of discussion. Dr. Toy was central peace at the heart of universal agitation. Nothing disturbed his splendid poise. Calmly he faced withdrawal from the tenderest associations and friendships of his life, sustained by the strength of his trust in God. He went out like Abraham, not knowing whither he went, but assured of divine leadership."

In the letter of resignation (published in the *Religious Herald*, Richmond, Va., Dec. 11, 1879) Dr. Toy affirms his unequivocal acceptance of the Seminary doctrine, that the Scriptures were given by inspiration. But as to the method, he says, we must examine the writings themselves. We may hold to no *a priori* theory. In science, in history, in prophecy, there are obvious errors in the Scripture. These, however, concern the shell, not the kernel, of religious truth. The Bible is wholly divine and wholly human. The Biblical writers received divine truth into their souls, which they then expressed in a natural, human way. Dr. Toy considers this view not only lawful to teach in the Seminary but "one that will



bring aid and firm standing ground to many a perplexed mind, and establish the truth of God on a firm foundation."

For a couple of years after the resignation there was not a little excitement throughout the South. Dr. Toy was the theme of much discussion in the denominational press. The *Religious Herald* published at least eight editorials on the subject of Inspiration. Dr. Toy contributed to this paper and to the *Baptist Courier* of South Carolina several articles in elucidation of the views expressed in his letter of resignation. Needless to say, these were all objective, expressed with the calm and confidence of one who knows.

Dr. Toy's work at the Seminary was not limited to his formal teaching. I have noted that it was his delight to guide his students to independent reading and research. He led them likewise into charming and instructive by-ways, as in a course of lectures on the fine arts, among which he included dancing. In commenting some days later on the death of John the Baptist, Dr. Broadus remarked to his class, "See what the dance of a silly girl led to." One of the students interrupted the speaker with, "But, Dr. Broadus, Dr. Toy told us the other day that dancing is a fine art." The lecturer replied, "Brother Toy may, but I don't."

From the Seminary period date several elaborate contributions to the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, on Hebrew and on Yoruban philology. The translation and enlargement of the Lange commentary on Samuel (in collaboration with Dr. Broadus) likewise belongs to this period.

Dr. Toy was for three years my favorite teacher in the Seminary, and I had intended remaining a fourth year for study with him. The summer following his resignation, and as a result of it, I went to Germany to continue there the pursuit of those studies which I had begun with him. Through letters he continued his kindly office of

guide and adviser. I am venturing to quote from some of these letters because they show his mind on a variety of topics, and make several references to the Seminary experience and to the doctrine of the Inspiration of the Scriptures.

First from a letter written before my going abroad:

"With a critical knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, ability to read German and French fluently, and habits of scientific investigation, you can doubtless work out theology for yourself. In so far as theology is the statement of Biblical teaching, it is absolutely dependent on exegesis, and in so far as it leaves exegesis, it depends on other sciences. . . . We may be sure that no harm will come from upholding truth, and I am quite sure that the O. T. hermeneutical principles that I have taught are true, and will make their way" (Norfolk, June 14, 1879).

To learn German he advises to keep aloof from those who speak English and to associate as much as possible with Germans. Dash

"boldly at talk, careless of mistakes and inadequacies; timidity in talking is the great obstacle to learning a strange language." Regarding music: "If possible, get instruction in music, the principles of harmony and the practice of vocalization; and after a while get a short history of music, learn the names and lives of composers and the character of their works and the history of the development of the science." When he wrote, he had been about two weeks in New York. "I have no official engagements, but shall do such work as offers itself in the line of Shemitic languages and Biblical exegesis. I have not yet got under way, and cannot say that I have any definite plan, but something will no doubt work itself out" (New York, October 18, 1879).

"Franz Delitzsch is ultra conservative, and his spirit and method are not good. He is afraid of the Bible and afraid of science. Some of his commentary work . . . is excellent. But when he gets into theology or, what is worse, pseudo religious philosophy (as the psychology of the Bible) that bizarre, resultless jumble of religion and science, he is weak and misleading. . . . At present I am living very quietly, writing an occasional article for a newspaper, and doing a little work for the *Independent* of this city. Some of the younger men of the South are pushing their inquiries into the Inspiration of

the Scriptures. There is . . . a spirit of inquiry among our people. The trouble is that they have not the necessary knowledge of the facts, and the knowledge cannot be acquired except by steady and long-continued work" (New York, Feb. 23, 1880).

"This question of Inspiration is a broad and deep one, and it will do you no harm to ponder it quietly for some time, before you commit yourself definitely and go into the heat of the conflict. And, about the conflict itself. I am unfriendly to controversy, as it is usually carried on. Though a man may be honest and true, it puts him into a frame of mind unfavorable to the pursuit of pure truth. My advice to you is to keep out of it, if possible — to be categorical or dogmatic rather than controversial. When you get back to America, there will be plenty of opportunity to speak out, and it may require determination and skill, and above all, quiet conviction, intellectual and spiritual repose, to keep out of sharp controversy. But I would take the liberty to urge two things on you: first, do not put yourself into a position where you will be gagged — that will destroy your mental symmetry and your satisfaction in life; prefer to starve rather than take a place where you must stifle or conceal your honest convictions; and then, in announcing and enforcing your opinions, choose the method of positive, categorical exhibition, such a method as you would use with a child to whom you wished to explain. Of course this may not always be possible, but it will in nine cases out of ten. Have your scheme well worked out, and expound it in the spirit of a philosopher, a lover of truth, without attacking other people's opinions. The surest way of destroying error is to teach truth, and that is the only way to reach the people, who as a rule don't understand arguments. Teach after the manner of the Sermon on the Mount. . . . I suppose I shall be in this city for several months to come. I am still writing for the *Independent* newspaper, and have other matters in hand. At a recent meeting of the Oriental Society in Boston, I read a short paper on Noun-inflection in Sabeian (Himyaritic), and I shall probably read something at the meeting of the American Philological Association at Philadelphia next July" (New York, May 29, 1880).

Before the next letter Dr. Toy had accepted a call to Harvard University as Hancock Professor of Hebrew and other Oriental Languages and Dexter Lecturer on Biblical Literature. Referring to this position he wrote from Cambridge, September 30, 1880, "I begin work tomorrow

under fairly favorable circumstances." In the same letter he says of an article by Rev. Dr. Bartlett, which had been submitted to me as a test of my own views, "I don't wonder that you couldn't subscribe to Bartlett's views; they not only defy exegesis, but muzzle thought."

In connection with Dr. Toy's election to Harvard, Dr. Broadus wrote "a most cordial recommendation, with the explanation that Dr. Toy's leaving the Seminary was due to nothing whatever but his holding views like those of Kuenen and Wellhausen."<sup>9</sup> Writing from New Jersey to me on August 3, 1880, Dr. Broadus says, "I hope to see Toy before the week closes. You know he has been appointed Professor of Hebrew and other Shemitic Languages at Harvard. I had the great satisfaction of laying myself out on a letter to the appointers. I am persuaded he will do great things there for Shemitic Philology." Dr. Toy held the Lectureship till 1903, and the Professorship till 1909, when he became Professor Emeritus. After his resignation he continued the work of research with his wonted enthusiasm, and produced one of his most noteworthy books.

When Dr. Toy came to Harvard, a Semitic Department did not exist. Of Semitic languages only Hebrew was offered. In his first year he added Aramaic, and gave a course of "evening readings" on the Arabic Poets. The next year he gave similar readings on the Book of Job. The addition of a new member to the Department in 1882 made a division of labor and an increase of the Semitic offerings possible. There followed a succession of assistants, and, for longer or shorter periods, of other instructors, with the result that for many years Harvard has offered elementary and advanced instruction in all the leading Semitic tongues, and courses on the history, literature, and religion of the more important Semitic peoples. Dr. Toy gave instruction in Hebrew, Aramaic,

<sup>9</sup> Broadus, *Memoir*. P. 264.

Arabic, Ethiopic, the Talmud, general Semitic grammar, history of Israel, religion of Israel, Old Testament introduction, quotations from the Old Testament, criticism of the Pentateuch and of Chronicles, constitution of Genesis, the Spanish califate, and the Bagdad califate. "From the nature of his material his class room attracted thoughtful and earnest students, but never considerable numbers. His instruction was characterized by fulness and accuracy of learning, orderly arrangement, comprehensiveness and lucidity of statement. His aim was always, however, less to impart knowledge than to quicken the mind of his pupils, to indicate sources and methods, to guide into the ways of research and productivity."

As lecturer Dr. Toy's utterance was measured and easy, always compact with thought, always choice in expression. He inclined to the conversational style, and encouraged the asking of questions. His manner towards students was deferential and considerate, almost paternal. He never put one of them to shame by irony or rebuke, however strong the temptation may have been. The urbanity of the well-bred gentleman never forsook him. Such considerateness he manifested indeed towards all men, especially to such as were in need. What endless hours he gave to those who submitted their manuscripts to him for criticism! How many in theological or ecclesiastical difficulty brought their troubles to him, and found relief in his sympathy and advice! It was his view that a man should not necessarily change ecclesiastical connections because of difference of opinion. He remained a member of the Baptist Church for nearly eight years after coming to Cambridge. Then he withdrew and joined the Unitarian Church. But he was never an ecclesiastical partisan in the old relation or the new. Nor was he an iconoclast. For this his temper was too judicial, and he was able to see a subject in too many of its bearings.

On coming to Harvard Dr. Toy's great learning was promptly recognized by his colleagues. Perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that they regarded him as the most widely informed member of the Faculty. His acquisitiveness for languages was insatiable. It led him to take up Sanskrit, which he taught to one of his Greenville associates, Persian, Assyrian, Egyptian, and Russian. He was profoundly versed in literatures, ancient and modern, and found time to keep informed on the stream of works constantly issuing from the press. The only criticism I ever heard as to his knowledge came from his laundress, who once said: "Dr. Toy don't know nothing. He don't know how to sew on a button." In the use of tools and machinery he was singularly inexpert.

Dr. Toy was the first scholar not a Unitarian to become professor in the Harvard Divinity School. His appointment was but a first step of many which have resulted in making that school the centre of a group of affiliated Seminaries, including Andover, which more than a century ago was founded as a protest against "Harvard theology." He was not only teacher but served in other capacities. He was a member of the Harvard Library Council and of the administrative board of the Graduate School. Outside the University he held office in various learned societies. He served on the editorial staff of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and as president of the American Oriental Society and the American Philological Association. But no man ever set less value on honors of this class than did he, as one may see from the meagre account of him in *Who's Who in America*. The same remark applies to the degrees received from institutions of learning — D.D. from Wake Forest College, LL.D. from Howard College, University of North Carolina, and Harvard University.

For my first six years in Cambridge it was my good fortune to live with Dr. Toy, and to have the friendship

of earlier years ripen into intimacy, which I prize among my most precious memories. In conversation his plans for work and publication were a favorite topic, and he was always interested to hear of the intellectual work of others. But regarding his experiences, achievements, honors, he was singularly uncommunicative. This reticence was due to a self-abnegating quality of soul, as beautiful as it is rare. He was regular and methodical in his daily routine, went but little into society, worked late at night, slept well, and ate well, but could go all day without food if he could but have his pipe.

Dr. Toy spent three sabbatical years abroad, the first in 1887-88. At the end of this year he was married at Norfolk, on May 24, 1888, to Nancy Saunders, daughter of Rev. Dr. Robert Milton Saunders.

Dr. Toy was the prime mover in the founding of the Conversation Club in Louisville, and at Harvard he founded three organizations for intellectual ends. The first of these is the Biblical Club. Early in 1881, not long after his arrival on the scene, he invited a small group of scholars to meet at his room in Wadsworth House, and there was formed the Harvard Semitic Club, which had for its object the study of the Old Testament in the original tongues and in the versions. Not long after, the name was changed to the Harvard Biblical Club, and the New Testament was included as an object of study. Dr. Toy was the first and only president, except in his sabbatical years abroad, when a substitute was temporarily chosen. This election year after year was in recognition of his learning and fairmindedness. The club has always included most of the Biblical teachers in the Protestant theological schools in and about Boston.

A year or two later he founded the club of graduate students and undergraduates known at first as the Semitic Seminar, then as the Semitic Seminary, and finally as the Semitic Conference. In the selection of subjects to be in-

vestigated and presented to the club, Dr. Toy was always inspiration and guide.

The Harvard Club for the Study of the History of Religions came into being in Dr. Toy's study in the autumn of 1891. This Club comprises a small group of Harvard instructors and an occasional member from the outside. Dr. Toy's chief interest during the later years of his life was the broad field of religion, and he was rarely happier than in the monthly meetings of this group of congenial friends. The Club has no elected officers, but Dr. Toy kept the record as long as he was able to attend the meetings, and by unanimous consent he was always looked up to as the president. When he completed twenty-five years of service at Harvard this Club celebrated the event by a dinner and the presentation of a handsome silver cigar case engraved with the initials of the members. In 1912, in connection with several of his friends and former pupils, the Club published in his honor a volume, *Studies in the History of Religions*, as a belated commemoration of his seventy-fifth birthday (March 23, 1911).

The space allotted to this article is already so nearly exhausted that only the briefest account of Professor Toy's publications can be given. Before coming to Harvard he published a life of Rev. Dr. R. B. C. Howell, and as we have seen, an American edition of the Lange commentary on the Books of Samuel. In 1882 appeared the *History of the Religion of Israel, an Old Testament Primer*. This is a clear and concise presentation of the leading facts from the modern point of view, with such account of the political history and of the literature as the nature of the subject required. *Quotations in the New Testament*, 1884, is intended to show how the expounders of the new religious movement deal with the sacred books of their nation, what is their method of interpretation, how they understand the instructions, exhortations, and predic-



tions of the past, how they fit the old order of things into the new. The discussion of hermeneutical principles (pp. xxi ff.) is reverent but plain-spoken. It points out that the New Testament writers, while in many respects superior to their contemporaries, were yet, in the ordinary processes of thinking, men of their times. The rabbis, though profoundly reverent, pursued "an unhistorical, unscientific mode of studying" the Scripture. Historical criticism and exegesis were sciences not yet born. A passage was taken literally or allegorically according to the need of the interpreter. So with the New Testament writers, whose method is in general that of the Talmud, only "more cautious and reserved."

Perhaps Dr. Toy's most important book is *Judaism and Christianity, a Sketch of the Progress of Thought from Old Testament to New Testament* (1890). The Introduction discusses in a comprehensive, philosophic way the general laws of advance from national to universal religions. The eight chapters of the work deal successively with the literature, the doctrine of God, subordinate supernatural beings, man, ethics, the kingdom of God, eschatology, and the relation of Jesus to Christianity. In regard to Jesus, Dr. Toy sees in the New Testament several diverse views: the Jewish, in the Synoptic Gospels; the Pauline, in the writings of the Apostle; and the Alexandrian, resulting from the union of Greek philosophical speculation with Jewish theology, in the Fourth Gospel. But in spite of this diversity and of all subsequent changes, the person of Jesus has been central in religious life. "Whatever the particular construction of theology, whether he be regarded as substantially divine or only as a profoundly inspired man, whether Church or Bible be accepted as infallible guide, he is ever the leader and model of religious experience." "The fundamental truths which he announced are as new as they were in his time." The great themes of this remarkable volume are treated in

Dr. Toy's best manner, with fulness of learning, careful discriminations, sympathy, spiritual poise, elevation of thought, and in a style simple, clear, and eloquent. The story is told with so much life and so convincingly that the reader feels himself to be actually contemporary with the events recorded. Only a profound student and thinker could produce such a work.

*Introduction to the History of Religions* (1913) is Dr. Toy's last book, and shows him at his best in the range of the inquiry, the accuracy and minuteness of the research. The object of the book is "to describe the principal customs and ideas that underlie all public religion." While the work is devoted to primitive religions, "references to the higher religions are introduced for the purpose of illustrating lines of progress." The thought is clear but condensed. No useless word is allowed, and fact crowds relentlessly on fact. The vast mass of material, bewildering in its complexity, is reduced to order, and the common bond that underlies widely diverse custom and ceremonial is brought to light.

Dr. Toy published three critical exegetical books on the Old Testament, all in 1899. They are: *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text, with Notes*; *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel. A New English Translation, with Explanatory Notes and Pictorial Illustrations*; and *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs*. For the production of such works Dr. Toy had in an eminent degree the necessary qualifications, fulness of learning, patience, poise, sanity of judgment, a keen critical faculty, a clear and logical mind, the power to grasp and state the essential thought, brevity of statement, and felicity of expression.

Doubtless there would be many more volumes to the credit of Dr. Toy, had he not devoted so much attention to editorial work and to contributions published in encyclopædias, magazines, and journals. A partial list,

prepared by Dr. Harry A. Wolfson, is given in *Studies in the History of Religions*, mentioned above. From the foundation of *The New World* he was one of the editors (1892-1900). Besides his editorial labors he contributed to this magazine six learned articles and seventy-four book reviews. He was a member of the editorial board of the *Jewish Encyclopedia* (1901-1906), contributing to all of the twelve volumes, and having charge of the departments of Hebrew Philology and Hellenistic Literature. He contributed to about twenty journals, both technical and literary, to some of them many times. To the *Harvard Theological Review* he contributed two elaborate articles, one on Pan-Babylonianism, and one on the Islam of the Koran. If space allowed, it would be rewarding to examine some of these contributions. One at least may be mentioned — the Duddleian Lecture for 1899, published in the *Christian Register* for January 18, 1900. The subject, Pope Leo XIII, lies in a controverted field, but is handled with such breadth, wealth of learning, and conclusiveness, that the positions taken by the lecturer are incontrovertible.

This is but an imperfect sketch of Dr. Toy's life and work. Those who knew him well will not fail, I hope, to recognize the sketch as true, so far as it goes. But beyond and above these life-incidents was the man himself. To characterize him as man I venture to quote from the minute prepared by three of his colleagues who had been his pupils, and published in the *Harvard University Gazette* for June 14, 1919.

"Dr. Toy was a cultivated gentleman of the old Southern type, courtly, considerate, deferential, sympathetic. His wide reading and his many-sided learning, in archaeology, history, language, literature, theology, religion, music, politics, and philosophy, made him a centre in any group, and notably in circles of scholars of kindred interests.

"He had a boundless passion for learning, great industry in the pursuit of it, the power of severe and sustained application. Through

a retentive memory he had always at command the great stores of learning which he had gathered by wide reading in many languages. Not less marked were his courage, both physical and moral, his imperturbable poise, his complete freedom from self-seeking, his catholicity of spirit, his geniality of speech and manner, his quiet and inoffensive humor. His temper was judicial, his discriminations keen, his judgments sane. In criticism he was kindly and just, in statement clear, in expression felicitous. He was always interested in younger scholars, and to this interest age brought no abatement.

“ Dr. Toy was essentially an investigator and pioneer. His studies in Biblical Science and in Religions and his frankness of utterance mark the beginning of a new epoch in American scholarship. Yet he seemed altogether unconscious of his own greatness. With all his learning and honors he was at heart as simple and guileless as a child. He belongs in the class of the sages of olden time. He followed after wisdom, and received the fulfilment of her promise, ‘ Length of days, and years of life, and peace.’ ”

## RECENT DISCOVERIES IN ETHIOPIA

GEORGE A. REISNER

HARVARD CAMP, GIZA PYRAMIDS, EGYPT

Ethiopia or Cush extends from the upper end of the First Cataract in the Nile southwards to somewhere near the junction of the White and the Blue Niles at Khartum. Strictly speaking, the name "Cush" was applied by the ancient Egyptians to that part of the valley which lies between the Second and the Fourth Cataracts while the name "Wawat" was given to that between the First and Second Cataracts. More general names were "Ta-set" (or perhaps "Ta-Khent"), "Khenthennefer," and "Ta-nehsi" (= Land of the Negroes), and a still more general name was "The Southern Lands," applied to all the southland including Wawat, Cush, Punt and the tribal districts along the Red Sea and in the eastern and the western deserts. The people of Ethiopia are usually called *nehshi* which is translated inaccurately "negro;" and *nehshi* are represented in the monuments as typical woolly-haired black men. But it is clear from the pictures of men from Ethiopia and from the skeletons found in the ancient cemeteries that Ethiopia was inhabited by a race, dark-skinned it is true, but easily distinguished from the true negro. Thus it is probable that the proverb in Jeremiah 13 23 ("Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?") was founded on the Egyptian tradition rather than on a first-hand knowledge of the Ethiopians.

The land of Ethiopia is the most barren part of the Nile valley, almost the only part which might be called poverty-stricken. Through the greater length of the country, the only cultivable fields are little patches of dark soil laid down in the mouths of the side ravines

which have been cut by the rare rain-fed desert torrents. A hundred miles of the valley above Halfa is so desolate that it is now called "the Belly of the Rock." Even in the most fruitful stretches, which are in southern Cush or Dongola Province, the cornland is rarely more than a few hundred yards across from desert to river bank. It is one of the seeming paradoxes of history that so unfertile a country should have been an object of desire to one great empire after another, and a still greater paradox that a royal family, grown great on such soil, should have mastered the whole of the Nile valley from Khartum to the sea. But the material resources of Ethiopia lay, not in fields, grazing lands, and in forests, but in the control of roads and water. The river is the only ample source of water as well as a great traffic way, and all the roads from Egypt to the south return to its banks. The communications with the ancient gold mines in the eastern desert depended on short roads which debouched into the valley. The great caravan routes from the north were three in number — the first along the eastern bank, the second along the western bank, and the third through the chain of oases which runs parallel to the valley in the western desert. The river itself and all these roads were at the mercy of him who held the control of Ethiopia. There is a fourth way — by ship through the Red Sea; but the harbors of this route on the western shore of the sea were also under Ethiopian control. From the region of Berber, caravan roads strike out east and west and south, to the Red Sea, to Darfur, to Abyssinia, and the headwaters of the Atbára, the Dinder, the Blue and the White Nile. Along all these roads, commanded by rulers of Ethiopia, caravans went northwards bearing ivory, leopard skins, ostrich eggs and feathers, resins, myrrh, incense, various plant products, gold, and black slaves, and southwards caravans bearing the products of Egypt — cloth, amulets and ornaments, alabaster vases of per-

fume, bronze tools and weapons. In all times the material resources of the governing power in Ethiopia have consisted of the income derived from taxing in one way or other this great trade and in exploiting the gold mines. The agricultural produce has barely supported a meagre population, and no industries were initiated except under Egyptian influence.

In addition to the information contained in a large number of inscriptions found in Egyptian tombs and on the rocks of Nubia, the material for the ancient history of Ethiopia has been enriched in recent years by the excavations of the Nubian Archæological Survey<sup>1</sup> between Assuan and Dakka, and by those of the Harvard-Boston expedition at Kerma<sup>2</sup> and at Napata.<sup>3</sup> The excavations at Napata—Gebel Barkal, Nuri, and el-Kurruw—have yielded among other results the tombs of all the independent kings of Ethiopia, twenty-five in number, from 750 to about 300 B.C., and what is much more important, the chronological order of these kings. Thus the foundation is now laid for a history of Ethiopia including that part where it touches the history of Palestine. But to make clear the character of the Ethiopian monarchy of the time of Hezekiah and Isaiah it is necessary to review briefly the earlier history of the land and its people.

The history of Ethiopia falls into three great periods previous to 1000 B.C.<sup>4</sup>—(a) that of the Egyptian trading caravans, from before the Fourth Dynasty (2900 B.C.) to the Middle Empire (2000 B.C.); (b) that of the Egyptian occupation, from the Twelfth Dynasty to the Hyksos period (2000 to 1600 B.C.); and (c) that of the Egyptian Viceroyalty, from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth

<sup>1</sup> Reisner, Nubian Archæological Survey, Bulletins Nos. 1-4; Report, 1907-1908; Firth, Nubian Archæological Survey, Bulletins Nos. 5-7; Reports, 1908-1910.

<sup>2</sup> Reisner, Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Nos. 69, 80.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., Nos. 89, 97; Journal of Egyptian Archæology, IV, 213-227; V, 99-112.

<sup>4</sup> Reisner, Sudan Notes and Records, I, 3-17, 57-79, 217-237; II, 35-67.

Dynasties (1550 to 1100 B.C.). In all these periods Egypt was the determining factor in the life of Ethiopia, and the interest of Egypt lay largely in the trade with the south, but in the third period in the exploitation of the gold mines as well. During the first of these periods the deeds of the great caravan leaders — Kharkhuf, Pepynekt, Sebni, and Thety — are fairly well known from their tomb inscriptions. The remains of one of their trading stations dated by inscriptions was excavated by our expedition at Kerma; and the desolated character of the No Man's Land of Lower Nubia has been revealed by the Nubian Archaeological Survey. During the second period, Cush was permanently occupied by an Egyptian force under a governor and accompanied by craftsmen and officials. The fortified administrative center, part of the town, two of the mortuary temples, and the great cemetery were excavated by the Harvard-Boston expedition at Kerma. This town was in fact an Egyptian colony settled at the upper end of the Third Cataract and commanding the most important part of Cush. That it was a real colony is shown by the fact that a curious Egypto-Nubian set of crafts and customs was initiated and ran a course of development which can be traced for over four centuries.

After the reconquest of Ethiopia by Ahmose I and Amenophis I, the third period was opened about 1550 B.C. by the establishment of an Egyptian Viceroyalty, the first holder of which was the titular "king's son" Thure, appointed by Amenophis I. The communications with Egypt were now chiefly by water and were kept permanently open, so that the Egyptian administration in Ethiopia lost its isolated colonial character. King's messengers and inspectors of the central bureaus of Thebes passed to and fro, and yearly the tribute fleet went down to Thebes, probably during the inundation. We have a list, perhaps complete, of twenty-three successive Egypt-



tian viceroys in Ethiopia, extending from about 1548 to about 1080 B.C., from Thure of the Eighteenth Dynasty to Paiankh of the Twenty-first. Temples were built at Napata, Gematon (Kawa), Delgo, Soleb, Semneh, Buhen (Halfa) in Cush proper, as well as the well known great series between Halfa and Assuan. Many of the forts built to safeguard the roads in the Middle Empire were still held. At each temple and fort there was an Egyptian community of officials, soldiers, and priests, while the cemeteries prove that other Egyptian communities were settled in almost every cultivable area in Lower Nubia and probably southwards of that. Some remnant of the older negroid population must have remained; but it was culturally Egyptianized, and by the end of this long period of four and a half centuries Ethiopia was a part of Egypt in administration, religion, and crafts, although the racial mixture was not purely Egyptian. A second great center of the religion of Amon-Ra was established at Napata (temple B 500, excavated by the Harvard-Boston expedition), and it may be taken as certain that the priesthood of Amon in Napata walked in the ways of the priesthood of Amon in Karnak.

For the period from 1000 to 250 B.C. the material for a historical reconstruction has hitherto been wanting, except for the brief period of about half a century (715-663 B.C.), when the kings of Ethiopia — Shabaka, Shabataka, and Tirhakah — ruled Egypt as an Ethiopian province. But in 1916, the Harvard-Boston expedition discovered the great royal cemetery begun by Tirhakah at Nuri, and in 1919 the old family cemetery begun by the founder of the Ethiopian royal family at el-Kurruw. Both of these cemeteries are within a ten-mile radius of Gebel Barkal, the religious center of Napata, the capital of Ethiopia. It has fortunately been possible by means of the archæological material to arrange all these tombs in a chronological order, which is certain except for two

minor details toward the end of the list. Thus the basis has now been won for beginning a connected history of the first independent kingdom of Ethiopia, that whose capital was at Napata from about 900 B.C. to about 300 B.C.

The remarkable fact appears from the graves of the six generations of ancestors found at el-Kurruw that the royal family of Ethiopia was Libyan in origin, and from a stela of a wife of Piankhy that they were of the southern Libyans, the Temehuw. The chief of the first generation had among his grave-furniture flint and chalcedony arrow-points of well known Libyan types, but also such an amount of gold and of first-rate Egyptian faïences and alabasters that he must have been in control of part if not the whole of the resources of Ethiopia. His date I estimate at about 900 B.C. plus or minus 20 years. It would thus appear that the movement of the northern Libyan tribes into the Delta was accompanied, or followed, by a movement of the southern Libyans into Ethiopia. The obvious road for the penetration of Ethiopia by the southern Libyans would be through the Selfma Oasis road, used from the earliest times to the present day. About 900 B.C. the chief of the Libyan invaders was settled at el-Kurruw, and here was the seat of the family certainly until the reign of Tirhakah. The graves of the first three generations show a progressive increase in the size and magnificence of the tombs; the next three generations were practically at a standstill, but the chief of the last of them was undoubtedly Kashta, who held the title of "king." The chiefs of these — the fourth to sixth — generations probably all called themselves "kings of Cush," and the chief of the seventh generation was Piankhy, the conqueror of Egypt, who assumed the fivefold titulary of a king of Egypt. Then follow, at el-Kurruw the tombs of Shabaka and Shabataka, at Nuri the tomb of Tirhakah, and, returning, to

el-Kurruw, the tomb of Tanutaman beside the pyramid of his father Shabaka.

Now it must be remembered that Ethiopia was as completely a cultural part of Egypt as the Delta; and the Temehuw Libyans of Ethiopia became as thoroughly Egyptianized as the Meshwesh Libyans of the Delta. The Meshwesh, coming earlier and into a richer part of the Nile Valley, were the first to gain political power, and ruled Egypt as the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Dynasties for two centuries. But the growth of the feudal character of their government led in the early part of the eighth century to a disintegration of the kingdom into more or less independent provincial principalities, of which Ethiopia was without doubt the most powerful, probably the first to attain complete independence. It is certain that about 750, Kashta, king of Ethiopia, already held Thebes and had forced the adoption of his daughter, Amenirdis I, as heir to the high-priesthood of Amon-Ra by Shepenwepet I, the daughter of Osorkon III. Piankhy, when he set out to defend his territory against the rising power of Tefnekht, a prince of Libyan origin who had gained control of Memphis and the Delta, counted himself over-lord of Middle Egypt as far as Heracleopolis. With the submission of Tefnekht, the whole of Lower Egypt came under the sovereignty of Piankhy; but Tefnekht remained prince of that region as the representative of the Ethiopian king. Thus the feudal system of government was applied by Piankhy to Lower Egypt and was still in existence in the time of Tirhakah and Assurbanipal. But Piankhy and his successors maintained a standing army and military agents in Egypt whose duty it was to preserve order and collect the tribute of the vassal princes.

Thus at the time when the kings of Assyria were conquering Palestine, the Egyptianized Libyan kings of Ethiopia were forcing their supremacy over Egypt and

transferring the political capital of the whole kingdom to Napata. As I mentioned above, the Ethiopians were not negroes, and their royal family, Libyan in origin, shows in their portrait-statues no trace of negro blood. We have now portraits of Tirhakah, Tanutaman, Atlanersa, Senkamanseken, Anlaman, and Aspalta (the fourth generation after Tirhakah), and the negro head given to Tirhakah by the sculptor of Esarhaddon on the Senjirli stela simply represents the prevailing idea of Ethiopians as "*nehsi*," spread no doubt by the Egyptians. The ruling class in Ethiopia was Egyptian in culture, and indeed the royal family considered itself as peculiarly the favored people of Amon-Ra, the national god of Egypt.

Some historians have distinguished two Kashtas and as many as four Piankhys.<sup>5</sup> That confusion is now swept away by the excavations at Napata, and the list may be set forth with certainty as to the order of the names but not as to all the dates. Starting with 525 B.C. as the date of the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses, the maximum known reigns of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty<sup>6</sup> give us 663 (with a possible error of a few months) for the end of the reign of Tirhakah. The reign of Tirhakah is known from one of the Serapeum inscriptions to have lasted twenty-six years and a few months. But beyond that the reigns are uncertain. For Shabataka the only date in the monuments is the third year, although Manetho gives him twelve or fourteen (Africanus) years. From the reign of Shabaka, a date in his twelfth year is preserved and one in his fifteenth (Dr. Budge), while Manetho again reports twelve years. Finally, the Conquest stela of Piankhy is dated in his twenty-first year, and the strip of linen in the British Museum purchased by Greene gives a period which is more than twenty and pos-

<sup>5</sup> Petrie, *History of Egypt*, III, 279; Gauthier, *Livre des rois d'Egypte*, IV, 2, 24, 50, 51.

<sup>6</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, I, 47; IV, 518, 519.

sibly more than forty years. With this material it is only possible to set out a series of dates which show a cumulative limit of error as the date recedes from 663 B.C. backwards (Kashta is numbered six, allowing five numbers for the ancestral chiefs found in the tombs, el-Kurruw, Tumulus I and XIX, Mastabas IX, XI, and XXIII):

	King of	Max.	Min.	Probable
6. KASHTA,	Ethiopia	.....	.....	.....
	Ethiopia and Thebes	.....	.....	-743
7. PIANKHY,	Ethiopia and Thebes	755-734	733-712	743-722
son of 6.	Ethiopia and Egypt	734-715	712-704	722-714
8. SHABAKA,	Ethiopia and Egypt	715-701	704-692	714-700
son of 6.				
9. SHABATAKA,	Ethiopia and Egypt	701-689	692-683	700-689
son of 8.				
10. TIRHAKAH,	Ethiopia and Egypt	689-663	688-663	689-663
son of 7.				
11. TANUTAMAN,	Ethiopia and Egypt	663-661	663-661	663-661
son of 8.	Ethiopia and Thebes	661-655	661-655	661-655
	Ethiopia	655-653	655-653(?)	655-653(?)

In the probable dates I take Piankhy's reign at about twenty-nine years, based on the date in the hieratic inscription on linen, and Shabataka's at twelve years, based on Manetho and the archæological evidence at el-Kurruw.

The history of the relations between the kings of Ethiopia on the one hand and those of Assyria and Palestine on the other depends entirely on the Biblical and the cuneiform documents. It is true that Tanutaman in the Dream stela<sup>7</sup> gives an account of his campaign to recover Egypt in 663, but he speaks of the Assyrian appointees merely as rebels and gives no hint of the conflict with Assurbanipal. For some time false conclusions were drawn from the Assyrian and the Hebrew materials owing to the confusion between "Cush" in Arabia and Cush-Ethiopia, and that between "Musri" in Arabia and the Semitic name for Egypt. That difficulty was

<sup>7</sup> Breasted, *loc. cit.*, IV, 468 f.

definitely cleared away by Professor Winckler;<sup>8</sup> and it may now be accepted that the Assyrian annals of this period do not refer to Egypt before the reign of Esarhaddon, and that the only Biblical reference to Ethiopia of possible historical value is that to Tirhakah in II Kings 18, 19 (Is. 36, 37). The identification of So, king of Muṣri (in Arabia), in II Kings 17 4 (minimum date, 724), with Shabaka, king of Egypt (maximum date, 715), is obviously a mistake, while the Muṣri, which with Milukhkha attempted to relieve Ekron in Sennacherib's campaign of 701, was certainly the Arabian Muṣri, not Egypt. The reference in II Chron. 14 9-15 to Zerah the Cushite and his war with Asa of Judah, does not relate to Cush-Ethiopia but to the Arabian Cush (cf. II Chron. 21 16).

The utilization of the cuneiform material as far as it concerns Egypt under the Ethiopian dynasty is fairly easy. The chief events may be summarized as follows:<sup>9</sup>

- 705. Sargon killed in battle. Sennacherib came to the throne and was confronted by widespread resistance.
- 704-3. Campaign against Merodach-baladan and pacification of Babylonia.
- 702. Against the Kassites.
- 701. Campaign against Phoenicia, Philistia, and Judah. Attempt of the Arabian Muṣri and Milukhkha to relieve Ekron; their defeat at Eltekeh. Hezekiah pays tribute, but Jerusalem is not taken.
- 700-681. Sennacherib occupied in the East; Syria and Palestine apparently quietly tributary.
- 681. Sennacherib assassinated. Esarhaddon became king.
- 676-5. Abdimilkuti of Sidon, having revolted, was conquered and beheaded, together with his ally, Sanduarri of Kundi and Sizu.
- 674. Invasion of Arabia.

<sup>8</sup> Winckler, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III (1898), Nos. 1, 4; XI (1906), 102-116; to Cush, p. 106; *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 24-41.

<sup>9</sup> See for example, Paton, *Early History of Syria and Palestine*, pp. 248 ff.; Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 410-415, 525.

- 673.** Invasion of Egypt and defeat of the Assyrians in Egypt (Knudtzon).
- 672-1.** Campaign against Rurisa; perhaps also other eastern campaigns; perhaps beginning of internal troubles.
- 670.** Invasion of Egypt. Defeat of Tirhakah at Iskhupri on third Tammuz; pursuit of Egyptian army to Memphis; Memphis taken on twelfth Tammuz; further battles (south of Memphis?) on sixteenth and eighteenth of Tammuz. Submission of Egyptian vassals of Tirhakah as far as Thebes: their appointment as vassals of Esarhaddon. Tirhakah resumes his over-lordship apparently immediately after the departure of the Assyrian army.
- 669.** Internal strife in Assyria between Esarhaddon and the officials and officers; many executions; solution found in appointment of Assurbanipal to be crown prince of Assyria, Shamashshumukin of Babylonia.
- 668.** Esarhaddon marches again to Egypt and dies on the road. Assurbanipal continues the campaign and describes it as his own. Battle at Karbaniti; capture of Memphis; flight of Tirhakah [one month and ten days later, Thebes taken and plundered (K 2675)]. The twenty-two dynasts reëstablished as Assyrian vassals; Assyrian garrison left in Egypt.
- 668-663.** Intrigues between Tirhakah and the dynasts of Sais, Mendes, and Tanis (Delta alone in Assyrian control). Assyrian commanders quell the revolt and send the three kings to Nineveh. Necho of Sais pardoned and restored as king in Sais. Tirhakah dies and is followed by Tanutaman, son of Shabaka.
- 663-2.** Tanutaman retakes Memphis, and Assurbanipal makes his second campaign to Egypt (according to Tanutaman's Dream stela, Tanutaman took Memphis and received the submission of the Delta dynasts). Memphis taken without a battle; Thebes, after a march of one month and ten days, taken and plundered; Tanutaman flies to Kipkip (unknown place in the south). Thereafter the only mention in the annals of Assurbanipal is that referring to the alliance between Gyges and Psammetik I, in which the latter is said to have thrown off the Assyrian yoke.

These are the chief events; but there was also the revolt of Baal of Tyre, which Professor Winckler<sup>10</sup> has reconstructed, with so much insight into the history of the times, somewhat as follows: Baal, disappointed at not regaining his territory on the mainland, made an alliance with Tirhakah and revolted in 673. Esarhaddon besieged Tyre and attacked Tirhakah, but was defeated by the latter. The siege of Tyre continued, and in 670 after the victory of Iskhupri Baal offered submission. But on the return of Tirhakah to Memphis Baal withdrew his submission, and therefore the Senjirli stela, on which Baal is represented behind Tirhakah, makes no mention of Baal. The siege lasted until Assurbanipal defeated Tirhakah in 688, when Baal gave up, thus having resisted for five years as related by Menander (Josephus). The final taking of Tyre is recorded as Assurbanipal's "third campaign." The first half of this reconstruction, it must be confessed, has little material support, (a) from the annals of Esarhaddon,<sup>11</sup> where the names of Baal and Tarku are both restorations by Winckler on the basis of the sign *ri* taken as the end of Sur-ri (Tyre); (b) a treaty between Baal of Tyre and Esarhaddon,<sup>12</sup> the date of which is impossible to determine (I question any date after 674); and (c) Assurbanipal.<sup>13</sup> Thus there is no evidence against the following reconstruction: submission of Baal and treaty at the beginning of the reign of Esarhaddon; defeat of Esarhaddon in Egypt in 673; consequent revolt of Baal without any instigation by or alliance with Tirhakah; and later events as given by Winckler.

The character of the kings of the Ethiopian dynasty of Egypt as drawn from their inscriptions, their monu-

<sup>10</sup> Winckler, *loc. cit.*, I, 524-526; II, 10-16.

<sup>11</sup> K 2671 (see Winckler, *Forschungen*, I, 524).

<sup>12</sup> K 3500 + 4444 + 10235 (*loc. cit.*, II, 10 f.; and Peiser, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 6, pp. 1-14.)

<sup>13</sup> Rassam Cyl., II, 49-66.



ments, and their burial customs, was proud and boastful, but at the same time bold and devoid of fear. Against the foes they had met previous to the coming of the Assyrians, they had been universally successful. They believed themselves the favorites of Amon-Ra and were confident in his power. Piankhy, Shabaka, and Shabataka appear to have spent little time in Egypt, and Tirhakah was the first to reside there. He had come down from Napata when a young man of twenty (Tanis stela <sup>14</sup>), and had been crowned in Egypt. His predecessors, living at Napata, could hardly have taken any interest in affairs beyond their borders. Fragments of one tablet (or two) with the impression of the seal of Shabaka were found at Nineveh,<sup>15</sup> but this tablet (or these tablets) may have contained only formal greetings. The Ethiopian kings could conceive of no land so rich and desirable as Egypt — their own land — of no ruler so powerful as themselves, of no god the equal of Amon-Ra. As far as we know, they never indulged in foreign adventures, and even the battles fought by Tirhakah against the Assyrians were in every case fought on Egyptian soil. For of course the conquest of Egypt by the Egyptian province, Ethiopia, was not a foreign war. Thus it is unlikely that Tirhakah played anything more than a passive part in Palestine and Syria. Information was brought to him no doubt, and probably messengers, perhaps even from Baal of Tyre, were received with hospitality; but why should Tirhakah seek to make trouble for Assyria? And why, if he had made trouble, did he make no effort to utilize the situation?

The news of the defeat of Assyria in Egypt in 673 must have sent a quiver through the whole of western Asia, and was duly noted in the dry record of the Babylonian chronicle. Yet the only consequence was the revolt of

<sup>14</sup> Petrie, Tanis, II, pl. IX, No. 163; Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, IV, 456.

<sup>15</sup> Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, II, 30.

Baal of Tyre. Palestine continued quietly paying tribute, and neither the hieroglyphic nor the Assyrian inscriptions preserved to us contain any hint that Tirhakah attempted to advance beyond his own borders either then or at any other time. On the other hand, the part of agitator in Palestine and Syria, assigned to Tirhakah, is contrary to the character and the general conduct of that king, as far as is known. I imagine that the victory of 673 only made Tirhakah more confident of his power and of his impregnable position. Nor do we need to assume an alliance between Baal and Tirhakah to find a motive for Esarhaddon's invasion of Egypt in that year. Egypt was the richest land left unplundered by the Assyrians, a land capable of an enormous annual tribute; while to the army which had penetrated Arabia in 674, the crossing of the desert between Palestine and Egypt was not a matter of too great difficulty. Both before and since then, other armies have made the trip with comparative ease, time and time again. Thus I come to the conclusion that Baal did not revolt before the Assyrian defeat of 673 at the instigation of Tirhakah, but afterwards, encouraged thereto by that defeat and trusting to the strength of Tirhakah only in the sense that they had a common enemy — Assyria.

As for the subsequent struggle between the Assyrians and Tirhakah, the one point in doubt is whether Assurbanipal took Thebes in 668 as well as in 663. Winckler<sup>16</sup> believed that the account in K 2675 resulted from a confusion of the two campaigns by a scribe. Professor Breasted<sup>17</sup> has pointed out that the large restorations carried out at Thebes for Tirhakah by Mentuemhat (one of the vassals in the list of Assyrian appointees) could only have been made during the period previous to 663, that they were probably made between 668 and

<sup>16</sup> Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, I, 478 f.

<sup>17</sup> Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, IV, 460.

663 and indicate that Thebes had been looted in 668. But that conclusion is by no means certain and the question must remain in doubt. However this may be, the chief point is that Tirhakah had no difficulty in reëstablishing himself after his defeat in 670, and that he recovered Upper Egypt after the fall of Thebes in 668. He was bold and obstinate in his stand against Assyria, as befitted a great king fighting on his own soil for his own country.

Assyria attempted to hold Lower Egypt on the same feudatory system as that already in use by the Egyptians and with the same princes; but Assyria was too far away to exercise an efficient control over this form of administration even when under the watchful eyes of Assyrian officers. The vassal princes of Egypt must have been galled by the oversight of foreign soldiers and preferred the lighter yoke of their own kinsmen. Assurbanipal confesses his constant difficulties, and finally appears to have adopted the expedient of setting up Necho at Sais and Memphis as a rival of Tirhakah. At this point a contemporary document, the Dream stela of Tanutaman,<sup>18</sup> informs us that Tanutaman in his first year (663 B.C.) saw in a dream two serpents, which was interpreted to mean that he would be king over both the southland and the northland. He was then crowned in Napata, and went downstream stopping at all the principal temples to make offerings until he came against the "rebels" at Memphis. That is, Upper Egypt down to, but not including Memphis, had passed to him at the coronation in Napata. He took Memphis by assault and advanced without resistance into the Delta. After Tanutaman's return to Memphis the Delta princes came in and submitted. As this must have been in 663, the last campaign of Assurbanipal could not have been before that year and may indeed have been a year or two later. As late as

<sup>18</sup> Breasted, *loc. cit.*, IV, 468 f.

656-55, a stela found at Thebes<sup>19</sup> is dated in the ninth year of Tanutaman. Psammetik I, the son of Assurbanipal's favorite, Necho, counted his reign from 663 B.C., but he did not obtain Thebes until his tenth year. It is clear that Tanutaman lived and held Thebes until 655, when he either died or was forced to withdraw to Ethiopia. We have no further evidence of Ethiopian activity in Egypt, unless it be the fragment of a faience plaque bearing the name of Senkamanseken (second king after Tanutaman), recorded from Memphis by M. Daressy.

With this outline of the relations between Assyria and Egypt in the Ethiopian period in hand, the passage in II Kings 18, 19, Isaiah 36, 37, may now be examined. Stade's division of the text into three parts has been generally accepted — (a) II Kings 18 14-16, (b) 18 18, 17-37, and 19 1-9, (c) 19 10-37.<sup>20</sup> Winckler and others raise a question as to whether 18 18 belongs to (a) or (b), and whether 19 9 belongs wholly or in part to (b) or (c). It is not a vital matter from my standpoint whether the Tirhakah verse belongs to (b) or (c), but I agree with Winckler in concluding that it is the introduction of (c). As it is admitted that Tirhakah could not have been "king of Ethiopia" in 701, two explanations have been favored — (1) that Tirhakah was commander of an army belonging to Shabaka (or Shabataka), and was either regent of Egypt or was given a title which he acquired later; (2) that Sennacherib made a later campaign and a siege of Jerusalem at a time when he, Hezekiah, and Tirhakah were, all three, kings of their respective countries.

It may be observed in the first place that Tirhakah in the hieroglyphic inscriptions bears one or more of the five traditional titles of the king of Egypt. These five titles have usually different names attached to them, but

<sup>19</sup> Gauthier, *Livre des rois d'Egypte*, IV, 43, 68.

<sup>20</sup> Stade, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1886, pp. 173 f.; Winckler, *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen*, p. 81; *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 1, p. 33; Prasek, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, VIII, No. 4.

the Ethiopian kings of this period were fond of using the same name with the first two or three titles. The name by which each one is now called is that attached to the title "son of Ra," and thus Tirhakah was "the son of Ra, Tirhakah;" but the Ethiopians sometimes used the personal name with the title "king of Upper and Lower Egypt." It is only on his funerary vases and figures, found in his tomb at Nuri, that Tirhakah is called simply "the Osiris, the king, Tirhakah." In the cuneiform inscriptions of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, Tirhakah is called "king of Egypt and Ethiopia," except in one case, where *after the capture of Thebes in 668* he is called "king of Ethiopia."<sup>21</sup> After 668, an Assyrian or a friend of Assyria might have referred to Tirhakah as "king of Ethiopia," and after 655, when Egypt and Ethiopia were divided into separate kingdoms, any writer might have given one of the Ethiopian kings of Egypt the title "king of Ethiopia," although it was inexact. But it is extremely improbable that any document of the time of Sennacherib could have described Tirhakah as "king of Ethiopia."

It is now quite clear that in 701, Tirhakah was neither king nor regent, and not even crown prince. The curious succession of the kings of Ethiopia (see above) excludes a law of direct inheritance from father to son, and rather implies that the succession fell to the eldest, or perhaps the most capable, member of the family. In 701, in the reign of Shabaka, the heir-apparent must have been Shabataka, who became king on the death of Shabaka. Tirhakah was passed over, although he was the son of Piankhy, the predecessor of Shabaka. He was neither old enough nor politically strong enough to take precedence of Shabataka; but when Shabataka died, he did take precedence of Shabaka's other son Tanutaman.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Rassam Cyl. C, I, line 123.

<sup>22</sup> At el-Kurruw, Tirhakah buried Shabataka in the same state as Shabataka had buried Shabaka, and the queens of Shabataka he buried in tombs and with furniture like those of his own queens at Nuri.

According to the stela found at Tanis<sup>28</sup> which celebrates the visit to Egypt of Queen Aqlaqa, mother of Tirhakah and presumably a queen of Piankhy's, to see the glory of her son *after he had been crowned in Egypt*, Tirhakah left Napata when a youth of twenty and had not seen his mother since. The inference is that it was a long time, but the mutilated inscription gives no evidence by which the date of his coming to Egypt might be reckoned. Even if his coming was before 701, it could not have been much before, and Tirhakah must have been too young to have had the chief command in Egypt before the reign of Shabataka. Moreover the danger of having a member of the royal family so close to the succession in a position of such power would have been obvious to an old Oriental like Shabaka. It is not only impossible for me to accept the conclusion that Tirhakah led an army against Sennacherib for Shabaka, but even the conclusion that any Egyptian army crossed the frontiers of Egypt in 701. That conclusion would be contrary to the whole character of the Ethiopian kings and their settled foreign policy, as I judge it to have been and as it appears even in Tirhakah's wars with the Assyrians. Indeed it is quite clear that the power to which Hezekiah trusted and of which Isaiah must have spoken was Musri in Arabia, not the Egypt of the Ethiopian kings. Sennacherib relates that "the kings of Mu-su-ri" summoned the forces of the king of Milukhkha and attempted to relieve Ekron. The relief of Ekron meant the defeat of the Assyrians and the relief of Jerusalem and all Palestine.

As for the second explanation whereby II Kings 19 9-37 is taken to be a record of a second expedition to Palestine and a second siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib, the chronological conclusions appear to be against it. According to the most reasonable conclusions on Judæan

<sup>28</sup> Petrie, Tanis, II, pl. IX, No. 163; Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, IV, 456.

chronology, Hezekiah ceased to reign in 691, while the Egyptian material shows that Tirhakah could not have come to the throne before 689. The annals of Sennacherib for the latter part of his reign are wanting, and the evidence for a later campaign to Palestine is based on the observation of Professor Winckler that Esarhaddon in Cyl. A, II, lines 55 ff. says that his father Sennacherib had captured Adumu the stronghold of Aribi-land. This expedition, which is not recorded in the known annals, must have taken place in the second half of the reign of Sennacherib, and proves, provided Adumu lies south of Palestine, that Sennacherib in later years passed by Jerusalem with an army. But in addition to the fact that the location of Adumu is unknown except that it was in territory inhabited by Arabs, the evidence is a long way from permitting the deduction that Sennacherib besieged Jerusalem between 691 and 681. The distinction which Dr. Prasek<sup>24</sup> makes between the military operations of Sennacherib at Jerusalem in 701 and a "siege," is unconvincing. The suggestion of a second siege depends in fact on nothing except the passage which it was invented to explain. And finally, the character of Tirhakah's foreign policy makes against the supposition of a foreign campaign in 691-681 as much as in 701. In 673, 670, and 688, Tirhakah met the Assyrians on Egyptian soil, and even after his victory of 673 did not interfere in Palestine. He was neither afraid of invasion nor covetous of so undesirable an addition to his territory as Palestine.

Considering then the reference to Tirhakah in II Kings 19 9 in the light of the above examination, the whole of part (c) of the passage presents a combination of Sennacherib, Hezekiah, and Tirhakah "king of Ethiopia"

<sup>24</sup> Stade, *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1886, pp. 173 f.; Winckler, *Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen*, p. 31; *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, III, No. 1, p. 33; Prasek, *Mitteilungen d. vorderasiat. Ges.*, VIII, No. 4.

which is a historical impossibility. So far I was bound to go in my examinations of all possible materials for the history of Ethiopia. I may add that as a consequence I come to the conclusion that the editor of II Kings, having a late version of the prophetic utterances of Isaiah which he wished to incorporate with part (b), provided an introduction from his general knowledge of history to distinguish it from part (b). It is of course possible that he believed part (c) to have been another occasion, or that he found part (c) with its introduction already in existence dressed up by some former editor. The composer of part (c) in its present form appears to have had a confused knowledge of Tirhakah's wars with Esarhad-don and Assurbanipal, and possibly of the relief expedition from Muşri, which he naturally confused with Egypt.<sup>25</sup>

To sum up, the royal family of Ethiopia, to which belonged the kings of the Egyptian Twenty-fifth Dynasty, took its origin from a Libyan chief who settled at Napata about 900 B.C. Ethiopia was then as always the land of the southern roads, and thus the material resources on which this chief and his descendants founded the family fortunes came from the control of the trade routes and the gold mines. The normal population supported by the agricultural areas of Ethiopia is small, but with a large income from the traffic the rulers of Ethiopia were able to draw levies from the negro and the desert tribes. Individually men of courage and successful in the military occupation of Ethiopia, favored by the political disintegration of Egypt, these Libyan chiefs gained the headship of the Nile valley, held it for about eighty years, and then went down to defeat before the invading Assyrians. Their losses in men, accumulated wealth, and pres-

<sup>25</sup> The origin of the story of Sethon, Sennacherib, and the field mice, related by Herodotus (*see* Griffith, *Stories of the High Priests of Memphis*, pp. 5-12), is a legitimate subject for investigation; but the statements contained in the story cannot at present be utilized for the examination of the question in hand.



tige in their ill-fated struggles with the Assyrians, perhaps also a degeneration of character in Tanutaman and Atlanersa, reduced them to inferiority to the king of Sais, Psammetik I, and they withdrew to Ethiopia, which Psammetik was not able to include in his kingdom. Thus Ethiopia, for centuries a province of Egypt and for eighty years the dominant province, was separated from the mother country under independent kings descended, at least at first, from those who had ruled Egypt. Tanutaman was succeeded by a king named Atlanersa, probably a son of Tirhakah.<sup>26</sup> He began a temple to Amon at Gebel Barkal, which we excavated in 1916, but he must have died unexpectedly. Only one room was completed and a beautiful granite altar set up in it; but the reliefs in that room and the front part of the temple were unfinished. Neither of the great granite statues intended to stand before the outer pylon was ever completed; one was found on its side in the debris before the temple, and the other is still lying in the quarry at Tombos. He was buried in a small tomb at Nuri (Pyr. XX), the second king's pyramid in that cemetery. It was his successor, Senkamanseken, who appears to have revived the fortunes of the family. He finished the temple of Atlanersa at Barkal, and placed at least three fine granite statues of himself in the Great Temple there (found by us in 1916). At Nuri he built the first of the large three-room stairway-pyramids (28 m. square), and his burial was carried out with great ostentation. His reign was marked by an accumulation of wealth and by the fact that his craftsmen participated in the development of the Egyptian renaissance. I refrain from giving the list of subsequent kings down to 300 B.C. or beyond, which we have recovered, inasmuch as the

<sup>26</sup> The pronunciation of these names of Ethiopian kings after Tanutaman is conjectural. The writing gives only the consonants. The forms I adopted in 1917 are merely pronounceable ones in which the original hieroglyphic forms may be recognized. My justification in rejecting forms based on the Meroitic now appears in the fact that the names are for the greater part of Libyan origin.

names would be meaningless to any one but a specialist in Egyptian history. Suffice it to say that Senkamanseken was followed by five kings whose scribes and craftsmen clung closely to the Egyptian traditions; but the fortunes of the last two of the five gradually declined. The next two dynasties, also buried at Nuri and therefore probably claiming descent from Tirhakah (by marriage?), present a progressive departure from the Egyptian traditions, and about 350–300 B.C. the degeneration had produced a curious Egypto-Ethiopian culture closely resembling the Meroitic. Long before 300 B.C. the Ethiopian kings, cut off from Egypt, had turned their attention to the South and had developed the country about Baru'a (supposed to be Meroë). In the time of Nastasan, the last king buried at Nuri, the political seat was at Baru'a, but Napata remained the religious capital, the place of coronation and burial. After Nastasan's death, the royal cemetery was opened at Meroë (Kabushiyah), and at that time the political capital probably became the seat of the chief temple and of the priestly hierarchy. In the first century B.C. either Napata became again the capital of Meroitic Ethiopia, or it was the seat of an independent kingdom of Napata, detached from the kingdom of Meroë. For during this century pyramids were again built at Napata, this time at Gebel Barkal (excavated by us in 1916), the Great Temple of Amon and that built by Atlanersa-Senkamanseken were restored, and numerous buildings, administrative and religious, were constructed for the first time. The Ethiopia or Cush known to the Greeks and Romans was that of the Meroitic kingdom, and the name "Ethiopia" was first given to Cush by them. In spite of the long accounts of the classical writers, the history of the Meroitic Kingdom is still in obscurity, and it is the hope of the Harvard-Boston expedition to continue its researches in Ethiopia by excavating the royal cemetery of Meroë.

## PSYCHIC RESEARCH

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Psychic Research, "not to put too fine a point upon it," means for the most part thus far a careful and systematic investigation of the phenomena of spiritualism. A more elegant and reputable camouflage might be devised for it, and of course the name can be legitimately used to designate the study of many things with which spiritualism has nothing to do. But words have to be taken in the sense which common usage gives to them, and practically psychic research is the study of spiritualism. It used to be said by almost everybody, except the spiritualists, that the matter was not worth investigation; it was all an unwholesome mass of fraud, imposture, and delusion, to which no reasonable person would think for a moment of giving serious attention. Very likely a good many people are saying that still; but not if they have enough knowledge of the facts to serve as the basis of intelligent judgment. Whatever frauds may be practiced in the name of spiritualism, there are plenty of occurrences which no sane mind, having real knowledge of them, will attribute to that source.

It is more common now to hear these occurrences ascribed to telepathy, which is perhaps correct; though where that conclusion is most confidently stated there is probably least right to hold it. Of telepathy very little is yet known, and what has been proved would seem to indicate that it is a faculty of quite limited range and power. It cannot be invoked to explain the facts which spiritualism presents without extending its capacity enormously, far beyond anything that is known of it elsewhere. Possibly it has this greater gift; but that is something

which requires to be shown, not merely taken for granted. One can only jump to the conclusion that it has the gift; and this jump is often made, one must say, less for the sake of getting at the truth than for the purpose of getting rid of spiritualism. However, the investigation has now proceeded far enough so that we may intelligently state the issue to be, "spirits *versus* telepathy." Either there is some limited communication with personalities which have survived the change of death, or telepathy is a power of the mind possessing hitherto undreamed-of capacity.

The purpose of the present paper is abundantly fulfilled if it can be shown that this is the issue to which psychic research has brought us, and that however unable we may now be to demonstrate in favor of spirits, we are quite as far from being able to give the case to telepathy. Whether or not this is a matter which no one can ever find out, remains to be seen. At present not many have the means at hand for making a decision of that question. Some minds of first-rate ability in close contact with the investigation have given their verdict strongly and unhesitatingly in favor of spirits. The general public may be in a better, or worse, position for exercising a dispassionate judgment; but it has no right to deliver an opinion which would close the case. As the matter now stands, with what it now knows or what can be shown to it, this public cannot be fairly asked to accept the views, say of Sir Oliver Lodge. But neither has it any good right to say that he is altogether deluded and mistaken. So far as it has any right to judge, the case for telepathy is quite as dubious as that for spirits.

The heart of the problem which psychic research has attacked is the attempt to decide the real value of what purports to be evidence of the survival of personality after death. Its main task is the study of what is offered as proof of personal identity from a source beyond our

sight. Is one disqualified for that study when he admits the possibility of such survival? No more, certainly, than when he starts with a denial of such possibility. In truth, whatever may be its prepossessions, a candid mind ought to be able to deal fairly with what it finds. The demand on it in this case is that it shall concentrate its attention on this question of the sufficiency of the evidence for personal survival.

It is often said that the chief interest lies elsewhere. One hears people declare, for instance, that they will listen to what psychic research has to tell them when it can disclose something worth while about the nature and character of a future life, and not till then. But the first question is, Do spirits exist? Surely if an effort were made on the other side to communicate with us here, the first endeavor would be not to describe conditions there but to say, "This is So-and-so, whom you have formerly known. By such and such memories which we share in common you may know that I am speaking." In point of fact this is mostly the character which the spontaneous communications take. The first thing to do is to find out, if possible, whether this appearance of actual communication is true or false.

It may be said that if they who are, by hypothesis, trying to give assurance of their continued existence can furnish this, they ought to go on and satisfy our curiosity about many other things, and that their apparent inability to do this throws fatal discredit upon the whole manifestation. But that is a too hasty and superficial judgment. The means of transmission might suffice for the one thing and not for the other. If we consider presently what such a line of transmission may possibly be, this should be quite evident. Just here it cannot be said with too much emphasis that if there is anything of this sort to investigate, it is, first of all, the question of personal survival and personal identity. Do the supposed

communicators give sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that they are real persons, and is the assertion that they are such more reasonable or more credible than other explanations of the origin of the communications ?

Probably all who have looked into this for themselves will agree that it is not a case for snap judgment, for or against. Questions of personal identity are generally apt to need rather careful handling. Everybody must know something of the way they are treated in our courts of law. What a long time it took, and what almost endless discussion, to dispose of the Tichborne case in England! Do such and such things prove, or do they not, that the claimant at bar is Roger Tichborne or Arthur Orton ? How this debate went on for days and weeks, and on what "trivialities" it mostly turned! The question in the case of psychic research is not unlike that.

First and last there is a very considerable amount of evidence in the literature of psychic research that is worth serious study. Unhappily, thus far it lies embedded in a mass of irrelevant matter, so that the search for it is like the quest for Gratiano's "two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff." And when it is found everyone has to be his own lawyer in dealing with it. No one can doubt when he hits upon some of the more striking incidents in this literature that they do constitute evidence of something. But just what it is that they prove is likely to be, to the mind unskilled in the handling of such evidence, one of the most baffling questions it could take up. It is difficult to make any theory cover all the facts in the case. There is great need that someone should make a selection of what really has evidential value, and examine it with that critical skill which a good lawyer or a good judge brings to bear upon the evidence presented to a jury in court. A little of that has been done, but not very much; and if the investigation is to go on, it is a job that some competent person ought soon to tackle.

Suppose we glance for a moment at the method pursued in gathering this evidence, and at some of the difficulties of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion with regard to its meaning. Most investigations now make use of automatic writing, which is found on the whole to yield better results. This has the advantage of making an exact record of the alleged communications, and also it stops an immense amount of merely inconsequent talk; thus reducing the labor of separating from the flood of verbiage anything that seems to deserve further study. Now it is easy enough for anyone to write whatever comes into his head and call it "automatic." But whoever cares to look into the matter can soon satisfy himself that there is plenty of such writing in which the person who does it is not consciously responsible for what is written. Automatic writing, however it is to be explained, is an undoubted fact.

Mostly, when left to itself, that is to say when it is not guided by leading questions, this writing takes the form of an attempt to reveal and establish personal identity. It pretends to come from some person, no longer living in this world, who seeks to convey to those who are still in the flesh an assurance of his continued existence. Now and again what comes in this way is remarkably convincing. It really seems as if the person in question were close at hand, dictating the words that are being spoken or written. We are told, and no doubt with truth, that the best of this evidence does not get into print. It is too intimately personal to submit to public inspection. However, what is printed, if one will have the patience to fish for it in somewhat extensive seas of vapid talk, is often very good. But it comes only as it were in brief snatches, and is never long sustained. After a kind of sunburst of startling impersonation which fairly takes one's breath away, so realistic does it seem, the communications trail off into a sort of dream-like drivel, or even into mere stupid misstatement and gross fabrication.

Why is it then that these attempted impersonations are by fits and snatches so remarkably lifelike, and for the rest so wretchedly ineffective ? If they are the mere masquerade of secondary personality, why this curious unevenness of quality, and where does the information come from on which the impersonation is based ? Does it come from other adjacent minds through some process of telepathy ? Perhaps so. But the telepathy which can get into the mind of an utter stranger and, with little delay, select out of a great store of memories covering many years a group of pertinent incidents connected with one single personality, is a somewhat staggering thing to think of. To go by the record, we are required to suppose that this telepathic faculty sometimes ignores altogether what is in the foreground of the consciousness it is exploring, and brings forth what turn out to be facts from a depth which conscious memory does not reach. Moreover, it has to be a telepathy that can work upon occasion across hundreds of miles of space. The writing has been known to use information that could not have been derived from any living person without going that far afield. No one is in position to say that this cannot be done; but really it sounds quite as incredible as any other hypothesis that can be offered.

Meanwhile, if we look a little closer at what assumes to be a line of communication between the living and the dead, though we may be unable to make a wholly satisfactory explanation on the supposition that this is real, we can get a little start toward some possible explanation. The common spiritualistic assumption has been that a spirit gets into or takes possession of a physical organism conveniently loaned for the purpose, and proceeds to write or talk through that organism in place of its real owner. No long or profound study is required to lead to the conclusion that this is not what generally takes place. Whatever comes from another world, provided anything



does come from that source, the spirit remains in some sense quite apart, and only sends what it can through what might be described as two different layers of consciousness, both of them, it would seem, in an abnormal and irresponsible state. The line of transmission, if such there be, lies through two independent mental strata, either of which is liable at any moment to begin talking on its own account.

First of all, we are dealing with the subconscious mind of the so-called medium. To all intents and purposes that is in a state of sleep, and not under the control of a conscious will. Most likely it is having a dream of its own, and anyone wanting to use it to transmit a message would have to get the message into and through that dream. And behind this subconscious mind there is very constantly, seemingly a vital part of the manifestation, what is called a "control." This purports to be a spirit in charge of the line of communication; and it so frequently intervenes with comment or explanation as to make us know that it is always there. We are given to understand that it takes from some communicator what he desires to send, and transfers this to the medium, who then delivers it to the person to whom it is addressed. Now this "control," almost certainly, is also more or less irresponsible, like the subconscious mind of the medium. If both are forms of secondary personality, they are alike incapable of distinguishing truth from fiction. If the control is a real spirit, very probably it has to put itself, in order to make a line through, into a condition like the medium's trance; which means that it also is in a somewhat dreamlike state.

Imagine then an intelligence like our own on the "other side" wishing to send some message through a channel like this. Obviously a task of no small size confronts it. Its one chance of success is so to get the attention of these two separate "streams of consciousness" that they will

suspend, or partially suspend, their own dreaming operations to repeat parrot-like what they are told to say. The message is nothing that concerns them, and they are apt to take no more than a languid interest in it. Even though they went to sleep with the fixed purpose of lending themselves to such a transfer of intelligence through them, being once asleep they might not much respect that purpose. They might listen carefully and report faithfully, or again they might not. In the latter case they would probably take up with and expound their own silly dream instead.

The conjecture that some such process as this is involved in the communications furnished by automatic writing is not here offered as answering to all the facts in the case; but it goes as far in that direction as one reader of this literature can get. It has to be acknowledged that, as thus described, it is an exceedingly fragile and uncertain line of transmission. Perhaps it is even less trustworthy than what has been already said would make it out to be. For there is reason to think that what comes is largely in the form of symbolic pictures, and that what is delivered is such an interpretation of these pictures as the subconscious mind of the medium can make. If the message were in words, names ought to come as easily as other parts of speech. But as a rule they do not; they occasion great difficulty; though curiously enough they are sometimes given with great ease, and again for no apparent reason cannot be had at all. But the dream-mind which assumes to be delivering the message always spends much time in describing what it sees; a kind of panoramic vision that is passing before its sight. It is possible that some communications which have been received with much ridicule, like that about the cigar factory in Sir Oliver Lodge's book, are due to the attempt to tell something, nobody knows just what, in this pictographic way.

It should be said also that though we have spoken of three separate entities, or quasi-entities, that enter into the manifestations—the communicator, the control, and the medium—the three often appear to be fused together in some inexplicable way, and it is all but impossible to tell which is for the moment on top. Altogether nobody can be much blamed for saying that it is sheer waste of time to fool with what is offered as a possible link between two worlds, if this is the best account of it that can be given. One can imagine that it might be genuine enough, as far as it goes, and that spirits might exist most plentifully at the other end, but would pay little attention to the means of communication because of the extreme uncertainty of being able to use it in any satisfactory way.

And yet a good many of us, as we go over the record, are again and again impressed with the strong probability that, wavering and unreliable as it may be, there is a fitful connection here and that something does get across. It would be foolish to expect very much. Of predictions about the future, for example, we could never be very sure just where they came from or what they were worth. Though we were entirely satisfied about their source, there is no reason to think that spirits with which we are likely to come into contact have much greater knowledge of coming events than we possess. Whatever descriptions may be attempted of the manner of life hereafter, there is no possible way by which we can check them up to determine their accuracy.

The one thing that we can hope to get from the connection, if it really exists, is some new ground for assurance of personal survival after death. This must come from the conviction that good evidence of personal identity has been submitted through the communications. Is there hope of getting evidence of that kind which would satisfy the majority of reasonable minds, and what would it be worth if we had it? One does not see that

the hope is extravagant or absurd. Poor as the instrument is with which psychic research works, it perhaps suffices as well as did the earliest devices for the transmission of sounds by means of electricity. Possibly with further experiment this instrument may be improved.

Those who are closest to the investigation are just as sure that the possibility of intelligent communication has been established as were the men who worked so long on the invention of the telegraph and the telephone. They may be entirely mistaken; but, on the other hand, the people who are sure that there is "nothing in it" appear to base their certainty on *a priori* grounds, which in like case have often proved untenable. Many a quest has been ardently followed with less promise of ultimate success to support it; and it is not probable that the scornful indifference of "orthodox" science will be able to smother this.

If it should turn out that evidence which compels the world's attention and assent can be thus gathered, what would that be worth? At this moment we are much in the mood to say that materialism is not a good word to conjure with. We are not disposed to place reliance on the fruits of a purely materialistic civilization. But can we get what we want out of an idealism which, when all is said and done, is a kind of sunset effect, a painting of attractive possibilities on mists and clouds? Does it not all come down at last to the question, "If a man die, shall he live again?" With the assurance that our personal existence is to be carried forward into another state of being, we seem to have a hold upon idealism and a defense against materialism that can be gained in no other way.

Probably in any event there is not much reason to fear actual extinction of the belief in immortality. But can those who cherish that belief afford to neglect or despise any means of strengthening assurance in the common mind? If psychic research can ever do for the many

what it has done for a few, it has a very important part to play in building up the higher life of the future. This appears to be so plain that one must think the prejudice against it is based, more than anything else, on the fear of its failure. No poverty is quite so bad as that which follows the break-down of plans for the sudden acquisition of great wealth.

This risk certainly has to be reckoned with. Yet the prejudice might be moderated to a reasonable caution. It is not as if we were staking our whole fortune on this one cast. May we not profitably remember the proverb, "Nothing venture, nothing win?" When we consider the changes which the increase of scientific training and the growth of a scientific temper are likely to make in the minds of men, it is evident that there would be much advantage in the possession of something like scientific evidence of the reality of the future life. The promoters of psychic research are quite confident that such evidence, good enough for anybody, is attainable. They may be too sanguine about this; promoters often are. But then again some of us may wonder in days to come why we did not make an earlier investment in an undertaking whose promise we were too slow to see. It is not quite clear yet who the fools in this case really are, and it is as well perhaps to be a little frugal in the use of that epithet.

## TWO CONTRASTING ATTITUDES TOWARDS EVIL

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The problem of evil is nearly as old as philosophy itself. At present, however, it is occupying a very prominent place in philosophic thought, perhaps because the horrors of the great war and the unsettled social conditions have brought home to us with added emphasis the evil in the world, and have upset some of our theories of the even tenor and progress of mankind.

Leaving aside the theological question as to how evil can be reconciled with a benevolent Deity, the problem is this: We find our world a mixture of good and evil. This evil appears in various forms. According to the classification used by Professor Hocking there is, first, physical evil: pain, accident, misfortune; secondly, the quasi-physical: inequality, limitation, and the result of the evil of others; thirdly, the reflective evils: cynicism, and alienation from the world; fourthly, moral evil, or sin; and finally, death — of our plans and aspirations, as well as of the body.

Now can we look forward with the hope that the good may sometime triumph and the evil be eradicated, or is evil an eternal element and an indispensable one in the constitution of the universe? As one idealist has stated it, the question is, "Whether the arduous and heroic life with the conditions, that is, the pain and the evil which evoke heroism, is worth while, enduringly and for its own sake, or whether morality is worth while only on the prospect of the final eradication of evil and therefore the abolition of morality itself."<sup>1</sup> These two ways of looking at

<sup>1</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *Neo-Realism and Religion*, *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XI, April, 1918.

evil are represented in philosophy by the two opposing views, respectively, of realism and idealism.

## I

As a matter of fact, the name "*Idealism*" is misleading, since we associate that term with the possession of ideals. The theory called "idealism," however, is no more idealistic in this sense than realism — the names being more appropriate to the epistemological side of the theories than to their moral spheres. For in the realm of morality, as has been quite rightly pointed out, it is realism which is idealistic, and idealism which is realistic.<sup>2</sup>

Idealism has been, and still is, to a large extent, the dominant philosophy in the universities of America and Great Britain, and has a strong popular hold from the fact that it stands as the champion of religion, opposed to naturalism. It traces back its lineage to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel; it was transferred to Great Britain in the last century, and there represented by such men as T. H. Green, the Cairds, F. H. Bradley, and Bosanquet, and in this country by Royce.

There is a quite natural antipathy, at present, to things German, and idealism has been looked upon with disfavor because of its origin — "*Timeo Danaos . . . !*" At the same time, we ought to remember the value of idealism and its important place in the history of thought. And whatever we think of it as a theory, let us judge it on its merits alone, and not on its pedigree.

Idealism is the theory which believes the universe to be spiritual — "the actual embodiment of the highest values, as witnessed by the spiritual forms of experience." There are two forms of idealism: first, personal idealism, which means by mind the *individual* mind, and which regards God as a greater Mind; a Moral Power, but limited.

<sup>2</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *Neo-Realism and Religion*, Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XI, April, 1918.

In other words, personal idealism is willing to sacrifice the omnipotence of God to His benevolence, and with its emphasis on the latter, is very near to pragmatism and realism, in the moral and religious sphere. The question in regard to personal idealism is whether this attitude is consistent with its idealism, which is a problem beyond the scope of this paper.

Secondly, there is absolute, or objective, idealism, which holds that the source of nature is one great Mind, the absolute, of which the universe is the expression. Man is the microcosm of the absolute, and through the knowledge of the individual soul the absolute reproduces itself:

“It would seem that the attainment of the knowledge [of the system of related facts] is only explicable as a reproduction of itself in the human soul by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists — a reproduction of itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ.”<sup>3</sup>

Man, through rational thought — when he can say, as one idealist has it, “Not I that think but the universe that thinks in me” — comes into touch with the absolute. Or again, through religious experience, the individual can be united with the absolute Spirit. From such a standpoint he can see the world as it really is — the reality instead of mere appearances. He finds that as a whole, the universe is perfect, despite, or rather, through the instrumentality of, the parts, which in their severality appear imperfect; he sees that what has seemed evil is, after all, good, or has a value, and therefore is a necessary and permanent element in the constitution of the whole.

Religion, for idealism, *transcends* morality; not in the sense that it omits it; it includes it. But it is a higher standpoint than that of “mere morality.” Through religion the idealist sees the necessity for, and the value of, morality in the world of experience.

<sup>3</sup> T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book I, Chap. II, § 71.



The cardinal principle, therefore, of absolute idealism in regard to the problem of evil is *Perfectionism*: that the universe is perfect as it is, since the evil is necessary for morality; and that the evil, therefore, cannot be eradicated.

In examining the arguments which idealism uses to prove this, we find that they fall into four classes: the psychological, ethical, metaphysical, and theological.

First, as to the psychological argument, some idealists find that there is, as they put it, a "craving for pain;" that such a thing as the "enjoyment of pain" may exist. Now outside of some pathological institution it would seem totally impossible to find anyone who really *craves* pain. Those who have ever had any experience with suffering realize the absurdity of such a suggestion. A person in agony with sciatica, neuritis, or even that common woe, toothache, will hardly say that he is enjoying it.

However, Professor Hocking notes that early man "knew how the frenzy of religious ecstasy made mutilation not only endurable but even necessary to give grist to the exhilaration that stormed within him. . . . Inhabitants of Greenland and Labrador do not leave their difficult countries, though they might; and seamen return to the hardships of the sea with an unbreakable attachment which is no mere habit."<sup>4</sup> He refers to James's essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" in which James shows that "sufferings do not . . . abate the love of life; they seem to give it a keener zest."<sup>5</sup> It has been suggested also that children seem to delight in certain painful acts, such as running pins into themselves. Moreover, most of us have met that strange variety of invalid who "enjoys poor health."

<sup>4</sup> W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 220.

<sup>5</sup> William James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 47.

How then can we explain these cases except by the assumption of a craving for pain? I think Professor Hocking puts us on the right track when he says that we long for "reality" and we find this in pain. This shows that it is not the pain which we crave, but that the pain is only a means to an end. In other words, pain is not valuable in itself. Early man considered mutilation a necessary part of religion, just as certain primitive sects, as, for instance, the Druids, thought human sacrifice necessary. The point is not that they themselves enjoyed the suffering, but that they thought such action pleasing to their gods.

As to the Labradorians and the Greenlanders, there seem to be several elements in their case. First of all, there is the tremendous tie of one's native land, the country where one was born and one's ancestors have lived. Secondly, although, as we have seen, Professor Hocking says this attachment is "no mere habit,"<sup>6</sup> habit seems to play an important part. The Greenlanders always have lived there; any other country would seem strange and uncomfortable, just as visiting in a palace is uncomfortable to some of us, because it is unaccustomed. It is not that anyone prefers hardships, but rather that what are luxuries to some, to others, particularly to those to whom they are new, are actually discomforts. This applies also to the seamen. In a terrific storm at sea a certain sailor said to his comrade, "Say, Bill, ain't we lucky not to be on shore. Think how the shingles must be flying on a night like this!"

Finally, for all these cases there is the love of the atmosphere of adventure and of excitement. This is by no means the same as the enjoyment of pain. When we analyze it, we find it to be quite the opposite. The lover of danger hopes that in the course of his wanderings or his difficulties he will have some thrilling experience, that

<sup>6</sup> See above, p. 59.

romance is lying in wait for him, with a rôle for him to play, perhaps that of hero.

With children it is not the self-inflicted pain which they enjoy; it is the pride in their own bravery and self-control which they like. So with the invalid who delights in being ill. It is the gifts, the sympathy, particularly, the attention of his friends, that he craves.

All these examples, therefore, show that there are values which are so dear to us that we are willing to endure pain to get them, perhaps even to sacrifice life itself for them, and these ends can range from devotion to a cause, like that of the Waldensians, whom James cites, to the admiration or attention craved by the plain egoist. Whether one can join all these values together under the name of "reality" and say that is what we crave, is a very different question, and one which would involve much metaphysical discussion.

The question would yet remain, whether pain would still be necessary in the world as a *means*. This brings us to what might be called the ethical argument and the one which is perhaps the most popular. According to this, pain and also the other forms of evil are necessary in the constitution of the universe, since without them we could not become virtuous. We need to struggle, and hence we must have something which resists us to provide a hostile environment. This we find to be evil, and we see that evil comes to have a value, since it is indispensable to morality, to prevent moral atrophy. Also, we are told that we get a certain solidarity from fighting evil. The common burden binds men together, as we see in any time of calamity, as, for instance, the Halifax disaster or the wreck of the Titanic. Eradicate evil as a force which must be fought and you will at the same time destroy the very good which you are trying to bring to victory. For virtue and evil are indissolubly joined together, in that it is only in the fight against evil that virtue exists.

But why does the idealist anticipate moral atrophy if evil were finally eradicated and therefore the struggle? We do not say that a man who has no craving for drink is "morally atrophied" or is devoid of morality in comparison to the man who has to fight to overcome his natural desires. We may admire the latter's will power, but we should hesitate to say that he is more highly developed mentally and spiritually.

In this war we have found among the gallant men and women of the Allies and from our own country that certain virtues have been heightened — courage, chivalry, high-mindedness, self-sacrifice, and a host of others. Shall we hope for a perpetuation of war on this account? No; because the qualities which we admire in these men and women spring not from war, which is in itself evil, but from the very fact that they are fighting against war for the purpose of bettering the world.

The fact that good may, and often does, come out of evil at the present state of world development does not prove that evil is therefore a necessary element in the universe for all time. As Professor Perry says, "Circumstances that press life forward will be left behind, if these circumstances are not themselves good."<sup>7</sup>

This argument is really derived from the more important Hegelian doctrine of the perfection of the whole, which forms the metaphysical argument. The universe, as we have seen, is a totality and is *perfect as it is*. This does not mean that it is a Utopia, but that it is perfect because of the evil in it. Destroy evil — not the individual evils, but evil itself — and you would have an imperfect universe, because you would lose all positive values as well. As we look at facts in their severality, we see misery and wickedness, but when we take the attitude of the whole, the "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint," we no longer see these facts blindly, but with an

<sup>7</sup> R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 26.

understanding of their value and their meaning in relation to the whole. "Hence," says Royce, "the deepest assertion of idealism is not that above all the evil powers in the world there is at work some good power mightier than they, but rather that through all the powers, good and evil, and in them all, dwells the higher spirit that does not so much create as constitute them what they are, and so include them all."<sup>8</sup>

This is the religious attitude, but it is an attitude which prevents "morality from being meaningless," since it includes the latter with its struggle as essential. Evil, therefore, becomes an incident in the whole, and the individual who has taken the attitude of the whole is able to "transmute it."

Of course, the obvious objection to this is that the result of an evil-plus-good mixture, as this transmutation would have to be, cannot be called *good*, in our use of the term, without equivocation,<sup>9</sup> any more than a cat which is part Persian and part plain cat can be classed as a Persian cat.

But there is another side to this theory of evil as an incident. "Memory," says one idealist, "puts a frame about evil and changes it" — "*Hæc olim meminisse juvabit*" — but as one of the poets quaintly remarks, "Perhaps it may not be pleasant a bit." Memory has not put a frame about the Spanish Inquisition, or the massacre of St. Bartholomew, or the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and changed them. There are things in the history of the world which stand out as simple horrors over which men will always shudder as they recall them.

The trouble is that the idealist, in looking at the history of the world, because of his premise of the absolute unity, has to attempt a justification of such deeds. As Professor Hocking puts it, "One must even be able to look

<sup>8</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 335.

<sup>9</sup> R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 180-183.

backward without a shudder.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, he must find not only a scientific explanation of the facts, but a purpose behind these facts.

This brings us to the theological arguments: We are told that there are two kinds of evil in the world, that which we can help and therefore which we must fight — “our job” — and that which we cannot help, which is “God’s job.” This would seem to be an aid to us in looking at history and also in facing life, until we reflect that the whole point hinges on the nice line of distinction between “our job” and “God’s job.” How are we to decide between the two varieties? This would soon prove a dangerous way of shifting responsibility.

Evil in the last resort, we are told, drives the mind to God. It is the “weapon which God uses to drive us to Himself;” because God understands evil, and if we come to see evil through the mind of God, we find it changes its character. To the ordinary theist, to say nothing of the philosophers of other schools, such a statement appears little short of blasphemous. What a conception of God that leaves in one’s mind! One is involuntarily reminded of that delightful sailor minister, Father Taylor, who said to a certain preacher, “Your God is my Devil.” “If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him” does not tally with the conception of a God who invented the agonies of the world as a particularly clever instrument of torture to drive human beings to Him.

Again, how about the terrible suffering among dumb animals? How is that to be explained?

Let us hope that Xenophanes is not right in his explanation of the derivation of the conception of God.

<sup>10</sup> W. E. Hocking, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

## II

Realism is a comparative stranger in the philosophic world and cannot boast of so famous a lineage as idealism. We have been told by some that realism is the direct descendant of English empiricism; but in this country, at least, it is more closely connected on the metaphysical and epistemological sides with the radical empiricism urged by William James. To give an adequate presentation of its technical doctrines or of the differences between the English and American realists would be impossible for us, since we must spend our time on its moral and religious side; but we should remember that realism, in contrast to the monism of idealism, believes the universe is pluralistic, and that it is plastic and hence "perfectible," rather than the ordered externalizing of the absolute Mind which is perfect.

Realists, unlike idealists, have as yet given little of their attention to the problems of the spirit, with the exception in America of R. B. Perry. They have confined themselves to a "scientific review of the universe." As a matter of fact, Professor Perry's moral and religious philosophy seems a direct descendant of William James's pragmatism. We find the same burning dissatisfaction with things as they are, the sympathy for the tragedy in the world, and the optimistic faith and enthusiastic determination that the universe can be bettered through human action.

For the realist religion is not a different point of view from that of morality. It is the consummation of the latter; it is a religion for the "tough-minded," as James would say, not a panacea to lull one to rest, or a stoical resignation to fate, but a call to the pioneering spirit to action. Perhaps it is this very characteristic of neo-realism which makes it so alluring to the younger students, especially to the youth of such a time as the present.

The cardinal moral doctrine of realism, as we have seen, is meliorism, or the theory that the world can be made better; that the evil can be eliminated. How then does realism seek to prove that this is possible?

What would seem to be realism's most important argument is derived, as is that of idealism, from its metaphysics. It is a pluralistic theory of the universe; we are not dealing with a "block universe;" hence, not all the elements or parts are valuable. Evil is not the condition of virtue; it does not partake of the same essence. It is possible, therefore, to eliminate the parts which are valueless without completely destroying our scheme, as would happen to monism. We can quite ruthlessly set to work to destroy the evil in the universe without feeling that we are interfering with the Absolute or upsetting the universe.

Secondly, realism insists that evil is not indispensable to virtue; that we must distinguish carefully between good and evil and not confuse the two and make good equivocal. As we have said, the realist admits that under present conditions good may come out of evil, but he emphatically denies that this fact in any way changes the character of evil, or that the two are therefore necessarily indissoluble. "It would be as reasonable . . . to argue that because a man may be lifted from the mire, therefore mire is essentially that from which a man may be lifted, and hence, a condition of the higher life."<sup>11</sup>

Again, the realist has said that we must separate the two forms of knowledge—theory and belief—in order that they may work amicably together. "Theory should enlighten belief and belief strengthen theory."<sup>12</sup> Faith, he tells us, is the especial domain of religion. Now the realist finds that this faith in the perfection of the universe is necessary as a working hypothesis. It is necessary for life.

<sup>11</sup> R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 247.

<sup>12</sup> R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*



This is strengthened by psychological facts. Can you ever make an army fight by trying to convince the men that they never can win? It is psychologically impossible. Our army officials knew this and they begged the people at home to write more encouraging letters. Virgil knew this: "*Possunt quia posse videntur.*"

Again, it is impossible to fight adequately if one takes too friendly an attitude toward one's opponent. After all, the fight against evil is not a tennis game, which merely gives us exercise and in which we are grateful to have a friend who will play opposite us. It is a grim business, in which we are fighting not a fellow human being, but a deadly force.

The realist feels that the only justification of his fight is that he is trying to make conditions better for those who come after, that is, helping to better the world. As Professor Dickinson Miller says of the heroes in the war, "They are not facing agony for the sake of facing it, but solely in order that other lives may be spared the agony that they bear."<sup>13</sup>

Again, the realist has infinite faith in the plasticity of his environment. The "cosmological proof [of moral idealism] lies in the moral fruitfulness and plasticity of nature."<sup>14</sup> It believes, with pragmatism, that "through the knowledge that is power, and guided by his desire and hope of better things, man may conquer nature and subdue the insurrection of evil."<sup>15</sup>

But does the realist find any justification for this faith that nature may be transformed? I think that he can point to scientific and moral progress. No one, I think, would deny the importance of the scientific achievements, especially in the past one hundred years. But we are told by certain of the idealists that there really is no such

<sup>13</sup> Dickinson Miller, *The Problem of Evil in the Present State of the World*, *Anglican Theological Review*, Vol. I, No. 1.

<sup>14</sup> R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy*, p. 252.

<sup>15</sup> R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 268.

thing as progress. Life has simply become more complicated. The cave-man lived up to his ideals just as well, since they were easier, as we do to ours. The standards have changed, but not mankind. Even granting this much, however, if the same percentage, or a smaller, even approximated the higher ideals, the world would be just so much the better. It is true that few persons live up to the highest ideals of today; but few belong to the cave-man age, and the average is obviously better. A hundred years ago a boy was hanged in London for breaking into a candy shop, and another boy was hanged in the square at Aberdeen, by order of the Duke, for stealing a sheep.

Again, who makes the standards? Are they arbitrary rules imposed from without? Has the individual nothing to do with the shaping of these standards? To the realist it seems that these standards belong to the individual, are just as much a part of his evolution as is his ability to stand erect. The very fact that he has better standards to which he is trying to live up shows his improvement.

During the war the pessimists were all most eager to point out that civilization was "going under" and that we had "slipped back." But was there ever a greater example of moral force than when nations joined together to destroy the idea that ruthless strength is the greatest aim, that the weak should be exterminated, and that war is a necessary and desirable thing? When men have given their lives not for gain or conquest but that the ideals of freedom, democracy, and humanity might live, I think we can safely say that we have progressed somewhat.

But the idealist objects to all this in that it is quantitative. The realist, he argues, thinks that evil is something at which we can keep nibbling until finally it is all gone; whereas, it is a quality; it is of the essence of the universe, and can never be eliminated, especially in this piecemeal fashion.

Now it is quite true that the realist does look at evil quantitatively. He is saved from the qualitative dilemma by his pluralistic universe. He has no trouble in getting rid of the evil, because it is not of the same essence as good. When he has finally succeeded in conquering an individual evil, he has eliminated just that much evil from the world. He does not have to reflect with Bosanquet, that "the stuff of which evil is made is one with the stuff of which good is made;"<sup>16</sup> that he really has not touched the roots of the matter, and that it will manifest itself again.

But there is another objection to realism's attitude: "Why so hot, little man?" we are asked. Religion is something other than grubbing. We must turn away from the "gospel of service," from mere morality, which Bosanquet tells us is "fashionless," and look at the world *sub specie æternitatis*. This attitude of realism keeps us tied down to the fight; it prevents us from becoming serene. Now there is just a grain of truth in this criticism, namely, that service must not become mechanical, if it is to be valuable; but I think the realist would agree to this quite as readily as the idealist.

Professor Hocking tells us the act of giving a cup of cold water is not in itself religious. It is only when the cup of cold water is given "in His name." In this connection it is interesting to note that in Matthew 25, in the description of the Last Judgment, the King says to the blessed ones who are to inherit the kingdom, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me," without any idea of the necessity of its being done "in His name." Whereas, in Matthew 7 we find, "Therefore by their fruits ye shall know them. . . . Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy by thy name, and by thy name cast out demons, and by thy name do many mighty

<sup>16</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 215.

works ? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you. Depart from me, ye that work iniquity."

Finally, we are told that we should not want a world without evil in it; it would be too placid, too colorless. Such a world, according to Professor Hocking, "might provide a type of happiness bovine or angelic, but certainly not human."<sup>17</sup> James's famous Chautauqua description has been cited by Bosanquet<sup>18</sup> and by Professor Hoernlé,<sup>19</sup> who try to prove to us that one of the most famous of meliorists has gone back on his own theory.

But why was the Chautauqua community so unbearable to James ? The whole point is that under present conditions such a community is smug and unreal; it is out of touch with the tragedy of the world *as it is*. No person in his right mind really prefers dirt, squalor, "battle, murder, and sudden death" to beauty, freedom, and peace. He may be, and if he is a meliorist he must be, happier now fighting the former than placidly enjoying the latter, but this is only because he has a guilty sense if he is high-minded; he knows that he is a "slacker," if he is not helping to put more of the valuable things into the world, or helping others to reach them, or rooting up that which chokes them. Those who are doing the real fighting against evil — social workers, doctors, nurses, missionaries — are all upheld by their faith that they are contributing their part, however small, to the improvement of the world and the betterment of their fellowmen. They probably are improved by their struggle, too, but that is not their main purpose in life.

Of course, it is impossible to speculate on what the world would be like without evil. We have been presented with all varieties of pictures, from the harps-crowns-golden-streets theories to those of socialistic com-

<sup>17</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 217.

<sup>18</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 332 ff.

<sup>19</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

munities, according to the type of the imagination and the beliefs of the narrators. It is equally foolish, at the present state of the world, to argue as to what will be left to do when the world shall have been made perfect. The meliorist does not seek to switch away evil suddenly by a wave of a magic wand, as the idealist seems to think he means, and to have people of just the same development as the present transported to a "Golden Age," an earthly paradise existence;<sup>20</sup> rather, he believes that perfection is something which must be won through ages of labor and the united efforts of mankind.

If, on the other hand, evil is the "valuable" possession which the idealist insists, the logical thing would be to give everyone as much of it as possible and so provide every opportunity for improvement. While it may be said that this providing of evil can safely be left to the universe, would it not be still better to assist the universe? "Double, double, toil and trouble." A doctor trying to cure a man who would have been a cripple might well pause, on idealistic principles, to consider whether the man might not make more of himself if he were left to suffer. The realist, who would be trying simply to alleviate suffering, would not be troubled by any such nice point. For the idealist, the benevolent, altruistic thing for one to do would be to go about not "doing good," but making it as hard as possible for his neighbor, who, of course, would reciprocate quickly, so that there might be enough trouble for the improvement of all.

"It would be natural, but still perverse," says Professor Hocking, "to infer from this psychological truth [that we do not desire a world free from evil] the desirableness of preserving or courting or importing a degree of evil . . . [but] no war can act as such a remedy unless it is *just*; and no war is just unless it is inevitable."<sup>21</sup> In

<sup>20</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, pp. 93 ff.

<sup>21</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, p. 217. (*Italics mine.*)

other words, Professor Hocking would have us believe that evil can be divided into two classes: the good evil and the bad evil! Instead of helping, this merely complicates matters, by leading us into equivocation.

### III

Such then, are our two theories, roughly sketched. To what conclusion can we come regarding what they offer us? Let us first see what is the outcome of idealism's theory. Having found that the world is perfect because of the evil in it, there are two courses open to the idealist: The first is to adopt a *laissez faire* attitude; to ignore evil. The second is to fight, even though there is no hope of winning, because it brings out the best in us. The former is the more dangerous, but is perhaps more consistent with the idealist's theory of the universe, and avoids the paradox of fighting whole-heartedly against what one knows cannot be destroyed. This type of idealism has a great deal in common with mysticism and is almost oriental in its attitude. Having gained the knowledge that evil is necessary for the universe, we become more than critics and become serene. We arrive at that stage of which the hymn tells us:

"Content to let the world go by,  
To know no gain nor loss."

Professor Hocking expresses this standpoint when he says: "It [reality] must yield us the idea which unites what we most deeply desire with what is."<sup>22</sup> Now when we say that we are in danger of one of two results: Either we must overlook facts as they are, or we have got to content ourselves with low standards. We must either wear rose-colored glasses as we look out on the blackness of the world, or we must be very easily satisfied. We have confused the actual with the ideal.

<sup>22</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 436.

Again, we find that we are to overcome evil by ignoring it, by "working out the good by over-attention to it and under-attention to its opposite;"<sup>23</sup> or, as Bosanquet — who, however, belongs more to the second group of idealists — says: "The secret of overcoming it [evil] is to feel that it is overcome and to treat it practically as a conquered thing."<sup>24</sup> This is a sort of inspired Christian Science. Just think you have cured your disease, and, presto! it is accomplished. This type of idealist seems to forget that there is such a thing as a divine unrest. Serenity is not enough as a *summum bonum*, and one may wonder whether this peaceful state of mind may not be merely the result of a phlegmatic temperament and a disregard of one's neighbor's woes. Dr. Walton in his delightful little book, *Why Worry?*, tells us that when we see any accident or misfortune, we should always say to ourselves, "Never touched me!" This type of idealist seems to adopt this motto.

Bosanquet and his followers best represent the second type of idealist. "It is part of the paradox of our finite-infinite being," he says, "that we are bound to maintain the combat against evil, and no doubt in a great degree against pain, not merely without anticipating, but even without whole-heartedly desiring, their entire abolition in every possible shape with all their occasions and accessories."<sup>25</sup> Or again: "Another prejudice," he tells us, "is that justice, the equal dealing with individuals, is an ultimate law of things. Plainly it is not so."<sup>26</sup>

Evil, we are told, is like the dust which we sweep away one day only to have it return the next — "there must needs be offences."

Now we cannot but admire the courage which keeps these men striving against the impossible, like Tantalus

<sup>23</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 176.

<sup>24</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 104.

<sup>25</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 179.

<sup>26</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 117.

or Sisypheus, or King Canute when he ordered the sea to be lashed with whips.

But why must we fight? "The only question worth asking and answering in this matter is, What kind of a life, and under what conditions, is fundamentally most worth while as enabling us to make the most of ourselves — life in this actual world of ours, with its suffering and evil, or life, as the meliorist's fancy paints it, in a world without either?"<sup>27</sup>

The world, therefore, becomes a sort of moral gymnasium, with evil as the indestructible punching bag for the development of our moral muscles. It is not that my purpose is to do my share in improving the world, but that the world exists for the purpose of improving ME. Now there is no more dangerous, more subtle, form of egoism than just this. We can see it in that poem of T. E. Brown called "Pain:"

"The man that hath great griefs I pity not;  
'Tis something to be great  
In anyway, and hint the larger state  
Though but in shadow of a shade, God wot!"<sup>28</sup>

And we think of Milton's

"Fame, . . . that last infirmity of noble mind."

Strangely enough, the person who consciously aims at the improvement of himself as an exclusive end usually fails. The whole value of "self-realization" depends on what is meant by "self" and "realization." In itself, the term is nothing but an empty shell which can be loaded according to the desire of its creator.

But both forms of idealists tell us that their view of the perfection of the universe is taken from a "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint." Phrases like this and "God as moral and a-moral," and countless other such, may

<sup>27</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

<sup>28</sup> Quoted by Bernard Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 161.



have a meaning for mystics, but for the ordinary mortal they smack of Bacon's *Idols of the Forum* and of equivocation. For good and evil we have actual "sense-data," as Kant would say, and therefore they are real, and we can argue about them; but no human being can honestly know what "beyond good and evil" means; it exists only in that No Man's Land of the imagination where dwell the Purple Cow and the Dodo Bird, and an argument concerning it would be just as valuable as it would about the other two. When the idealist retires to this nebulous region, it is quite impossible to argue with him; but his superior manner towards the "stupidity" <sup>29</sup> of his opponents is extremely irritating, and we are strongly reminded of Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος*.<sup>30</sup>

Idealism, in short, leaves us with a God which we as moral beings find it difficult to worship, and with a universe in which we must, through mystical experience, rise to a "beyond-good-and-evil standpoint" if we are to attain peace of mind or if we are to continue the struggle. Its greatest faults are that it would tend either to indifference — if we are to ignore evil in the "transmutation" process — or egoism, if we are to use the evil to benefit ourselves, and that the natural esoteric quality of its religious experience leads it to be undemocratic.

What has realism to offer us? To be sure, realism, unlike idealism, is not a complete system. It is still in its constructive stage; it is blazing its trail. But this much I think we can say: First, realism gives us a universe in which man may strive hopefully. It scorns the use of mystical experience as a way of escape from the evil around us. It saves the heart of humanity from despair. It recognizes and emphasizes individualism — the power of the individual mind acting on the environ-

<sup>29</sup> Bernard Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 179.

<sup>30</sup> Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, Chap. 3, p. 22: "ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως (δοξάζει καταφρονεῖ γὰρ ἀληθῶς) οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχεῖντος."

ment. As the carpenter said to James: "There is very little difference between one man and another, but what little there is *is very important*;"<sup>31</sup> and realism believes that this difference is good for the world. We need the varied ideas and efforts of all these individuals.

Again, realism is democratic. It does not hold that the right attitude toward the world is open only to those who have had or can have the mystical experience. It is open to all who are willing to fight "the beautiful fight," and it holds out to them, through faith, the prophetic vision of victory.

Secondly, it gives a moral God, instead of the Absolute of idealism who remains "above the contrasts of good and evil;"<sup>32</sup> and it insists on a religious dualism, God being a power other than ourselves, not a comprehensive totality.

Professor Perry's definitions of God seem rather vague and unsatisfactory: "God is neither an entity nor an ideal, but always a relation of entity to ideal."<sup>33</sup> Or, again: "My God is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my ideals. In this sense then, conveyed by this term *attitude*, my God will invariably possess the characters of personality."<sup>34</sup>

James has perhaps best expressed the melioristic idea of God. "First it is essential," he says, "that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality . . . a power not ourselves then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means it, and which recognizes us."<sup>35</sup>

<sup>31</sup> William James, *The Will to Believe*, pp. 256, 257.

<sup>32</sup> W. E. Hocking, *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 332.

<sup>33</sup> R. B. Perry, *The Approach to Philosophy*, p. 87.

<sup>34</sup> R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

<sup>35</sup> William James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 122.

Such an idea of God has been recently popularized through H. G. Wells's *God the Invisible King*. This God, who is striving against evil — or, as Mr. Wells has it, that fights for “the great attainment,” which is “the conquest of death,”<sup>36</sup> is a God who works — “My father worketh hitherto and I work.” Man becomes the co-worker with God in the enterprise of transforming nature. He meets God in the field of human endeavor, rather than when he has retired to the beyond-good-and-evil region.

But is this enough for religion? Professor Hoernlé tells us that Perry's religion with its “zeal for progress in human welfare, for rendering service to the cause of reform, for fighting against evil in all its guises, is clearly something without which religion would be poor and ineffective.” But this is not religion, because it is only a “cosmology and ethics, welded together from a biological point of view”;<sup>37</sup> it ignores mysticism.

Now mysticism should be recognized as a variety of religious experience, if one is to have religious toleration; and realism, if it is true to its ideals of democracy and individuality, will not seek to exclude the mystics; but for the same reason, realism finds it hard to tolerate statements claiming that mysticism is “the intensest and purest form of religion,” or that mystical experience is “the most characteristic and revealing variety of all [religious] experience.”<sup>38</sup>

Let us have all the light which the mystics can bring to us, but let us protest when they insist that theirs is the only true light, or when they try to impose their experience on their less fortunate brothers. The term “religion” should be broad enough to include all varieties of religious experience — and who shall say which the “key-note” is?

<sup>36</sup> H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*, p. 99. (Quoted by R. B. Perry, *The Conflict of Ideals*, p. 329.)

<sup>37</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

<sup>38</sup> R. F. A. Hoernlé, *op. cit.*

For realism, religion is the consummation of morality; the lifting of service into the light of a great ideal, into fellowship with God with whom we become co-workers. It is a way of life which appeals to those who wish to "play a man's part and fulfil a man's destiny," but it adds to this struggle the vision of hope, the light of victory, the faith in the unconquerable power of good.

It is said that Leibnitz thought he had invented a "universal characteristic" which he hoped would bring a solution of all problems and an end to all disputes. "If controversies were to arise," he says, "there would be no more need of disputation than between two accountants, for it would suffice to take their pens in their hands and to sit down to their desks and to say to each other (with a friend as witness, if they like) 'Let us calculate.'"<sup>39</sup>

Unfortunately, this happy day has not yet dawned, and realism and idealism cannot yet calculate on the problem of evil in this mechanical way. They can only theorize from experience, and wait. For after all, realism and idealism are two states of mind, and only time can prove which is right. Meanwhile, the realist, in his belief that the elimination of evil from the world is not a forlorn hope, proposes to struggle onward towards his ideal, with a faith and "a determination that through enlightened action things shall in time come to be what they should be."

<sup>39</sup> Quoted by Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, Chap. V.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**ALTRUISM. ITS NATURE AND VARIETIES.** The Ely Lectures for 1917-18.  
GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. x, 138.  
\$1.25.

This little book is Professor Palmer at his best. One is justified in saying that it *is* Professor Palmer; for it is in reality not a book, but a wise man teaching, a great teacher reflecting, a subtle thinker setting forth his ideas. It is in its form, not so much instruction as consultation. The teacher is sitting at his desk with a group of young men about him, and reporting to them in the most intimate fashion his experience of life. "I have been moving about lately through the country," he begins; "When a plate of apples is passed and I pick out the best one," he goes on; "A stranger hands me a five dollar bill;" "A man I knew broke his leg" — how elementary and unsophisticated such teachings appear! One might even suspect that they were mere autobiography. The fact is, however, that the profoundest antinomies of conduct are approached through these trivial incidents, and that, in purporting to narrate the experience of the teacher, they in reality illustrate the most serious problems of ethics. The great guns of philosophical discussion are disguised by this ingenious camouflage of simplicity. It is not egotism which is using the personal pronoun, but dialectical skill. If education means the "e-ducing" or drawing out of a student's mind, few finer instances of the higher education could be cited than this ingenious familiarity with which Professor Palmer gently persuades consent. "When he putteth forth his sheep," it was said of the greatest of Teachers, "He goeth before, and the sheep follow him, for they know his voice."

This little book of eight lectures deals in this casual manner with the fundamental problem which confronts both individuals and nations today — the issue between egoism and altruism, individualism and socialism, the person and the community, the integrity of one's own character and the obligations of the life in common. This conflict of types, which has become the central theme of contemporary politics, as it has always been the chief perplexity of personal conduct, is summarily disposed of by Professor Palmer through his doctrine of the "Conjunct Self" — the essentially social nature of the individual, the unreality of the separate self, and the consequent merger of altruism with egoism. The successive stages through which this conjunctive principle develops are traced in successive chapters,

whose titles have the genuine Palmeresque touch of paradox and surprise. The teacher with dainty discrimination tries various words in succession to fit his theme, as a man of fashion might stand at the counter and select a necktie. One word is too vivid; another too dull; another does not match his thought. At last he settles on names which seem at first unsuggestive; but as he dresses his subject in them, they seem made for his discourse. "Manners," "Gifts," "Mutuality," "Love," "Justice" — such are the successive steps by which Egoism identifies itself with Altruism. "Manners" are simply the give and take of social life, the voluntary conformity to a conventional code; "Gifts" are the more substantial tribute of the person to the common life; "Mutuality" is the definite recognition of the "duality of giving;" "Love" is the flowering of mutuality into identity. "Perfect love knows no giving. What is there to give? All thine is mine, all mine is thine." Yet even Love is "selective mutuality," and beyond it lies that "public love which I have ventured to call Justice." "Justice knows no persons; or rather it knows everyone as a person and insures each his share in the common good." Justice is "the impartial love of our fellow-men." "In this external and superpersonal love, altruism attains its fullest and steadiest expression. But so does egoism too." "The conjunct self finds in this judicial love its large opportunity." "Socialism which does not promote individuality, individuality which does not tend toward a completer social consciousness, are alike delusive. Each must find its justification in the service it is able to render to its pretended foe."

Thus, with firm tread and gracious ease, Professor Palmer mounts the stairway of his argument. Each step is solid in itself, and each in turn prepares for the next. There is a sense of inevitability in the procedure. One could not step aside without intellectual disaster. The scholar takes the teacher's hand, and the way up becomes plain. Yet even more instructive than the ascent is the conversation on the way. Starting from a lifetime of acute observation and profound experience, the veteran teacher talks, as he mounts, of the limitations and insufficiency of each step. "One must not count 'Manners' too highly. It is as if I devoted a section to brushing the hair." There are defects in "Gifts." "It may be the part of wisdom to help only the strong, and let the weak sink." Even "Love" is "ever unstable." "Unrelated, it slips down into the lower forms of altruism." Cogent as are the formal arguments of the book, these passing reflections on the conduct of life may not improbably remain in the memory of many readers, as similar reflections remain in the

minds of many hearers of Professor Palmer's oral discourses, as the most convincing evidence of his sanity, discrimination, and poise.

There remains a further aspect of this little volume which is of more immediate significance. It is its relation to the movement of contemporary thought. The mind of the present time has been almost completely diverted from the ethics of personality to the ethics of social relationships. The Community, the State, the Labor Union, the Syndicate, the Revolution, have become the units of value. Professor Palmer, on the other hand, has represented to a whole generation of students the classical school of ethics, the analysis of motives, the classification of virtues and vices, the springs of action, the personal ideals. In the hall of Philosophy at Harvard University, Professor Palmer has delivered his famous lectures on the ground floor, while above him were collections illustrating social ethics, or the application of duty to the amelioration of modern life. There seemed to be here a division of fields. The student, having examined with Professor Palmer the nature of goodness, might mount to the second floor and study goodness at work. This apparent separation of being from doing, of character from service, is, however, quietly bridged by the doctrine of the "conjunct self." There is no separate self. One man is no man. Goodness is not achieved until it is socialized. Professor Palmer does not invade the foreign domain of social ethics, as though he marched upstairs in Emerson Hall and appropriated a larger lecture room; he simply indicates the obvious truth that to reach the second story one must enter on the ground floor. His teaching is at once a summary of moral philosophy and an introduction to social ethics. The classical method of analysis underlies the modern movement of reform. Perfect social service is practicable only through perfect moral freedom.

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PANTHEISM AND THE VALUE OF LIFE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. W. S. URQUHART, M.A., D.PHIL. The Epworth Press, London. 1919. Pp. viii, 732. 12s. 6d.

This volume embodies a thesis approved by the University of Aberdeen for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and appears to be in its entirety the developed form of a minor thesis adversely critical of Hindu pantheism, to which has been added the study of pantheism in the West, as represented by the Stoics, Spinoza, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; against which are urged the same objections as the author

has already made against the Vedanta. These objections are that, in contrast with a belief in a personal, good God, pantheism obscures moral values or denies them altogether and is universally pessimistic or tends to become pessimistic. Whatever is good in Stoicism, whatever is optimistic, is due to the fact that the Stoic was not really pantheistic; whatever is bad and pessimistic in Stoicism, is due to the fact that the Stoic was pantheistic. In other words, in Stoicism we are to see optimism and pessimism, good and bad, but also a theism as well as a pantheism, and we are to credit pantheism with all that is bad and leave the good to the credit of theism.

So with Spinoza, whose pantheism is universally admitted, but to whom, unfortunately, optimism (which ought not to be closely connected with pantheism) is also usually ascribed. Dr. Urquhart concedes that Spinoza is generally classed among optimists, and indeed points out the justification of this view. But he argues that Spinoza's optimism was based on too great confidence in knowledge as a means of salvation from evil. If Spinoza had lived today, he would have been less confident, therefore more pessimistic; hence we may say that his grounds for optimism are accidental, untrustworthy; so that we are justified in doubting whether he was really an optimist, since pessimism is the logical outcome of his teaching.

We submit that this argument is unsatisfactory. In details also, if space permitted, it would be of interest to debate some of the inductions made by the author to the glorification of theism versus pantheism. He implies throughout that love of God is impossible in pantheism, because this love is not personal affection between persisting realities, and conversely a theistic interpretation of the universe should result in the love of God. But it was Aristotle, no pantheist, who said that love of God was an insult to God; and surely no greater devotional love exists than is found in the pantheistic circles dominated by *bhakti*.

Here Dr. Urquhart would rejoin that *bhakti* implies polytheism (better a personal God and saviour); it is not a real adjunct of pantheism, but an emotional reaction. This brings us to the inner kernel of his work, the acute and scholarly criticism of Brahmanic pantheism. We may say at once that it is a real contribution to knowledge, in that it is a clarification, not so much of Hindu thought as of what has been said in respect of that thought. At the same time we question whether the author's synchronous attempt to clarify Hindu thought is legitimate. He would make a distinction, unimpeachable in logical necessity, between real pantheism and theistic pantheism, between real optimism and an optimism found in the Upanishads in



much the form it takes elsewhere: the world is all a fleeting show, but those who know God are released from vanity and sorrow. The Upanishadic restriction to the elect of those likely to enjoy ineffable bliss hereafter is also not unknown outside of pantheism. What we find to admire in Dr. Urquhart's work is far more than what we have to condemn, and it seems invidious to complain that a study of this sort, made by an expert in logical and philosophical discrimination, is too logical, too discriminating, to have its due effect. But such we believe to be the case. It is not till we get to the later systematized Vedanta that we have logic at all or any proper ratiocination. In the confused groping toward a spiritual unity, picturesquely voiced in the contradictory rhapsodies of the first pantheists, it is a mistake to apply a system of interpretation based on too lucid thinking. The Brahma or impersonal Power was forever shifting into the personal All-Soul, as this All-Soul was forever passing from an existence expressed by negations into God whose grace can save. Even the commentators on the Sutras were uncertain and confused, partly because they tried to be both logical and orthodox (that is, not heterodox in rejecting the traditional Word of God), and partly because pantheism in India has always felt divinity personally. When creation is predicated of a Lord of Beings who is represented as wishing ("He *desired*, let me be many") to create, how can we say with the author, "Creation means emission; it is not the definite exercise of conscious power"?

Again, when the ultimate state of the saved is described as that of a bliss too great to portray, when this bliss is said to be the very essence of Brahma, when the blessed, who even before death has a face shining with divine light and, released from all trouble and fear, "experiences bliss indescribable in words," is it not to be untrue to the Hindu scriptures to say that "this tranquil bliss" is unduly negative, and so to deny that pantheism can be optimistic, because the happiness attained is like the Absolute, only negative? Dr. Urquhart concludes that passive contentment without character enough to preserve the soul's personality is not "bliss in the true sense of the word." But it is not a question of what we think the Upanishad authors ought to have thought bliss to be. The bliss they looked forward to was as real to them as Dr. Urquhart's bliss to him, and they thought they were likely to attain it. The author says it was an impossible bliss. But surely the goal is real and obtainable to the Vedantist. The author argues that, energetic desire being excluded by the passive Vedantist and the ideal sought being such as to demand energy, "the goal is unattainable and the bliss

is out of reach." So "joy turns to bitterness and optimism to pessimism." But against this we may urge that the Hindus did not regard the bliss as unattainable, no matter whether they should logically have so considered it; hence the whole argument is vain; there is no conversion of optimism to pessimism to the Upanishad authors. We can still hear them singing hymns of joy that they, the elect few, are saved and about to enter into eternal bliss.

More satisfactory is Dr. Urquhart's discussion of the respective merits of Shankara and Ramanuja as interpreters of Badarayana. Here the author is at his best. He sides with neither as a partisan, but holds that Shankara is right as to the doctrine of illusion, not as interpreter of the earliest Upanishad thought but of the position necessitated in face of the philosophical difficulties; and that Ramanuja is right, as interpreting the Sutras, in claiming that the individual soul is real, but wrong here as interpreter of the Upanishads. The discussion of the Puranas is less satisfactory. These tracts represent merely the survival of original polytheism; pantheism has had little effect on this worship. The Hindus *en masse* are only nominally pantheists, users of taught phrases culled from superior minds; the many are, as they have always been, polytheistic. The hereafter that appeals to them is one of emotional fullness. A most valuable and searching criticism is the author's extended survey of the religious ideas of Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore, the latter justly scored as disguising his indebtedness to Western thought. Our own opinion is that Vivekananda was a good deal of a fakir, and Rabindranath is of no importance whatever; but those who enjoy his rather mushy religion will also welcome the opportunity presented by this estimate, very readable as well as fair, to see in what regard Rabindranath differs from the really Oriental, respectively Hindu, attitude toward life. The author might have made more of one point — that there has always been a healthy realization of life and its duties in the theistically shaded pantheism of India; it is a side of religion ignored by the effete talkers of present-day India but not by the virile Hindus of antiquity. The Bhagavad Gita does not praise a life of intellectual or physical indolence, but one of active endeavor; not pretty dreams but honest work in the world is a man's life, if he is to be fit to live hereafter with a God who says "I too work ever."

Dr. Urquhart has written a book which is not only a valuable contribution to the history of Indian thought but a quickening work, likely to rouse those for whom it raises the all-important question, Is your pantheism the best religion possible? Dr. Urquhart demon-

strates that in so far as pantheism is pessimistic it has a deadening effect, and reasonably advises all pantheists to take up a better, optimistic religion, which will put more life into the belief, more energy into the believer, and more happiness into the world. We agree fully that religion ought to make the whole world happier and that pantheism has not done much for the world at large. Only we question whether belief can be set aside for practical reasons, and whether the test of intellectual validity is to be found in the stimulus it exerts upon the believer's morale.

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**THE RELIGIOUS TEACHING OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.** ALBERT C. KNUDSON.  
The Abingdon Press. 1918. Pp. 416. \$2.50.

Consideration of the influence which this book is likely to exercise in the great Methodist denomination makes one feel grateful that Professor Knudson has done such a careful and scholarly piece of work. Only fourteen years ago his predecessor, Professor Hinckley G. Mitchell, lost his chair in Boston University because he would not assert the historicity of the early chapters of Genesis. The Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church regarded this as sufficient ground for refusing to confirm his reappointment to the chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis.

But a decade has wrought great changes. A sound, judicious progressiveness is apparently in the ascendant and this book is to be welcomed as one of its products. The author stands squarely upon the solid gains of modern biblical criticism in his presentation of the religious teaching of the Old Testament. This is quite evident in the excellent opening chapter, which gives an outline of the development of Old Testament religion and literature. One wonders, however, whether he has gained as much as he has lost by adopting the topical mode of discussion, even if he had in mind primarily the practical needs of the preacher. There are some aspects of Israel's religion that can be treated apart from the general history of the people. But others are deprived of a large measure of their human interest by dissociation from the historical movements in which they originated. It is difficult to see how the religious significance and consequences of the Deuteronomic movement can be presented under a topical treatment which focuses attention on certain abstract features of Israel's religion. But we must assume that the author accepted the disadvantages of this method to achieve certain ends which he had in view.

The author has grouped the contents of this book under two main headings: God and Angels, and Man and Redemption. Under the first he discusses in seven chapters the following aspects of the Old Testament conception of God: personality, unity, spirituality, power, holiness, righteousness, and love. The chapter on "Angels and Other Divine Beings" forms the eighth and concluding chapter of this part of the book, the last three pages being devoted to the development of the idea of Satan. The seven chapters of the second part deal successively with the following topics: the nature of man, the doctrine of sin, the problem of suffering, forgiveness and atonement, nationalism and individualism, the Messianic hope, and the future life.

In his introductory chapter Professor Knudson has forcefully pointed out that the ancients were little concerned with abstractions; that in order to interpret their religious ideas with historical justice one must remember that they dealt with the concrete and the tangible. One cannot help feeling that the author set himself a difficult task when he, therefore, begins to discuss, to the extent of about twenty pages each, the personality, unity, and spirituality of God. These aspects of the Old Testament conception of God obviously were rarely direct objects of Hebrew thought, but are a modern theological distillate from what they said or implied. Professor Knudson is far too good a scholar not to have been conscious of this difficulty, and one becomes genuinely interested in the skill with which he holds a middle course between these abstract topics and the historical reality.

In his broader conclusions the author, where two views are possible, leans to the conservative side. In the preface he declares it to be a contention of his book that the literary prophets were not the creators of ethical monotheism; that "the higher faith of Israel may be traced back into the pre-prophetic period," and that "its germ is to be found in the teaching of Moses." However, since he does not credit Moses (p. 79) with more than the establishment of monolatry, without denial of the existence of other gods, this germinal Mosaic monotheism had more to grow out of than to grow into before the time of Amos. If the decalogue is to be ascribed to Moses on the ground that "between the time of Moses and that of Amos there was no event and no personality significant enough to be regarded as the starting point of so far-reaching a change in the conception of the character of Yahweh," one wonders why he should think this period favorable for the development of ethical monotheism. It should be noted, *en passant*, that it is not strictly accurate to speak of a "unan-

imous biblical tradition ascribing the Decalogue to Moses." Professor Knudson, of course, means the ethical decalogue which was unknown to J, the oldest stratum of the Hebrew tradition. It should be mentioned also that to speak of the "calf-worship" of the Israelites without explaining that by golden calves were meant little bull-images used to represent the Baals as well as Jahveh, is misleading for the general reader. This indeed is one of the points at which the pre-Deuteronomic syncretism of Baal-Jahveh, which the author minimizes, comes to expression.

In the chapters that deal with the place of the individual in the religion of early Israel and with the history of the Messianic hope, Professor Knudson calls for a reconsideration and revision of views now generally held. He thinks it "a mistake to regard Jeremiah and Ezekiel as marking the beginning of individualism." He also holds that there was a more or less developed Messianic eschatology behind the preaching of the eighth-century prophets, and that the ethical idealism of the seers and singers of Israel sprang from their Messianic hope. "Their eschatology constituted the very atmosphere of their religious life." In this the reviewer cannot follow him. But to attempt a critical estimate of these and other positions taken by the author does not lie within the scope of this review. Professor Knudson has presented his evidence in carefully reasoned discussions which will interest serious-minded readers and richly deserve the attention of scholars. He is a man of learning and wide reading. He knows the literature of his subject, states the facts comprehensively, and has a keen eye for their practical bearings. His conclusions are set forth with admirable lucidity, and often with stimulating suggestiveness. In short, the book reflects honor upon the biblical scholarship of American Methodism, and we warmly commend it to the attention of all students of the Old Testament.

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PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION.

ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT IN CANAAN. C. F. BURNEY, D.LITT. Published for the British Academy, London, 1918. Pp. xi, 104. \$1.60.

With the march of archæological discovery the problem of the origins of Israel becomes an increasingly complex one. Dr. Burney does well therefore to make it the subject of his Schweich Lectures. The impulse came to him through investigation of the historical content of Judges in his recently published commentary on that book. From this vantage point he has surveyed the question in its various

aspects, and presents a view of the case which, though far from revolutionary, is both candid and judicious, learned and stimulating to thought.

In the first two chapters the Biblical tradition is carefully examined. Like all modern scholars, Dr. Burney concedes the superiority of the account given of Israel's settlement in Judges 1 1-12 5. But this also calls for closer criticism. A comparison of Judges 1 16 f. with Num. 21 1-3 and Judges 1 27 with such passages as Num. 32 39-42 and Judges 5 13-15 makes it clear that the movements of Judah, Simeon, and Manasseh there related were independent of any initiative from Joshua. The same inference applies to the other tribes who are represented as long maintaining a precarious foothold against the Canaanites. The only members of the later commonwealth of Israel, in fact, to whom the narrative ascribes any real share in the conquest under Joshua, are the Joseph tribes, settled in central Palestine. And, "if tradition is correct in making Joshua the successor of Moses in the leadership of Israel," it follows in all probability that the people whom Moses led out of Egypt at the Exodus was confined to the "household of Joseph," the remaining tribes belonging to "the floating semi-nomadic population, pressing in from the barren steppes to the northeast, which has always formed an element in the settled life of Canaan" (p. 36). This is certainly the conception we gather from the patriarchal legends of Genesis, where under the guise of eponymous heroes we find unveiled to us the wanderings and distribution of Israelite clans, "at a period possibly long prior to the entry of the Joseph tribes under Joshua" (p. 52). The elucidation of ancient legend is notoriously a field where the imagination is apt to run riot; but Dr. Burney displays a sanity of judgment, combined with a keenness of suggestion, which is worthy of all praise. We may note especially his emendation of Gen. 49 5 (pp. 38 ff.), his discussion of the early history of Levi (pp. 44 ff.), and his recognition of the astral character of the names of handmaid tribes, as contrasted with the totemistic background of a number of the purely Israelite stems (pp. 55 ff.).

In a closing lecture the external evidence is canvassed and resultant conclusions are drawn. Dr. Burney accepts the prevailing identification of the Tell el-Amarna *Habiru* and SA-GAS (ideogram for *habbatum*, "robber" or "cut-throat") with Hebrews "in the widest sense of the latter term." Scheil's discovery of *Habiru* mercenaries in the employment of the Elamite king Rīm-Sin, the contemporary of Hammurabi, is no insuperable objection to this theory, the Biblical tradition itself associating Abraham "the Hebrew"

with the same general period and locality. The Habiru are clearly Aramæan nomads who press continually westward, until in the reign of Ahnaton they occupy the whole of Palestine, from the Phœnician cities in the north to the district around Jerusalem. All this is in striking harmony with the movements of Hebrew tribes as reflected in the patriarchal traditions (pp. 82 ff.). That the main body of the Israelites had no part in the migration to Egypt is borne out by the mention of 'Asaru (the district assigned to the tribe of Asher) among the conquests of Sety I (c. 1313 B.C.), and the inclusion of Israel in the list of peoples subdued by Mineptah (c. 1222 B.C.). It is possible indeed that Israelite families may have participated in the southward movement of Amurru peoples under the Hyksos domination of Egypt, but the migration proper was confined to Joseph tribes, probably during the flourishing period of the Empire (from the reign of Thutmose III onwards). On this view there is little reason to doubt that Ra'messe II was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and his successor Mineptah the Pharaoh of the Exodus. The contrasted theory of Mr. H. R. Hall, which connects the Exodus with the expulsion of the Hyksos, and identifies the Habiru aggressions with the conquest of Palestine by Joshua, not merely wrests the witness of the monuments, but "is obliged to do great violence to the Biblical tradition," for it crowds the campaigns of Sety, Ra'messe, and Mineptah into the period of the Judges, and otherwise alters the whole perspective of events (pp. 91 ff.).

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ZOROASTRIANISM AND JUDAISM. GEORGE WILLIAM CARTER, PH.D. The Gorham Press. 1918. Pp. 116. \$2.00.

Judah Ibn Tibbon, one of the most famous translators from the Arabic into Hebrew during the Middle Ages, repeatedly emphasized the fact that to be a good translator one must possess these three qualifications: the mastery of the language from which he translates, the mastery of the language into which he translates, and the mastery of the subject-matter with which his translation deals. Slightly modified, one may apply this characterization to the author on comparative religion. To write intelligently on comparative religion one must master the systems of religion compared and their mutual relation.

The many points of resemblance between Zoroastrianism and Judaism have attracted the attention of the learned world for more

than two centuries. T. H. Hyde in his *Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum*, Oxford, 1700, had not the slightest doubt that Zoroastrianism was a poor copy of Judaism. Abraham is for him the first law-giver of the Persians, and the Messianic hopes found in the Zoroastrian writings are directly dependent upon the Old Testament, "which was well known to Zarathustra"—"quod ei bene notum fuit." One can hardly suppress a smile at his naïveté, but one must not take too seriously the opposite view, which maintains that Judaism borrowed its main religious views from Zoroastrianism.

The author of the present book, though he does not go to the extreme, is nevertheless convinced that "while the germs of the beliefs that came into prominence in post-exilic times in Judaism may be present in the earlier writings, the germs are not enough to explain the later developments." This reads like a compromise between those who deny any essential influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism and those who make the latter depend on the former. Compromises may solve political and social difficulties, but never a scientific problem. If pre-exilic Judaism contained the germs from which its post-exilic form developed, then why make it dependent on external influences? But if post-exilic Judaism can only be explained as a result of foreign influences, it is no longer a direct development of the pre-exilic religion of Israel. However, be that as it may, the view of Eduard Meyer with regard to the relation of Zoroastrianism to Judaism is the only safe and sane one, at least for the present, while the date of composition of the most important Avesta documents is so uncertain.

The analogies between Judaism and Zoroastrianism, says Eduard Meyer,<sup>1</sup> are very striking, but it would be radically wrong to claim a direct influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism. What is common to both religions is mainly due to their similar development, and, in some details, to the dependence of both on Babylonian religion. If we disregard Darmesteter's theories concerning the late origin of the Avesta, in which he finds elements borrowed not only from the Bible but also from Philo, the view of Eduard Meyer is shared by the leading authorities on the history of Judaism and Zoroastrianism. I will only mention Söderblom, whose book, *La Vie Future d'après le Mazdéisme* (Paris, 1901), is the most thorough and extensive study on the relation of Judaism to Zoroastrianism, and Schürer, whose *History* is the standard book on the inner life of the Jew at the time of the rise of Christianity. Both of them agree that the influence of Zoroastrianism on Judaism is of a very unessential nature. It is

<sup>1</sup> Die Entstehung des Judentums, p. 239.



therefore very regrettable that Dr. Carter did not follow the safe guidance of these scholars; for, carried away by untenable hypotheses, he gives to the public a very wrong impression of the development of later Judaism.

It would lead me too far to enter into a detailed discussion of this book, and there is no need of this, as there is hardly any material brought forward by the author which has not been thoroughly examined before by others. I shall, however, call attention to the following few facts. The author (p. 24) accepts as historical the tradition found in *Arda Virāf*, 1 2, according to which Zarathustra lived about three hundred years before the invasion of Alexander the Great — not before the time of Alexander, as the author has it. He maintains that this view is also in harmony with the most recent scholarship. But the testimony of Assyrian inscriptions finally disposes of this tradition. An inscription of the year 713 B.C. mentions the name "Miazdaka," and, as pointed out by Eduard Meyer, this shows that the Zoroastrian religion must even then have been predominant in Media. The author (p. 26) takes also as historical the legend about Zarathustra at the court of Vishtaspa. But the King Vishtaspa has no place in historical chronology. The legend undoubtedly thought of Hystaspes, the father of Darius I, and in true legendary style Hutaosa is given as the name of Vishtaspa's wife — a reminiscence of Atossa, the wife of Cambyzes. The author shows a good deal of naïveté in his remark (p. 39) that post-exilic Judaism could not have been influenced by the Babylonians, because "the Babylonians were too gross in their idolatry to develop Jewish religious conceptions." One does not need to be an adherent of Pan-Babylonianism to see the absurdity of such a statement. That one who is not cognizant of the great influence which Babylonian religion has exercised upon Judaism does not take into account the contact between Aryan and Semito-Hittite religion, is of course not surprising. For our author, the seven archangels forming the heavenly hierarchy, according to later Jewish writings, are directly borrowed from Zoroastrianism (p. 65). But the truth is that the number seven has no special meaning with the Aryans, while it plays a very important part in the religious conception of the Babylonians. There can therefore be no reasonable doubt that the *seven* Amesha Spenta of Zoroastrianism, as well as the seven archangels of later Judaism, have their archetype either in the seven planets of the Babylonian cosmology or in the "ilāni-sibit of the Babylonians." This is no longer a hypothesis but an assured fact, as can be seen from the list of Assyrian gods published by Scheil (*R. T. r xiv*, 100), in which we

find Assara Mazdas (=Ahurah Mazdah) immediately followed by the seven spirits of heaven, the Igigi, and the seven spirits of earth, the Anunaki. That Asmodeus is not, as the author maintains (p. 65), of Persian origin, but is good Aramaic, I think to have conclusively shown in the Jewish Encyclopedia, s.u. *Asmodeus*. In this connection I may be permitted to call attention to my essay, *Mabbul Shel Esh*, published in the Hebrew periodical *Hag-Goren* (Bordetschan, 1912). In this essay I have shown that the conception of the conflagration of the world, which plays such an important part in the eschatology of Zoroastrianism and which is also known to the Jews and Greeks, is of Babylonian origin.

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CHRISTIAN BELIEF IN GOD. A German Criticism of German Materialistic Philosophy. GEORG WOBBERMIN. Translated by DANIEL S. ROBINSON (Third German edition). Yale University Press. 1918. Pp. xx, 175. \$1.25.

This work has been well known and highly appreciated for several years by those who have read it in German. It is now made available to English readers in an excellent translation, and such readers will be well rewarded by its perusal. It is a brief book, in which the author sketches in large outline, and stresses the significant features of the Christian faith in its relation to the main currents of modern thought. He deals in the first chapter with the chief tendencies of present-day philosophy; in the second with epistemology; in the third with cosmology; in the fourth with biology; and in the final chapter with psychology. He shows the bearing of all these philosophical disciplines and their main conclusions on the Christian faith, and the place this faith holds in its own right as a living experience and as throwing light on the problems of philosophy. While the author recognizes the destructive criticism of Kant and the inadequacy of the old scholastic arguments for the existence of God, he holds, nevertheless, that there is need to show the implications of the modern world view, which requires the Christian faith for its best interpretation and justification.

The book is generous in its appreciations, particularly of the religious motive in Nietzsche; keen in its criticism, as in case of Haeckel; spiritual in its conception of the providence of God, as in his abandonment of the miraculous, and vitally religious.

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ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

**THE PROBABLE INFINITY OF NATURE AND LIFE.** WILLIAM EMERSON RITTER, PH.D. The Gorham Press. 1918. Pp. 164. \$1.25.

I shall mention at the start two defects of this book, in order to have done with them early; for though prominent, they are not vital. The first is careless proof reading. Commas are occasionally out of place, and many words, including several proper names, are misspelled, the most unfortunate instance appearing in the dedication, where *Le Couste* is written for *Le Conte*. The second defect is a lack of sure-footedness in the field of physics, which the author, who is Director of the Scripps Institution for Biological Research, of the University of California, enters needlessly and where he often comes to grief. He spends about six pages in stating and refuting certain propositions of M. Gustave Le Bon, whom, I am confident, physicists would not generally accept as an expounder of their beliefs. He rejects the hypothesis of "the ether of space" on the curiously mistaken ground that physicists regard this ether as incapable of motion. He speaks rather scornfully of the "ultimate Atoms or Electrons of present-day physico-chemical metaphysics," partly because he objects to anything ultimate and partly because he opposes the idea of any possible divorce between electricity and matter. In neither of these criticisms of the electron belief is he, in my opinion, justified. The generation of physicists and chemists that has shattered, or at least splintered, the old-fashioned atom is not likely to make the mistake of supposing that the electron is essentially indivisible, however incapable we may be, at present, of dividing it experimentally. Moreover, the builders of the electron theory, instead of seeking to separate electricity and matter, are trying to explain matter by means of electricity; and surely one might expect that Professor Ritter, who will hear nothing of ultimates, would welcome this endeavor to explain ideas or phenomena heretofore regarded as final by others still more fundamental. That he does not do so is a curious fact which will be commented on later.

The following passage is significant: "Slight as was my training in these provinces [magnetism and electricity], and faded as are most of the facts and mathematical equations presented to me in my college days, very distinct pictures are still before my mind of sticks of sealing wax, chunks of amber, the skins of various small animals tanned with the hair on, pieces of flannel cloth, scraps of pith, bars of iron of various shapes and sizes, and so on, whenever the subject of magnetism was up for treatment." Now a man who thinks that "chunks of amber" and "scraps of pith" are the proper materials for illustrating magnetism may have perfectly sound ideas regard-

ing other matters of human knowledge, but he cannot parade such ignorance, while criticizing the beliefs of physicists, without discrediting to some extent his authority on matters with which he is more familiar.

But this, after all, is no great harm, for few of us expect authoritative answers to questions touching infinity; stimulating suggestion is all that we can reasonably look for, and this the book before us is capable of furnishing. It is well for us to have these questions represented occasionally, if only to be reminded that there is still mystery, even in the physical world, and probably always will be.

The author's main thesis, or a very important part of it, is presented in the passage which follows: "The conclusion pointed to is that the Cosmos or Universe or total order of things is genuinely infinite. By genuinely I mean infinite, not in the sense of subjectivist metaphysics or theology, but of physical science and mathematics. A short description or characterization of the Cosmos from this standpoint would be that it consists of an infinite number of bodies, each belonging to an infinite series, and that of all these bodies every one has some attributes in common with all the others but not one is exactly like any other." He seems to think, and perhaps he is right, that most people believe the material world to have existed in some form eternally. But he takes it for a fact that many who admit the past eternity of matter balk at accepting a past eternity of life, and he asks us to "reflect upon the relative difficulties in the conceptions that the oxide of iron, for instance, has existed forever, while organic beings must have begun, actually *de novo*, sometime, somewhere." He reminds us that "the great controversy of the Pasteur-Pouchet period, culminating in Tyndall's memoir of 1875, ended in the complete overthrow of the theory of spontaneous generation as then held," and he has no expectation whatever that Professor Jacques Loeb, for example, will ever succeed in producing life from materials which are not themselves the product and the seat of life.

Is Professor Ritter, then, a "Vitalist" in biology, as Professor Loeb is a "Mechanist." He refuses to go into either of these categories, neither of which, in his opinion, is satisfactorily defined. Undoubtedly he is a materialist, for he recognizes no properties or functions apart from matter. He rejects Louis Agassiz's "fallacy" of "attributing to Deity the power of *thinking sensible objects* into existence." He seeks to refute "Bergson's argument that the creativeness which is distinctive of the evolutionary process is wholly unique and requires the invocation of an impulsion from a source wholly beyond the realm of material things."

If we seek for one word additional to "materialist" for the characterization of Professor Ritter as a philosopher, we must call him an extreme pluralist. He rejoices in multitude, multitude of objects, multitude of substances, multitude of causes. The first quotation I have made from him must be taken literally as expressing his belief that no two of all the objects in the universe are exactly alike in their essential qualities. He holds that every individual animal or plant produces chemical substances the exact like of which were never produced and never will be produced by any other animal or plant. He does not make or welcome attempts to find fundamentals, few things explaining many. Hence, in part, his aversion to the conception of electrons. Herein, it seems to me, lies Professor Ritter's originality, and his contribution, such as it is, to philosophy. According to him, organisms, living bodies, tap sources of chemical energy which the processes of the laboratory cannot discover, and they do this by disintegrating the atoms of so-called elements, each act, each thought, each emotion, making use of some chemical reaction peculiar to itself; and, as no two individuals are precisely alike in their acts, thoughts, and emotions, no two individuals are the seats of precisely the same kinds of chemical reaction. Naturally, a chemical philosophy which begins by declaring itself outside the reach of present chemical tests can be neither confirmed nor refuted, though it may be rejected, by the chemists.

True to his love for multiplicity, the author closes his book with a chapter on Multiple Causes in Organic Evolution, from which the following characteristic passage is taken: "It is curious, once one comes to think of it, that Darwin and the rest of us should have talked so long and so absorbedly about one or a few 'factors' of evolution, when the demands of rigorous science are that there shall be at least as many causes as there are species. Were this not so, the same cause would produce different effects, and that would make biology a hocus-pocus indeed. Supernatural causes would be quite as amenable to science as such natural ones." And so he calls himself neither a Darwinian nor a Lamarckian, though he accepts natural selection as a real factor in evolution and, on the other hand, recognizes "a group of external causes producing 'body' changes, and a group of internal causes, no matter what their nature, producing after a while corresponding 'germinal' changes."

Professor Ritter says nothing, I believe, as to the bearing of his conception of the infinity of life in general on the question of the permanence of individual life, and as a thorough-going materialist he may not think this question worth considering. Yet one can

hardly avoid the following reflection: If the life of every individual should completely end, evidently an event much more readily imagined than the annihilation of all matter, all life would be extinct, and it could never come again. Thus we have the curious conception of life extending through a past eternity but coming to an end in the present or the finite future. I wonder whether Professor Ritter's philosophy would be satisfied with a terminated infinity. If not, is he, as an undoubting materialist, ready to accept that other weird conception, of a material essence of life, a ponderable soul, escaping from the body at death?

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ALCOHOL; ITS ACTION ON THE HUMAN ORGANISM. Report of the Central Board of the Liquor Traffic of England. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. xii, 183. 60 cents.

The adoption of constitutional prohibition by the United States will probably result in a more careful examination than ever before into the scientific foundations of our knowledge concerning the effects of alcoholic beverages taken in so-called small amounts. In comparatively recent years a number of surveys of the alcohol literature have been made. Frequently the authors of such summaries have revealed a partisan attitude in their choice of sources and in discussing "established results," so that perhaps no other scientific subject has suffered more from over-statement. Consequently it is important to understand something of the circumstances which prompted the preparation and publication of this book, and to note the personnel of the authors whose breadth of view is reflected in it.

By a prefatory announcement we are informed that in November, 1916, the British Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) appointed an Advisory Committee with instructions "to consider the conditions affecting the physiological action of alcohol, and more particularly the effects on health and industrial efficiency produced by the consumption of beverages of various alcoholic strengths, with special reference to the recent Orders of the Central Control Board, and further to plan out and direct such investigations as may appear desirable with a view to obtaining more exact data on this and cognate questions." The committee appointed comprised the following personnel: Lord D'Abernon (Chairman), Chairman of the Central Control Board; Sir George Newman, Principal Medical Officer of the Board of Education; A. R. Cushny, Pharmacologist; H. H.

Dale, Biochemist; M. Greenwood, Medical Statistician; W. McDougall, Psychologist; F. W. Mott, Pathologist; C. S. Sherrington, Physiologist; and W. C. Sullivan, Psychiatrist. A volume which these well-known scientific men have jointly produced merits very careful and wide attention. This is particularly true in the present instance because the members of the Committee are specialists in just those fields which would naturally fit them to judge and write intelligently about the action of alcohol on the human organism. The report is signed by all and the statement is made that "the conclusions represent the unanimous judgment of the committee."

The Central Control Board appointed the Advisory Committee because they considered the present "knowledge on the subject of the action of alcohol is inadequate to the needs and importance of the question;" so the Committee made it their first task to compile a summary statement of this present knowledge regarding alcohol. The above-titled book is their report on this subject. It is dated December, 1917; it was first issued as a British government publication, and is a commendable attempt to answer from experimental sources the question, "What is known concerning the action of alcohol on the human body?" No new results are contributed. The authors have made it their sole object to summarize and evaluate the facts which others have already gained by controlled observation and experimentation in this field. By this preliminary clarifying of the question it is their aim to prepare the way for further research.

The introductory chapter defines the principal scientific terms (many of them physiological) needful in discussing the subject, together with several familiar words, such as "food," "drug," "poison," and "alcohol." It discusses the constituents of alcoholic beverages, classifies the ordinary food substances, and briefly explains how the human body obtains energy from ingested food for tissue repair and for storage.

The known facts regarding alcohol effects are arranged under the following chapter topics: Alcohol as a food; Mental effects of alcohol; Alcohol and the performance of muscular acts; Action of alcohol on the digestion; Action of alcohol on the respiration and on the circulation of the blood; Influence of alcohol on the body temperature; Poison action of alcohol; Alcohol and longevity. A chapter on conclusions is followed by five pages of appendix, providing much very useful data on the consumption of alcoholic beverages, general mortality from alcoholism and also among males of the chief occupational groups, percentage of absolute alcohol in various beverages, and in ordinary retail quantities. Most of the appended data are statistics

from England and Wales. The usefulness of the book is greatly augmented by an adequate index.

Our purpose in this review is not to provide a digest of facts presented, but to introduce a book that is certain to make for clear thinking on a difficult topic. The book itself is a rather brief summary of complicated results. However, technical terms have been most successfully converted into popular language, the paragraphs are short, each chapter has many sub-heads, and no one will find the presentation difficult. Throughout the pages there is a fair number of references to original experimental reports from which the facts are drawn. Of the two thousand or perhaps more titles which might be cited in this literature, the authors have chosen about fifty, mostly from among the more recent contributions. It seems an oversight that mention is not made of the larger bibliographies on the question, even though these do not include the most recent references. Aside from its clearness and directness of statement the book is to be recommended for its impartiality in presenting the facts. Moreover, "the writers have frankly admitted doubt, when the evidence appeared insufficient to establish a definite conclusion, and have further indicated with absolute sincerity the many points, some of them of great importance, regarding which no precise and scientific knowledge is available."

The preface contributed by Lord D'Abernon is of particular interest to the scientific student of this problem. Here it is mentioned as a remarkable thing that, considering the world use of alcohol and its conceded importance to social, industrial, and economic life, humanity should lack exact knowledge of its action on the human system, for the writers contend that "no authoritative scientific work gives or seeks to give the required information." Lord D'Abernon kindly shows a little consideration for the investigators who have labored in this field by discussing some of the peculiar difficulties encountered in the laboratory when using alcohol with human subjects and when attempting to interpret the experimental results. He outlines a number of topics which the Committee regard as of fundamental importance for future investigation, and states that research, under their supervision, has already begun on several of these.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Since this abstract was written, two valuable reports issued under the supervision of this committee have reached me, viz.: *Alcohol; its Absorption into and Disappearance from the Blood under Different Conditions*; and *The Influence of Alcohol on Manual Work and Neuro-muscular Coördination*. Special Report Series, Nos. 31 and 34, respectively, of the British Medical Research Committee.



Needless to say, the further activity of this Committee will be awaited with great interest, not only by the public but also by the other committees, commissions, and laboratories which have in progress organized work in this field. The problem is easily large enough to occupy profitably the attention of several such groups.

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## THE DOUBLE LOYALTY OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY<sup>1</sup>

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The major task of all our theological seminaries is to prepare men for the Christian ministry. It is true that some men who go out from our seminaries will be diverted into other lines of religious service. A few become teachers; others are drawn into the cogs of ecclesiastical machinery in administrative functions for which they are peculiarly fitted. Here and there a man goes through some hard, unhappy experience in a parish and leaves the ministry altogether to become a radical free lance. But these men are in the minority.

The majority of the men who graduate from the seminary become the teachers and pastors of our churches. And whatever the inevitable disciplines and disappointments of their work, they will remain parish ministers to the end. This means that they will do their active work in the world and will make their contribution to the religious life of their time primarily through their identification with three or four successive groups of men, women, and little children to whom they minister.

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered at the opening session of the Harvard Divinity School and Andover Theological Seminary for the academic year 1919-20.

It should be perfectly apparent to every man who enters this office that he has a double loyalty. He has a loyalty, in the first place, to Christian truth, made known and to be made known to him in his own religious experience. And then he has a second loyalty to his fellow human beings with whom he lives and works. This double loyalty is by no means confined to the ministry. It is a part of every earnest life. It is the double loyalty of the doctor to the wide knowledge and high ethic of his profession and to the immediate human need of his patient. It is the double loyalty of the lawyer to the ideals of the law and to the concrete claims of his client. It is the double loyalty of the teacher to the absolute truth and to the immediate intellectual attainment of his pupil.

Now there is not and there never can be in daily life any perfect reconciliation of these rival loyalties. Students of the old Greek tragedies have often pointed out that the tragic element in those sombre dramas does not lie in a collision of good and evil. The moral problem would then be a simple one, without perplexity and poignancy. The essence of tragedy lies in a collision of loyalties, each of which is good in itself but which cannot be reconciled to the other in a given dilemma. In every tragedy, when choice and action become inevitable, there is always the sacrifice of a minor good for the sake of a major good, which involves the actor in a moral loss. The mother cannot square her loyalty to her husband with her loyalty to her children. The king cannot square his loyalty to the state with his duty to his family. In these homely but imperious dilemmas is found the essence of all tragic action.

There is no escape for any one of us from these tragic collisions in human life. Each one of us has to endure the moral friction which arises when his loyalty to truth, to duty, to the absolute good, cuts across his devotion to

family, friends, country, church. And it is the memory of values which have had to be relinquished, sometimes absolute, sometimes concrete, which makes up the deeper unhappiness and moral pathos of much of our human life.

There is no man in the world who has to feel this clash of loyalties more keenly than the Christian minister. He never perfectly squares his duty as a preacher with his duty as a pastor. He is, on the one hand, the spokesman for what is confessedly the most absolute idealism in the world — the uncompromising religion of Jesus Christ. He realizes as he reads the history of the church that most of the moral and strategic failures of Christianity have been due to the persistent ecclesiastical habit of underwriting the Christian counsels of perfection with permissory commandments, in which the moral austerity and therefore the creative energy of the gospel have been frankly “minimized” to meet the world as it happens to be. And the man of moral fervor and religious aspiration who knows his two thousand years of Christian history well, turns from its pages to his day’s work with the resolute determination not to sell out his distinctive spiritual heritage for a mess of pottage by way of a passing popularity. This is what George Tyrrell meant when he stood at the parting of the ways in his Modernist pilgrimage and said, “I am driven by a fatality to follow the dominant interest of my life, though it should break half the heart of the world.” There is no one of us in whom a pitiless and resolute utterance of this sort does not awaken an instant moral echo.

And yet this is not the only loyalty of the Christian minister. The man who ministers to his fellow men in religion becomes increasingly conscious of a paradoxical and rival duty to our very unideal human nature. He does not preach to a world where his absolute idealism is accepted or even generally understood. He feels at times

the mood of the ancient prophet who cried, "Ah, Lord God, they say of me, Doth he not speak parables!" And, always struggling against this stern devotion to truth, there is something within him bidding him to hear and heed "the still sad music of humanity."

It was Tyrrell himself who felt most poignantly the moral tragedy of his choice, and the consequent annihilation of many intimate and homely values which his course demanded of him. In the whole history of contemporary religious experience there is no passage so filled with the unutterable pathos of spiritual tragedy as are the sentences in which Tyrrell chronicles his own misgivings as to the final validity of his choice in turning his back upon his mother and sister, who sorely needed him, for the sake of the sombre austerities of the Society of Jesus:

"Well I remember my last day at home, my last day with those two now hid in death's dateless night, who were my share of the world, the best this life has had for me; whom I forsook — for what? in the name of all that is sane and reasonable! For a craze, an idea, a fanaticism? Or for love of and zeal for the truth, the Kingdom of God, the good of mankind? Had I been faithful to duty all along, had I worked hard at school and after, had I stayed at home and supported my mother and sister; and made their sad narrow lives a little brighter and wider, would not God have given me light, had it been needful for my salvation? And would not my chances of salvation have been better than they now are? Have I done so much good to others who had no claim on me, as to atone for my neglect of those who had every claim? What have I given up or forsaken for the service of God, as I suppose some would call it, except my plain duty. These are the pleasant doubts that fill my mind at spare moments and make me say, 'Surely, I have lived in vain!'"

This friction arising from the double loyalty of the Christian ministry creates for us all a moral problem to which we must give renewed thought. It gradually dawns upon a man as he lives and works that there is no cheap and easy solution of his dilemma. He comes at

last to realize that he too must be again and again the central figure in the ever-renewed moral tragedies of human life; that much of the comfort of his life will have to come from "the things that he aspired to be and was not," either as a preacher or a pastor. But it is not too much to hope that he may establish in the main some working relationship between these two loyalties, which will enable him to go on with his ministry in some measure of spiritual peace.

Our life in the academic world is devoted almost entirely to the quickening of our loyalty to religious truth. Perhaps it would be better to say to the intellectual and moral habit of truthfulness. For liberal Protestantism is not a body of clearly defined religious belief and practice; it is distinctively a religious method, a way of thinking and meeting the world. This cardinal virtue of sincerity has with us supplanted the older ideal of an immutable orthodoxy. And our theological disciplines, in so far as they bear ultimately on character and through character on the world, look primarily to the perfecting of this inner integrity, which we have come to know as sincerity. It does not matter very much what the stone may be on which a man grinds his soul to this cutting edge of a clean sincerity. One course in the curriculum may serve as well as another. None of our several departments has any prerogative in this matter. For the object of all our disciplines together is so to sharpen the mind and the conscience to the biting edge of keen sincerity that the conventions and orthodoxies and idols of the marketplace shall not blunt that edge when it is laid against them. The earnest mind of our own time will stand almost anything from a minister today if it can only believe that his soul has been tempered and ground to this rare, fine edge of a clean sincerity. The world will endure from him heresies and treasons which it would not tolerate for a moment from patently insincere men, be-

cause it knows instinctively that in such spirits has always lain and still lies the hope of its own salvation.

It is to be written down to the credit of most of our theological seminaries that they are now graduating into our ministry a body of comparatively sincere men. The Christian church may be unable to boast in our own time of some of the outstanding intellects and men of administrative genius who adorned and guided her in other days. But in some very real measure Robert Browning's prayer in *Paracelsus*, "Make no more giants, God, but elevate the race!" has been answered in the modern ministry. The level of sincerity has been tremendously raised in the last half-century. This is the net result of the whole modern critical method of theological instruction. And no honest man will minimize the clear gain to the Christian church in a ministry which, whatever its other patent shortcomings, is newly possessed by a spiritual integrity.

For all the too familiar strictures of the secular world upon the church, it remains true today that there is no great modern institution where men are as free to say what they really think as the pulpits of our liberal churches. There is still, alas, intellectual mediocrity and timidity and moral compromise left in the pulpit. But on the whole there is as little of it there as in any other great institution or profession. Unless a man is to dissociate himself altogether from the organized life of his time and live as an isolated mugwump, he may enter the ministry with the assurance that he will there enjoy an intellectual and moral liberty as great if not greater than that to be found in the law, in medicine, in teaching, in politics, or business.

Now no man would breathe a word of criticism or rebuke upon the on-going development of this newly felt devotion to sincerity. What Carlyle calls "the fixed indubitable certainty of experience" is in religion today



our primary moral obligation. But the man who goes into the Christian ministry needs also to be reminded, particularly at the outset of his work, that he of all men in the modern world has also a moral duty to humanity, to those — in the great phrase of the prayer from the Fourth Gospel — “whom God has given him out of the world.”

Most of the failures of the average minister in the early years of his pastorate, and some of the final tragedies of men who leave the ministry altogether, broken and discouraged, rise from the fact that sincere men become so absorbed in the statement of their major loyalty that they lose sight of human life to which they minister. They go out fired with a splendid passion to speak the truth, come weal, come woe, and they forget, what all Christian ministers ought to remember, that truth is always most potent in history when it is spoken in love.

There are, at the present moment, two contributory causes to this almost universal failure of the ministry to mediate its truth by means of a great charity for mankind. The first of these causes which lead to a neglect of our devotion to humanity, is the persistence in the pastorate of the scientific point of view, which dominates our religious disciplines today. In his recent volume of Gifford Lectures Professor Sorley says:

“Our intellectual interests fall into two distinct classes, according as they are centered in the universal or in the individual. In the whole region of what is called the sciences the interest in the universal is supreme. What we are in search of is general principles or general laws. Things and processes are not regarded as individuals or as interesting for their individuality — for what distinguishes them from everything else — but for what they have in common with other things and processes. The uniformity of nature is the supreme principle, and individuals are but examples which prove the law or cases which illustrate its operation.”

The aim of the modern science of religion is to discover for us the universal and reliable laws of the spiritual life.

There is not and there should not be for any one of us any escape from the most rigorous scientific discipline in religious history, in the classical literature of religious experience, in the development of the Christian ethic, and in the increasingly important body of religious psychology. But the just and inevitable prominence of the scientific method in our theological preparation for the actual work of the pastorate does bring with it a very real liability on the human side. This is the liability to ignore and neglect the claim of the individual to be in himself a centre of spiritual value.

This liability is not confined to the ministry. It is shared equally by the members of every other profession which rests upon a scientific training and point of view. We have become all too familiar in the modern world with the specialist type of mind which is primarily interested in human life as an interesting congeries of types, classes, and movements. There is the modern medical specialist, whose professional interest in a patient is confined to the diagnosis of the "case," so much more scientific fodder for the machine which grinds out universal laws. Darwin's complaint that he had become such a machine and had lost the power to care for poetry, music, and the drama, is a confession of scientific liability which has an increasing validity with the spread of the scientific temper.

There is, therefore, a very grave danger in the ministry that the measure of mastery over the general laws of the spiritual life, which the seminary genders, may become a liability in the pastorate, for the very reason that it has unconsciously trained us to regard our fellow men as of primary value because they may be neatly classified, ticketed, and put away in the card catalogue of our general knowledge. The newly ordained minister tends to find his people mainly interesting and important as individuals because they are more laboratory material

on which he may perform his intellectual operation. They are his first "cases." In other words, a genuine scientific interest in the laws of the spiritual life, so far from fostering a devotion to humanity, may often dissipate what the scientist chooses to regard as the miasma of personal affection.

But this is merely to increase for the subjects of the theological investigation an ill which is already too acute. What troubles the average man today is just this fact that nobody seems willing to treat him personally as a centre of distinctive and inalienable values. "No man cared for my soul," is the perfectly valid cry of the average man as he faces governments, industries, institutions, in the modern world. And from the world's indifference to himself it is not a far leap to the suspicion that God does not care for him individually; that God, like the scientist, is interested in types and species but careless of the individual. The greatest stumbling-block to the acceptance of the Christian religion on the part of the average thoughtful man today is his inability to comprehend and realize as a matter of personal experience Jesus' tremendous saying about the sparrow falling to the ground. This is a difficulty which is deeply felt and freely confessed by all men who have in any way been scientifically disciplined. "I see no reason," wrote Huxley, "to suppose, as Christianity asserts, that God stands to us in the relation of a Father, loves us and cares for us. . . . Science everywhere reveals the passionless impersonality of the unknown and the unknowable." And modern science has communicated something of this "passionless impersonality" to all the great modern professions. But for the Christian minister to face his fellow human beings as one more disciple of "passionless impersonality" is little short of a religious tragedy. He, of all men in the world today, ought to be the mediator and incarnation of the mind and heart of Jesus, to

whom every individual was a centre of unique and inalienable values.

And the other cause for the neglect in the modern ministry of a devotion to humanity is in some very real measure a reflection of the stress which is laid at the present moment upon the office of the prophet. The conception of the minister as a priest, that is, as a man who goes to God with the needs of the people on his soul, has almost disappeared from the ministry of our liberal churches. In so far as there is any model in Biblical tradition for our office, that model is generally said to be found in the Hebrew prophet. The recovery of Hebrew prophecy from the meshes of allegory and prediction is probably the most signal achievement of Biblical criticism. The moral energy released by the resurrection of these noble souls from their neglect and misunderstanding has led many a modern minister to covet for himself also the deep joy of coming to the world with the rubric "Thus saith the Lord." So to live and think that we may be the vehicle for religious certainty is one of the noblest ideals which we may covet for our office.

But as one reads the classical history and content of prophecy as it is found in the Old Testament, one is inclined to make certain reservations as to the entire suitability of this ideal for the modern ministry. What we sometimes miss in the prophets is just that gentle and patient charity by which St. Paul nurtured the early churches of his spiritual begetting. The Hebrew prophet was half political agitator, half itinerant evangelist. He was a religious teacher, but he was not a pastor. He came and said his prophetic word in all its majesty and simplicity, and then he went. His effectiveness was in part due to his detachment from his audience. He was a voice from another world. The tremendous effectiveness of this type of religious leader in history cannot be denied. But the conditions which made it effective in early times

are the very conditions which it is almost impossible to realize in a permanent pastorate.

The spectacle of Amos coming from Tekoa and prophesying in Bethel and returning again to the wilderness, is one of the most exhilarating in all religious history. But when we of the modern ministry try to play Amos to the modern world, we are crippled at the outset by the depressing conviction that we ourselves have been living in Bethel all the while, that we never have broken away to get the moral perspective of life as seen from Tekoa; indeed, by the suspicion that there may not be any wilderness of Tekoa left in the world. Tolstoi spent his life trying to get to Tekoa and never got there. He died, as he had lived, a citizen of our modern world-Bethel. In other words, the social conscience has widened since the days of Amos to include the prophet himself. There seems to be no point of absolute moral detachment and aloofness from the life of our age. And even if there were, men's tempers have changed, so that such a wilderness would seem to few men really a point of moral vantage. The problem which the modern preacher states is his own problem; the guilt which he ascribes to his age comes from his lips not as a scathing denunciation of others but as a halting confession of his own original sin as a member of modern society.

There is no more effective statement of this characteristic point of view to be found in contemporary literature than the preface to Shaw's play, "Major Barbara":

"When an enthusiastic young clergyman first realizes that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners receive the rent of sporting public-houses, brothels, and sweating dens, or that the most generous contributor to his last charity-sermon was an employer trading in female labor cheapened by prostitution, or that the only person who can afford to rebuild his church or give his boy's brigade a gymnasium is the son-in-law of a Chicago meat-king, that young clergyman has, like Barbara, a bad quarter of an hour. But he cannot help himself by refusing to accept money from anybody except sweet old ladies

of independent income and gentle and lovely ways of life. He has only to follow up the income of the sweet old ladies to its industrial source, and there he will find Mrs. Warren's profession and the poisonous canned meat and all the rest of it. His own stipend has the same root. He must either share the world's guilt or go to another planet."

It is just this widening of the circle to include the prophet himself which somehow makes the office of the modern preacher unlike that of the Hebrew prophet. The deeply religious man today will say with Browning's "Gram-marian," "Oh, if we draw a circle premature . . . sure, bad is our bargain." And it is the shrewd suspicion that when the would-be prophet tries to draw such a premature circle of denunciation from which he begs to be personally excused, he does so either in ignorance of all the facts which go to the making of his own circumstances or else in deliberate Pharisaism. The number of men who are in the moral position to play Amos to the modern social order is almost negligible.

Now all this means that in so far as the modern minister sets up for himself the prophetic ideal as the norm for his office, he sets himself in a certain moral opposition to his people which is patently wanting in charity and which is actually unwarranted by the facts of modern life. For these facts compel the minister to admit that he also is a citizen of Bethel, no matter what his professional preference for Tekoa as a moral headquarters.

These two persistent causes then contribute at the present moment to the minister's failure in devotion to the men and women who make up his immediate world — first, a scientific interest in the universal laws of the religious life to the neglect of individual values; and second, a conception of the ministry as a kind of modern Hebrew prophecy calling for a moral detachment from society which is almost impossible of present attainment.

When we turn to the minister's development of this second loyalty to human nature we realize that it is only life itself which will reveal to him its claim to his consent. Men do not come easily and quickly, even in the Christian ministry, to the conclusion that persons are what matter in our world. This conviction comes as a kind of conversion with the ongoing of life itself. But it is reasonably certain that many ministers might spare themselves much of the persistent loneliness and unhappiness of their lives as well as some of its ultimate tragedies, if they determined in advance that their sincerity should be mediated to the world by charity.

When we begin to speak in this way we are at once suspected of counseling compromise, of suggesting a certain paring down and diluting of truth and truthfulness so that they shall be less offensive to the god-of-things-as-they-are, who is secretly worshiped by so many timid, lazy, and selfish persons. The word "compromise" is the ugliest word in the dictionary. And it is true that when a preacher begins to measure his words so that they shall match the immediate moral attainment of his hearers, his ethical fervor and his religious insight are imperiled. But, on the other hand, there is an hour in the history of sincerity when it may soon and easily sour into fanaticism or bigotry, and once a man's heart and mind are thus soured, he has lost the power, if not also the moral right, to speak to the vast majority of his fellow men about the things that belong to their peace.

Compromise is a kind of inglorious muddy mean between truthfulness and time-service. It is to be eschewed at all costs. What we all are seeking is an attitude which somehow grasps the two loyalties in a comprehensive vision, even though it may not reconcile them. Höffding is right when he says that the world comes to us with its hard and fast alternatives — "Either-Or" — and that in those moments it is the business of religion to help us

say "Both-And." The man who knows only one major loyalty of the ministry to a pitiless sincerity and whose ruling principle in every dilemma is "All or Nothing," may find himself led with Ibsen's Brand into futility as well as heartlessness. Or if there be in his attitude toward the fallen and despicable world a touch of relenting, that relenting may take the form of moral pity. Now pity is the virtue of an aristocrat. There is just that touch of condescension about it which goes so ill in a democratic age, and which makes it so unwelcome to those who are to be its beneficiaries. It will not do to pity the modern world of men any more than to ignore them.

What the average man needs when he starts in his ministry is to have his heart thawed out toward all sorts and conditions of men. "As a young man," wrote Mr. H. G. Wells the other day, "I affected the pose of the cynic; but I must now confess that at the age of sixty, and greatly helped by the War, I have fallen in love with humanity." That is precisely the experience which every minister must have, and the sooner after leaving the seminary the better. He is sound as to his major loyalty to truth. His knowledge of the content of religion is sufficient to cover the emergencies which he will meet as a "general practitioner." What is too often wanting is a perception of the homely human reality which is his parish, the intimate joys and sorrows of our common human life, its concrete perplexities and its inarticulate aspirations.

This is what F. H. Bradley means when he says in one of his later volumes, "It is not merely one of the doctrines of religion but the central doctrine, the motive of all religious exercise, that God cares for each one of us individually, that he knows Jane Smith by name, and what she is earning a week, and how much of it she devotes to keeping her poor old paralyzed mother." If this be the central doctrine of all religion, and it certainly is very



near the heart of Christianity, it is surely incumbent upon the Christian minister also to know Jane Smith by name and to enter in some measure into her life and struggle.

The problem of developing something more than a professional acquaintance with Jane Smith is a very real one. It is easy enough to recognize her name each time it turns up in the card-catalogue of the parish. For five dollars any one of the memory-system mongers who advertise in the magazines will teach us a system of mnemonics by which her name may be linked with her face. But this is only a poor beginning at the matter. Jane Smith will be pleased to be called by name at the second meeting. But the real problem is far deeper than that; it is to see life and to experience religion from Jane Smith's premises. Thus and thus only can her minister become to her a real teacher and pastor. And the man whose system of mnemonics sometimes plays him false will be forgiven by Jane Smith if only he speaks to her with insight and sympathy.

The Christian minister should learn to enter into the lives of those to whom he ministers by taking the simpler and deeper experiences of his own life quite seriously, as not exceptions to the common lot but rather as a clue to what happens to men and women everywhere, always, to all. The superficial conditions of human life are constantly in flux. Our sociological milieu is always changing. But underneath the shifting, superficial aspects of life there lies a deeper and unchanging drama of birth and death and love and work and play. The passing of the centuries changes this deeper lot of man little or not at all. And it is at this deeper level that the Christian minister really touches human life. Ancient custom and men's desire associate him with these more permanent and vital aspects of their experience. No ministry escapes for any length of time from some intimate share in these profound and homely dramas of our

common humanity. Now no minister who once senses this intimate and imperious element in human life, which remains almost static in spite of the vicissitudes of history, will ignore the teaching of these very elements in his own experience. He will not look upon his own profession as an exemption from the common lot of man. Rather, his own difficulties in relating his absolute idealism to the problems of his own family life, the regulation of his money affairs, his duties as a citizen in the State, his pleasures and recreations, all the gladness, perplexity, and sorrow of his own daily life, he will freely use as the direct teaching of his own personal experience to make him patient and gentle, as he brings his major loyalty to bear upon the men and women who make up his charge. Mark Rutherford says somewhere that he has often observed that the greatest help we get in time of trouble is given to us by some friend who comes to us and says quite simply, "I have experienced all that." Happy is the Christian minister whose unprofessional life is deep enough and broad enough, so that he can go to the world of men in their homely joys and sorrows and say, "I have experienced all that!" Such a word from such a man is worth all the formal creeds and codes of Christendom. If the minister is to be loyal to his people, to look upon them and to work with them in charity, he will first of all try to live simply and deeply himself, and then will fearlessly use his own more intimate experience as the open sesame into what otherwise will be to him "the secrets of many hearts."

Then while not relinquishing his prophetic passion to be, in his best moments, the voice of God, he will strive to become at the same time the voice of his people's better self. A man in the pews has said of one of our contemporaries, "He has the gift of putting into words for us what we have always wanted to say but never were able to say. And that is a very great gift." Perhaps we do

not wish to revive definitely the priestly function in our free churches; the priestly office lends itself so easily to ecclesiastical abuse. But there was something in the old idea that in the priest the people had an articulate voice for their better selves. So far as our free churches are concerned, it may be better to say that the modern minister stands to his parish in the relation of the research worker, the experimental investigator in religion. He is to work out for men and women who have neither the time nor the training to do so for themselves, a credible Christian creed and a practicable Christian ethic. But always in his wrestling with the religious doubts of his day he must include himself among the doubters; in his attack upon the broad social evils of his time he counts himself among the guilty; and into his bolder spiritual aspirations he welcomes his people not as spectators but as participants. The preacher today who takes his stand outside his congregation and preaches at them, no matter with what moral fervor and religious enthusiasm, will never really move the mind and will of his time. Shaw's bishop who says, "I am not a teacher; only a fellow-traveller of whom you asked the way. I pointed ahead — ahead of myself as well as of you," is really the most effective type of modern minister. The secret of a really useful ministry under present conditions is to be found in the tacit, perpetual suggestion both of a man's preaching and of his pastoral work, that he is himself one of the audience to which he speaks. Neglect of this subtle but absolutely fundamental distinction between the ancient Hebrew prophet and the modern Christian minister, will insulate all a man's good will toward his fellows and render it ineffectual.

Again, the preacher who wishes to understand more accurately the varied lots of all sorts and conditions of men will occasionally set out on what we may call the sociological adventure. In its characteristic contempo-

rary form this deliberate transfer of your life from one environment to another for the sake of social insight is a rather recent feature of our world. It is true that long ago John Woolman got off his horse and walked the roads of Jersey, that he might thus better understand the lot of the common laborer; that he traveled to England in the steerage rather than in the cabin, that he might share the squalor and discomfort of his less fortunate fellow passengers. But John Woolman was before his time in this as in many other matters. In recent years, however, this method of bridging the social gulfs has become one of the recognized means of establishing communication and understanding between those whose lots are superficially very far apart. Tolstoi among the laborers in the corn field, Jane Addams at Hull House, Thomas Mott Osborne in the solitary cell at Auburn prison, Charles Fleischer in the shipyard, Donald Hankey as a private in the ranks when he might have had a commission for the asking, all of them have been primarily interested to understand better the life, the interests, and the motives of great social groups other than their own — peasants, prisoners, slum dwellers, artisans, Tommies.

Now and again, particularly in the care-free years, it is a good thing for the Christian minister to go on one of these modern quests after the secret life of his fellow men. To be one with them even for a little while, to share their tasks and to eat their bread in the sweat of the common brow, is an illuminating experience. No minister who ever spent a casual week or a vacation month upon one or another of these adventures, inadequate as his experiment may be for any final pronouncement upon the problems he has met, counts such days as lost. They remain for him in all later life as shafts of light, penetrating what must otherwise be gross social ignorance. To do this thing occasionally immensely quickens one's charity for humanity. But life is too short and the

duties of the pastorate too many and exacting for us to hope to make the round of the world in this desultory way. And in the last analysis the minister is thrown back upon his own imagination to picture to himself the varied life and lot of man. If he is the man he should be, he can realize Jane Smith even more effectively in his own study than by merely working in her factory or taking lodgings in the squalid tenement over her flat.

The secret of a growing charity for mankind rests upon the development of the imagination. There is an old and familiar distinction between fancy and imagination, upon which the English poets of a hundred years ago harped with wearisome reiteration. Wordsworth and Coleridge wore the subject threadbare. But still vast numbers of supposedly educated men fail to make the vital distinction. Fancy is the flight of the mind released from all bondage to fact. It is our inner power to build air-castles in Spain and to picture "the light that never was, on sea or land." But the field in which imagination works is the field of hard fact, and the function of the imagination is to change a barren and bony fact into a warm and living human reality. It is the redemption and resurrection of all our statistics and surveys from the grave of indifference. It is the cry from the heart of us as we look out upon the laboriously gathered and pedantically compiled information of our time, "Lord God, can these bones live?" Imagination is, in short, the mind's inner power to get out of its immediate environment and to put itself over there yonder in the alien fact, and then to clothe that fact and breathe the breath of life into it and to make it live by that miracle as a part of one's own experience.

Every really great man has this power or this gift as an integral part of his greatness. Certainly all creative work rests upon this premise. Balzac says of himself in his relation to his characters, that he wore their rags,

walked in their tattered shoes, felt the pangs of their hunger and their tears pouring down his face. So the great Christian grace of charity rests, in the last analysis, not upon a multiplication of our own meagre experience to the  $n$ th power nor upon desultory social pilgrimages, but upon our ability to imagine how life looks to the other man. One of the profoundest utterances that was ever made about what we call the modern social problem is a chance remark dropped by an English essayist, "The broken link between classes in the modern world is a fundamental defect of imagination." It is this inherent inability of our great social groups to see the other man's point of view, which makes all our boards of conciliation and arbitration such poor social solvents.

The exercise of the imagination is very near to a religious function. Indeed it is utterly impossible for a man to put into practice the Golden Rule, the simplest of all Christian principles, without this ability to put himself in the other man's place as well as insisting that the other man put himself in our place. If we are to be men of real imagination, we must be unselfish men, not at the check-book level of an occasional easy benevolence, but at the deeper level of an inner unselfishness. We must be willing to get entirely out of ourselves, to perform that rare and almost superhuman feat of ignoring for the moment the familiar premises of our habitual creed and code, and in this moment of intellectual and emotional selflessness we must put ourselves over yonder in the other man's shoes and get the angle and feel of life from where he stands.

It follows hard after this statement, that every failure of imagination is in some real measure the result either of intellectual laziness or intellectual selfishness. There are a great many otherwise impeccable sermons preached in our churches, which are hopelessly vitiated by their lack

of imagination, that is, by the intellectual selfishness and idleness of the preacher, who uses the prophetic hour as an opportunity to discuss problems which interest him but which simply do not exist for the vast majority of men. Many of us preachers fall unconsciously, but none the less truly, under the woe which Ezekiel pronounced, "Woe be to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! Should not the shepherds feed the flocks?"

There is nothing more striking in the Gospels than the strange and instant hold which Jesus had over all sorts and conditions of men. They seem to have felt that he understood them, that he knew in advance how life looked to them. Jesus' interlocutors never trouble to explain themselves to him. To do so would be an insult to his charity. They take his understanding of them for granted. And we must suppose that this direct understanding of humanity was in Jesus' case the result not so much of the extension of his own experience to cover the common lot, certainly not of any artificial and self-conscious "social settlement" sojourning with fishermen and publicans, but rather of an inner unselfishness, which fulfilled itself in an unfailing power of the imagination to enter into the other man's lot and need. It has been very plausibly suggested that Jesus' silence at his trial was the outcome of this quality of his mind; that he saw Pilate's position so clearly that there was nothing he could say in self-defense; that, Rome being what it was, he realized that Pilate had no option but to kill him. However this may be, we must feel that Jesus' power over our common humanity is a power which springs in part from his unswerving loyalty to an absolute idealism, but in equal part also from that other loyalty which is suggested by the characteristic and recurring word in the Gospels, "compassion." Compassion and sympathy — they are the same word, one the Latin, the other the Greek

derivative; they both mean experiencing life with the other person. There is no mention, there was no place in the life of Jesus, for the imperfect exercise of this loyalty in the patrician form of pity. Pity was an Old Testament prerogative of a divine Sovereign. Jesus did not pity humanity; he had compassion upon it, he sympathized with it. And one whole half of his power over mankind rests in the fact that we still say of him,

“O Saviour Christ, Thou too art man,  
Thou hast been troubled, tempted, tried.  
Thy kind but searching glance can scan  
The very wounds that shame would hide.”

Such was the imagination of Jesus fulfilling itself in his distinctive grace of charity.

To try to live, therefore, in our inner world an unselfish life, is the secret of a deepening charity for men. To be persistently struggling to complement and correct our academic and professional view of life by Jane Smith's outlook, to share her work in imagination and to bear with her the burden of that paralyzed mother, is to put ourselves in such a relation to Jane Smith that we can really begin to be ministers to her, effecting some kind of contact between our high and holy truth and her humble concrete need. Mr. Wells has told us lately that “All the world is now Job.” It is equally true that all the world is Jane Smith. The minister who does not somehow supplement his theological disciplines by a parallel discipline of the imagination through poetry, fiction, drama, music, may have all theological knowledge and all faith so that he can remove mountains of contemporary agnosticism, and all the prophecies and gifts of tongues in the catalogue, but he will never be happy in the Christian ministry. His office will be to him first a baffling perplexity, then a grave problem, and finally a bitter dis-



appointment. Happy is he if he enters his life's work and labors at it, realizing that half his task is to win this rarest and most potent Christian grace of charity, and that the real secret of each day's working reconciliation of his rival loyalties to God and man rests in his growing power to speak the truth in love!

## THE LORD'S PRAYER

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In both the Old Testament and the New there is a climactic point, a passage, I mean, which so epitomizes all the teaching of that section of our Bible that we should be eager to save it were all else to be destroyed. In the Old Testament it is the Ten Commandments, which form a foundation for civil society. Society would go to pieces were not the Ten Commandments understood and usually obeyed. In the New Testament it is the Lord's Prayer, which lays foundations for the harmonious inner life as the Ten Commandments do for the outer. Here speaks the aspiring spirit to its Maker. This is the love-song of the Christian world. Few precepts of our Master, I suppose, have been more widely observed than that we are to "pray in this manner." For most of us that day would lack something in which the Lord's Prayer had not been repeated. It fits all circumstances. It is the chant of the saint in his most exultant moments, his refuge and solace when most depressed. The poor sinner, who through walking in the ways of vice has almost lost the power of aspiration and can no longer formulate for himself his better desires, finds in these sacred phrases his appropriate utterance.

Everywhere, indeed, the Prayer is used. And I believe we should be in error if we thought to disparage it by saying that for the most part it is repeated without our being distinctly aware of its meaning. In this I find no blame. It is a diseased and morbid condition of mind that seeks to be persistently conscious. Our home affections would not be the sweeteners of life that they are if we were asking ourselves perpetually "How much do I

love these members of my household?" We preserve sanity best by taking our daily affections as matters of happy course. And just so it is in our ordinary repetitions of the Lord's Prayer. In the common use of it we rise into a sacred atmosphere, where some one holier than we seems to be speaking for us. In its general meaning we partake, but we need not be anxious to search that meaning out. Still, I hold that it is incumbent upon us from time to time to evaluate our treasure. Every noble thing will bear close inspection. The more minutely it is examined, the more do its riches appear. Wisely does the Psalmist say, "The works of the Lord are great, sought out by all them that have pleasure therein."

I propose then in this paper to hold up the Lord's Prayer to the light and let the sunshine shimmer through it. Let us discern what lies hidden here. Let us, with no irreverent hand, dissect, analyze, become distinctly conscious of the beauty and power of blessing which the Prayer contains. Often has something like this been attempted before. Recognized for nearly 2000 years as an almost magic source of spiritual supply, it has gathered about itself a body of commentary of every degree of worth — historical, textual, theological learning; sermonizing, acute or commonplace; and, best of all, the pathetic utterance by the lowly and unintelligent of thankfulness for benefits received. Though deriving much from the strong scholars and fervent devotees who have preceded me in telling what they have found in the Prayer (and I would call special attention to a wealthy paper by Professor von Dobschütz in this Review for July, 1914), I shall not directly follow in their train. My aim is somewhat peculiar. I approach the Prayer as a lover of psychology and poetry no less than of religion, and would fix attention on some of its less noticed perfections as a work of art. In my judgment it is a masterpiece of literature, whose quality our translators have

astonishingly preserved. Of course all good literature is something more than literature, which is merely a means for giving competent form to the dominant desires of man. The desires themselves are the stuff and substance. In making a literary survey of the Lord's Prayer we must accordingly ask how normal and formative are the desires here engaged, how exactly and simply are they reported, and how well do they come together to form a thing of beauty, good for contemplation, good for stimulus.

As we thus approach the Prayer certain general characteristics of it strike our attention; features of it, I mean, which concern its total structure and pervade it throughout.

In the first place, there is its social character. Its pronouns are *we*, *our*. They are not *I*, *my*. Usually religious emotion is individual — "The Lord is *my* Shepherd; *I* shall not want," "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Here it is collective — "*Our* Father." "Give us this day *our* daily bread." We are bidden to enter into our closet and to shut the door. Yes, but to take the interests of our fellow men in with us. No exclusive blessing is sanctioned. Our Lord seeks to bring all his children together as members of one family; and if we are not prepared for this relationship, if we do not value the common love but care only for that which is bestowed on ourselves and shuts others out, we had better cease the repetition of this Prayer.

Again, it is remarkable how in this Prayer the whole is in every part. Let one ask oneself what is its central petition? I have sometimes thought it was "Thy will be done." But is it, any more truly than "Forgive us our debts," "Hallowed be Thy name," than any one indeed of its many petitions? Each is all, all is in each.

But a peculiarity of it which I think when it first catches our attention is somewhat forbidding is its brevity. Here all spiritual life is supposed to be epitomized. Here are

set forth the relations of our souls to God. Rightly we called this the love-song of the Christian world. And can no more be said than this? Is this brevity characteristic of love? Is it so that love utters itself elsewhere? And why be so poverty-stricken when we approach God? Does not love delight in exuberance, never satisfied, pouring itself out in continually fresh forms? The lover will not content himself with his lady's mere name; he rings a dozen changes on it. He will not speak his affection in straightforward language. He must embroider it all. He repeats his devotion over and over. There are not words enough to set forth his mistress' praises. And yet, when we come to God, a few sentences are counted enough. Is there not here a misunderstanding of love and its need? No! What I have said of the language of love is true, but it is true only of initial and astonished love, love that is unaccustomed to its object and fearful of itself. So speaks the lover who can hardly believe the great fact and is trying to reassure himself. There is a nobler love than that, and one which Jesus has sought to embody in his Prayer. It is the love of assurance. On such intimate terms with him do we live that it is merely the raising of the eye that is necessary, the uttering of a few words. He understands what we have need of before we ask him. All of us know that in this quietude lies the fulfillment of love, when it has escaped its hurry, its need of repetition, and dwells in assured peace with its great object.

But before proceeding farther I think it important to observe that no fixed formula for praying is here offered, but only a type of the worshiper's inner attitudes, whatever his words may be. Central though the Prayer is in our Lord's teaching, as the Ten Commandments in the teaching of Moses, it cannot be taken as a formula, for it is never used again. No one who prays afterwards in the New Testament employs this form. We hear Jesus

praying, but it is in other words than these. Stephen prays, Paul prays, but in phrases dictated by their immediate circumstances. No, it is not a formula. We are not bidden to confine our prayers to these particular words. It is a method. Indeed, it is impossible for us to employ it as a formula, for we really do not know what its words are. Though recorded twice, the accounts do not agree. In every sentence there are variations, and these by no means slight. Consider a few of them. In one or the other of its two statements, whole clauses are omitted. "Our," at the opening, is omitted. "Who art in heaven" is omitted. "Thy will be done" is omitted. "Deliver us from evil" is omitted, and all that follows is omitted.

Does this injure the Prayer? I think it enriches it. For, in reality, the Church, not knowing what the veritable words of the Master were, has joined with him in the construction of a prayer according to its own requirements. He set the pattern, suggested the manner, provided materials out of which a prayer might be framed. And then the Church, full of needs, saw in that material which he had left us the elements from which the Prayer was to be fashioned. It chose, accordingly, from his words, those which best fitted its necessities; and it added at the close a great clause of its own. As a result we have in this Prayer a sort of induction of the ages, experience after experience shaping appropriate expressions to meet daily needs. Led by our Master, we have gone on as fellow workers with him in the construction of a prayer.

And let it not for a moment be supposed that these additions and adjustments are merely the work of early ages. They have continued up to our time, for we use the Prayer in translation. It is a child's notion that in translation exactly the original is carried over uncolored and that the translator puts nothing of himself into his work.

When precious things are handled, they are apt to bear the mark of him who has touched them. Our translators have observed this, and have not hesitated to compensate for their touches by adding what is appropriate. It is often overlooked that they — yes, and the translators of some other languages, notably Luther in his superb German translation — have set the Prayer to a subtle rhythm. They have thrown it into verse; an iambic-anapestic rhythm has been made to palpitate throughout it. This will be caught more readily if we repeat the Prayer with undue emphasis on the marked syllables:

Our Fátther who árt in heáven,  
 Hállowed bé thy náme.  
 Thy kíngdom cóme. Thy wíll be dóne  
 On eárth as it ís in heáven.

Here is a veritable stanza, where short, sharp clause calls to clause. Through the whole Prayer, indeed, there is a graduated rhythmic echo. In the early part, relating especially to divine things, that rhythm is kept entire, measured, regular. But as we pass on into the entanglement of human needs, it becomes more broken; and finally, when we reach an experience essentially human, it goes over into plain prose; yet at the close, where the thought of God becomes again prominent, the full cadence returns:

Gíve us thís dáy our dállý bréád.  
 And fòrgive us our débts, as wé fòrgive  
 our débtors. And léad us nótt into  
 temptátion, but deliver us from évil.

And then comes the closing rhythmic chant:

For thíne ís the kíngdom,  
 And the pówer, and the glóry,  
 Foréver and éver. Amén.

How right, how subtly true were our translators, how responsive to human requirement, when they gave so

suitable a setting to their Prayer! For everywhere aspiration claims rhythm. In rhythm must be expressed our deepest emotions, and the utterances of the will. Prose is left to describe what we observe, it expresses fact. Rhythm expresses hopes. Accordingly, our translators, understanding the human mind with delicacy, have given to this document that form in which it seems simplest to us, most natural, least disturbed. Unfortunately those who prepared the English liturgy had no such fineness of ear, and clumsily substituted for the rhythmic word "debts" the unmanageable "trespasses," a word which does not occur in either of the two forms of the Prayer.

This then is the Prayer which we are to examine, this composite Prayer, as we have it today in its marvelously appropriate form. And, scrutinizing it, we see that it falls into four parts. Here is the hush before prayer. Then our service of God, what we bring to Him. Thirdly, his service of us, what He alone can bring. And, last of all, our rest in Him, our confidence. Let us devote a few words to each.

I venture to call the opening clause "Our Father who art in heaven," the hush before prayer. As we come into that august presence, we bow our heads. He is high and lifted up. He is not to be identified with the actualities and tawdry affairs of our world. He is in the heavens, and we are among the limitations of earth. And yet, his kin we are. There is nothing in his nature which we should not aspire to possess. "Our Father." He who identifies himself with another expresses love. And this is the opening thought of the prayer — love and awe. They should always go together. Certainly either, disjoined from the other, would wreck the Prayer.

In that great hush then, where we know our love and so press forward, where we know his exaltation and so bow our heads, our Prayer opens. But in every nation prayer



has been connected with sacrifice. He who prays brings an offering. Primarily, prayer is giving. The worshiper bestows gifts on him to whom he comes. And how could it be otherwise? Is it not of the very nature of love to give? Have we ever loved any one on whom we did not wish to bestow? The thought of the loved one inevitably brings a desire to spend oneself for his enrichment. Accordingly, the first section of the body of the Prayer is devoted to our service of God; for it has ever been a true thought that prayer is sacrificial. The heathen brings a heifer from his herd. We no less come bringing gifts. But, like all in Christianity, these must be of a spiritual kind. We search, therefore, after what is most precious to our own hearts, and come offering these things to God. And what are they? They are threefold:

“Hallowed be Thy name.” Our standard of worth shall be found in him. Nothing that is not of his nature shall be accounted precious in our sight. Tempted we are continually to call gold of value, to call pleasures delightful, to count our mere continuance in life as something to be sought. All this we sweep away in our first sacrificial offering. “Hallowed be *Thy* name.” All things to us shall be precious according as they bear his mark.

“Thy kingdom come.” What we bring to God shall be no random aspiration. Life shall be organized after his pattern. Our devotion shall be systematic. A very kingdom shall be erected to Him by our endeavors. Good deeds shall match with good deeds; and all be builded up into a suitable place for Him to dwell in.

“Thy will be done.” That is the heart of the matter, and perhaps the hardest of all. We will give up, we promise, our very selves. We come bringing in our sacrificing hands our own will, preferring that his will shall take its place.

Such are the gifts we bring to God, the greatest gifts anyone can bestow. And all of them we give without

limitation of amount, for by an interjected clause we declare we will not rest till earthly offerings attain a heavenly perfection.

But love is always reciprocal. The third section of the Prayer names gifts we desire from God. It is often said that petitionary prayer is a mockery. It has only a reflex influence, working its effects merely on him who prays. It may mellow our nature, exalt our ideals, render a rebellious heart submissive, but it can operate no change in God or outward nature. Strictly speaking, prayer is always addressed to ourselves, as a species of self-communion. God will of Himself give us what we need. It is impious and useless to instruct Him what that shall be. Such thoughts receive no sanction from the Lord's Prayer. It is frankly petitionary. It asks. It announces homely needs and believes God's love is adequate to meet them. How faulty it would be were such confidence omitted! It is a fantastic notion that love simply bestows. No! It is a large receiver; ever two-sided, refusing to make distinction between that which it gives and that which it gets. Between those who love, a frank expression of desire is natural and readiness to give is largely influenced by readiness to receive. The wisest father listens tenderly to the immature requests of his child and allows them to affect his subsequent action. According therefore to the psychology of love, ample room is provided in the Lord's Prayer for petitions. Those petitions indeed cover the entirety of human life. They are naturally threefold; they refer to the present, to the past, to the future.

"Give us this day our daily bread." This relates to the present. And, because the present is essentially transient, with nothing abiding in it, what we pray for is also ephemeral. It is the supply of these decaying bodies, the reasonable thing to think of in any present instant; that is all.

In "Forgive us our debts," we frame a petition with reference to the past. It would at first seem that praying for the past is folly. The past cannot be changed. Why then have wishes about it? There is only one sort of wish which is appropriate, and that a sad one — when we perceive its misuse, and become aware how in the past we have done something which hampers the present and the future. If we were not sinners, we could bid the past go its way, setting our faces entirely toward the future. But we have tied ourselves up in iniquity and are compelled to carry the burden of the past with us. Therefore, in approaching God, we acknowledge this and ask that that past may interfere the least possible with further righteousness.

But such forgiveness is conditional. It occurs only when we too are able to forgive. For many the condition is a stumbling-block. I have known those who hesitated to repeat the Prayer on account of this appalling clause. What if we should be taken at our word and be forgiven only to the degree in which we ourselves forgive! For forgiveness goes against our natural instincts and its very possibility may be doubted. Can I truthfully count him just who has treated me unjustly? So deep are these difficulties that on this clause alone does Jesus offer comment — a comment, however, which merely generalizes the trouble, reiterates, and does not explain it. With an imaginative "for" taking up the unspoken perplexity of his hearers, he declines to analyze the enigma of undeserved love. "For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you."

But as regards the future? Recognizing the lessons of the past, and understanding that our chief solicitude for what is to come should be that we be not through inevitable weakness liable again to such wrongdoing as now pursues us, we put a kind of terror also into our last petition: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil."

I have said that there is no sign that the thought of Jesus passed beyond this point. But the Church was not contented to pause here. It added what I have called the closing chant. And this was necessary. For, after we have brought our gifts to God, and have asked his for ourselves, we need to be assured that these will certainly be ours. Such certitude the Church finds in the fact that our petitions are rooted in his nature. "For thine is the kingdom." That kingdom is no arbitrary matter, waiting to be constructed by ourselves alone. There is an eternal groundwork already laid. It is as when I come to my father and say "Let me be thy son, for thy son I am." I rely on a fixed fact as my ground of confidence in his love. Just so is God's kingdom fixed. Ours it is to comprehend it, to bring out its earthly significance — not to create it.

Here then in this closing portion the Church expresses its assurance of prayer answered. "For thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory." And let it be noticed that in doing so it returns to those sacrificial gifts which it has already brought. "Thine is the kingdom." We have prayed that his kingdom might come, we have promised it to God; and now we know that He assures it to us. "Thine is the kingdom and the power." So we said, "Thy will be done." "And the glory." Yes, that was our first thought, "Hallowed be thy name." At the close of the Prayer we take up again the original theme or dominant note, as in a piece of music. This thought of the abiding character of that which love both gives and receives swells the massive music of the final clause. It is something properly uttered not by the Master but by ourselves.

I said at the beginning that this Prayer, far from being a formula, is a type. I meant that in it the necessary elements of all prayer are set forth. And these are they: The hush before prayer, our gifts to God, his gifts to us,

assurance, rest in Him. Strike out these, one after the other, and see how prayer is maimed. Strike out the first; you have the hasty and irreverent prayer. Strike out the second; you have the selfish, the greedy, prayer. Strike out the third; you have the adulatory and artificial prayer. Strike out the fourth; you have the anxious and hesitating prayer. Only when all are in some degree present can prayer reach its proper beauty as the natural expression of an exalted, generous, needy, and quiet soul.

“After this manner therefore pray *ye*.”

## THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE "WE" SECTIONS OF THE BOOK OF ACTS

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How alluring and yet how elusive is the personality of the self-effacing Diarist of the Acts! Modest to the last degree and yet dignified in his quiet assurance that he is an integral part of the most significant spiritual fellowship of his day, a hero worshiper, lost in admiration for his leader and yet singularly correct in his identification of really great events, and always unwaveringly convinced that he is observing and recording consequential affairs, he nobly deserves his place in the comradeship of the Book. The more, therefore, should we like to draw this quiet workman out of his namelessness, and set him in his true place as pioneer of those historians of the clearer insight to whom the expanding church of Jesus Christ has seemed the central fact of the world's life. Can we do him this right? I venture to hope that it may yet be possible.

The consequences, however, are far from being merely a matter of personal justice and recognition. No question is more fundamental to the whole structure of the higher criticism of the New Testament than is the long-debated problem of the authorship of these diary passages of Acts, bearing as they do every mark of being the priceless record of an actual eyewitness to the events described. As such they are the earliest bits of assured first-hand testimony which the New Testament documents afford. This primacy alone would make them of inestimable importance. But farther than this, they are inextricably interwoven with the problem of the authorship of the whole book of Acts, and so also of the Gospel of Luke. Indeed if we could unfold the original mystery

of these sections, it is at least possible that a flood of light would thus be thrown on both the literary and historical habits of the author of Luke-Acts and so not only on the validity and historicity of his results in both books, but also upon the whole Synoptic problem and the bases which lie under it. Indeed there is much to indicate that, with all the study which has heretofore been devoted to the Acts, it is not unlikely that just now the largest hope of critical progress in the New Testament resides in this book; and if so, the question of the authorship of these particular sections is of new significance.

Let us restate the elements of the problem. The "we" passages begin with Paul's departure from Troas on his second missionary journey. Thence the Diarist accompanies him to Philippi, where the "we" is discontinued. Apparently leaving this companion here, Paul goes on his way to Thessalonica and Achaia and thence to Ephesus and Jerusalem. The third missionary journey brings Paul back to Ephesus for a long stay and thence to Macedonia and Greece, whence he once more travels north to Philippi, where the "we" passages again begin. Thus after a separation of six years the Diarist apparently rejoins his leader at the very point where they had parted, the obvious inference being that the intervening years had been spent by him in some association with the Philippian church. Following the reunion a scattered use of the plural pronoun in the subsequent chapters of Acts indicates that he then accompanied Paul on the eventful journey to Jerusalem and Cæsarea and thence, in due time and on the same ship, to Rome, where the book of Acts suddenly, even abruptly, ends. This companionship from Philippi to Rome, covering the most intimate relations, must have occupied about three years. That a man should share with Paul these stirring events and be involved in such an endearing fellowship of suffering and peril during these conspicuous and conse-

quential years, and yet slip through the meshes of all the comprehensive personal references to the Pauline group, seems absolutely incredible. Paul's friends troop through the Acts and crowd the salutatory passages of the Epistles, yet historical cross-questioning has dismissed them all from probable identity with the Diarist. Gradually this process of elimination has seemed to leave but one possible name. Surely this dear companion cannot be unmentioned in the Pauline literature; he must be here; but of all Luke is the only possibility. So the argument has run. Strange indeed it would be if this long-time companion, whose acquaintance must have been scattered all along the line of his thousands of miles of travel with St. Paul, should never be mentioned in the greetings of salutation or remembrance; and yet are we right in the final selection among those who do appear? Was it Luke? Notwithstanding all repeated argument, the doubt has never rested.

Tradition indeed has consistently assigned the completed book of Acts to Luke. We may well surmise, however, that early opinion based itself merely on the same hopeless process of reduction which has been the despair of later critics, only Luke being left apparently as a possibility after the enforced elimination of every other hypothesis of authorship. Then too to those who understand the naïveté of early criticism it is highly suggestive that the phrase, "Only Luke is with me," furnishes exactly the soil out of which such a tradition would be most likely to grow. Nevertheless tradition, whatever its worth, is unanimously in favor of Luke. The consensus begins with the Muratorian fragment (170 A.D.), is accepted as a matter of course by Irenæus, a few years later, and is axiomatic with Eusebius; but beyond the mere matter of authorship there is no information additional to the biblical facts unless it be the Eusebian statements (*Hist. Ecc. III, 4.6*) that Luke was of Antiochean



origin and (*Hist. Ecc. II, 22.6*) that probably the book was written at Rome during Paul's second imprisonment. This of course refers to the book as a whole and leaves untouched the question of the original authorship of the "we" sections. Following this lead, however, those who are committed to the late date of the Acts, have sought refuge in the suggestion that Luke was really the author of these sections only, and that it was around this modicum of truth that the misconception which attributed the whole book to him grew up. On the other hand, those who assign to him the authorship of the completed Acts have felt the special difficulty of refusing him these portions of the book recording, as they do, those very experiences which it seems most possible that he might have shared personally. The atmosphere of the later days of the first century which seems to surround the Acts, together with the growing evidence of the composite nature of the book, certainly make it clear that the theory of the Lukan authorship of the whole book has much to explain; but in either case the theory of the Lukan origin of the "we" passages is germane and has thus a substantial basis in tradition. Is this tradition correct?

In answering the question our first duty is to discover from the "we" sections, if possible, the movement of events and the personal niche into which the undiscovered writer must fit. Of course it is possible that the original diary was much longer than is our present document, and that the compiler of the Acts used therefore only those sections which he found particularly *apropos*. If this is the case, the complete document might seriously modify or complicate the history of the Diarist as it lies on the surface of these excerpts. But there is certainly a strong presumption against this theory of abbreviation, particularly if the omitted sections included farther accounts of any personal relations with or even impressions of St. Paul. The compiler of Acts leans so heavily on

this document and evidently trusts it so absolutely that it seems unlikely, to say the least, that he would completely delete other portions which recorded further personal companionship with Paul. On the other hand, the "we" document, as it now appears, so evidently exists for the primary purpose of telling Paul's story that, in case it was originally longer, it almost certainly included the accounts of any additional relations which the author shared with Paul, if such there were. Of course such an argument cannot be final. It is only this: We have no suggestion of a longer document, and such negative evidence as we have looks quite in the direction of the view that we have in the "we" passages substantially all that this document ever contained *regarding the author's personal fellowship with Paul*. And the probable correctness of this view will be immeasurably increased if we can find any otherwise probable person whose movements fit well into the record as indicated by the document in its present form and limits.

A careful review of the document and also of the circumstances under which the Diarist first appears just as Paul is leaving on his first European adventure, suggests that this new companion must already have been a man of some proved capacity for evangelistic pioneering when he thus steps into our sight. We may certainly assume that no doubtful novice would be associated with a group which is about to enter upon such an epochal undertaking. Nevertheless, if we take the facts as they appear on the surface, this comrade had not previously been associated with Paul. For some reason his fortunes apparently first fall in with Paul's at Troas. At least this should be our experimental hypothesis, and our initial effort should be to find someone whose biography will fit into such circumstances and conditions. From Troas he will then go with his leader to Philippi. Here he will be on new ground, for the whole group is evidently

breaking fresh soil. They have no friends; no one meets them. Their first permanent lodging-place is in the home of a casual new acquaintance, the purple-seller, Lydia, into contact with whom the work accidentally brings them. From the day that the Diarist starts for Macedonia, concluding that with Paul God had "called us to preach the gospel unto *them*," it is evident that he was feeling his way into new surroundings. He is apparently not a Macedonian.

But soon the situation changes. Following, for the present, the omissions as well as the admissions of the document as our guide, it appears that Paul leaves the Diarist at Philippi. The latter is not the founder of this church; Paul is that; but he remains there possibly for six years, and is doubtless the chief constructive influence in the church. The qualities which suggested him originally for the enterprise point him out now to carry on the work in this important center and inevitably involve him in the gathering affection of this company of Christians. His life merges with their life, and it would only be what is natural should he become their most conspicuous representative and leader.

The Philippian church was *par excellence* a generous church. Paul had repeated occasion to refer to this outstanding characteristic. In the Epistle to the Philippians he records the fact that across all the stretch of time and distance this church was mindful of him and remembered him with gifts sent to distant Rome, the memory of which kindness was like sweet incense; and he recalls also that this generosity had been typical of the church from "the beginning of the gospel," for "even in Thessalonica," whence Paul went from Philippi, "ye sent once and again unto my need," and "no church had fellowship with me in the matter . . . but ye only."

Such a church must inevitably have responded to the appeal of Paul for the offering for the Jerusalem church.

This project of a general "collection" looms large in Paul's mind. Doubtless it had an irenic motive, but it was also important as a call to the development of a fundamental Christian grace. His letters to the churches flame with urgency that they make ready by a definite program for the hour when this gift shall be carried to Jerusalem. The formal presentation is to be a notable event, to be accomplished by a deputation composed of messengers (1 Cor. 16 3, 4) selected by the contributing churches in company with Paul himself, if he can go. This deputation is gathering about Paul when, after the six intervening years, he is rejoined at Philippi by the Diarist, who proceeds with the company to Jerusalem. Obviously the church at Philippi will have its leading part in this generosity. There would have been no title ever again to grateful remembrance in Paul's mind if it failed now. Giving generously, the Philippian church will also naturally have its delegate in the deputation. The Diarist gives us the names of the delegates (Acts 20 4). Various sections of the church are represented. Two go from the neighboring church of Thessalonica. Others represent various fields. But no one is *named* from Philippi. This situation can only be explained by the natural conclusion that the Diarist was the Philippian representative.

The importance of this collection-project as it lay in Paul's mind cannot be overstated. The fact that it was of really primary significance and of the highest ecclesiastical consequence is to be gathered from the constant reference to it in his Epistles. It is hardly open to question that the two brethren (II Cor. 8 18-23) who went to Corinth to forward the matter there were already the appointed representatives of the churches of Asia, that they therefore reappear in the deputation as it is later named (Acts 20 4), and that it is because of their commission to this important and responsible service that Paul digni-

fies them by the title of "apostles." In view of this designation, we shall expect the Diarist, as a member of the same group, to be held in like esteem, and we may hope to identify him under the same title of honor and authenticated responsibility; he will be an "apostle" — if this chain of consequences which we have thus followed is correct.

In any case men are known by the company they keep, and we may well draw near to the comrades of the Diarist for such suggestion as they have to give. Of three we know little, but of the others there is something of significance to say. It is the presence of Trophimus at Jerusalem that indirectly causes the trouble which ultimately sent Paul, a prisoner, to Rome (Acts 21 29), and if II Timothy 4 20 is trustworthy, he was at a later day a traveling companion of St. Paul. Of the remaining four, half of the whole number — Timothy, Tychicus, Aristarchus, and the Diarist — the singular fact is to be recorded that they not only accompanied the apostle to Jerusalem but they continued with him or followed him to Rome. In other words, the Diarist is a member of a deputation which is not only of such a formal ecclesiastical nature that its members might be designated as the "apostles" of the churches, but at the same time also, of such a private nature that they are in some peculiar way committed to the personal interests of Paul and to such fortunes or misfortunes as may befall him individually. Under such a dual relation as this the Diarist, if we identify him, must make his appearance.

With such a company the author of the "we" sections goes on his way from Philippi to Jerusalem. He is present at the conference with James and the other elders. Exactly how near he was to the person of Paul during the dramatic events of his arrest and subsequent local trials we do not know, but the intimacy of the account indicates that he was not far away. In any case he is one of the

two companions who, putting their lives in jeopardy, share the perils of Paul's voyage to Rome, as he goes under guard to make his appeal to Cæsar. The Diarist specifies that Aristarchus, one of the deputation, is the third member of the group (Acts 27 2). The plain indication is that his companionship — and if so, that also of the Diarist probably — is voluntary, but it nevertheless must have involved a sharp and perhaps compulsory submission to the limitations of the prisoner for whose sake they were known to be aboard. It is highly probable therefore that it is to this occasion which Paul refers when he later speaks of Aristarchus as his "fellow prisoner" (Col. 4 10), for Paul was not unaccustomed permanently so to identify those who had once shared his prison. He calls them fellow prisoners not as in the present but as having had this relation in the past. Indeed this is his only manner of using the term elsewhere (Rom. 16 7; Philem. 23). If it is indeed thus with Aristarchus, we have every reason to expect that Paul would think of the Diarist as also a "fellow prisoner," and if we shall later find that Paul does thus think of him, it will in turn strengthen our conviction that it is this experience with Aristarchus to which Paul refers when he describes him as a "fellow prisoner."

Thus after anxious days, in which his own life has been absolutely subordinated to Paul's fortunes, the Diarist comes to Rome. Up to this point he has followed the events of his leader's life with an absorbed and concentrated interest. He has absolutely risked all to see how it should fare with his hero at the final tribunal of imperial Rome. Now that leader is on the threshold either of an acquittal, which is to set him free for a world service, or else of a conviction which shall permanently terminate the great career; and yet just before this event is reached, the record stops.

What can this sudden ending indicate? The strangeness of it all has begotten the theory that the Diarist, or perhaps, if he was a different person, the author of the book of Acts was really not intending to recount Paul's fortunes save as they were involved in the larger theme — how the gospel came to Rome. But if so, he passes over with absolute unconcern the fact that the gospel was already in Rome when Paul arrived, as the Epistle to the Romans and other evidence makes clear, and he shows no interest whatever in the origin of the Roman church. And even if this theory could possibly be correct, it does not explain why, after all our breathless suspense, the personal outcome to St. Paul should be eliminated as of no legitimate interest. There are but two possible theories of explanation for this strange conclusion. Either the diary has for some reason been decapitated, or else the manuscript came to an end because imperative events terminated the companionship thus suddenly. Now of course mutilation is always a possibility. As at the beginning of the manuscript, so at the end there may have been a process of surgery; but, as at the beginning so at the end, the conditions are such as to make this a secondary hypothesis, and our first search must be for some one whose companionship with Paul, otherwise also conformable to the Diarist's experiences, comes suddenly and perhaps unnaturally to an end soon after the arrival at Rome.

Such in general is the Diarist's history, and such is the niche into which the man and his experiences must be adjusted. The details may not be all exact but the main movement is unquestionably correct, and the more exactly the details correspond, the better the identification. Can such a person be found? As we have thus reviewed his history and the qualities and abilities which it demanded, the more impossible it seems that so conse-

quential a person should slip unidentified through that remarkable drama in which he played so notable a part. Who then can he have been ?

Was it Luke ? Assuming this theory, the meagreness of the information regarding him is our first difficulty. So far as the biblical record goes, there is only Paul's statement (Col. 4 14; Philem. 24) during the first Roman imprisonment, that Luke, the beloved physician, sends salutation, and his additional and necessarily doubtful memorandum in the later Roman imprisonment (II Tim. 4 10) that only Luke is with him. So far as tradition is concerned there is only the record that he was a native of Antioch and that the *completed* book of Acts was his work. And this notwithstanding the fact that if he was the Diarist, he was an intimate and long-time companion of Paul in extended journeys, absorbing experiences, and extreme perils — an outstanding companionship. And yet while other comrades appear and reappear in salutations to and from the churches along the way and are mentioned as fellow prisoners, fellow travelers, apostles, etc., Luke slips by with never such a suggestion and only as one of the Roman group. How improbable this seems!

But the moment we seek to put Luke in the Diarist's place by means of the slight data we possess, the detailed difficulties accumulate. If Luke was an Antiochean, why does his companionship begin at far-off Troas ? He must have known Paul at Antioch. Why no mention of the companionship which brought them the long journey to Troas ? Or if such a record was there originally, then why was it submerged or eliminated when the rest of the document is counted so valuable and is used with such constant trustfulness and interest ? That Luke qualifies as the Diarist on the theory that he had lived in Philippi seems to me wholly unwarranted, as appears from the attitude of the missionary party to their evidently new



surroundings on reaching that city, and the suggestion of such a citizenship indeed appears to proceed wholly from the interesting desire to identify the Diarist with the "man from Macedonia" (Acts 19 9), a supposition which, while surely picturesque, is certainly contrary to the most natural interpretation of the following verse.

Proceeding then to the Diarist's prolonged residence at Philippi where he nurtured and developed the church from infancy to notable strength and prestige, how strange it is that no mention is made of him in the Epistle to the Philippians! This Epistle was written from Rome. If Luke was the Diarist, he was of course in Rome with Paul. He is mentioned as being there in Colossians and Philemon, evidently written almost contemporaneously. Other companions are mentioned in the Philippian Epistle, but this long-time sponsor of the Philippian church, if Luke be that, is never mentioned! The only possible explanation for such a strange fact is that Luke was away on a short visit. But even so, is it not strange that no mention even is made to this church of the pastor who has been Paul's long, devoted, and imperiled companion and to whom he is so profoundly indebted? Would it not be the obvious thing to explain the strange omission by at least a reference to the absence? How can less be possible?

And now of the journey from Philippi to Rome. If we are correct in identifying Tychicus and Trophimus as the brethren referred to in II Cor. 8, 18, 22, then it follows that Paul dignified the members of this deputation by the apostolic title (II Cor. 8 23), a recognition held in such high esteem by him that he counts himself a modest member of that high company. But if Luke was a member of this delegation, no such title is ever bestowed upon him. Again of the two companions with Paul on the sea-voyage from Cæsarea to Rome, if Aristarchus is later called a "fellow prisoner" (Col. 4 10), certainly no such

title is bestowed anywhere on Luke. He is simply the beloved physician and one of a large group of fellow laborers (Philem. 24). And of all the journey and shipwreck, no word!

Finally we come on to assured ground. Luke is evidently a somewhat intimate companion with Paul at Rome. This companionship is continued indefinitely, and, if we accept at all the guidance of II Tim. 4 11, reappears in the second Roman imprisonment, where he is left, the only living witness, to give his invaluable testimony. But the surer we are of this, the more inevitably does the question arise why this faithful Diarist should have left the record of his hero, just as he was on the very threshold of a decision at the hands of the world's highest tribunal, with no word of the result or of those subsequent events with which Luke of all others was surely familiar. How strange the conclusion by which an informed comrade withholds the dénouement of Paul's whole dramatic appeal to Rome! Granted even that the personal outcome was not the main concern of the writer's purpose in the book of Acts, it yet remains most inexplicable that this loyal lieutenant, risking all in a crusade with his captain, should dismiss the outcome of those fortunes as unworthy even of passing mention. But of all this there are only the two closing verses of the Acts. The record ends with the *arrival* at Rome. All else is silence. Again the question presses home with redoubled force: Why does the diary end here? Was it originally longer, and if so, why was it abridged? To be sure, all this is negative evidence. But how overwhelmingly cumulative it is! The Lukan theory certainly raises more questions than it solves. Is it the best we can do? If so, we are left in dismay.

I believe this is by no means the best we can do, and I desire to point out the remarkable array of facts which indicate that Epaphroditus (Phil. 2 25; 4 18) who,

as I believe, is identical with Epaphras (Col. 1 7, 4 12; Philem. 23) is the lost Diarist.

The view that these two names belong to one and the same person has long been recognized as the simplest and most plausible theory, but thus far it has run athwart difficulties which have seemed very perplexing but which may presently be entirely cleared away. Epaphras is a shortened form of Epaphroditus. The latter name is used in the Epistles to Philippi and Ephesus; the former in the Epistles to Colossæ and Philemon of Colossæ. All the Epistles were written at Rome and at almost the same time. To hold that these names represented two persons involves the difficult replacement of one man by another of like name in the little circle of workers at Rome. One man is present, the other absent; the second arrives and the first disappears; and the names so nearly identical, and neither appears elsewhere. But in view of the difficulties mentioned above it has seemed the simplest theory.

These difficulties are all contained in the misinterpretation of Philippians 4 18, and it is on this rock that the whole search for the Diarist has been diverted from its true course. In this passage Paul, writing of course from Rome, expressed gratitude to the Philippians, "having received *from* Epaphroditus the things from you." This has been uniformly assumed to mean that after Paul reached Rome the Philippians becoming aware of his need sent Epaphroditus to him bearing certain tokens of love. If Epaphroditus thus came direct from Philippi to Rome *after* Paul arrived there, he could not have been the Diarist who journeyed *with* Paul via Jerusalem. But a more careful examination of the passage, however, makes it unlikely that Epaphroditus was in this sense the bearer of these gifts;<sup>1</sup> and it will be pointed out that the con-

<sup>1</sup> The linguistic facts clearly support the suggestion here made. "From Epaphroditus" exactly duplicates the preposition of "from you." It is the *ἀπό* of

ditions and simplicities of the situation are better satisfied if we suppose that Epaphroditus was already in Rome with Paul, and that the Philippian church with characteristic thoughtfulness sent a gift to their pastor who we know was ill in Rome, and included with it some remembrance to Paul, which was passed on to him *from* Epaphroditus. In any case Paul could not have better described a gift received under such wholly plausible circumstances.

Indeed when we come to study the details of the event this view strangely fits in with the known facts. Epaphroditus had been seriously ill at Rome; his life had been despaired of, and we know farther that the Philippian church had heard of his condition and was seriously distraught over it (Phil. 2 26). How could it be possible — particularly if there had been a long and hazardous separation — that the Philippian church should do other than send succor to their absent pastor? And, so doing, how could they possibly fail to make some kindly enclosure to Paul? The fact is, as we shall see, that many cumulative indications point to the conclusion that Epaphroditus had made the long journey *with* Paul as the Philippian representative, and that his supposed journey from Philippi direct to Rome bearing the Pauline gift is wholly a misinterpretation of the passage referred to. *Per contra*, it is only necessary to point out the difficulties of any other view. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the declared ignorance of Paul regarding the condition of the Philippian church, when he addressed the Epistle. If we accept the theory of a special journey, only a few months at most can have elapsed since Epaphroditus left Philippi, well aware of the situation through long years of spiritual intimacy and leadership; and yet Paul proposed to send

*source* which is used in each case and not the *id* of *agent*. Regarding the distinction Paul is extremely careful. Romans 1 8 presents an exact parallel, where agency is intended. See also Gal. 1 1, 12.

Timothy thither that he may secure report of the state of the church (Phil. 2 19); as if Epaphroditus, "brother, fellow-worker, and fellow-soldier," was not qualified to give such a report. But if it is four years since such personal news has come, the situation becomes entirely transparent.

But this difficulty is only the beginning of the considerable series of perplexities in which the theory involves us. It is evident that some little time must have elapsed after Paul's arrival in Rome before the Philippian church could know that he was there, or, even so, would long remain there. Indeed the supposition was quite otherwise. He had appealed for a Roman release. Moreover there was nothing to indicate that he was in any such special need as to warrant so notable an embassy. Nor is there anything in Paul's remark to indicate that the Philippian gift was of such a material or consequential size as to demand so important a bearer. The reference, crowded as it is into the closing paragraphs of the Epistle, is quite to the contrary. How improbable that the Philippian pastor should be sent on this long journey with such a present! This is very different from asking a convenient traveler to bear help to their own pastor who, they know, is seriously ill in Rome and of whose illness we are particularly informed that the Philippians had heard.

Then, too, the theory involves an amazingly swift and complicated program for Epaphroditus. First, the Philippian church must become aware that Paul is in Rome and that the conditions are such as to keep him there. Then there must be the movement to send him a gift of such consequence that no one less than the pastor should be sent to bear it. Then there is the journey. Then there must have been some experience in which the messenger hazarded his life for Paul's sake (Phil. 2 30). Then, if Epaphroditus and Epaphras are identical, he must somehow have been arrested and singularly enough

become Paul's fellow prisoner (Philem. 23); then there must have followed the long, serious sickness — so prolonged indeed that the Philippian Christians can hear of it, and Epaphroditus be so troubled by the knowledge that they have heard of it (Phil. 2 26) that on his recovery he is eager to be back among them. Surely this is a tolerably eventful experience if it must be crowded into this short trip. By far the simpler view is that Epaphroditus never made such a trip, and if not, that he came to Rome with Paul as the Diarist.

Once we are relieved of this burdensome misconception, how simply and accurately every item slips into its natural place. The "we" document begins at Troas, which was in the same Roman province with Colossæ where Epaphroditus had been at work (Col. 1 7; 4 12, 13). Let us revive the situation in our minds. As Paul was starting for Antioch in the third journey his party had suddenly been disrupted by the loss of his strong companion Barnabas. He then took Silas, but in no sense could the latter make good the place of the former; he was distinctly a satellite. So Paul is on the watch to recruit his broken group. At Lystra he claims Timothy, also a distinctly younger disciple. What more natural than at Troas, facing the immediate call into the Great Adventure, he should feel the need of some experienced and successful pioneer of the gospel, and again what more natural than that he should turn to the approved founder of the near-by churches of Colossæ, Laodicea, and Hierapolis (Col. 4 13). Of this notably successful evangelist Paul must have long known, but all the evidence goes as well to show that thus far they had never labored together. So large a field must have long and exclusively occupied Epaphras, and, on the other hand, we know in particular that Paul had never visited these churches (Col. 2 1). On this very journey we are specifically told that Paul passed hurriedly to the north of this

region, "having been forbidden of the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia" (Acts 16 6), and hastened direct to Troas. There, suddenly called to venture on the European crusade, he solicits the experienced services of Epaphras, near at hand, who joins him at Troas. In a word, the Diarist has had no previous personal experience with Paul to record. The document began at Troas substantially as we now have it, and no excuses are necessary for any elimination of earlier portions.

So the Diarist comes to Philippi. Here also the events are equally obvious. The experience of Epaphras at Colossæ has fitted him for the constructive work in the first European center. He has been known more familiarly in his native region as Epaphras. Here he takes the more dignified title of Epaphroditus. Here the Diarist, whoever he is, stayed for the six eventful and formative years weaving his life into the affections of the Philippian Christians. Who can this possibly be but Epaphroditus, as his likeness is drawn for us in the Epistle of Paul to the Philippians? We are here told in detail that Epaphroditus belongs to the Philippian church; he is their outstanding representative (Phil. 2 25); their hearts are bound up in him and he is longing to be back with them; and to them Paul sends him back, with the Epistle, as evidently to his own people (Phil. 2 25, 26). While he is still remembered affectionately in Colossæ, his home and heart have been essentially transferred to the loving and generous church at Philippi. So exactly does the photograph fit and so accurately are we led by the appearance of this plural personal pronoun.

But if all this is true to life, how much more amazingly clear and detailed is the identification of Epaphroditus in the journey from Philippi to Rome. As pointed out above, the Diarist was obviously the representative selected for Philippian membership in the collection deputation. How accurately the experiences of Epaphroditus

fit into such a commission both in its public capacity and in its personal relations to Paul is fully set forth in *Philippians* 2 25-30. Now that we are relieved of the misconception that these verses relate to a later journey, we see at once how adequately and exactly the passage refers to the conditions and circumstances of the Diarist's journey. Instead of the unaccountable silence regarding him in all Pauline literature which has seemed so amazing, we at once find that this situation has been due only to our oversight of most ample and appreciative references to him which are really wonderfully clear.

We have seen, for example, that Paul's conception of the deputation is so lofty that he calls the members of it *apostoloi*, using this rare and sacred designation. Now strangely enough he gives this very designation to Epaphroditus (*Phil.* 2 25) setting him forward alone out of the Roman group, with the exception of Timothy, also a member of the same deputation, to bear this title. Conceiving that this designation of Epaphroditus referred merely to the supposed later journey of personal service, the English translators have been unable to understand Paul's use of this high term for a simple and individual kindness to himself, and have softened the word into "messenger."<sup>2</sup> Thus is Paul supposed to doze regarding his high church conception of apostleship. But Epaphroditus' title to the name is now perfectly clear; with the rest of the deputation he is to Paul, for that reason, an apostle.

<sup>2</sup> Strangely enough, the only other place where the accurate translation is thus abandoned by the Revisers is in the reference (*II Cor.* 8 23) to the other members of the same deputation. Not realizing that they are such, and that they have already thus been appointed not only to carry the collection but also to promote it, and failing also, as I think, to realize how large the whole project bulked in Paul's mind, they have here also softened the word into "messenger," thus throwing confusion into the whole Pauline use of the word. The identification of all these members of the group as in Paul's mind entitled to the name "apostle," helps most significantly to clarify for us the whole Pauline conception of this office, regarding which he is so deeply concerned (*I Cor.* 9 1, etc.).



We have seen, however, that membership in that group was not solely a public ministry. In some sense it involved a commitment to Paul's personal fortunes or misfortunes. Four of the group, at least, did not stop at Jerusalem, having fulfilled the collection service, but went on to Rome, though only two, Aristarchus and the Diarist, seem to have traveled in the same ship with Paul. This dual relationship is exactly reflected in this Philippian reference to Epaphroditus. He is there "your apostle and minister to my need." Is it possible that the actual relation of the Diarist to Paul could in any way be better described?

And now about the experiences of the journey itself, its labors, its risks, its hardships, its intimacies, and finally its perilous shipwreck and the rescue; has this all slipped from Paul's memory, and particularly has the Diarist, the only comrade with him and Aristarchus in the ship of his imprisonment — has he disappeared? Not at all. In later years, as has been pointed out, Aristarchus was remembered as a "fellow-prisoner" (Col. 4 10), and so also (Philem. 23) is Epaphroditus. And he is the only other person at Rome besides Aristarchus who is so denominated. And as for the other circumstances of the journey, what could be more adequate and exact than the passage in Philippians (2 25-30): "I . . . send to you Epaphroditus, my brother and fellow-worker and fellow-soldier, and your apostle and minister to my need . . . for indeed he was sick nigh unto death; but God had mercy . . . on me . . . that I might not have sorrow upon sorrow. . . . Receive him . . . and hold such in honor; because for the work of Christ he came nigh unto death, hazarding his life to supply that which was lacking in your service toward me." So tenderly and loyally does Paul remember his comrade of the terrible voyage.

Thus did the Diarist Epaphroditus come to Rome. From that time on the developments are equally natural

and simple. Arrived in Rome, Epaphroditus soon falls seriously ill (Phil. 2 27). Perhaps it is not rash to suggest that the record indicates that the exposures and dangers of the voyage had something to do with this. At any rate the active companionship with Paul ends. The illness is long enough continued for the Philippian church to hear of it (Phil. 2 26) and to send some ministration to his need, in which was also included a remembrance to Paul (Phil. 4 18). Convalescing, Epaphroditus turns longingly (Phil. 2 26) to the faithful friends of the Philippian church from whom he has now been separated for years and among whom his affections have taken deepest root. He is indeed Paul's companion only by virtue of the fact that he is the officer and representative of that church. If Paul desires a detailed and personal report of conditions at Philippi, another messenger must go (Phil. 2 19), for Epaphroditus departs not to return; his companionship with Paul is over at least for many a day. This disposition to return fits in with the mood of Paul to communicate with the church at Philippi. Indeed this mood seems to be more inclusive. In his confinement he broods over the condition of the churches which he has cherished. Every word regarding them is a matter of deep concern to him. Not only Philippians but Colossians and Philemon are the evidence, to say nothing of the Ephesian and Laodicean Epistles. These were evidently written not far apart, and it is at least possible that the convalescent Epaphroditus carrying the Epistle to the Philippians is accompanied nearly to his home by Tychicus (Col. 4 7, 8), bearing the Colossian Epistle. Indeed it looks as if the delegation of the churches was now finally breaking ranks. In such company and under such circumstances does Epaphroditus turn homeward and disappear from us down the Philippian way.

The final and perhaps, individually, the most striking piece which now fits into the convincing completeness of

this remarkable mosaic is the very fact which heretofore has been so inexplicable — the "we" record ends after the first few days in Rome. This is precisely where it should end — with the termination of the intimate companionship of Paul and Epaphroditus. It is not unlikely that the diary was cut short by the illness of the writer and that the record was never resumed. In any case, here is no strange decapitation of a priceless document. It began with the writer's personal experience of Paul; it was dropped when they temporarily separated; and it ended with their parting at Rome; and the manuscript in its entirety is embedded in the book of Acts exactly as its evident value would lead us to expect.

The particular thesis is here ended; but from this new assurance we inevitably look off into other and most suggestive areas. Did the invalided Epaphroditus ever reach Philippi? Did his record include originally only the strictly "we" passages, and were the interstices filled in later or by other hands? With his historical interest facilitated by his long delay at Jerusalem, was it he who accumulated the other memorials of the early church which are involved in the Acts, and did he carry them back to Philippi where they were later woven into the one fabric? Or was his document with others left at Rome in the hands of Luke, his attending physician, and was it there inwrought, a shining thread, into another's narrative of the advancing dominion of the Master? Is it possible that Luke's association with the Acts is due to the fact that the basal documents were passed on to the Redactor through him? Or is it more likely that the elimination of Luke from earlier association with Paul, and so from any personal acquaintance with the details of the ecclesiastical beginnings, makes it possible that he was comparatively young when he first appears at Rome, and therefore was perhaps himself this late, and in many respects, uninformed Redactor? Was it his deliberate

thought to confine himself in Acts to an editing of the manuscripts of others, as he did also in the Gospel, thus covering a period with which he, and possibly Theophilus, had no personal association? Was it perhaps his plan to add a third book which should give his own reminiscences of later days, thus taking up the thread himself where others had left it? These are most interesting questions. In the growing light that is falling upon these early days of the church and the identification of the Aramaic Greek sections of the earlier part of the book, it may not be impossible that these questions shall yet have their illuminating answers.

## THE ROMAN CHURCH AND MODERN ITALIAN DEMOCRACY

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Among the many anecdotes about Pope Sixtus V, a stern figure of an Italian Pope-king of the sixteenth century, there is one which tells of an old Franciscan friar who had been a close friend of the Pope when the latter in his young days was a friar himself, known by the name of Felice Peretti, living in a small convent of northern Italy. When "Fra Felice" was elected Pope, his friend thought that Sixtus would not forget him and would call him to Rome and perhaps make him an important personage in the Curia. But no call came from Rome, not even an acknowledgment of the humble letters of congratulation sent with so many hopes by the old friar to his exalted friend. So he decided to go to Rome and speak personally to the Pope. After many hours of waiting in the antechamber he was admitted to the papal presence. Sixtus looked at him with indifferent eye as if he never had known him. It was more than the old friar could bear; he knelt down to kiss the Pope's feet and addressed him with a Latin verse in which there was a delicate allusion to a certain Aesopian fable about changing skin:

"Sancte Pater, scire vellem, si Papatus mutat pellem."

("Holy Father, I should like to know whether papal dignity changes one's skin"). To which the Pope, who knew his Latin well, answered immediately with another Latin verse:

"Pellis papae non mutatur, sed nullius recordatur."

("The skin of the Pope does not change, but he does not remember anybody). The anecdote may well be true.

Really its value is beyond the anecdotic realm, and Sixtus' reply, slightly modified, may be considered as the program of many a Pontificate. As a matter of fact, there is no institution which presents such an unbroken historical continuity in its development and such a consistency in the fundamental points of its definite program as the Papacy. "*Pellis Papae non mutatur.*"

From the remote day in which the Papacy acquired the consciousness of its power up to the present day, its maximum program has been and is the same — to control the complex whole of human life and social organization through the spiritual power in order to make possible the conditions which alone can lead individual souls to eternal salvation. The Papacy is logical; if the keys of the kingdom are in the hands of Peter, it is Peter who must see to it that the conditions which will make the soul worthy to enter the door should be made accessible to all men.

No less true is the second part of Sixtus' verse: "*Sed nullius recordatur.*" Has the Papacy learned anything from history? If we look at the maximum program as mentioned above, it has not; the Papacy has forgotten, or rather has not paid any attention whatever to all the failures and disappointments which have followed its boldest attempts to acquire full control of human society. But if we consider the individual programs of most of the Popes, the practical method of action adopted by them in order to reach the end of the maximum program, then we shall find that not only have the Popes learned a great deal from history, but they have learned much more than all other political and religious leaders, to such an extent that their institution is the only one which has survived after so many centuries of hard struggle, in which powerful empires and strong political and social organizations have disappeared one after another.

To follow a skillful process of adaptation to the ever-changing condition and circumstances of the times, without modifying the final purpose; to change the road without changing the goal; to change the attitude without changing radically the mind; to give to each Pontificate a personal character without breaking the unity and the continuity of all the Pontificates — such has been and is the secret of the immortality of the Roman Papacy.

A necessary issue of such a policy, of such a process, when it is adapted to an historical institution, is that its activity takes an essentially conservative character; it does not create new initiatives, but follows those started by others and struggles to bring them under its own control and to adapt them to its own general and traditional program. But an institution which considers itself as definitive, complete, and unchangeable, as the Roman Church does, is naturally led to oppose all new tendencies and even all new interpretations of old principles. Thus it happens that the Papacy, as the representative and central power of Roman Catholicism, is perpetually struggling between two impulses leading in opposite directions. On the one hand is the principle of resistance, which is the result of its consciousness of being the only true religion, unchangeable in its essence and in its form of government; on the other hand is the dynamic tendency, which is inseparable from the natural instinct of conservation of life, proper to all individuals as well as to all historical institutions. The former makes of the Papacy an irreconcilable enemy of the law of mutability, inherent in human nature and identical with the law of progress; the latter obliges it to come to terms with new conditions involving new principles and to reconcile itself, *bon gré, mal gré*, with them. The equilibrium between the two opposite tendencies is reached only through compromises; theological and philosophical compromises

in the realm of doctrine, ethical, political, and legal compromises in the realm of fact.

After all, a compromise which could bridge the eternal and the transient, the immovable and the ever-changing, has been and is the greatest problem of all metaphysics as well as of all religions. And it looks as if the old pagan title which became the exclusive qualification of the Roman bishops, "Summus Pontifex," was providentially chosen to represent exactly the main occupation of the Papacy — that of building incessantly new bridges to keep the Church in contact with the progressive life of mankind. In times of old, when human progress was slow, some of those bridges were real monumental constructions, which gave to their builders the idea that they would last forever, so deep-laid were their foundations both scientific and political; but in more recent times events follow so rapidly, science and politics have undergone such radical changes, principles and institutions are under such a direct fire from every side, that all old and new bridges are easily carried away by the swift current, and the task of the Papacy has become a very difficult one. There is no possibility for a conservative institution like the Papacy to keep pace with the great speed of today's political and social life, and the question is no more of building solid stone bridges but only of throwing at least a narrow plank across the gulf, so as not to be cut off entirely from modern thought and life.

During the last fifty years the loss of the temporal power, with its consequences, brought to the Papacy in a more striking way the realization that the modern world had gone too much ahead in its religious, political, and social ideals, and that it was time for the Church of Rome to speed up in order to gain the ground lost under the reactionary Pontificates which had identified themselves with the principles and ideals of the ancient regime. Accordingly Pope Leo XIII with a stroke of the pen



obliterated all the condemnations of his predecessors against democracy. From his Pontifical chair he declared that the principles of democracy not only are not radically opposed to or in any conflict with the Church, but, on the contrary, they find in the Church their natural ally and their religious legitimation. Fifty years before, Lamennais had been excommunicated for propounding the same principle.

It is true, however, that Pope Leo had not a very comprehensive idea of democracy and was very far from being inclined to accept all the logical consequences involved in really democratic principles. But he could not ignore the fact that under the democratic regime, conceived as the rule of the majority with a fair consideration of the rights of the minority, the social question was assuming a political character and as such was to be the final test of the organizing power of modern democracy. The Pope therefore went a step further, and in a much celebrated document (Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*." — "*De conditione opificum*") assumed that the Catholic Church, as it was the cradle and the guardian of true democracy, was also in possession of the golden rule which alone could solve in a satisfactory way all social problems.

Those outside the Church were not much impressed by Leo's words. They thought they were no more than pious vagaries of a theologian who, compelled to face a new situation, looks at it through his theological glasses and finds that there is really nothing new in the world, "*nil sub sole novi*," and all he has to do is to put the same old wine into new bottles. But even as such, Pope Leo's conservative dilettantism in sociology was a very clever stroke of ecclesiastical policy. It was another plank across the gulf between the Church and modern life.

But the greatest problem with which the Papacy has been confronted in the last half-century is that of its relations with the new Italy. The various questions aris-

ing in the Church at large did not present difficulties which could not be solved by compromises. Diplomatic bargains with the various governments, both Catholic and non-Catholic, could always be negotiated, and in its long political tradition the Roman Curia had developed a remarkable skill and almost unique ability in settling those matters to its own advantage. Moreover the task had become easier on account of the frank attitude taken by the Catholics themselves of the various countries, who had not concealed their unwillingness to support the Curia in eventual attempts to interfere with the internal politics of their nations. They either organized themselves in political national parties of their own, as in Germany, and in such a case they were led to emphasize their character of national-political associations in order to avoid the much feared accusation of political and religious ultramontaniam; or, as happened in the United States, participated in the political life of their country as mere individuals according to their personal political connections and local interests. In both cases the Vatican had to limit its activities to the religious sphere, concealing even the thought of political purposes in its influence over Catholic believers.

As a matter of fact, where a political activity was carried on in the name of the Church, the fault was not so much of the Papacy as of groups of unscrupulous Catholic politicians who wanted to use the authority of the Church and the Papacy to the advantage of their own political party, as in France; provoking the retaliation of the opposite parties and producing the final political estrangement of France from the Vatican.

But in Italy the situation was totally different. Here the Papacy had an avowed program of political claims aiming at the overthrow of Italy's new regime, either by means of foreign intervention or by internal dissolution. To effect such a purpose the Papal diplomacy had the

task of creating all possible difficulties for the Italian government in its dealings with the governments which were in diplomatic relations with the Pope. Those governments, although officially friendly to Italy, yet were more than glad to have always within reach a powerful means of intimidating the Italian government by reopening the Roman question under the pretext of complying with the wishes of their Catholic population. And they made use of it. It was thus that France imposed its policy on the new kingdom for more than a decade, and it was through this as well as in other ways that Bismarck succeeded in pushing Italy into the unnatural alliance with Austria and Germany. Even in the last war it was used as a scarecrow by the Central Powers to prevent Italy from joining the Allies.

The Pope thought perhaps that the Papal claims could more easily be realized by provoking an internal incurable crisis. With such an aim Pope Pius IX first and Pope Leo XIII afterwards, made it a crime for Italian Catholics to take part in the political management of their country.

This political sabotage ordered by the Vatican was intended to make it impossible for the Italian government to root itself in the national consciousness and to bring about its fall in a short time. That way once chosen, the Vatican insisted on it with its usual obstinacy; although it appeared immediately that the great majority of the Catholic Italian laity did not take seriously the Papal veto.

After the advent of Leo XIII, and under his inspiration a great effort was made to influence the young Italian generation and to impress on their minds that Italy's evils and weakness were the consequence of its sins against the Church, and therefore that it was a religious as well as a patriotic duty to reestablish the political Papacy in order to create a greater Italy. This propa-

ganda, carried on with great fervor in the Catholic schools, by the Catholic papers, and by the official Catholic organization called *L' Opera dei Congressi*, was so successful that Pope Leo thought the time had come to go a step further and to proclaim his democratic sympathies to the world. It was a concession which was supposed to destroy new objections against his political program, and to make it appear as representing the newest spirit of the time, instead of being a recast of a program definitely discarded by the national consciousness of young Italy.

But such a deception could not last long. The young Italian Catholics came to realize very early and at their cost, what was the real meaning of such a program and how it was primarily directed against Italy's national existence. They could not see any valid reason why the same Church which not only allowed but made it a duty for a Catholic Frenchman or Englishman or American to be loyal to his national government, whether it were Catholic or Protestant or neither, was authorized to make it an unpardonable sin for an Italian Catholic to love and respect the democratic government of his country; a government legally elected by the majority of the population under laws of freedom, which had been conquered after so many centuries of slavery at a price of enormous sacrifices and heroic struggles. The logical conclusion of the movement was to deny the authority of the Pope to impose upon the Italian Catholics a *political* program, and to claim for themselves the same freedom in political matters which was not denied to the Catholic believers of all other countries. The reply of the Vatican to such a bold claim was the excommunication of the leaders like Romolo Murri, and the condemnation of the *Lega Democratica Cristiana* as being a heretical organization.

The reason was obvious. The new Pope, Pius X, was not a politician like Leo XIII, and although at the beginning of his Pontificate he, as usual, published a protest against the Italian government, yet he was not at all anxious to recover the temporal power. Coming not from diplomacy but from the ranks of the diocesan clergy, Pius X knew well the feelings of the Italian population, and had come to realize that the greatest menace against the Church and the Papacy was not the liberal Italian government but the Socialist party, which in Italy assumed from the very beginning a strong anti-religious character. Now two ways were open to the Pope to counteract the progress of the Socialist party in Italy: either by supporting openly the young Christian democratic party which had already formulated a program of social reforms with a Socialist flavor, or by throwing the Catholic forces into the balance in favor of the old conservative parties in order to strengthen their power of resistance to Socialism. In the former case the Pope would have met Socialism on its own ground and become the moral leader of a progressive movement.

But the adoption of such a program involved two concessions: first, a definite and clear statement which would end the conflict between Italy and the Papacy as to the temporal power, and thus enable the young Catholic-democratic party to be sincerely loyal to the State as well as to the Church; second, the grant to the same party of that autonomy and self-government which is an essential character of a really democratic policy. A democracy under the absolute control of an infallible and irresponsible power is nonsense. Pius could do neither. Although personally unconcerned about the temporal power, yet he was not bold enough to disregard the traditions of the Vatican policy and to overcome the influence of his environment; and on the other hand he was too conscious of his infallibility and of the divine character

of his authority to admit any limitation to it in his relations with Catholic believers, even in matters of political and social program.

The other alternative was chosen. The Pope granted to the Catholics permission to take part in the electoral campaign, not however, with a platform and candidates of their own, but only to help with their votes men of the various reactionary parties in order to defeat the Socialist candidates for Parliament. Obligated to make a choice between the old Liberal party, which had deprived the Pope of his temporal power but which had given to him the law of guarantees, and the Socialist party with its hostility to religion in general, Pius did not hesitate. But the great majority of the Catholics did not dissimulate their dissatisfaction; they felt deeply humiliated that after so many years of work to organize themselves and to get ready for the day, they would only be allowed to make their political *début* in a secondary rôle, as supporters of the old discredited Liberal party, creating the impression among the masses that the Catholic party was radically opposed to a program of much needed social reform. And their claims were such that the Pope at the next election did not dare to oppose entirely their wishes. They were allowed to have at least a number of candidates of their own, and, although without official approval but with the tacit consent of the Vatican, a Catholic group was formed in the Italian Parliament. It was not strong, having only about twenty members; it was not brilliant; but it represented a definite step towards the complete abolition of the old system, which had kept the Catholics from taking part officially in the political life of the country.

It did not take long for the Vatican to realize that it was not an easy task now to keep the Catholic group of the Parliament under a strict control. The Catholic deputies, challenged in the Chamber by the Radicals to

formulate their attitude towards the papal claims against Italy, did not hesitate to express their unbounded loyalty to the institutions and the unity of the nation with Rome as capital. The *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Vatican, grumbled, and remarked that the deputies of the Catholic group did not represent at all officially the Catholic organizations, because the Pope never had explicitly recognized them, and therefore their feelings and their words were not to be taken as inspired or in accordance with those of the Vatican. There became apparent then the fundamental equivocation which was inherent in the Catholic political organization; that is to say, on the one hand the Vatican claimed full and exclusive control of the organization and its representatives, and on the other hand refused to assume official responsibility for the natural and practical results of its activity. As a matter of fact, the Pope could not assume such a responsibility. Being the head of the universal Church, he could not allow him self to become the responsible leader of a political party in the Italian kingdom without descending from his high rank and creating a great danger for the Church, the danger of identifying the Church itself with a local political party and exposing it to the unavoidable consequence of paying the price of an eventual defeat with the same party. But, on the other hand, to resign the control of the Italian Catholic party was too much of a revolution for the Vatican policy; it was a humiliating confession of lack of power over the Catholic masses and a radical change of attitude which could not be expected from the Pope, unless as an extreme necessity.

Such was the situation of the Italian Catholics and the Vatican in regard to Italian political life when the Great War began. We have been told again and again that the Vatican had strong German sympathies and that its policy was pro-German to the core. Perhaps that is

not true; the Vatican may have been really and sincerely neutral from the very beginning, but in regard to Italy there was no hesitation. Italy's neutrality became a vital issue, and to prevent Italy from joining the Allies the Vatican played all the trump cards that were in its hands. Its failure was due to the Italian Catholic party.

The conflict which hindered from the beginning the efficiency of the Catholic party — the moral and practical impossibility of harmonizing in thought and action the allegiance to the Church required by their religious connections and the allegiance to the State required by their political interests — came to the crucial point when it became impossible to live as usual through daily expedients and compromises and to avoid definitely taking sides. The official leaders of the Catholic organizations and their official papers did all they could in support of the papal order to work for keeping Italy out of the war, but the great majority of the Catholics joined the Nationalists, who advocated Italy's intervention on the side of the Allies. And when war was declared, the Catholic group in Parliament not only supported the government but shared its responsibility by having two members in the Italian war cabinet. It was the first time in the modern history of Italy that militant Catholics belonging to Catholic organizations, usually under the control of the Vatican, became executive members of that government which is styled by the Church as a usurper, and as such is branded by the Canon law and by Pontifical decrees as an enemy of the Church and is excommunicated. The Vatican remained silent; but the official leaders of the Catholic organizations did not conceal their disapproval of the step taken by the Catholic parliamentary group, and started that unfortunate propaganda which, supported by the famous appeal for peace issued by the Pope in August, 1917, concurred unconsciously, together with the more violent Socialist propaganda, to produce the



disaster of Caporetto. The disaster, to be sure, was not what the Pope and the Catholic official leaders expected and wanted; and the heroic reaction by the Italian people was such that both took hurriedly a step backward, and while the Pope let himself express feelings of sympathy and love for Italy such as no Pope had manifested since 1870, the Catholic leaders cast aside all hesitation and became at once more nationalist than the Nationalists themselves.

In the history of the Roman Pontificate there perhaps cannot be found a more unfortunate Pontifical document than the above-mentioned appeal of Pope Benedict XV of August 16, 1917. It was equivocal in itself, and it could be, and it was, misinterpreted and ill used by both parties. The common assumption is that the appeal to the nations for a non-victory peace was made by the Pope at the request and for the benefit of Austria, in danger of imminent overthrow. There is some truth in such an assumption. The Pope could not but be very anxious to save from total ruin the Hapsburg monarchy; which was the only one left in Europe under which the Catholic Church, although kept under control, enjoyed still the position of privilege of the old regime.

But more than to protect Austria or to hinder Italy and the Allies from crushing Germany, there was in the mind of the Pope a higher and more definite purpose in issuing that appeal, apparently directed to the various belligerent governments, but in fact directed to the Catholic masses of the whole world. The real and manifest purpose of the appeal was to warn Catholics of the imminent danger of a general *social* outbreak threatening all the nations, and to spur them to action in order to impose upon the various governments a speedy peace without victory, which would enable the conservative forces of the Allied countries, as well as of the Central Empires, to get together and form a coalition against the common

enemy — *social revolution*. From the very beginning, when Socialism from the field of abstract theories passed to a practical activity, and became a political party with a program of social reform inspired by a materialistic conception of history and life, the Church of Rome began to worry a great deal as to the prospect of a triumphant Socialistic regime. The fact that Italian Socialism — with which the Popes and the Roman Curia were more closely acquainted than with Socialism at large — was from the very beginning radically anti-religious and had started against the priests and the Church a violent campaign very effective among the working and rural classes of Italy — this fact made the Vatican so afraid of everything that was or seemed to be connected with Socialism, that in the eyes of the Pope Socialism became no less than the beast of the Apocalypse. As a matter of fact, the Pope had reason to be worried. There was and still is a humoristic Socialist paper, *L'Asino*, published in Rome, which for years did not fail to present every week to its thousands of readers vulgar, and more frequently indecent, caricatures of priests and of the Popes themselves, which were surpassed in lack of good taste only by those to be found in the famous book of Martin Luther, *Abbildung des Bapstum (Popery Pictured)*, published in Wittenberg in 1545.

Moral scandals of priests, unavoidable in a country where there are thousands of priests and not all carefully chosen and properly educated, were the daily delight of all the Socialist papers, and the corruption of the clergy was described in dark colors as being the legitimate outcome of the teaching of the Church itself. As a whole, this campaign, aiming to represent the Church as identified with corruption and hypocrisy, tyranny and exploitation, and as such with the greatest enemy of the progress and welfare of the humble classes, succeeded very well. In cities and towns where the Socialist party

converted the majority of the population, churches were deserted, priests insulted and sometimes even chased away by popular mobs. The Vatican had a good sample of what would happen in Italy to the Church if Socialism were to establish a new regime under its control. No wonder that Pope Pius X, who during all his Pontificate was an easy mark for the caricatures and attacks of the Socialists, conceived such an *odium theologicum* against them that he did not hesitate to condemn the Christian Democrats, who did not conceal their sympathies for a part of the Socialist minimum program. It was this horror of everything having a Socialist flavor that led Pius, as we noticed above, to overcome his hatred of the old Italian Liberal party, to break Leo's policy of keeping the Italian Catholics outside the political life of the country, and to adopt the new policy of obliging them to undertake an electoral campaign in support of the candidates of the Conservative parties against the Socialist leaders.

At the beginning of the great European conflict, the Vatican sounded very early the alarm against the social revolution likely to come out of the evils of the war. Almost daily the *Osservatore Romano*, the official organ of the Roman Curia, published articles and pessimistic comments on the events of the day, and the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the bimonthly review of the Roman Jesuits, took upon itself the task of Cassandra, the prophetess of desolation, admonishing kings and governments of the impending ruin. And when the Russian revolution came to fulfill those prophecies, the Vatican, far from rejoicing, felt the iron grip of the revolution near, and raised higher the warning cry: "Et nunc reges intelligite, erudimini qui iudicatis terram." It was at such a psychological moment that Benedict XV wrote his appeal for peace and it was as an attempt to stop the rising tide of revolution that he published it. But the Catholics of the world

were not responsive and did nothing to impress the various governments in the direction wanted by the Pope. Only a group among the Italian clergy and Catholic laity took seriously the appeal of Benedict, and, as was said above, that propaganda concurred unintentionally in bringing about the disaster of Caporetto.

At the end of the war it seemed that the Papacy had been left more isolated than before 1914. As a matter of fact the German revolution seemed rather hostile to the Church even in Catholic Bavaria. In Hungary where the Catholic bishops were the richest landowners and a highly influential force in politics, the Socialist regime deprived them at once of their princely estates and privileges and of their political standing. The Hapsburg of Austria, the Wittelsbach of Bavaria, the house of Saxony, and other minor Catholic royal dynasties, were wiped out, leaving the king of Spain the only crowned head in the world in communion with the Pope. England also was resentful both for the Vatican's attitude in the Irish question and for the Pope's violent protest against any arrangement in Palestine which would deny a position of privilege to the Catholics. France and Belgium were supposed to have not yet forgotten that the Pope did not raise his voice openly against German violation of the treaties and German atrocities.

But really the situation was not so bad as it looked. The European nations for one reason or another, but primarily because they emerged from the war exhausted and in sore need of bringing together in a solid block all the constructive energies of the nation, were anxious to avoid any split among the conservative parties and to gain the support and the hearty coöperation of the Catholic population and the Catholic clergy. It is not to be forgotten also, that in all the belligerent countries the clergy both secular and regular, during the war did their full duty earning the respect and the admiration even of

their religious opponents and acquiring a new and stronger influence over the populations; while on the other hand the papal diplomacy throughout the whole conflict rendered, under the direction of the Pope himself, very valuable humanitarian services to all the countries, especially in matter of relief and exchange of prisoners. No wonder, therefore, that in the course of the last months we have seen all the European governments, the old ones as well as the newly organized, eager to enter in cordial relation with the Vatican, and even in France the proposal of reëstablishing the Vatican Embassy has come again on the foreground of national politics with a great probability of success. We do not know how in a long run the new international situation brought about by the war will affect the organization of the Catholic Church, but there is no doubt that for the moment it is perhaps the only Church which, because of its strong central organization, has emerged from the chaos with the same if not larger powers and influence than it possessed before. Among other things the war has put an end to the long period of religious-political concordats, which were still in vigor in many European countries, and the Pope has already acquired, or is bound to acquire very soon, the full control of the Catholic Episcopate, and through it of the Church in all the new states emerging from the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, without the hindrances of the secular power. And under the new liberal regime of those countries the Catholic Church will undoubtedly spread more rapidly than in the past.

As for its relation with Italy, the events of the last four years have altered radically too the situation of the Vatican. A restoration of the temporal power was already out of the question even before the war. Leo XIII was the last Pope who cherished the dream of such a restoration and carried it with him to his Pontifical tomb in

Saint Peter's. What his successors aimed at was only the internationalization of the Law of Guarantees, that is to say, an international agreement to guarantee to the Pope the character of a sovereign. The Allied victory and the exclusion of the Pope from the Paris Conference gave the last blow to the illusions of the papal diplomacy, and made it once more evident that Italy will never be induced to accept an international control in its relation with the Papacy. Resignation was necessary, and the new Vatican attitude towards the Roman question was well manifested by the words of Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State of Pope Benedict: "The Holy See relies upon the *free will of the Italian people* made wiser and more illuminated in so far as it concerns the independence of the Pope." It was not a renunciation of the old claims, for this the Papacy never will make officially, but it was its equivalent for a practical program of political activity, to be carried on by the Italian Catholic party.

The Pope never recognized officially the existence of a Catholic group in the Italian Parliament, much less approved of their participation in the government. But such a group was in existence and its members had been elected by the votes of the Catholic organizations, which were not only recognized by the Pope, but were supposed to be under his control, because their executive boards were appointed by the Pope himself. Never was there a stranger situation than that of a political party whose representatives the Parliamentary group elected by its votes, instead of representing the party and of being considered as carrying out its program, were on the contrary left to formulate and adopt a program of their own, some points of which were irreconcilable with the general policy of the Vatican which controlled the party.

To find a way from such an impasse was not easy; there was no solution which could be applied with satisfaction. To take a step backward and return to the polit-

ical aloofness imposed upon the Italian Catholics by Leo XIII was out of the question; the war had so strengthened the national feeling among them that not a soul would have obeyed, not even under threat of excommunication. To follow the lines of policy inaugurated by Pius X and lend the Catholic forces to the support of the old conservative and reactionary parties of Italy not only would be against the wishes of the great majority of the Catholics themselves, but would identify the Catholic program with that of a class whose control over politics is in decay and rapidly disappearing; and it never is good to be on the side of the loser. A step further was therefore necessary. Would the Pope recognize the existence of the Catholic Parliamentary group and heal the internal dissent and straighten out the situation of the whole Catholic party? It seemed the most logical solution and yet it was the less likely to be adopted, because the Pope cannot assume the responsibility of a political party. Again, to escape such a responsibility it would have been necessary to grant to the Catholic party a complete autonomy. The situation came to be again the same it had been when Pope Pius X was confronted with the young Catholic Democratic party, fifteen years before. And again the Vatican was unwilling to abdicate the political control of the Italian Catholics, especially in a period in which the menace of a social revolution, so hostile to the Church in general and to the Papacy in particular, had become so serious and threatening to the life of the whole Italian nation.

But while in 1907 Pope Pius X could safely condemn, *pollice verso*, the young *Lega Democratica Cristiana*, which claimed autonomy and self-determination in outlining a political program, Benedict XV could not do the same in 1919 with the Catholic Parliamentary group, which had already acquired such an importance in the political life of the nation as to be represented by two

members in the Cabinet. On the other hand, if, according to the words of Cardinal Gasparri quoted above, the Papacy has come truly to rely only upon the free will of the Italian people for the final solution of the Roman question, it is evident that the free will of the Italian Catholic majority hoped for would not be able to manifest itself efficiently unless a political Catholic party were allowed to be organized, with the purpose of acquiring one day or another the control of the government. Moreover, Benedict XV became fully aware that concessions were to be made to the general social tendencies of the progressive Catholics, and that the vague indefinite formulæ expounded by Leo's old Encyclical and presented as a universal panacea for all the social evils, needed a more practical interpretation, if they were to be taken seriously and be of some use in counteracting the influence of the Socialist party. Accordingly, the period in which the Vatican felt obliged to curse *in odium auctoris* everything that had even a Socialist flavor, came to an end, and a new plank was thrown over the gulf between the Roman Church and the modern world.

That was done through a new compromise. The old Catholic party, such as it was when reorganized at the beginning of Benedict's Pontificate, was kept unmolested and unchanged under the official control of the Vatican. But side by side with it a new political party was allowed to be formed by militant Catholics, under the name of *Partito Popolare Italiano*, which, having no professed Catholic character in its title, disclaimed any control by the Vatican and by the ecclesiastical authority in general over its organization and political activity.

The Pope neither approved nor disapproved officially of the new organization and its program. The silence of the official spheres means only that the Pope, with a prudent reserve due to his character of supreme head of the Church universal, does not identify himself and the



Church officially with the *Partito*, just as he is not identified with all other Catholic political organizations of the various countries of the world. But on the other hand, this silent reserve of the Vatican does not mean at all that the new *Partito* enjoys that full independence of the Curia, that real autonomy, which may be found more or less in the Catholic parties of other countries. There are many facts which make us think the opposite to be true. As a matter of fact, the general secretary and *magna pars* of the new *Partito* is a Sicilian priest, D. Sturzo, known for his devotion to the Papacy, and any one who knows how strict are the rules laid down by Pope Pius X and still in full vigor about the participation of the Italian clergy in political movements and associations, realizes immediately that the presence of D. Sturzo in the capacity of general secretary of the *Partito*, means that directions for the *Partito* come from the Vatican and that under him they will be faithfully obeyed. The fact, however, that the Pope granted by silent acquiescence at least an apparent autonomy to the *Partito* is very important and far-reaching in its consequences on Italian political life.

But there is more. The program outlined by the new party is in the main identical with the politico-social program published almost at the same time by the four American Catholic bishops of the Committee on special war activities of the National War Council under the title "Social Reconstruction." It is well known that the American program was given a hearty approval by the Pope in his letter addressed to the American Catholic hierarchy in May, 1919. Both programs, the Italian as well as the American, embody the latest concessions that the Catholic Church has made to the radical social tendencies of the times. The difference between the two programs is that the American is concerned more directly with the details of a social reconstruction, while the Ital-

ian, on account of the circumstances in which the *Partito Popolare* was born, involves also a number of local political questions and some fundamental political principles with interpretations of them, which, at least in part, are not traditional in the Catholic official teaching.

The social part of the Italian program is bold and radical enough. It advocates the syndicalist organization of the workers, which was condemned in 1914 by Pius X, and asks for class representation in the legislative bodies of the nation. The vote for women, administrative autonomy of the provinces, reform of bureaucracy, protection of small property owners, are among other measures of improvement demanded; but more emphasis is laid upon the necessity of legislation which would make general the adoption of the coöperative system in industries, as a step toward a reasonable socialization of the producing forces of the nation, and also for effective laws to provide in a satisfactory way for the needs of old age, sickness, and unemployment. The nationalistic note is strong through the whole program, and the national aspirations of the moment are indorsed without reservation, although a vote is also formulated for the abolition of national armies and for a society of nations. As a whole it is a program that every democratic-progressive party could accept without many modifications. From the point of view of the Catholic Church it represents such a bold step as nobody would have thought possible a few years ago, when almost all of its articles would have met with condemnation. It must have been very difficult for the Curia to yield in so many points to the radical tendencies of the young *Partito*, but it will be still more difficult to carry such a program into practice without affecting deeply the spirit and the organization of the Church itself in Italy.

The *Partito* had been in life only a few months when the Italian War Parliament was finally dissolved, after hav-

ing passed a new electoral law, by which the old uni-nominal electoral districts were abolished, and the system of pluri-nominal districts with lists of candidates on party tickets was adopted, leaving thus a place for representatives of minorities. Such a law was in favor both of the Socialists and of the Catholics, and they made the best of it. Supported energetically by the whole clergy, and having candidates chosen with a remarkably comprehensive criterium, the *Partito* reported a signaled victory on election day. More than one hundred seats were conquered, and the *Partito* is now second only to the Socialists in number of deputies belonging to a single party in Parliament. From the first day it became evident that the great battle for the control of Italian politics will be among those two parties, and that at the crucial moment the other groups must rally around them.

But from the beginning also it became evident that there are among the Catholics of the *Partito* two tendencies, or rather that there is within it a considerable and bold group of deputies who are more radical than the *Partito* can afford to be at the present moment, and who in the matter of social questions share more fully the Socialist point of view than that of the Catholic leaders, and as a matter of fact they, more than once, have cast their votes with the Socialists, breaking the party discipline. Will the *Partito* be strong and vital enough to overcome this internal crisis, and to establish such a sound party consciousness as that which gave to the German Center party almost the control of the Reichstag for many years? And if it does, will this internal accord be reached on the ground held by the more conservative tendency, or on that of the radicals? And in the latter case, will the Vatican go so far as to indorse their revolutionary program? This is the problem.

Up to the present day the Vatican officially ignores the *Partito*. No doubt, however, that *les enfants terribles*

must have been called more than once *ad reddendam rationem* of their rebellion, but it is still too early to foresee what the future has in store for the *Partito*. It is very probable that for a while the conservative tendency will prevail in it and that the more or less secret instructions of the Vatican will be followed; but it is probable also that the logic of events will in time lead the *Partito* to conquer and to affirm openly and in fact that full independence from an irresponsible power behind the scene, that real autonomy, which will be necessary to its life, and of which now it possesses only the appearance granted to it by way of compromise. What will then the Vatican do? Will it, rather than accept the fact of the real autonomy of the *Partito* and all the consequences of it, disavow the *Partito*, withdraw its favor and support, decide to retire again behind the trenches and to enjoin upon the Italian Catholics to refrain again from taking part in the political life of their country?

Such a task would be as impossible as to push back the running water of a stream to its source; but even to try would be extremely dangerous. It would alienate from the Papacy the young true Italian democracy, which has already conquered the greatest majority of Italian militant Catholics. It is from the ranks of these Catholics that the Roman Curia has received its capable leaders, its skillful diplomats, its energetic prelates, and its Popes. The consequence therefore of a definitive estrangement of the Vatican from the Italian democracy would be so far-reaching that the Italian members of the Curia are anything but cheerful in foreseeing what would happen in case such an event were ever realized. But there are, as there have always been in the past, non-Italian elements at work in the Curia, to whom the idea of the great Roman Bishop taking up his residence in Maynooth or in Boston or Baltimore would appear so full of possibilities and thrill as to compensate the Church for the loss

of Italy's new democracy. And they add oil to the fire. But Rome has not forgotten the captivity of Avignon. The lesson then taught to the Church was such that no Pope can afford to forget it and be bold enough to renew an experiment which proved almost fatal to the whole of Roman Christianity. That is why the Popes must be Italian and must come to terms with Italian democracy.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE BOOK OF JUDGES, WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.** C. F. BURNET, D.Litt., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford. Rivingtons. 1918. Pp. cxxviii, 528, with maps and phototype plates.

Professor Burney's preface, after reminding us that Biblical science does not stand still, and that we should be daily widening the basis of our research, declares that "for himself, he can say with truth that such first-hand acquaintance with the Babylonian and Assyrian language and literature as he has been able to acquire during the past fourteen years or so, has revolutionized his outlook upon Old Testament studies." It is with no little trepidation, therefore, that one takes up this bulky volume of 650 closely-printed pages. But apprehension soon gives way to a sense of relief; for, although the book contains a vast amount of material not hitherto found in works on the Book of Judges, it contains little that, even if universally accepted, would seriously affect the prevailing processes and opinions of Biblical scholarship.

The chief results of the author's occupation with Assyriological learning are to be found in his admittedly disproportionate dissertations on questions which lie beyond or aside from the subject-matter of the Book of Judges. Thus there is a long section (64 pages) of the Introduction devoted to "External information bearing on the period of Judges," which sets forth and discusses with great detail all that is known — and supposed — concerning the history of Palestine and Syria, as well as Mesopotamia and parts of Asia Minor, before ever the Israelites appeared upon the stage. Some of this is highly speculative, one "if" being piled upon another until the whole edifice leans dangerously, and a great deal of it would be more in place in technical Assyriological journals; but conservative Old Testament science has no positive quarrel with it. So also with the excursus on "Yahwe or Yahu, originally an Amorite deity" (pp. 243 ff.). Old Testament scholars are well aware that the name Yahwe is not Hebrew, and must therefore have been derived by the Palestinian Israelites either from some foreign source or else from their own foreign ancestors. To be sure, the Amorites themselves, according to Professor Burney, spoke a language nearly identical with Hebrew, so that the question remains as to whence they in their turn acquired title to the god. But we are content to leave the matter

there. Nor are we much shocked to find another "additional note" on the "Early identification of Yahwe with the Moon-god" (pp. 249 ff.), a deity whose worship will have extended from Ur of the Chaldees in southern Babylonia to Haran in the north, and thence again to the wilderness of Sin on the borders of Egypt. For if Hebrew *Yahwe* is the same as *Yahu* or *Yatum* or *Ya* of the Babylonian inscriptions, then, *Sin* being the moon-god of Babylonia, the Babylonian names *Ya-ma-e-ra-ah*, that is "Ya indeed is the moon," and *Sin-ya-tum*, that is "Sin is Yatum," and the Hebrew name *Sinai*, that is "Sin's mountain," combine to attest the fact that Yahwe was at one time identical with the moon-god Sin; a conclusion confirmed by the circumstance that a North Arabian tribe of Yahwe-worshippers was called *Jerahmeel*, which is (being interpreted as a species of Hebraeo-Babylonian jargon) "the moon indeed is god"! Such may be the hole of the pit whence Yahwe was digged. It is only when we are told that the words of Exodus 24 9-11, "Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel; and they saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it were a pavement of sapphire, and as the heaven itself for clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of Israel he put not forth his hand; and they beheld the deity, and did eat and drink" — that these words betray familiarity with Yahwe's lunar past, and suggest "the spectacle of the moon, riding at the full in the deep sapphire sky," that we are inclined to balk. One may, if one chooses, identify the bearer of the name *Yahu* in the Babylonian records with the Moon-god or anything else, in the absence of evidence to the contrary; but one must be careful not to let the Israelites of the historic period know that the talk is of their national deity. For they would hardly have allowed the prophet Elijah to travel forty days and forty nights beyond the southern confines of Canaan, to a cave on Mount Horeb, for an interview with the moon; or have dealt so savagely with a recognized fellow servant of the moon as they did with Sihon, king of the Amorites. And we may add — it is the author who raises the question — that Christians, at any rate, will probably continue to think "the alternative conception of a revelation in human form less unspiritual."

More sane and to the point is the essay on "The use of writing among the Israelites in the times of the Judges" (pp. 253 ff.), although this too is somewhat marred by a fantastic Assyriological note on the "Sumerio-Akkadian" origin of the Phoenician alphabet. The author's treatment of historical questions is naturally more successful where the field is less nebulous and the data more tangible.

For example, the section of the Introduction on the chronology of the Book of Judges furnishes an excellent conspectus of that involved subject, and, except for the erroneous assumption of the trustworthiness of the genealogy in I Samuel 14 3 (a demonstrable scribal concoction), leaves little to be desired. The first business, however, of a commentary on an ancient text is, not to discuss the historical problems which it suggests, but to determine, so far as possible, when and in what environment the writer of it wrote, just what he said, and what he meant. When this much has been achieved by the exegete, the historian may take up the task — preferably in a separate volume.

With regard to the composition and date of the Book of Judges, the author adopts in the main the conventional critical view. Our present book is a post-exilic enlargement of an earlier work, the so-called Deuteronomistic Judges; which was in turn merely a homiletical edition, with introduction and notes, of certain narrative extracts from a composite "prophetical" history book identical with the JE source of the Pentateuch and Joshua. Chapters 1 1-2 5, 9, 16, and 17-21 were not included in that edition, but were inserted, chiefly from the still extant JE source, by the post-exilic redactor R<sup>P</sup>. Professor Burney departs from the current view, however, in denying emphatically that the earlier edition of Judges is properly characterized as Deuteronomistic, holding that, on the contrary, it antedated the Deuteronomic legislation and reform, to the development of which it very materially contributed. The principal argument for this contention is linguistic: unlike Joshua and Kings, the Book of Judges contains few of the stock phrases of Deuteronomy, showing affinity rather with the language of Joshua 24 and I Samuel 12, which are commonly assigned to the later stratum of the E document. He accordingly designates the earlier editor R<sup>E2</sup>, "Redactor of the late Ephraimitic School," instead of R<sup>D</sup>. The linguistic argument is by no means conclusive; for it is quite conceivable that, of two writers equally dominated by the Deuteronomic point of view and teaching, one should adhere more slavishly to the phraseology of Deuteronomy than the other; and the theological pragmatism of Judges, which after all is the important thing, is sufficiently akin to that of Kings. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that Professor Burney has furnished reason enough for a reconsideration of the critical position at this point, especially if, as has been plausibly maintained, the earlier Book of Judges embraced material now found in the first twelve chapters of the Book of Samuel. Unfortunately, he threatens to complicate the discussion with a theory of



his own as to the North Israelitish origin of Deuteronomy, which he promises to set forth in a future publication. When he does so, he will doubtless not overlook the fact that the theory involves the defense of the Samaritan as against the Jewish interpretation of Deuteronomy 12.

Only occasionally does the author hesitate to resolve the narratives themselves into their constituent elements, J, E, E<sup>2</sup>, and R<sup>JE</sup>. He detects both J and E material in the stories of Ehud, Gideon, Abimelech, and Jephthah, as well as in chapters 17-21. The prose story of Deborah and Barak is mainly E, though contaminated with matter from another source; the Song of Deborah came in with E; the story of Samson is J. In the judgment of the present writer, it is by no means certain that two primary sources underlie so many of the narratives even of the Deuteronomistic Judges; while it is absolutely certain that no second source was ever employed in the stories of the Migration of the Danites and the Benjamite War, where Professor Burney's analytical *tour de force* reminds of nothing so much as of the late Professor Green's satirical "analysis" of the parable of the Prodigal Son.<sup>1</sup> The important fact, which our author has failed to perceive, is that the sections inserted in the Book of Judges by the post-exilic redactor, from the still extant extra-canonical ancient literature, had an entirely different history. It is an unwarranted, though too prevalent, assumption that all the pre-exilic narratives contained in our books of Genesis to Samuel are descended in a single and direct line from the union, sometime in the seventh century, of the two documents which critics label J and E. For the rest, the characterization of the J and E national histories as "prophetical," although quite the fashion among a certain class of writers on the Old Testament, has little justification, and should be abandoned, in the interest alike of accuracy and of more fruitful research. E is a somewhat uncertain quantity; in particular, matter designated E<sup>2</sup> is not easily distinguished from that which is assigned to R<sup>JE</sup> and subsequent redactions. But the J document, upon any entertainable theory of its date and compass, affords no justification whatever for the name "prophetical."

Quite the least satisfactory part of the book is the section devoted to the elucidation of the Song of Deborah, which occupies no less than 81 pages. Besides a voluminous running commentary on the text, there is a discussion of the art of Hebrew versification in general, a "detailed examination of the rhythm of the Song," a chapter on

<sup>1</sup> "Auch im Alten Testament kann die literarische Analyse zum Kinderspiel ausarten." Wellhausen, *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, p. 57.

its "climactic parallelism," an English translation (printed twice in full) reproducing the supposed "rhythm" of the original, and a complete transliteration of the restored Hebrew text as it was pronounced in pre-Masoretic times (!) — with this result, by way of illustration:

Awáke, | awáke, | Deboráh!  
 Awáke, | awáke, | sing páean!  
 Ríse | Barák, | and lead cáptive  
 Thy cáptors, | O són | of Abinó'am!  
 Cóme, | ye commánders | of Ísrael!  
 Ye that volunteéred | among the péople, || bléss ye | Yahwéh!  
 Let the riders | on táwny || she-ásses | revíew it,  
 And lét | the wayfárers || recáll it | to mínd!  
 Hárk | to the máidens || láúghing at | the wélls!  
 Thére | they recoúnt || the righteous ácts| , of Yahwéh,  
 The righteous ácts | of his árm | in Ísrael.

This represents a "strophe" of the original (as restored by transposition, emendation, and conjectural interpretation), showing five lines of three accents each, followed by five lines of four accents, and a final line of three accents. It must not be supposed, however, that the remaining "strophes" of the song exhibit the same scheme. On the contrary, each "strophe" is a law unto itself. So that one wonders how the poor Hebrews ever divined what rhythmization was expected of them without the aid of Professor Burney's space-rules to guide them. As to the transliteration and rhythmization of the original, if the author himself has succeeded in pronouncing *hammikh-naddabhtim, baggabbortim, umizZabhulún, tubarrakhi, wattuyabbabh*, with but one accent as indicated, and as demanded by his "rhythm," he has performed a phonetic miracle, the wonder of which is not lessened by the specimen of *alliterative* poetry from "Piers Plowman" misguidedly adduced in the addendum on page xiv. It will be noticed from the above example, moreover, that the ancient Hebrew poets actually practiced *enjambement*! For the rest, the statement that "the theory of Hebrew rhythm expounded by Sievers is now generally adapted [adopted ?] by scholars" (p. 100) could have been made only by a writer who had failed to grasp the essence of that theory, and was but superficially acquainted with the literature of the subject. So far from being now followed "very generally" by scholars, there is reason to doubt that the theory has been entertained by Sievers himself since the year 1908, when its very foundations were demolished.

In general, the author's textual criticism and interpretation, while undeniably exhibiting abundant erudition and almost incalculable

labor, fall far short of the rigidly scientific standards set by Professor Moore's publications of twenty-odd years ago. To mention just one point, it seems incredible that a scholar living in Oxford should have contented himself with the notoriously inadequate and unreliable footnotes of Kittel's edition of the Hebrew Bible for the readings of a text so important for the Book of Judges as that of the Codex Lugdunensis.

Such spellings as Joshua', Hosea', Gide'on, Cana'an, Cana'anite, are neither English nor transliterated Hebrew.

WILLIAM R. ARNOLD.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

**THE PRESENT CONFLICT OF IDEALS. A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WORLD WAR. RALPH BARTON PERRY. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1918. Pp. xiii, 549.**

Professor Perry has given his readers two books in one; the first an examination of the moral and religious aspects of contemporary philosophical tendencies, the second a study of the national characteristics and the political traditions of Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States. The dozen chapters which make up the latter part of the volume belong essentially to the literature of the war, and have now lost some, though by no means all, of their pertinency and interest. But the conflict with which most of the book deals has its seat chiefly in men's minds, and its fighting lines are drawn without regard to national boundaries. It is not, in spite of the title, merely a conflict of "ideals" which Professor Perry describes; it is more largely with rival conceptions of the general nature of things, of the implications of man's cognitive and moral experience, of the relation to human interests and ideals of the reality which envelops them, that he is concerned. The book, in short, has even more to do with the philosophy of religion, in the broadest sense of the term, than with ethics; though no single label could easily do justice to the range of its themes. Few of the more significant tendencies of contemporary thought are left unconsidered. Nor does Professor Perry, in the present volume, limit his interest to the philosophy of the schools. Strindberg and Maeterlinck find their place along with the more technical moralists; neither "Billy" Sunday nor George Moore is altogether ignored, among the samples of the mind of the twentieth century, and Ian Hay jostles Hegel in the

index. I know of no single book in English which at once surveys so widely and interprets, in the main, so understandingly the movement of ideas in our time, or comes so near to being a comprehensive record and analysis of the thoughts which our generation has had concerning the world we live in and the meaning of life. Professor Perry has the gift of condensing without distorting, and of being brief without being obscure; and he has therefore been able to crowd into some four hundred pages a remarkable wealth both of lucid exposition and of significant criticism.

When a book ranges over so many and so diverse issues, the reviewer must necessarily select, for serious critical discussion, only one or two of its theses. The readers of this Review will perhaps look with most interest for Professor Perry's account of the religious and practical implications of the "neo-realistic" teaching of the group of American philosophers to which he belongs. One finds with some surprise that but a single chapter is devoted to this subject, though "realism" is one of the four generic types of contemporary philosophy under which the author attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to subsume the entire mass of contemporary opinions which he sets forth — the other three being "naturalism," "idealism" and "pragmatism."

It is essential to distinguish first between those elements of Professor Perry's practical philosophy which result from his neo-realistic principles, and those which he happens to hold on quite other grounds. This distinction he himself tends to forget. "Realism," he tells us, "is theistic in its religion." But in point of fact, from neo-realism as a premise the truth of theism is very certainly not deducible. All that Professor Perry can legitimately mean is that he sees in realism no repugnancy to some kind of theistic faith, and that, for his part, he accepts such a faith. *Why* he does so, what "arguments for the existence of God" he finds convincing, he nowhere intimates. But he does not leave us in much doubt as to the kind of God he believes in. It is the temporal, finite, and struggling God of J. S. Mill and William James, of Mr. Wells and a growing company of our contemporaries. This temporalistic theology has obvious affinities with realism, inasmuch as it is irreconcilable with a genuinely idealistic epistemology. Consistent idealism is bound to conceive "true reality" as eternally complete, comprehending all time and all experience in its absolute unity. But a temporalistic theology is not necessarily irreconcilable with a spiritualistic metaphysics; and in any case, its affinity is not specifically with the "new" realism but with realism in general.

When then we look for the moral and religious implications which are distinctive of this newer philosophy, we find apparently only two. In the first place, we are told, the neo-realist "accepts the mathematical and logical part of the Platonic realism;" that is, he holds that the properties and relations of universals, "the necessities of logical implication," are existent facts independent of mind, just as he holds that physical objects, their relations and interactions, are independent existents. And this "strain of Platonic realism" has certain implications "of emotional and practical significance." For example, it excludes pure materialism; for the universals are of course neither corporeal nor psychical, but "neutral" with respect to the psycho-physical distinction. And in the contemplation of this realm of supersensible realities and timeless truths some neo-realists find a species of religious satisfaction and of consolation for the futilities of the temporal order. Some neo-realists; but hardly Professor Perry himself. For he is not one of those who see in these cold and barren ecstasies of the logician the end and consummation of human life; nor is it sufficient for him to know merely that, though all man's hopes were frustrate and all man's efforts vain, nevertheless "truth is so." His interest is manifestly in the business of the temporal universe; it is a "religion of action" that appeals to him. And such a religion is possible only if we have some assurance that we live in a world in which man's deliberations and discoveries, his purposes and deeds, are relevant and efficacious, and his ideals have at least a fighting chance of fulfillment.

It is, Professor Perry thinks, a distinguishing merit of neo-realism that it is "the only philosophy to provide such a world." It alone can without inconsistency "admit consciousness into the natural world as a genuine dynamic agent." Absolute idealism fails to do this because of its conception of "reality" as eternally complete and perfect, and as requiring as predeterminate ingredients in its perfection both all the finite evil and all the finite good that actual experience contains. But for a very different reason Professor Perry finds that the older or dualistic kind of realism is equally incapable of giving significance to human action. For it regards consciousness "as a peculiar substance, absolutely distinct from corporeal substance," and therefore as "incapable of entering into any commerce with it." Neo-realism, however, maintains the doctrine of the "immanence of consciousness"; it declares that mind is "homogeneous with its environment" and therefore "interactive with it."

This contrast between the "new" or monistic and the dualistic realism seems to me to limp upon both its legs. It is not the case,

on the one hand, that all or most dualistic realists infer from the distinction between minds or ideas and their external objects that the former are "incapable of entering into any commerce" with the latter. Doubtless Professor Perry thinks that dualists *ought* to draw such an inference; but as he offers no argument to show why they ought, he must be said to deal in a rather dogmatic and cavalier fashion with an important and difficult issue. On the other hand, it is not the case that monistic realism admits anything which can significantly and distinctively be called "mind" or "consciousness" into the natural world as a dynamic agent.

For when the neo-realist tells us that consciousness is "homogeneous" with the physical environment, he is, with some delicacy of language, denying that anything resembling what both philosophers and laymen have hitherto meant by "consciousness" exists at all. Consciousness, as commonly conceived, has certain definite attributes and powers. It can, as men have supposed, look before and after, representing both past and future in present ideas without thereby making either past or future actual. It can dream dreams, evoking images of things which do not exist, and of some which never can exist, in the physical world. It can apprehend meanings and "references" and can, in its deliberations, feel the constraining force of purely logical necessities. And it can take the form of moral self-consciousness, and, even in the act of making the interests of other selves its own, find the significance and the glow of this experience in the knowledge that those selves are not "immanent" in itself but are truly other — are distinct and independent bearers of values and possessors of interests. But a so-called "consciousness" which is strictly "homogeneous" with the external environment — which "differs from bodies very much [*sic*; the author should in consistency have said "simply"] as one bodily system differs from another" — can possess none of these powers or attributes; for the external environment, as science represents it, knows naught of them, and "bodily systems" *are* "bodily" only in so far as they lack them. No doubt the neo-realist would reply that his "strain of Platonic realism" saves him here; that at least meanings, logical relations, values, are for him a part of the total objective (but not exclusively material) order which constitutes the environment of the human organism, and can therefore properly be included by him among the contents of a consciousness homogeneous with that environment. Yet the reply does not meet the difficulty. For it is only as universals that these "neutral entities" find a place in the neo-realist's universe. But a pure universal, unindividuated, existing neither in

time nor space, obviously cannot be a "dynamic agent in the natural world." In short, the realm of Platonic ideas contains elements resembling certain of the distinctive elements of consciousness, but it cannot act; matter can in some sense act, but it contains nothing resembling the distinctive elements of consciousness. But as the whole of reality is, for the neo-realist, made up exclusively of these two parts — of Platonic universals *plus* material particles diversely arranged in space and time — his scheme of things nowhere affords room for any reality which *both* possesses the actual properties of consciousness and also is capable of being "a genuine dynamic agent."

In its metaphysics, in short, neo-realism is — but for its otiose appendage of Platonic realism — a soft-spoken, if not a "tender-minded," materialism. This appears most plainly of all perhaps in Professor Perry's intimation that when the new realism speaks of "mind" it uses the word in a purely "behavioristic" sense. Now behaviorism as a method of experimental inquiry in psychology has its place and finds practical justification in its results. But behaviorism as a metaphysics is simply naturalism gone mad. It conceives the whole process of consciousness in terms of physical stimulus and bodily response. It recognizes in the experience of an individual no elements which are not, at least potentially, wholly open to the direct sensible observation of other individuals — no elements, in other words, which are anything more than visible or tangible movements of the muscles or other parts of the animal mechanism. In all this, it incidentally stultifies itself; for the behaviorist philosopher puts forward his doctrine as meaningful and true, and as reached through logical processes — and yet "truth" and "meaning" can have no place among the strictly behavioristic categories, and the theory cannot recognize any such thing as the determination of the action of an animal (even though the animal be a philosopher) by logical reflection as such. If we apply the behaviorist's principles to himself, we must treat his arguments and conclusions merely as so much "animal behavior," that is, as movements of the muscles of (*e.g.*) his throat or forearm, and as nothing more.

Yet of course Professor Perry does not follow his premises out to the absurdities in which they logically result; nor — as has been seen — does he himself discover in his neo-realism the practical implications which are proper to it. On the contrary, through a considerable part of the book he carries on a vigorous polemic against naturalism; and his own practical philosophy is eminently sane, humanistic, insistent upon the efficacy of ideas and of ideals, upon the potency of man's reason both in the direction of his bodily be-

havior and the modification of his physical environment. This happy inconsistency (as it appears to me to be) seems to have come about, in Professor Perry's case as in others, in a simple and natural way. His reflection upon the problem of perceptual knowledge early persuaded him that the possibility of such knowledge is inconceivable unless the object perceived and the percept "in consciousness" are literally identical. This "epistemological monism" (being construed realistically rather than idealistically) was then converted, logically enough, into a psychophysical monism, into the doctrine that consciousness, or the content and processes which make it up, are "homogeneous" with the physical environment. But having thus metaphysically identified "mind" with "bodily systems," the new realist then quietly reads into the "bodily systems" the contents, relations, and activities which he knows, and everybody knows, actually to belong to our experience, however foreign to the physicist's conception of the properties and motion of matter. The psychical lamb, in short, is supposed to be swallowed by the materialistic lion; but when, after blood-curdling growls and the crunching of tender bones, the deglutition is finished, what appears before one is not a lion but a lamb. Yet the legerdemain by which this reassuring substitution is accomplished will hardly escape the observant spectator; nor can I believe that Professor Perry himself will remain permanently unaware of it.

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THE SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MODERN WORLD. EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE. (University of Chicago Publications in Religious Education. Handbooks of Ethics and Religion.) University of Chicago Press. 1919. Pp. xi, 352. \$2.00.

In the large and rapidly filling section devoted to "Missions" in all the larger institutional libraries there may be found at least a couple of shelves of books dealing with the special subject, "History of Missions." Here are books attempting to cover the entire history as well as monographs treating various periods and fields, like Lemuel C. Barnes' *Two Thousand Years of Missions before Carey*, G. F. Maclear's *History of Christian Missions during the Middle Ages*, and Julius Richter's *History of Protestant Missions in the Near East*. A brief historical review of the special point of view of these historical books will disclose pertinently the nature of the change which has taken place in the concept of Christianity and of Christian Missions.



In the first two-score years of the modern period Missions were still largely a brave adventure into an almost unknown situation. Accordingly the most interesting, and perhaps the most profitable, review of their work which could be given at that stage used to be gathered in reports of heroic journeys to distant lands, thrilling personal experiences of pioneers, and many curious bits of information about strange peoples. Such was the kind of history which is to be found in Smith and Choulis' *Origin and History of Missions*. After five-score years the missionary enterprise was still regarded, and perhaps not unnaturally, as quite a distinct process from ordinary worldly affairs. Baptized converts needed to be gathered out from heathendom, and organized into church communities independently of the rest of the world; the value of the Christian Gospel which the missionaries were sent out to dispense was believed to be for an other-worldly application. Accordingly, the appropriate method of surveying such a series of events was by historical annals of an enterprise largely distinct from current events. Such was the kind of history sketched by works like D. L. Leonard's *A Hundred Years of Missions*; though the centennial epoch was bringing an appreciation of some of the sociological significance of Christian Missions, as in James S. Dennis' *Foreign Missions after a Century*.

The long story has been rehearsed from many points of interest. It has been set forth as an array of facts in chronological succession or in geographical areas. There are several chronicles, like George Smith's *Short History of Christian Missions*, F. M. Bliss' *Concise History of Missions*, and A. D. Mason's *Outlines of Missionary History*. There are also larger compendia more crowded with details, like C. H. Robinson's *History of Christian Missions*. But while there exist length and breadth in the spread of Christianity in the world, there exist also heights and depths and lights and shadows. To make use of another simile, there are also intricate interweavings with the great web of human events, connections made and long stretches dropped, which result in a curious design for Christianity in the output of the loom of history. In the hands of the erudite German Professor Gustave Warneck an *Outline of Protestant Missions from the Reformation* is simply a special study in modern Church History. In the hands of the evangelist and thrilling religious editor, A. T. Pierson, *The New Acts of the Apostles or the Marvel of Modern Missions* and *The Miracles of Missions or Modern Marvels in the History of the Missionary Enterprise* (four volumes) are simply a collection of wonder-tales, repeating apostolic events, and reporting how a supernatural gospel was brought and vindicated to a wicked world,

without much interest in historical relations or even in historical accuracy.

A vital relation between modern Christian Missions and contemporary events was first brought forth with abundance of carefully documented facts by a broad-minded successful missionary administrator, Dr. Robert E. Speer, Secretary of one of the largest American Boards of Foreign Missions. In his substantial two-volume *Missions and Modern History* the connection of the Christian ideal and the actual Christian endeavor is shown in the case of thirteen important movements selected from the history of the nineteenth century. Since then the method of a large historical orientation of the specialized effort to spread Christianity has been variously attempted, e.g., by an admirable English book surveying *The Expansion of Christendom*, by Mrs. Carus-Wilson.

However, it has remained until the agonies of the Great War for a Harvard professor, who is the President of the oldest Foreign Mission Board in the United States, to envisage the task and the accomplishments of Christianity more intimately and more comprehensively by setting the history of *The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World* into the vast and intricate framework of modern history as a whole. Here the sense of the marvelous, the sacred, and the wicked too has not been lost in the swift traversing of great events of the whole world. Not quite so frequently as in the narratives of avowedly miraculous events, yet not infrequently, there do occur, here in balanced and sober survey of history, phrases like "it is only to be wondered at" (p. 183), "it seems strange" (p. 189), and "truly amazing" (p. 207). But what evokes attention is not so much individual incidents as the marked contrasts, the mighty achievements, and also the incompleteness of the process. Laments indeed are expressed, but not so much over the deficiencies of non-Christian religious systems and the prospects of the unsaved heathen as over the abuses which have been perpetrated by professing Christians and the new evils which have been introduced from the West into the new situations in Africa and the East (see pp. 82, 270, 304, 311). Not pessimistically but discriminatingly and with hope, it is shown how the processes of advancing civilization have included both pathetic failures and gratifying successes. The proselytizing task which formerly had been deemed fairly simple, being merely "religious," is now seen to be immensely complicated with factors racial, social, governmental, economic, and with all the diversities in human nature and its environment.

Professor Moore's book is a product both of researches in the study and of experience in administrative headquarters. It is a notable

example and vindication of the best modern interpretation of Christianity and its world-wide enterprise. In contrast with the separatist point of view which, not absolutely yet too largely, prevailed in the former historians of Christianity and of Christian Missions, this latest historian presents a Christian gospel which is more immediately, more extensively, and more intensively redemptive. The situation which needs to be saved is now seen to be not less perilous; the genuine results, more glorious; the need of divine empowerment, more urgent.

"A world-view is never a substitute for religion. Amelioration is not redemption" (p. 88).

"Religion is the only remedy that we have against an inherent tendency of high civilization to destroy character and personality. What is needed is still that kind of ministry which none among men has ever so exemplified as did Jesus, and which true followers of Christ seek to exemplify. It is the alchemy which can make a son of God and a saint out of the most forlorn being in an untransformed world, but which will also infallibly set that saint upon the transformation of his world" (p. 90).

The book gives a liberal course in modern history as well as a record of Christian Missions and an insight into the meaning of Christianity. The historian's stern task of setting forth a wide sweep of events is accomplished with an abundance of narrated facts, fascinating pictures of personalities, incisive judgments, and brilliant generalizations. Perhaps the nearest comparison for scholarliness, though not of course for material, would be with a treatment which has been given to the earliest period in the history of Christianity by Harnack in his *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*. The addition of a map or maps to accompany the course of the history, especially of the various geographical areas of the world, would leave almost nothing to be desired in a volume which, both in form and in spirit, takes a worthy place in a notable series of textbooks in religion.

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PROGRESSIVE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN AMERICA. JOHN W. BUCKHAM.  
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 352. \$2.00.

To reveal to many the thoughts of their hearts is a service deserving gratitude; especially when the thoughts are not individual only, and when a development is exhibited with those of others. The solitary thinker gains courage and fuller understanding of himself when he becomes aware that he is part of a "movement," and the

world knows better where it stands when the thoughts of different minds are shown tending in a common direction.

Professor Buckham has performed this service for readers who are interested in rationality in religious thinking. His aim has been to do for the last seventy years or so in America what Principal Tulloch did for Great Britain in the nineteenth century. He has chosen six men who possessed "the great gift of Christian reasonableness," has shown the contribution of each to the broadening path of Christian thought, and has mentioned more briefly others who set up guide-posts along the way. The six studied in detail are Theodore T. Munger, George A. Gordon, William J. Tucker, Egbert C. Smyth, Washington Gladden, and Newman Smyth; while among the others are Horace Bushnell, William E. Channing, Henry Ward Beecher, Lyman Abbott, and James M. Whiton.

The studies show careful insight, and combine critical analysis of work with personal appreciation. "If in some cases," says Professor Buckham, "they suggest eulogies or even panegyrics, it is because personal contact has begotten in the author a deep but, he trusts, not unintelligent admiration for men whose breadth and earnestness of thought issued from a like nobility of mind and character" (p. vii). We do not need the author's apology to note that they do perhaps too often resemble eulogies. A glowing halo placed on every head leads the beholder to question the judgment which places it, and therefore to discount the distinction conveyed. Purple adjectives should, in their own interest, be used sparingly. Yet a better portrait is generally painted by an artist who is enthusiastic over his sitter than by one whose grudging hand raises a doubt as to his friendliness and therefore his judiciousness.

If a word were chosen to express the characteristic tone of all the men Professor Buckham describes, a tone which constitutes their thought a New Theology, it would perhaps be reality. It is a sequence to the gospel which Carlyle in his early days thundered forth. Every doctrine or opinion must accord with the facts of life and interpret them. It must be recognized as such by me before I may say I believe it. The difference between every New Theology — for there have been countless such — and its predecessor is that the older rests still in some respects on grounds external to the believer, while the newer is based on personal affirmation. The enfranchised soul says to its former conventional self, "Now we believe, not because of thy saying, for we have heard ourselves and know."

This note of reality the author finds in Bushnell's insistence on the Christian life as normal rather than alien, on intuition as a necessary

element in the reception of truth, on his breaking down the barrier between the natural and the supernatural, and on his erection of a vital Christ as the light and centre of Christian theology.

Munger found the distinctive mark of the New Theology not so much in a new set of doctrines as in a new attitude of spirit. He took theology away from the narrow realm it had established for itself and insisted that it must be at home in literature and science and the whole sphere of human knowledge.

In Dr. Gordon the analyst finds that comprehensiveness which led the older theologians into system-making, but here extended beyond any system. He completes what Bushnell began. He has been, in Professor Buckham's opinion, original in depth of apprehension of the old, and in his restoration to theology of imagination, feeling, beauty, so that his sermons are filled with theology and yet are "great lyrics."

President Tucker is characterized by public-mindedness. He has felt the spiritual meaning and value of the unity of humanity, has felt that this must express itself through authority and sympathy in the social work of the church. He may almost be called the father of the social activities in which all churches are today more or less engaged.

The most important work of Egbert C. Smyth was as an interpreter of the past, especially as an exponent of the true function and interpretation of creeds. The face value of a creed is by no means necessarily its true meaning; it cannot be understood apart from the conditions out of which it grew. It is to be regarded as a kind of algebraic formula or "summary of the principles which are to be applied and developed from generation to generation."

While Dr. Tucker put the social impetus into practical action, Washington Gladden took the new sense of social solidarity and by it as a factor multiplied theology. He worked over doctrines such as the Divine sovereignty, static revelation, a substitutionary atonement, till he brought out of them nourishing food such as fatherhood, an ever-present spirit, vicariousness, the inspiring revelation of God in Christ. Through his efforts "out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness." With his vivid social consciousness he became an ardent advocate of concord among the churches and peace among the nations.

Newman Smyth is the prophet of the evolutionary method applied to theology. Science investigates the processes through which life has come to be what it is, and Dr. Smyth declares that this is what theology too does in its so-called dogmas. They are statements, by

no means final, of the facts of life. He insists that the scientific spirit is a form of religion.

The study of the work of these men is appreciative and just. An omission in the book is a lack of treatment of the Unitarian movement, the effect of which was so deep not only in the first third of the last century, but which profoundly affected the thought of the period of which Professor Buckham writes. Perhaps this omission was necessary in brevity of treatment. It would be almost impossible to trace how much this or that man owed to the impetus Unitarianism gave. Yet some mention of that impetus would have been in place, even if no space were given to so important an element in it as Theodore Parker, with his insistence on the imperative dominance of conscience.

The last chapter of the book contains a valuable criticism of the New Theology in its relation to the future of theologic thought in America. Professor Buckham finds the central interest of the New Theology in the study of personality, and this, he holds, is the key to the theology of the future. He has given a sympathetic, judicious, and important interpretation to the school of thought of which he writes.

Every one who knows the labor of preparing an index will be grateful for the book's three ample indexes — one of names referred to, one of subjects, and one of volumes by the authors mentioned.

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**SPIRITUALISM AND ITS HISTORY, PHENOMENA, AND DOCTRINE.** J. ARTHUR HILL. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 316. \$2.00.

**WHAT IS THIS SPIRITUALISM?** HORACE LEAF. George H. Doran Co. 1919. Pp. 185. \$1.50.

The anxieties and bereavements of the war have produced in England wide, deep, and intense interest not only in psychic research, but also in the more positive and less academic Spiritualism, towards which the former seems to be swiftly and surely moving. Of the large output of books on the subject, the two mentioned above are fairly representative both in their resemblances and their differences. Mr. Hill's is more of the old-time psychic-research type, rather cautious and reserved, while Mr. Leaf's belongs squarely to the propaganda of Spiritualism. The former author is more ready than the latter to admit fraud, pronounces the evidence of materialization and Home's levitation inconclusive, acknowledges more fully the influence

of telepathy and the subliminal, and, in general, inspires greater confidence in his candor and mental poise. Yet the resemblances are striking. Both writers, for example, regard the "discerning of spirits," mentioned among the gifts of the early church, as a clairvoyant power to see invisible beings — Myers ought to set his living friends right on the meaning of New Testament Greek. Disregarding such minor matters, we find both agreeing as to the existence of a psychic force subsisting in a highly attenuated form of matter ("psychoplasm" is Mr. Leaf's name for it) which is projected from the body of the medium and perhaps also from the bodies of sitters, to which the physical phenomena are attributed. Mr. Leaf is alone, however, in finding in this theory an explanation of what is usually deemed convincing evidence of mediumistic fraud. If some part of the supposed spirit was surreptitiously marked with some colored material and after the séance the mark was found on the body of the medium, the latter was naturally discredited; but, says Mr. Leaf, "The solution to the mystery was found when it was discovered that the substance composing the materialized form was extracted from corresponding parts of the medium's body. On the form dematerializing, these elements returned to the psychic's body, carrying with them the incriminating marks" (p. 135). Both agree also that there are facts exhibited by psychics for which ordinary methods of acquiring knowledge or exercising force cannot account, and that while the subliminal consciousness and telepathy may in part explain them (although each hypothesis must be stretched almost to the breaking point) the theory of spirit communication and operation offers a simpler as well as more satisfactory solution of the problem. Now that is the precise point at which many halt. They acknowledge that there are facts, well-established but mysterious, for which explanation is demanded. Some of them can be explained plausibly without reference to spirits — dowsing, for instance, raps and table-tipping, unless these spell out an intelligible message. For others, such as automatic writing and oral communications, the hypothesis of dissociated personality or subliminal consciousness is plausible, especially in connection with telepathy, which, however, has not itself been adequately proved. There seems to be, nevertheless, a residue of facts for which the hypothesis of spirits does appear to offer a more satisfactory interpretation, and it depends very largely (as Mr. Hill points out in his pages on Belief) upon one's general mental attitude whether he will regard all the mysterious facts from the side of the residue, or the residue in the light of principles found applicable to part of the class. The convinced believer

in Spiritualism insists that only such as have had actual personal experience with these phenomena and are familiar with *nuances* which cannot be reported are competent to an opinion, and the claim must be an awkward one for theologians who maintain that their science rests upon immediate experience. But there are others who cannot bring themselves to psychologize upon a mother's grave, who know full well that if in a séance a mother's spirit should appear to be communicating, cool judgment would be completely overborne by loving emotion, and such persons must be convinced by published reports. Most of these persons probably feel that, in all the circumstances, a verdict of not proven is the only one they can honestly render; the evidence is not strong enough for full acceptance, but it is too strong for flat denial. Yet they may believe in immortality nevertheless, for there may well be survival without communication, although of course proved communication would demonstrate survival.

W. W. FENN.

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THE WORK OF PREACHING. ARTHUR S. HOYT. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. 382. \$1.50.

VITAL ELEMENTS OF PREACHING. ARTHUR S. HOYT. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. 326. \$1.50.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PREACHING. CHARLES S. GARDNER. The Macmillan Co. 1918. Pp. 389. \$2.00.

THE WAR AND PREACHING. JOHN KELMAN. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 213.

Of the making of books on preaching there is no end, perhaps because there is no standard treatise on Homiletics which dominates the field. Furthermore, since the voice from the pulpit must speak to each generation in the manner to which it will listen gladly, it is essential that the preacher's emphasis and form should change and grow from decade to decade.

Among recent books on Homiletics those of Professor Hoyt are well known and useful. His treatise, *The Work of Preaching*, first appeared in 1905, but in its present form a good deal of new material has been added. The volume is well arranged and suggestive, and has been written out of a large experience and wide study of the subject. His advice to the young preacher is eminently practical, and he supplements his own words by convenient references to a few of the older books upon the subject.



In *Vital Elements of Preaching* he has written for those who have already begun to preach. The book is one which many a minister could read and ponder with profit, particularly those chapters which deal with "The Preacher of this Age," and with preaching for special groups or occasions. The two books cover somewhat the same ground and have more or less common material, especially in the way of illustrations.

In *Psychology and Preaching* Professor Gardner of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville has undertaken to do for preachers what volumes on educational psychology have done for teachers. He begins by discussing the general mental processes, goes on to a review of the phenomena of feeling, belief, attention, and suggestion, and concludes with a discussion of the psychology of groups as seen in assemblies, occupational types, and in "the modern mind." The best chapters in the book are those on "Assemblies" and "Mental Epidemics," which have many useful suggestions of advice and warning for the preacher. Indeed the whole theme of the book is one which has received relatively little attention from preachers or from teachers of Homiletics, who may well be grateful to Professor Gardner for his discussion of the subject. What he has done, however, is but to give a psychological analysis of the factors which the great preachers of all ages have instinctively felt and acted upon. Consequently there is little in his book that is new for the reader who has had any training in psychology or for the preacher who has studied his art with care and discrimination. It must furthermore be said that the first half of the book is rather dry and technical and that a volume half the size would have held the meat of what Professor Gardner has to say.

And could not the whole subject be most satisfactorily dealt with in a book on Homiletics which should state — as few books on Homiletics have done — the psychological bases for the methods taught?

*The War and Preaching* is the forty-fifth series of the Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching at Yale — that remarkable foundation which has given to the world so many admirable contributions to the study of Homiletics. Dr. Kelman, at the time minister of St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh, but now of New York, has wisely refrained from attempting any formal treatise on a subject already so fully dealt with. Instead he has undertaken to interpret the work of the preacher in the lurid light of the war, of which he himself saw much at close quarters. The result is a modest volume, rather discursive, but full of charm and suggestion, due to the clarity of the

author's style, his wide outlook upon the world, and the moving experiences through which he has passed. Every minister would profit by his lectures entitled "Then Came the War," and "The Soldiers' Creed;" but indeed the whole book abounds in passages weighted with suggestions for the alert preacher, who seldom finds a vein so heavily loaded with ore.

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## THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS AND ROMAN CHRISTIANITY

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It may be gathered not only from the tone of his admonitions but from at least one specific reference (13 19), that the author of Hebrews was himself associated with the community to which he wrote. His Epistle may therefore be accepted as evidence for the religious position of the readers, as well as of the teacher who addressed them.

The question of destination cannot be regarded by any means as settled, but the weight of critical opinion is more and more in favor of Rome. In this paper I propose to deal more especially with the theological considerations which, to my mind, bear out this hypothesis. The arguments from the literary side are familiar, and it will be enough to recall them with the briefest comment.

From the use of the Epistle by Clement not many years after the probable date of its composition, we know that the Roman church was well acquainted with it, almost from the outset. It is possible, no doubt, that copies of it had found their way to Rome from some Eastern church, but we can hardly assume that it passed so immediately into general circulation. The natural inference from Clement's use of it is certainly that it was the peculiar possession of the Roman church.

The closing salutation, *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*, implies that it was written either from or to Italy, in other words Rome; for no mere local community could thus speak for Italian Christians in general. Of the two possible interpretations of the ambiguous phrase, the more reasonable one is clearly that some little Italian colony sends greetings to the home church. This is the more probable as the author of Hebrews does not write, like Clement, in the name of the community, and it would be beyond his province to offer a general salutation. What he appears to do is simply to include the Italian friends who were with him in his greetings to an Italian church. It may be added that the comprehensive term "Italy" has a special fitness if the Epistle was sent to Rome from some distant city, where all Italian Christians would form a single group. The evidence of the salutation is of course compromised by the doubt as to whether the closing chapter is an original part of the Epistle. To my mind the case for the negative has little to stand upon. There is no visible break between any of those concluding verses and what goes before; and the very fact that the writing has no epistolary beginning is strong proof that the ending is genuine. A late editor, anxious to assimilate Hebrews to the Pauline Epistles, would not be likely to leave his work half done.

The circumstances of the church addressed, so far as we can gather them from the various allusions, all point to Rome. It is a church with a long and honorable history. Eminent teachers have labored in it, and have shown a noble example. It has distinguished itself by its liberality and many-sided beneficence. In a peculiar degree it has been exposed to persecution. Here, it is true, we meet with the gravest argument against the Roman destination, for the references to persecution are altogether too mild for a church that had suffered the terrible outrage under Nero. But it must be borne in mind that

the Epistle is addressed to the existing community, which had never been called on to endure a heroic test. Possibly there is a reminiscence of the Neronian persecution in the eulogy of bygone teachers—*ὧν ἀναθεωροῦντες τὴν ἑκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς, μιμήσθε τὴν πίστιν* (13 7).

It has often been pointed out that the Epistle contemplates a body of readers who were all living under the same peculiar conditions, and that it cannot therefore have been addressed to the great miscellaneous community at Rome. The argument is perfectly valid; but rightly considered, it furnishes one of the most convincing proofs of the Roman destination. The writer has in view a church within the church — a select company to whom he can address warnings and instructions of a very definite kind. An audience of this nature presupposes one of the large centres of the Christian mission, and we should look for it most naturally in Rome.

Here, however, we touch on a point which seems to me vital for the understanding of the Epistle, and which has been too generally overlooked. Not only is it clear that the writer addresses himself to a separate group within a larger community, but indications are given as to the character of this group. It consisted of mature converts — men who ought themselves to be teachers, and for whom the common instruction in the elements of the doctrine of Christ has ceased to be necessary. The church has a right to expect that they should make paths for the more ignorant to walk in (12 12), and that they should take a certain oversight of their brethren (12 14). It is significant that in his warnings to them the writer says practically nothing of the grosser sins, against which the hortatory sections of other Epistles are mainly directed. They are supposed to have outgrown those pagan immoralities and to be facing subtler temptations — apathy, self-complacency, carelessness about their progress in faith and knowledge.

It may be gathered, therefore, that Hebrews is addressed to a limited circle, called to the study of Christian truth in its higher aspects. That the *τέλειοι* formed a class apart we know from Paul's explicit statement in 1 Cor. 2; and the same fact can be inferred, with hardly less certainty, from the practice which Mark attributes to Jesus of imparting the "mystery of the Kingdom" to the inner circle of his disciples. It is quite unnecessary to conclude that in the church there was a distinction between initiates and ordinary members, as in the pagan cults. We can well understand how the division might have come about of its own accord, as a matter of practical convenience. For purposes of instruction the raw converts, to whom Christian doctrine and morality were utterly strange, would need to be taken separately from those who were more naturally gifted and had advanced to a further stage. We may assume that every community of any importance had its little circle of *τέλειοι*, to whom a teacher could speak freely on the higher matters of Christian knowledge. In a city like Rome, they may have formed a considerable group, meeting separately for religious study, under the guidance of some revered leader. I would suggest that in Hebrews we have a discourse prepared by this master for his disciples at a time when he was parted from them for a considerable period. It is not so much a letter as an address or lecture to be delivered in his name, but he takes the opportunity of adding a few personal notes and greetings at the close.

If the Epistle is thus intended for an inner group of advanced converts, a light is thrown on its real character. It aims at the deeper interpretation of the ordinary beliefs; in other words it is an example of the Gnosis which was cultivated in the primitive church. Just as Paul had a wisdom which he spoke among the *τέλειοι*, so this teacher communicates a doctrine which goes far beyond the usual instruction. He is aware that his readers will find it novel

and difficult, and doubts whether they are yet prepared for these high speculations. He approaches his main theme by careful degrees, and makes a solemn pause before he at last divulges it. In its content, as well as in the manner of its introduction, the doctrine bears all the marks of Gnosis. It is admittedly concerned with the higher world which lies beyond our senses (cf. 2 5). It takes its departure from a cryptic utterance of Scripture. The writer is conscious that he owes his insight to a special illumination, and that he can only proceed "if God permit." His teaching certainly contains nothing that is Gnostic in the later sinister sense. It does not blend Christian ideas with pagan theosophy, and makes no claim to be occult or esoteric, except in so far as it appeals only to mature, enlightened minds. But we must remember that there was a Christian Gnosis, which was not the least valued of the gifts of the Spirit. A great teacher was expected not merely to impart the accepted tradition but to throw light on its further implications, confirming faith by knowledge. Almost from the beginning this speculative activity seems to have gone hand in hand with the transmission of what had been received.

If the Epistle is to be viewed as primarily an example of Gnosis, it stands on a different footing from other early writings, and any account of its teaching must be subject to certain reservations. For one thing, we need not try to extract from it a complete system of theology. The writer's aim is to discuss one peculiar doctrine — a doctrine to which he no doubt attaches the highest importance, but which does not by any means exhaust his whole presentation of the gospel. Again, his Gnosis by its very nature is supplementary to the normal beliefs of the church. It is intended for those who desire "to press on to perfection," to explore the ultimate significance of the work of Christ. But it presupposes the whole body of belief which they already hold in common with their

Christian brethren, and which in itself is sufficient for salvation. Once more, the doctrine in question is not to be taken as in any sense representative. Attempts have often been made to construe the Epistle as the manifesto of some school or party which rested its Christianity on a belief in the priesthood of Christ. It is true that suggestions of this belief can be discovered elsewhere, but there is no indication that it was widely current, much less that any definite type of doctrine had grown out of it. The writer advances it as his own Gnosis, his new and peculiar interpretation of the work of Christ.

The more we examine the Epistle the more we realize how much is *assumed* in it, and how closely its specific teaching is bound up with those underlying assumptions. For all his boldness in speculation the writer is not an original mind in the same sense as Paul or the Fourth Evangelist. He makes no effort to grasp the Christian message as a whole, and think it over again in terms adequate to a new and profound experience. He is content to stand on the common Christian ground, and to work out the hidden implications of ideas that must be taken for granted. The significance of the Epistle resides no less in all that it presupposes than in the new doctrine which it contributes.

It has been necessary to discuss at some length the nature of the Epistle before considering its relation to Roman Christianity. That it was written to Rome by an accredited teacher of the Roman church may fairly be surmised on the ground of the literary evidence; but the peculiarities of its doctrine seem foreign, at first sight, to anything that we know of Roman thought. The difficulty, however, largely disappears when we make allowance for its specific character as a Gnosis, not a mere popular homily. When we come to examine it with this proviso, we find a number of features in its teaching which seem to have their true explanation in its Roman origin.



In the first place, it reflects a mode of thinking which diverges widely from that of Paul. Every one would now admit that the characteristic Pauline doctrines are absent, that Pauline terms are used in a totally different sense, that the interpretation of the work of Christ has hardly a point in common with Paulinism. But the tradition that this document is somehow connected with Paul is dying hard. In most handbooks of New Testament theology it is still classed vaguely as deutero-Pauline, even when the marks that differentiate it from Paul's writings are set in the clearest relief. It seems to me that the first thing necessary to any intelligent study of the Epistle is to rid our minds entirely of this Pauline obsession. A certain affinity with Paul no doubt exists, but it concerns only the larger assumptions with which the writer works. He accepts the usual apocalyptic scheme; he thinks of Christ as a divine or angelic being and lays a central emphasis on his death; he brings Christian ideas into line with contemporary speculation. But from all this it is futile to argue his dependence on Paul. We can only infer that he too was affected, on the one hand, by the primitive Christian and, on the other, by the Hellenistic tradition. The significant fact is not that the two thinkers have a few broad conceptions in common, but that they throw them into different combinations, each of them unconscious that another construction is possible. On the hypothesis that Hebrews is a product of Roman Christianity, this divergence from Paulinism is capable of an obvious explanation. The Roman church had come into being and grown to maturity apart from the Pauline influence. It had been faced with Paul's problem of adapting the gospel to Gentile conditions and needs, but had solved it in a fashion of its own, and its type of teaching had become more or less fixed before Paul's conclusions could affect it. There may have been other centres of Gentile Christianity outside of the Pauline orbit, but one at least is

known to us; and if the theology of Hebrews is roughly parallel to Paulinism but quite distinct, we have a strong presumption that it arose in the great independent church of Rome.

In Hebrews no trace can be discovered of anything that can properly be called mysticism. There is no suggestion of a union with Christ, or of a new life imparted by him to the believer. The Holy Spirit is viewed simply as the power behind the charismata, or as the source of scriptural revelation. The idea of participation in the divine nature gives way to that of access to God by means of a perfected form of worship. As the Epistle excludes the mystical element generally, so it allows no place to sacramental doctrine. The Eucharist is never even mentioned. To baptism there are several passing allusions, from which we can gather that it marks the formal transition to the Christian life. But it does not appear to be construed mystically, as the act of the new birth, or as the dying and rising with Christ. Its significance is at most that which was assigned to it in the primitive church — a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins. As in the early chapters of Acts, it is coupled with the Old Testament ordinance of the laying on of hands. How are we to account for this falling away of the mystical strain, which is elsewhere dominant in Hellenistic Christianity? Its exclusion from Hebrews is all the more remarkable when we bear in mind the relation of the Epistle to Philonic thought, which is essentially mystical. The fact may be explained partly from the writer's temperament, which responded to the Hellenistic influence on its reflective rather than on its mystical side. It may be explained also from his fidelity, in spite of Alexandrian sympathies, to the Hebraic and primitive Christian tradition. But if we may assume that he represents a Roman type of Christianity, there is yet a further explanation, for as far back as we can go the Roman church has shown itself averse to all forms of mysticism. The

Epistle of Clement takes no account whatever of those aspects of religion which were vital to Paul and the Fourth Evangelist. The *Shepherd of Hermas* may be partially modeled on the *Poimandres*, but in place of mystical speculation it offers imagery, symbolism, allegory. From the beginning the Roman church was preoccupied with moral and ecclesiastical interests, and the conception of Christianity as a new life, an inward fellowship with God, fell wholly into the background. In this connection it may be worth remarking that in Hebrews there seems to be nothing which can be related to the Oriental cults, if we except a few doubtful words (*κύριος, μέσσης, φωτισμός*) belonging to the general religious vocabulary of the time. A similar aloofness from the Oriental ideas is observable in 1 Clement. One is tempted to the inference that in Rome the church assimilated itself to the mystery religions to a far less degree than in Asia Minor. Owing perhaps to a preponderance of the Jewish element, or perhaps to an innate shrinking from mysticism, it took the direction of a reformed Judaism rather than of a Hellenistic theosophy.

The writer of Hebrews conceives of Christianity as a *ὁμολογία*, which it is the duty of the believer to hold fast in spite of all temptations to drift away. This identification of the new faith with a given body of beliefs and practices, which must be accepted once for all, was no doubt a feature of Catholic Christianity in general. But it was congenial in a special degree to the Roman type of mind, and the Roman church seems to have been chiefly instrumental in fixing it. Loyalty to the confession is coupled in the Epistle — and here we can discern another Roman trait — with reverence for the past, for the ancient institutions of Israel and the bygone teachers of the church. From one point of view the writing is nothing but a prolonged plea to live worthily of the past, upholding its traditions and carrying them out to yet higher issues.

Christianity is presented not as a new revelation but as the perfecting of all that was true and significant in the history of the past. More than any other New Testament writer the author of Hebrews stands for the principle of authority; and this, it must be acknowledged, is the theological weakness of the Epistle. For Paul the fundamental truths are the real and vital ones, and he is ever striving to understand them better and grasp them more certainly. For this writer they are so much to be taken for granted, "the rudiments of the doctrine of Christ," from which we must pass on, in the quest for a higher knowledge. In a sense he might be called the first of the scholastics. He sets himself to elaborate a soaring theory on no other ultimate basis than that of authority, the authority of Scripture and of the received "confession." In this feature of the Epistle we may discern not merely the mark of Catholic Christianity, but the individual signature of Rome.

It is not a little remarkable that the polemical motive plays hardly any part in the Epistle. The one reference to "strange teachings" (13 9) is of an incidental nature, and concerns some ascetic tendency which does not seem to have affected any cardinal Christian belief. In other New Testament writings of approximately the same date heresy is already the burning question, but the writer in Hebrews is content to leave it wholly on one side. This may partly be accounted for on the supposition that the Epistle is addressed to a select group of mature converts, in little danger of falling into the extravagances of semi-pagan speculation. But if heresy had begun to be a serious peril to the community at large, some polemic against it could hardly have been avoided. There is fair ground for concluding that the Epistle contemplates a church which as yet had been little troubled by false teaching, and Rome best answers to this condition. All the evidence goes to prove that the effort to drag Christianity into the syncre-

tistic movement began in the East, and did not manifest itself at Rome until a later date. Ignatius does not speak the language of mere compliment when he acknowledges the Roman church to be "filtered clear from every foreign stain." Indeed there are numerous indications that Rome, even when it became the centre of the great Gnostic teachers, did not afford the most congenial soil for their propaganda. It is noticeable that the one reference to false doctrine in our Epistle touches on the same form of error with which Paul deals — in order to condone it — in the fourteenth chapter of Romans. This coincidence must not be pressed, for an interval of about a generation lies between the two Epistles, not to speak of the cataclysm under Nero. At the same time it is not impossible that the ascetic tendency of which Paul is aware had persisted in the Roman church, and had grown to be something of a danger to higher religious interests.

Our Epistle has nothing whatever to say of the cleavage between Jew and Gentile. The old idea that the writer addresses himself to a purely Jewish audience and therefore ignores the alien section of the church, may now, I imagine, be safely discarded. No result of modern criticism seems more assured than that the title, "to the Hebrews," is a misnomer. For the writer the fusion of Jew and Gentile in the new Israel has become so complete that he can transfer to the church, without further question, the prerogatives of God's ancient people. He assumes that the new covenant links itself on to the old and perfects it; that believers, of whatever race they spring, are the sons and heirs of Abraham. This disappearance of the old division is perhaps an evidence of the date of the Epistle more than of its place of origin; but there is reason to believe that at Rome earlier than elsewhere Jews and Gentiles were finally united in one common church. In 1 Clement as in Hebrews the distinction between them is never drawn, and Jewish institutions and ordinances are freely

appealed to as normative for the church. It is easily conceivable that in the larger atmosphere of Rome the early dissensions had rapidly died down, and that the pressure of common danger had also done its part in bringing the two parties in the church together. Moreover, the development of the church as an institution would inevitably work for fusion. At Rome the demand for order and uniformity was always paramount, and ancient lines of division had little chance of maintaining themselves.

Perhaps it is only a matter of accident that the classical passage on the impossibility of repentance after baptism is found in Hebrews (6 4 ff. Cf. also 12 17). The view expressed in the passage was the logical consequence of primitive ideas regarding baptism, and was held, we can scarcely doubt, by Christian teachers generally. None the less, it is the writer of Hebrews who insists on it in emphatic language. Not once only, but on two separate occasions he goes out of his way to declare that repentance after baptism is impossible. One can hardly avoid the impression that between the view so strongly maintained in the Epistle and the polemic in the *Shepherd of Hermas* there is some direct relation. It seems not too bold to conjecture that in the church of Rome the question of post-baptismal repentance had early come to the forefront, and had been discussed with peculiar warmth. The laxer position with which Rome identified itself in the following century may already have found its advocates, and the writer of Hebrews may have felt it necessary to combat it. In this case we should have to reckon him in that succession of conservative leaders who vainly attempted for several centuries to resist the Roman tendency to soften the ancient discipline.

These points of contact with Roman Christianity all belong, as might have been expected, to those larger assumptions which underlie the special thesis of the Epistle. If the doctrine of the heavenly priesthood of Christ is an

example of Gnosis, we may regard it as more or less peculiar to the writer himself. Traces of it may be discovered elsewhere, in early Christian as well as in Jewish apocalyptic literature, and it is more than probable that he avails himself of a conception that was already current. But there is every reason to believe that he was the first who thought of elaborating it into a central Christian doctrine. Not only does he speak of it himself as something new and hard to be understood, but all later versions of it are obviously derived from him, and from him alone. Granting, however, that he works out a speculation of his own, we can well conceive how it might have been suggested to him by Roman influences. In Rome ceremonial aspects of religion were always emphasized. Christianity was not so much a mode of inner communion with God as a purer form of worship, and the whole question of ritual was under constant discussion. Clement, in a passage already referred to, appeals to the priestly ordinances of the Old Testament as still in some measure valid, and as providing a model for the church. Now it is true that the writer of Hebrews has little interest in ecclesiastical order and ceremony. His doctrine of the priesthood of Christ, pushed to its logical conclusion, would make all the external forms of Christian as well as Jewish worship superfluous. Yet it is not difficult to understand how a contemplative mind might be led to this doctrine in a church that was accustomed to think of religion in the terms of ritual. Just as the Fourth Evangelist in the mystical atmosphere of Ephesus conceived of Christianity as an inward divine life, so this Roman thinker would define it to himself as a worship, an approach to God through the ministry of the great High Priest.

The Epistle, whatever may have been its origin, is marked by a curious affinity at once to the earliest and to the latest phases of New Testament thought. On the one hand, it adopts the Alexandrian categories and rests on

the assumptions of Catholic Christianity. Were it not for the definite evidences of its early date we might be disposed to class it with the Apologies of the following century rather than with the writings of the Apostolic age. On the other hand, it is reminiscent of the primitive tradition. In its naïve acceptance of the apocalyptic scheme, its view of Christianity as a perfected Judaism, its interest in the historical Jesus, its rejection of mystical and sacramental ideas, it seems to reflect the attitude of the church in Jerusalem. The two opposite types of thought are never really reconciled. They are interwoven, often with remarkable skill, but the primitive strain can be clearly distinguished from the later one with which it is combined. May we not discover the true explanation of this dual character of the Epistle in the conditions under which Christianity had developed at Rome? It had been introduced, apparently in the very earliest years of the church, by unknown missionaries, who had taught the gospel as it was understood by the mother community. In the church which they founded the original tradition held its own, and was never reinterpreted on Hellenistic lines, as in the Pauline churches. None the less, in a Gentile environment it was bound to come to terms with the Gentile ideas. The primitive type of thought persisted, but was overlaid by a theology with which it had no inner connection. Instead of the fusion which was effected elsewhere by the genius of Paul, there was a process of stratification.

Apart, however, from all debatable questions, there are solid grounds for believing that the Epistle to the Hebrews is our earliest monument of Roman Christianity, and a closer investigation of it from this point of view is much to be desired. No writing in the New Testament has been more unfortunate in its interpreters. Under the influence of false or one-sided theories it has been handed over to specialists in Jewish ritual or Alexandrian philosophy; it



has been treated as the outcome of some obscure side-current in Christian thought, which was destined to lose itself among the sands. A more adequate criticism may come in time to recognize it as a historical document of the first importance, throwing light on the genesis of that type of Christianity which, through the premier church, was at last to win predominance.

## THE INTEGRITY OF THE INTELLECT

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It is characteristic of today that the intellect should require such humble allegiance as that which I offer in this lame and halting discourse.

“But yesterday the word of Reason might  
Have stood against the world; now lies it there,  
And none so poor to do it reverence.”

Among the ancients reason was enthroned as “the ruling faculty” of man, and the essential attribute of God. The greatest of the Christian philosophers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, were its devotees. The seventeenth-century revolt against mediævalism was conducted in its name. In the eighteenth century, to be sure, reason, in the narrower sense, fell off somewhat in prestige; there was less confidence in the method of logic and mathematics. But this was offset by a heightened confidence in man’s powers of observation, so that the intellectual or cognitive faculties as a whole were greatly increased both in authority and in the extent of their dominion.

Since the eighteenth century the intellect has rapidly declined, until today it actually needs friends. Even those who have nominally acted as its friends have contributed to its downfall. I mean those who, like the Hegelians, have inducted reason into a sort of mock kingship, a sort of British monarchy over the empire of being. For by asserting that the real is the rational, by insisting upon having the sun rise and set in the name of reason, these thinkers have reduced reason to a mere symbol, a mere cloak of respectability, in which reality, such as it is, may still be venerated. From other quarters have come rougher if less fatal blows. Modern psychology, speaking for emotion

and instinct, has reduced intellect to impotence over life. Metaphysics has subordinated it to will. Bergson and his followers have charged it with falsehood and issued a general warning against its misrepresentations; while with pragmatists and instrumentalists it is sunk so low that it is dressed in livery and sent to live in the servants' quarters. It is against this last indignity in particular that I wish to speak a word of protest, to the end that the intellect may be accorded full rights within the community of human activities and interests.

Since doctors disagree, we must leave open the question as to whether the war was the result of too much intellect or too little. Dr. Hobhouse of England felt the pulse of suffering humanity, and issued the statement that the war was the result of the recent neglect of the intellect, the result of too much "will to live," too much "*élan vital*," too much of the "it's-true-if-it-works" sort of philosophy. He recommended a quiet life and as much logic as the system could assimilate. But Dr. Boutroux of France made a very different diagnosis, in fact quite the opposite. He said that humanity was suffering from too much science and too little feeling, especially in its Prussian parts; and he prescribed sentiment and milk of human kindness. So we may for the present pass the application by, and content ourselves with discussing the following question in general terms: Is the intellect to be regarded as autonomous and self-sufficient, as pursuing ends of its own, and as judging by standards of its own? or is it to be regarded as the servant of alien interests which impose their ends and standards upon it?

The modern tendency has been towards the latter or practical interpretation of the knowing faculties. This tendency appears to be divisible into four main phases. First, there is the rise of experimentalism in scientific method. The science of the seventeenth century, reflected in Cartesianism, was confident of the power of the rea-

soning processes to reach indubitable certainties. In the next century, however, experimentalism gradually superseded scientific rationalism, affecting first the empirical sciences, then the pure sciences, and finally, in our own day, even mathematics itself. Experiment rests on hypothesis-making, which is evidently a voluntary operation, a case of trial and error, of success or failure. The results of experiment are subject to correction, and can never be indubitably certain; and yet there must be results, such as they are, because man needs them to live by. Thus practical need, rather than logical necessity, reveals itself as the master motive of science. Second, there is the growth of applied science, the increased interest in the control and reconstruction of nature, accompanied by a decline in the practice of meditation or the vocation of the intellectual life. Third, there is the voluntaristic metaphysics, in which the act or impulse of thought is construed as more real than the ideas, its passive states. Or it is argued that the will to think at all, and the willingness to acknowledge reasons, are deeper than the particular reasons for thinking this idea rather than that. Finally, there is the growing influence of biology and the application of biological principles to the human faculties, thought among the rest. Man is said to have brains because they enable him to survive. Intelligence is construed as an organic function, and reason as developed or evolved intelligence.

Among these influences tending to subordinate the intellect there is only one that can be regarded as fundamentally questionable or likely to be reversed in the light of further investigation; and that is the voluntaristic metaphysics. The rest are influences that in a broad sense have come to stay. We cannot expect to see any decline of experimentalism in science, or in the scope and influence of applied science, nor any abandonment of the view that man and his faculties belong to the field of the biological

sciences and are therefore subject to the methods and laws which are proper to that field. In what follows I shall therefore regard these ideas as prescribing terms on which the status of the intellect must be defined. In particular, I shall cordially accept the biological view of the intellect; partly because I believe such a view to be ultimately and philosophically sound; partly because it is in any case acceptable in the limited scientific sense, so that we may, if we wish, waive these ultimate philosophical considerations and still reach conclusions that are in some sense true. In the biological view of the intellect I find nothing derogatory to that faculty; but on the contrary I find a justification even for the most extravagant claims that have been made in its behalf. Let me state what I find, first in general terms, and then with more circumstance and detail.

If we speak of the intellect as an organ in the biological sense, we mean the central nervous system in its cognitive rather than its motor and affective functions. Now this intellectual organ, like any organ, has its office or rôle in the life of the organism as a whole. As it depends on the nutritive, circulatory, and respiratory organs, so these in turn depend on it. It obtains its share of good only by virtue of contributing its share of service. We are taught by biology to believe that the organism carries no passengers, but only members of the crew, each with an allotted part in keeping the ship afloat and bringing it to port. Let me mention some of these duties of the intellect so that we may have them clearly before our minds. Through its sensory mechanisms the intellect enables the organism to time its responses, to keep in touch with occurrences in the environment, and to act opportunely. Through memory and association the intellect enables the organism to profit by the successes and failures of the past, and to learn better. Through the mechanisms of language and ideation the intellect enables the organism to extend the range and

freedom of its behavior by responding to situations distant in space and time, and by initiating action in the absence of an immediately exciting cause. Through its power of discrimination the intellect enables the organism to deal with those more abstract relations of things which are identical, persistent, and recurrent; and so to acquire a kind of concentrated adaptation and equipment — one that is suited to the multiple and varied emergencies of life while being at the same time light enough to carry. Finally, through the integrative action of the nervous system the organism is enabled to adjust its responses among themselves, and thus to proceed smoothly and consistently toward the execution of larger plans and purposes. These are some of the services which the intellect renders to the organism to which it belongs, and by which it earns its passage. Intellection is in this sense on a par with breathing and fighting and food-getting. Like these other functions it may be said to succeed or to fail according as it does or does not accomplish the specific task assigned to it.

Shall we then say that the proof of the intellect is in the living? that a healthy life argues a healthy intellect? that good thinking is whatever works? or that sound knowledge is whatever stands the test of time — whatever is accepted by the surviving minds that have sustained the struggle for existence?

What should we say if a physiologist were to assert that sound digestion is digestion that works, digestion that causes health, long life, and survival? I think we should be bored. It is an obvious, loose, and irrelevant view of the matter. Suppose an expert in military science were asked to define the standards and criteria of good generalship, and he should say, "A good general is one who wins battles." This might do as a *bon mot*, or as a confession of inability to provide an adequate definition; but in any case it evidently evades the issue by means of a

doubtfully true truism — doubtfully true because it is always possible in special circumstances that a good general should lose a battle, or a man with a good digestion find an early grave. In other words, what is called for is the specification of that particular state or activity which is peculiar to good digestion, or to good generalship, *as such*; the distinctive attainment by virtue of which digestion may contribute to health, or generalship to military success. Each of these functions has a success of its own to achieve, by which alone it is a factor in the success of the more general enterprise in which it participates. And this proper, distinctive success is to be judged by its own proper, distinctive standard.

Now let us apply this to the case of the intellect. This organ is a participant in the general organic enterprise, and the success of that enterprise is a rough and probable index of the success of the intellect. But the intellect has its own peculiar work to do, and it may do that work well or ill. Even though it does it well the life as a whole may fail owing to the failure of some other auxiliary function. In that case we may properly say of the intellect, "*That organ was not at fault. It did what was required of it.*" There is, in short, a distinctively intellectual success or failure, which is to be judged in its own proper terms, which is to be found in the state or activity of the intellect itself, and in its relation to the field and materials in which it operates.

But just as a specific organic function has its own peculiar standard and conditions of success and failure, so it may have and usually does have its own immediately inciting interest. Much of the success of pragmatism has been due to its very properly insisting that thinking is a kind of action, that it is impelled by motives and warmed by passions, like any other kind of action. But in its eagerness to insist on the organic status of the intellect, this theory has strangely neglected the originality and in-

dependence of these motives and passions. The term "instrumentalism," which has largely superseded the broader term "pragmatism," emphasizes the subordination of the intellect to ends beyond itself. But the organic analogy does in fact point to quite a different conclusion. Most organic functions are interested in their own behalf. I may even breathe for the sake of breathing. I may identify my soul with my lungs. I may form a cult of "United Breathers" or "Air Worshipers," and count as the supreme moments of my life those which I pass in profound and reverent respiration. Or consider the predatory instinct. This evidently has its place in the economy of life by virtue of providing food for carnivorous animals; but hunting is also an art and a pastime, which many have thought worth cultivating as an end in itself.

What is true of respiration and huntsmanship can scarcely be denied of an activity so developed, so varied, so self-conscious, as that of the intellect. Nor in this case any more than the others, does the subordinate rôle contradict the autonomous rôle. The devotee of breathing or of hunting need not cease to breathe or hunt for vital purposes; nor need the intellectualist, the scientist, the speculative philosopher, because he has cultivated the art of knowing for its own sake, therefore cease to use his mind for the conduct of affairs.

Such being the general thesis for which I contend, I wish now to set forth some of the peculiar and independent interests of the intellect, some of the autonomous activities in which it may discipline and perfect itself, and which will constitute its own unique contribution to life. I should like to distinguish five interests that seem to me to be capable of being independently sustained and that give rise to activities which may be disciplined and controlled by a methodical technique.

1. *Curiosity* is the empirical interest in particular facts, or the logical interest in implicative facts. Both interests



are explorative in character, tending to the expanding of the field of experience from a given center of attention. There is an impulse to look round the corner, or into the inside of what is perceived externally, or on the other side of this side. This is an impulse that drives men on travels and voyages of discovery for the sake of seeing things "first hand." These interests may be highly refined, and express themselves in systematic observation, microscopy, telescoping, analysis, and the pursuit of trains of implication to their conclusion.

2. *Systematic Thought* has its own independent motive, the interest in trying novel combinations of ideas, in building systems of supposition and conjecture. It is the impulse of intellectual inventiveness. This is the chief sustaining interest in the solution of theoretical problems, that is, in contriving combinations of ideas that shall exhibit certain formal characters, such as consistency and simplicity. It is important to note that thinking is never free in the sense of being lawless or without control. Even the most speculative thinking must "mean something," and possess a structure or coherence that is borrowed from the more fundamental relations of logic. The interest in systematic thought is the interest in creating new applications of fundamental structural principles, or in introducing systematic structure into a given subject-matter. So powerful is this interest that it has driven pedants to strange excesses. Students of philosophy will remember the awful effect upon the later Stoics and others of the paradox of the liar. *If you say truly that you are telling a lie, are you lying or telling the truth?* Chrysippus is reputed to have written five books on such "Inexplicables," six books on the Liar itself, a book against those who professed to solve the Liar by a process of division, three books on the solution of the Liar, and a polemic against those who asserted that the Liar had false premises! It is a wonder that Chrysippus did not die of it, like Philetas of Cos,

whose fate is recorded in his epitaph (as translated by Stock):

"Philetas of Cos am I;  
 'T was the Liar made me die,  
 And the bad nights caused thereby."

3. *Verification* has its own sustaining interest, that, namely, which is felt in the case of fulfilled anticipation. The hypothesis is a determinate expectation, a motor set, which may or may not fit the situation to which it points. It is satisfied when one can say, "I told you so," "It is as I thought," "It is as it ought to be." This is the interest in *truth*; truth being the value which attaches to a hypothesis or idea in so far as it fits the environment. The technique of induction is the technique of contriving such determinate expectations as can bear the ordeal of empirical fact.

These three are the intellectual interests proper. They are the *cognitive* or *objective* intellectual interests, interests which submit to control beyond the mind. They signify interest in that which is independent of and external to the interested mind; they move the mind to adapt itself to its environment rather than the environment to itself; they incline the mind to surrender and conform itself to the facts and necessities of being. With these are to be contrasted two pseudo-intellectual interests, which act as auxiliary incentives but which are indifferent and possibly opposed to the cognitive motive of the first three.

4. *Taste*, in the intellectual sense, is the love of the exercise of the cognitive faculties for its own sake and in ways that are congenial. It leads to a selective rather than an explorative sensuous experience, to a neglect of what is not sensuously agreeable, and to a prolongation of what is agreeable. It is especially likely to control the play of ideas and imagery, which are freer and more flexible than perception. There is, for example, a taste for unity, system,

and harmony. But this is not invariable, as is proved by James's relish for a world which he described in Blood's words as "wild, game-flavored as a hawk's wing, never an instant true, ever not quite." Taste may conflict with the interest in truth, as in the case of the ancients' bias for the circle as applied to the motions of celestial bodies.

5. *Belief* is an interest in confident anticipation, in having things settled. This value also is independent of truth in the stricter sense, as is seen in the desire to find a refuge in faith. There is an interest in beliefs that are congruent with desires, that fit other beliefs or the general trend of aspiration, even when such beliefs are contrary to evident fact.

Governed by one or more of these motives, it is possible to lead an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual life. It is possible to be preëminently, artfully, and methodically an explorer of facts, a speculative thinker, an experimental scientist, a devotee of culture, or a man of faith. One may be a specialist, an expert in any of these vocations, and with no thought of the extent to which his attainment ministers to his material success, his length of life, or to the well-being of society. Meanwhile, the usefulness of the intellect is not contradicted by such specialization, any more than the usefulness of bodily strength and skill is contradicted by the cults of athletics or craftsmanship.

It should be noted that the usefulness of the first three of these attainments is very different from that of the last two. The former or cognitive type of attainment contributes to adaptation and control; the latter, or subjective type contributes to inward satisfactions and volitional energies that must remain precarious and transient, in so far as they take no account of the external forces which condition both survival and achievement. In so far as philosophy, like science, professes an interest in knowledge, it owes its first allegiance to the former or objective interests of the intellect; and should subordinate taste and

credulity to curiosity, logical rigor, and the decrees of experimental evidence. This, however, philosophy has rarely been permitted to do. The demand for religious apologetics has been so strong, and doubtless will always be so strong, as to stimulate the production of the desired commodity. This demand is what the economists call an effective demand. It can offer sufficient inducements, in the shape of popular applause and influence. I do not mean to charge philosophers with any conscious apostasy to truth. But their atmosphere and tradition, and the established standards of judgment incline them by professional custom to seek a hopeful and edifying view of things.

Often it is less the philosopher who is at fault than his readers and hearers, who allow their hopes to color the teachings of the master, and make him in spite of himself the sponsor of some gospel of which he may never even have heard. M. Bergson is notoriously a victim of this doubtful flattery; so much so that he has even been accused of catering to it. Thus Remy de Gourmont wrote as follows in the *Mercure de France* in 1910, apropos of the death of William James:

"I believe that all philosophy that is not purely scientific (negative, that is, to metaphysics), comes at the end of the reckoning to reinforce Christianity under whatever form it dominates the various nations. Most persons who fancy themselves interested in what they call the great problems are moved by self-interested egotistical anxiety. They think of themselves and of their destiny; they hope to find by rational means a solution agreeable to their desires, which secretly conform to the earliest teachings they received. Now since all metaphysical movements are very obscure, or at least difficult of access to most minds, when these movements are confronted with religious beliefs the beliefs are found to be of the same order but clearer, having been known in the past. This phenomenon was exhibited at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The deism of J. J. Rousseau, which seemed so remote from Catholicism, made ready the ground for a renovation of Catholicism. Chateaubriand, thoroughly impregnated with Rousseau, was the first of this description. . . . William James, whose religiousness is indifferent to religious forms, has, without

knowing it, wrought in the same way for the sects. M. Bergson's spiral spirituality, with its scientific but treacherous charm, achieves the same result. The metaphysical clouds it eloquently stirs dissolve in a religious rain, and this rain, as it dries, leaves a sort of manna upon which belief is fed. There are more priests than intelligent free-thinkers at M. Bergson's lectures. The manner of postulating free will in a Catholic country like France takes on an apologetic value. The most illustrious of our metaphysicians must know very well what he is doing."

The aspersion with which this paragraph closes is unjust. But the philosophical masters as a group are nevertheless not wholly guiltless of the apologetic uses to which their work is applied. They have been too much addicted to the use of ambiguities, and to the use of vague terms of eulogy borrowed from the vocabulary in which plain men express their deeper yearnings and hopes. When philosophers write of Spirit and Freedom and God and Eternity, even though, as is usually the case, they employ these terms in peculiar and technical senses of their own, the plain man is scarcely to be blamed if he feels his yearnings and hopes to be confirmed. Indeed the ambiguity of philosophical terminology, a peculiar flabbiness of ideas which renders them incapable of sharply contradicting or excluding anything, and an excessive craving for comprehensiveness and reconciliation, have made it possible for protagonists of quite opposite doctrines to weave the same philosophy into their arguments.

Another French writer, M. Le Dantec, has commented on this last "remarkable property," not without a touch of satire. He says, virtually, that everybody gets out of metaphysics what he puts into it:

"If the speech of metaphysicians, like that of creative artists, is addressed to a restricted public composed solely of their personal 'resonators,' it possesses yet another property which renders it superior to the eminently impersonal language of mathematicians. This remarkable property is that those who perceive it, those who vibrate in harmony with the metaphysician or the artist, are not ordinarily

in accord upon what they understand. They are agreeably affected, and this is their only common ground; but that does not prevent their keeping their first attitude as to other matters, and notably towards religious and social questions. A Catholic and an anarchist who at the same time hear the Symphony in C minor, feel at the same time emotions probably different, and remain the one an anarchist, the other a Catholic, as before. I imagine they do not fancy that in his work Beethoven expressed precisely their religious or social belief; while, when they commune together in Bergson or in James, each of them recognizes the expression of his own thought in the work of these subtle artists; and both draw from the reading of metaphysical productions new reasons for their being — the one more an anarchist, the other more a Catholic than in the past."

Another cause which operates to compromise the intellect, a cause which is undoubtedly operating today, is just plain weariness. If we trace the history of modern thought, we find that one of its striking characteristics is the rejection of axioms. In the past, whenever any prop of faith was removed, the mind leaned more heavily than ever on the props that remained. Especially notable were the tendency in the eighteenth century to count upon the immutable truths of morality after the challenging of ecclesiastical and political authority; and the tendency in the nineteenth century to move the superstructure of belief from the crumbling foundations of religious metaphysics, such as the "cogito, ergo sum" and the proofs of theism, to the supposedly unshakable foundations of mathematics, such as the axioms of Euclid, or that last straw of the drowning mind, "Two plus two equals four." The critical intellect has now invaded every holy place, and spread a disquieting doubt through all the corridors of life. Doubt is a healthy and invigorating atmosphere for a hardy mind; but it is very tiring. The mind craves a place to sit down. It carries its idols about but cannot find any pedestal to support them. It suffers from homesickness, vertigo, and an unquenchable longing for stability and rest. It is little wonder that in such a time the churches

are recruited by those who are willing to shut their eyes if only they can be made to feel *sure* of something again. "It is sad to think," says Sir James Stephen, "how much theology in our days, whether Protestant or Popish, holds out to its disciples this great inducement: Come to me, all ye that are weary of doubt, and I will give you security that, if your creed is false, you shall be the last to discover it."

I would not be uncompromising in this matter. It is as possible to be fanatical on the subject of the intellect as on any other subject. I wish merely to point out that much of the distrust from which the intellectual activities suffer is not owing to their being futile or misapplied but to a circumstance that may discredit any good thing, namely, its difficulty. Thinking is not only, as Adam Bede said, "mighty puzzling work," a strain upon human strength and patience, but it is of all forms of work the most lonely. People act and feel and even believe, in mobs. There is (Professor Cooley to the contrary notwithstanding) no first person plural to the verb "cogito." Observation, verification, and inference are functions which are perfected only in their independent individual exercise. I am not unmindful of the importance of the corroboration of one mind by another; but such corroboration is valuable only in so far as both minds have reached their results alone. Corroboration implies the absence of collusion. The devotee of the intellect must, then, have the strength to work alone, to see things for himself, to stand against the currents of opinion and the winds of passion. He cannot hope to win applause by the easy method of agreeing with others, but only by the more difficult method of bringing others to agree with him. And even then he cannot allow himself to mistake his following for confirmation of his beliefs, but must be ready to desert his converts if and in so far as fresh evidence inclines his judgment to another view. He is as unlikely, then, to be a leader, as he

is incapable of being a follower. For such non-conformists society must make a place. I have little interest in the "conscientious objector"; but I have the greatest regard for the *individual thinker*. The former opposes private conviction to public policy. His inflexibility is symptomatic of will and emotion, rather than enlightenment. The latter opposes freedom of thought to uniformity of opinion. Though he may impede collective action and have in emergencies even to be forcibly suppressed, nevertheless he is the servant of mankind. Standing on his watch-tower and recording what he sees, he does, even though it be unconsciously, succor the community to which he belongs.

I should not thus have apostrophized the devotee of the intellect had I not believed that society needs him, and needs him as never before. The great problems of the present are in fact *problems*. We all want enduring peace and we all want social justice; but we need to be *shown the way*. The great difficulties are difficulties of complexity. Human interests, man to man and nation to nation, are now interrelated and interdependent, extensively and intensively, in a measure entirely unparalleled in the past history of the world. Intellect is the only means by which their tragic conflict may be removed. There seems to be a widespread belief that all we need in order to avoid war and class struggle is a little horse-sense. We shall, however, be fortunate if the cerebrum of some future superman is equal to coping with these problems. They are *the* problems, magnificently, terrifyingly difficult. Therein lies what is hopeful and stirring in the situation. If we fail, we shall have dared the utmost; if we succeed, we shall have won the greatest of all victories in the struggle of man against the death from which he sprang and which circles him about.

If we value what the intellect can do, then we should value the intellect. We all want to live and to prosper in



peace. For these ends intellect is one of the things needful, if not the one thing needful. It does not follow, however, that we should live with the intellect, or practice a trade or profession with it, any more than that we should breathe with it or eat with it. My suggestion is that we should *think* with it, and then use the results as we will. In some measure the intellect must be allowed to lead its own life and perfect itself in its own way if we are to have its indispensable fruits most abundantly. In so far as it is the lot of the intellect to serve, it must be as a trusted and self-respecting servant. As the counselor of the will, it is dangerous if constrained to flatter the will's hopes or to do its bidding, but a mighty ally if taught to speak its mind honestly and fearlessly.

## JOHN ROBINSON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

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"In the next place, for the wholesome counsel Mr. Robinson gave that part of the Church whereof he was Pastor, at their departure from him to begin the great work of Plantation in New England. Amongst other wholesome instructions and exhortations, he used these expressions, or to the same purpose:

We are now, ere long, to part asunder; and the Lord knoweth whether ever he should live to see our faces again. But whether the Lord had appointed it or not; he charged us, before God and his blessed angels, to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other Instrument of his, to be as ready to receive it, as ever we were to receive any truth by his Ministry. For he was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of his holy Word.

He took occasion also miserably to bewail the state and condition of the Reformed Churches, who were come to a period in religion; and would go no further than the Instruments of their Reformation. As, for example, the Lutherans: they could not be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw. For whatever part of God's will, he had further imparted and revealed to Calvin; they will rather die than embrace it. 'And so also,' saith he, 'You see the Calvinists. They stick where he left them; a misery much to be lamented.

'For though they were precious shining lights in their Times; yet God had not revealed his whole will to them; and were they now living,' saith he, 'they would be as ready and willing to embrace further light as that they had received.'

Here also he put us in mind of our Church Covenant; at least that part of it whereby we promise and covenant with God and one with another, to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from his written Word; but withal exhorted us to take heed what we received for truth; and well to examine and compare, and weigh it with other Scriptures of truth before we received it. 'For,' saith he, 'It is not possible the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness; and that full perfection of knowledge should break forth at once.'

Another thing he commended to us, was that we should use all means to avoid and shake off the name 'Brownist'; being a mere

nickname and brand to make religion odious, and the Professors of it, to the Christian world. 'And to that end,' said he, 'I should be glad if some godly Minister would go over with you, before my coming. For, said he, there will be no difference between the unconformable Ministers and you, when they come to the practice of the ordinances out of the Kingdom.' And so advised us, by all means, to endeavor to close with the godly party of the Kingdom of England, and rather to study union than division, viz., How near we might possibly, without sin, close with them; than, in the least measure, to affect division or separation from them."

So run the notable paragraphs in the so-called Farewell Address, delivered by John Robinson to that portion of his Leyden church of Separatists which had elected 'to become Pilgrims to this new world, the tercentenary of whose landing at Plymouth is soon to be celebrated. It is not clear precisely when or where the Address was delivered, whether as part of the sermon which Robinson preached from Ezra 8 21 when the as yet undivided church held its last meeting in Leyden, or as a fragment of the "Christian discourse" with which the Pilgrims and the friends they were leaving comforted themselves in Delfshaven on the night before the *Speedwell* sailed. But time and place are immaterial, for the words have a timeless and universal character which must endear them and John Robinson who spoke them to lovers of religious freedom and progress everywhere and always. So remarkable are they, all things considered, that one is tempted to suspect their authenticity. Can John Robinson, a Separatist minister, have been so broad-minded and large-hearted as to speak thus in 1620? The doubt was insinuated by Mr. George Sumner in a *Memoir of the Pilgrims in Leyden*, published in 1846 in the Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, (ser. 3, vol. IX). Without actually denying authenticity, Mr. Sumner pointed out that the argument from silence, taken in connection with the peculiar appropriateness of the words to the argument of the book in which alone the Address appears, justly

arouses suspicion. Both points are well taken. It is true that neither Bradford nor Morton gives any inkling of the Address, and that the sole authority is Winslow's *Hypocrisy Unmasked* which was published in 1646, twenty-six years afterwards. It is also true that in *Hypocrisy Unmasked*, Winslow was defending the Plymouth settlers against charges of intolerance and bigotry, and naturally it was much to his purpose to show that their revered religious teacher had inculcated principles of catholicity on so solemn and memorable an occasion as that of their departure from Holland. But on the other hand every historian knows that the argument from silence is weak and treacherous. Winslow had been with the Leyden company for three years prior to the departure from Holland, and as one of the *Speedwell* and *Mayflower* pilgrims, had full opportunity to know what was said and done. It should be noted, too, that he does not profess to give the precise words used but reports in indirect discourse "these expressions or to the same purpose." As for the *tendency* argument, here too it must be said that no "tendency document" should be rejected out of hand just because it has a tendency, unless it can be proved that the tendency is untrue to the facts. Was Winslow the sort of man to fabricate an address like this, not out of whole cloth but out of no cloth at all, in order to strengthen his argument? One ought to think not once nor twice before accusing Winslow of dishonesty, for really that is what it comes to, if in order to serve his turn and strengthen his plea, he put into the mouth of Robinson words which he never used. It is rather mean to seek to prove that Robinson was not a liberal by insinuating that Winslow was a liar. Besides, as will be shown presently, the words are in entire accord with the sentiments of Robinson as preserved in writings of unquestioned genuineness.

If then the Address must be deemed substantially authentic, precisely what does it mean? It sounds like a

remarkable affirmation of freedom and progress in religion, but perhaps Robinson did not intend that his words should be taken quite so comprehensively. This has been maintained by certain ecclesiastical descendants of the Pilgrims who have been nettled by the use made of his words to shelter liberalism in theology under the protection of an honored name. In the early part of the nineteenth century there appeared among the descendants of the early settlers hereabouts a party which took to itself the name of Liberal Christian, by the members of which the words of Robinson were freely and triumphantly quoted. More conservative opponents might attack religious freedom and progress in a periodical entitled *The Spirit of the Pilgrims*, but the Liberals were proud to believe that theirs was the true spirit of the Pilgrims, John Robinson himself being witness. Naturally, this was exceedingly irritating to the Conservatives, but there was no effective rejoinder until the publication in 1880 of Dr. Dexter's monumental book *Congregationalism as Seen in its Literature* in which it was argued that in the famous Address Robinson was thinking solely of church polity and not at all of theological doctrine. Although this view has found little acceptance, Dr. Dexter was a most competent scholar and his case is stronger than has been commonly supposed. Let me therefore put the argument for the narrower interpretation of the Farewell Address as clearly and forcibly as possible before presenting certain other considerations which warrant at least an arrest of judgment.

First then it must be remembered that the Separatists were separatists just because of questions of church polity and not at all on matters of theological dogma. The Puritans, whose left wing they were, differed from the Church of England partly on doctrine — they were stout Calvinists while the Anglicans inclined rather to Arminianism — partly on the score of ritual, for there was much of Rome still clinging to the vestments and ceremonies of

the Church of England which they would fain reform, but partly also on account of their preference for the presbyterial organization of Geneva over the Episcopacy of England. But they believed in the Church of England and wished to remain within its fold achieving the reforms they demanded by working from within. Among them, however, were some who came to believe that on account of its corruptions in organization and ritual the Church of England, in their elegant phrase, was as very a whore as the Church of Rome and consequently no true bride of Christ. Accordingly they took to heart the apostolic injunction, "Come ye out from among them and be ye separate, and touch not the unclean thing." In their eyes the Church of England was Sodom, Babylon, a cage of unclean birds, within which they could not stay save at the peril of their souls and the dishonor of Christ. Hence they became Separatists, differing from the Puritans not in doctrine, for both alike were Calvinists, but principally in a theory of the church and a method of reformation in harmony with that theory. Their study of the Scriptures had led them to the conclusion that the true church of Christ was a purer and a simpler thing than either Rome or Canterbury acknowledged. It was at this point then that new light had broken for them out of God's holy Word, for which cause they were Separatists.

Secondly, it was again at this very point that new light had recently come to Robinson himself. He had held that because the Church of England was a false church it was sinful for one who had received the new light to have public communion with it, even to the extent of being present at one of its services, or private communion with any of its members. A member of a Separated church in Amsterdam who attended a service of the Church of England was excommunicated for the offense. At this point, however, new light had come to John Robinson following an interchange of views between himself and Dr. William Ames,

the famous Puritan scholar and clergyman. In Robinson's own words:

"But had my persuasion in it been fuller than ever it was, I profess myself always one of them who still desire to learn further, or better, what the good will of God is. And I beseech the Lord from mine heart, that there may be in the men (towards whom I desire in all things lawful to enlarge myself) the like readiness of mind to forsake every evil way, and faithfully to embrace and walk in the truth they do or may see, as by the mercy of God there is in me: which as I trust it shall be mine, so do I wish it may be their comfort also in the day of the Lord Jesus."

The quotation is from a treatise *Of Religious Communion*, published in 1614, in which he upheld the lawfulness of private communion with individual members of the Church of England but still denied that a Separatist could rightfully participate in the public worship of the Church or listen to the preaching of its ministers. Twenty years later, however, nine years after the death of Robinson, there was published another treatise by him, found in manuscript in his desk, entitled *On the Lawfulness of hearing Ministers in the Church of England*, in which public communion also is defended. It must be remembered also that because of this greater tolerance, Robinson's church was condemned by their fellow-Separatists at Amsterdam, one of whom refers to the Semi-Separatists at Leyden as "ignorant idiots, noddy Nabalites, dogged Doegs, fairfaced Pharisees, shameless Shimeites, malicious Machiavellians." These be hard words, Masters, with their pelting alliterations, and perhaps their author would have been puzzled to explain their peculiar aptness, but one can safely infer that he did not wholly approve of John Robinson and his church. But the point is that at just about the time when the Pilgrims were leaving Leyden, new light was breaking upon Robinson's mind on this particular point which, be it observed, is precisely that touched upon in the Farewell

Address when he urges his Pilgrim friends to close with the godly party of the Church of England, seeking unity rather than division, and even expresses his desire that some godly minister would go over with them. Surely then here is good ground for believing that in the Farewell Address he was thinking not of doctrine but of polity, better ground if I may be so presumptuous as to say so, than Dr. Dexter himself has given.

Finally, it is true, as Dr. Dexter insists, that Robinson was a convinced Calvinist and that nowhere in all his writings is there the faintest suggestion of any wavering in his mind with respect to the truth of that system of doctrine. Remember also the source from which the anticipated new light and truth were to come — His holy Word. Certainly Robinson did not look for new religious truth to human reason, or to any other source than the book of God's perfect and final revelation. One must confess that the so-called Liberals have taken Robinson in a sense which he would have repudiated with indignant horror when they have quoted "*more truth and light*" with orotund voice and whispered or even passed over in silence "*God's holy Word.*"

So stands, then, the argument for the narrower interpretation of the Farewell Address, and evidently the case is a strong one although perhaps not wholly convincing. For there are considerations on the opposite side. Robinson bewailed the state of the followers both of Luther and of Calvin who had come to a stand in religion, being unwilling to advance beyond the instruments of their reformation — "a misery much to be lamented." Is it at all reasonable to suppose that here Robinson was thinking exclusively of the teachings of Luther or Calvin concerning church polity? Again, he reminded the Pilgrims of the Covenant by which they had constituted themselves a church, wherein they made solemn promise to God and to one another to receive whatever light or



truth God should make known to them from his written Word. This is plainly a reference to the Bradford Covenant with its memorable outlook clause — “to walk in all *His* ways, made known or to be made known unto us.” Did *all His ways* denote only ways of church polity? Certainly in the administration of discipline upon those who had thus covenanted together, the Pilgrims did not so restrict it — God’s ways were moral as well as ecclesiastical; in the street and home God walked as well as in the sanctuary, and there too men must walk in his ways. Again, it has been said that the distinction which we make so easily and properly between dogma and polity was foreign to the mind of Robinson, since both were of revelation. There is some truth in the contention; nevertheless Robinson did distinguish between them and with remarkable insight put them in their proper places on a scale of values:

“I will, therefore, conclude this point with a double exhortation: the former, respecting us ourselves, who have, by the mercy of God, with the faith of Christ, received his order and ordinances; which is, that we please not ourselves therein too much, as if in them piety and religion did chiefly consist. . . . Of which evil, and over valuation of these things, howsoever great in themselves, we are in the more danger, considering our persecutions, and sufferings for them; but that, as we believe these things are necessarily to be done, so we consider that other things are not only not to be left undone, but to be done much more. The grace of faith in Christ, and the fear of God, the continual renewing of our repentance, with love, mercy, humility, and modesty, together with fervent prayer, and hearty thanksgiving unto God for his unspeakable goodness, are the things wherein especially we must serve God; nourishing them in our own hearts, and so honoring them in others, wheresoever they appear to dwell.”

I find it hard to believe that a man who could write with such fine moral insight and tender grace of style could have been thinking only of church polity when he was speaking words of solemn farewell to friends who were starting on their pilgrimage. Nevertheless, it may be

true that if some one had asked Robinson, point-blank and on the spot, exactly what he meant, it is not improbable that he would have replied by urging peace between Separatist and Puritan. There is no question in view of quotations already made from his published works and especially in view of the Wallaeus-Hommius document that at just this time he was less stout than he had been for the Separation and was yearning for a broader Christian fellowship. Nor is it at all unlikely that he foresaw that his little company would be the precursors of a much larger and more important Puritan migration and that the relations between the two parties in the New World would be, and indeed must be, more fraternal than was the case in England and Holland. It was probably this thought which filled his mind rather than any hope for new revelations of doctrine. And yet, while admitting so much, one must add that to draw from this an inference adverse to Robinson's catholicity of mind, such catholicity as the usual interpretation of the Farewell Address has ascribed to him, would be thoroughly unjust. For although a principle may be consciously recognized at only a single point of application determined by immediate and pressing interests, it may nevertheless be a genuine principle exhibiting a general mental attitude and therefore sure to find other and perhaps more significant applications should occasion arise. And this, I take it, was precisely the case with John Robinson. As one reads his published words in chronological order, he becomes aware of a gradual loss of youthful acridity and a progressive mellowing of tone. He became more open-minded, and when a man's mind is actually open, so it be not merely at the bottom, there is no telling what may find entrance. Nor need the mind be open at all points i' the shipman's card; a man may be perfectly hospitable yet all his various guests may enter by a single door. That Robinson was actually growing into catholicity of spirit

with advancing years of experience and religious thoughtfulness is apparent from the honor paid him by men of various parties. Baillie, whose *Dissuasives* (1645) is bitterly against Separatists, says of Robinson that he was the most learned, polished, and modest spirit that sect ever enjoyed. Bradford both in the *History* and in the *First Dialogue* bears similar testimony. But one need not go beyond Robinson's own writings to be assured of his sweetness and largeness of temper. Take for example the concluding paragraph of *A Just and Necessary Apology* published in Latin in 1619, and in English, translated by himself, in 1625.

"And here thou hast, Christian reader, the whole order of our conversation in the work of Christian religion, set down both as briefly and plainly as I could. If in any thing we err, advertise us brotherly, with desire of our information, and not, as our countrymen's manner for the most part is, with a mind of reproaching us, or gratifying of others; and whom thou findest in error, thou shalt not leave in obstinacy, nor as having a mind prone to schism. Err we may, alas! too easily; but heretics, by the grace of God, we will not be. But and if the things which we do seem right in thine eyes, as to us certainly they do, I do earnestly, and by the Lord Jesus admonish and exhort thy godly mind, that thou wilt neither withhold thy due obedience from his truth, nor just succour from thy distressed brethren. Neither do thou endure that either the smallness of the number, or meanness of the condition of those that profess it, should prejudice with thee the profession of the truth. . . . But now if it so come to pass, which God forbid! that the most being either forestalled by prejudice, or by prosperity made secure, there be few found, especially men of learning, who will so far vouchsafe to stoop as to look upon so despised creatures and their cause; this alone remaineth, that we turn our faces and mouths unto thee, O most powerful Lord and gracious Father, humbly imploring help from God towards those who are by men left desolate. There is with thee no respect of persons, neither are men less regarders of thee, if regarders of thee, for the world's disregarding them. They who truly fear thee and work righteousness, although constrained to live by leave in a foreign land, exiled from country, spoiled of goods, destitute of friends, few in number, and mean in condition, are for all that, unto thee (O gracious God)

nothing the less acceptable. Thou numberest all their wanderings, and putttest their tears into thy bottles. Are they not written in thy book? Towards thee, O Lord, are our eyes; confirm our hearts and bend thine ear, and suffer not our feet to slip, or our face to be ashamed, O thou both just and merciful God. To him through Christ be praise for ever in the church of saints; and to thee, loving and Christian reader, grace, peace, and eternal happiness. Amen."

I must say that I know of no bit of English prose in the controversial literature of the period which begins to compare with that in tender and appealing grace. It fairly melts in a reader's mouth and is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb. Be the precise interpretation of the Farewell Address what it may, John Robinson himself, in inmost spirit and temper was all that the very broadest interpretation of it has led us to think, and it meant much to our Pilgrim forefathers that they had a religious teacher of such a sort as this. It meant much to them and much also to the future of Plymouth, Massachusetts, New England, and the United States that was to be. For what has been said may seem to be merely of antiquarian or what is sometimes slurringly called academic interest, but in reality it bears upon important issues. The Pilgrims came to Plymouth and for the first few years the future of the little colony hung in the balance. Without were an inhospitable climate and unfruitful soil, disease, famine, and menacing savages, and if within there had been bickerings and dissensions, the little company must inevitably have crumbled. And there was reason to expect internal wranglings, for these people were Separatists, who as a class were a painfully cantankerous lot. By good chance there has been preserved for us an account of the petty quarrels in the church of Separatists in Amsterdam of which Francis Johnson was pastor. He had married, while the church was still in London, the widow of a well-to-do haberdasher, and his brother George Johnson remonstrated with his brother for her extravagance in

dress, wearing three, four, and five golden rings at once, a showish hat, great starched ruffs, an excessive deal of lace and a cod-piece fashion in the breast, and using musk perfumery, while her husband and the church were in prison at home and poverty abroad. The pastor made a spirited rejoinder, and George followed it with an even more offensive letter, in which he said he feared he might quote against her Jer. 3 3 (last clause) which reads, "Thou hast a whore's forehead; thou refusest to be ashamed." This led Francis to threaten excommunication, but George yielded and a truce was patched up which lasted for over a year. In Amsterdam George was told that he would be elected elder if he would confess sin in alleging Jer. 3 3 (last clause) against Mrs. J., but he replied that after mature reflection on sea and land he had come to the conclusion that it was not sinful to allege that Scripture against her. Whereupon there were renewed threats of excommunication. Several church meetings followed, the general tone of which is well indicated by the following quotation from Dexter (*Congregationalism as Seen in its Literature*, p. 287):

"George Johnson was then accused of having charged Mrs. Johnson with musk as sin; and he replied that it was the excess and not the use which he condemned. Then they said he charged her with sin in wearing a topish hat. After much debate the church voted that the hat was not topish in nature. G. J. urged that he spake against the hat in her being a pastor's wife, and he in bonds, and not that the hat was simply unlawful in the nature thereof. Whereat the pastor made a syllogism, thus: What is not in the nature thereof topish, that used by any is not topish: the hat in the nature thereof is not topish: *ergo* being used by her it is not topish. G. J. wanted that reduced to writing, whereat the Pastor changed it two or three ways, and G. J. replied that though velvet in its nature were not topish, yet if common mariners should wear such, it would be a token of pride and topishness in them. Also a gilded rapier and a feather are not topish in their nature, neither in a captain to wear them; and yet if a minister should wear them, they would be signs of great vanity, topishness, and lightness in him. The pastor pleaded that differences of circumstances

and means made dress lawful in one which was not in another, that his wife paid for her own clothes, and that such things might lawfully be worn; whereupon one of the members begged him not so to speak lest it should bring in many inconveniences among their wives. Finally the brethren demanded that the gown with the cod-piece breast should be produced that they might decide for themselves upon its indecency; but the Pastor refused. So the matter worried along until both G. J. and the old father who had come over from England to make peace had been excommunicated — Francis Johnson himself pronouncing the sentence against his own father and brother.”

That is a most instructive glimpse into the inner life of a Separatist church, and when in addition we recall the many distressing schisms which rent the same church over matters of the smallest moment, we wonder what would have been the fate of this little bickering company on the lonely and inhospitable coast of New England. In very truth had the Pilgrims been Separatists of this sort the Plymouth colony could not have survived the first winter; but happily the example and oft-repeated teaching of their Leyden pastor had put another spirit in them, as is evident from the report which Bradford gives of the sweet harmony of their united life in Holland, to which also the magistrates of Leyden gave witness; and hence it was that on these shores the much-distressed company held together in mutual love and confidence.

Furthermore, eight years after the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth the first spume-flakes of the great wave of Puritan immigration fell at Salem. Now in England, Puritan and Separatist were at loggerheads and vile epithets were bandied back and forth in the name of the Lord, as if the very devil were in them both. We remember the words of Higginson as the shores of old England faded from his view: “We will not say, as the Separatists were wont to say at their leaving of England, Farewell, Babylon, Farewell, Rome; but we will say Farewell, dear England, Farewell, the Church of God in England, and all the Christian friends there. We do not go to New England as

Separatists from the Church of England, though we cannot but separate from the corruptions in it; but we go to practise the positive part of church reformation and propagate the Gospel in America." Such an attitude, with the feeling towards the Separatist which it reveals, promises ill for friendly relations between Plymouth and Salem. Yet shortly after landing at Salem that very company of Puritans organized themselves into a church by covenant quite after the Plymouth pattern, and Higginson himself was ordained minister of the church by the church as if he were not already a regularly ordained minister in the Church of England. Moreover, the Plymouth church gave and the Salem church received the right hand of fellowship, and from that time forward the two colonies stood together with consequences of immeasurable importance for the future. What if they had played Kilkenny cats? Would they not have been devoured one of another, even if their savage foes had not annihilated them severally? What then is the explanation of this unlooked-for fellowship? Of course the ocean had actually and literally turned the Puritans into Separatists whether they would or no. The leagues of tossing sea traversed through many weary weeks effected a decisive physical separation. Besides, why talk longer of reforming from within when here there was no without to be reformed. Their occupation as a reforming party within the church was gone, for here they were "the whole thing." What more natural then, since a fresh start had to be made, than to start right, and form out of hand a true Church of Christ after the New Testament model. Robinson had predicted that exactly this would be the course of events, and so it turned out. But deeper than any one of these reasons separately and more significant, I fancy, than all of them together is the fact that the men of Plymouth were of the church of John Robinson. The Amsterdam church of Francis Johnson would have been

in perpetual quarrels among themselves and with the Puritans in Salem. But the advanced Puritans of the Bay and the Semi-Separatists at Plymouth were able to live and work together.

Was it then solely because of John Robinson that this happy result was accomplished? But he never crossed the Atlantic. Was it because he had taught the Pilgrims? But who taught him and who transported his spirit? If I may trot out a little hobby of my own, permit me to say that perhaps the good Leyden pastor learned some of his liberality from certain lay members of his congregation, namely from William Bradford and William Brewster, particularly the latter. Brewster was a man of the world as almost no other of the contemporary Separatists was. He had spent three years in diplomatic service with William Davison, one of which, 1585, was passed in the Netherlands, and both there and also during thirteen years as Master of the Post and caretaker of the Manor at Scrooby, he had learned the ways of men. Moreover, it is expressly stated that he had been in the habit of attending the public services of other than Separatist churches and that Robinson had winked at this before his eyes were permanently open to the legitimacy of the practice. Again, Winslow expressly testified that "if any joining with us . . . held forth separation from the Church of England," Robinson or Brewster would stop them forthwith, showing that we "required no such things at their hands but only to hold faith in Christ Jesus, holiness in the fear of God, and submission to every ordinance and appointment of God, leaving the Church of England to themselves and to the Lord." Both Robinson and Brewster signed the Seven Articles, in the second of which the Leyden Company profess their desire to keep spiritual communion in peace with the Church of England. Hence I strongly suspect that the character of the Plymouth Pilgrims was due quite as much in the last analysis to William Brewster as



to John Robinson. If so, the history of this country was mightily influenced at a critical period by Christian laymen. Certainly it was Samuel Fuller, doctor and deacon of Plymouth, who was the active agent in bringing his colony into friendly relations with Salem and Boston — thus foreshadowing the value of medical missions in the diffusion of Christianity, and perhaps also the means by which eventually Christian unity will be achieved through the leadership of laymen. This would not be the only instance in Christian history in which laymen have taught their professional clerical instructors the ways of a larger, more generous, Christian charity. Indeed, as one distinguished theologian has said with emphasis — Christianity is preëminently a layman's religion, and it is this just because Jesus himself was a layman.

## JOHN ROBINSON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE PILGRIM MOVEMENT

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The scope of this article is strictly limited. It takes no account of the great issues, social, national, and international, which, in the course of time, flowed from the few simple folk "in the north parts" of England about Scrooby and Gainsborough who obeyed what they believed to be a divine impulse.

Others far more competent for the purpose have already dealt with, or will deal with, these. Nor does it do more than touch the details of the life into which the exiles passed at Amsterdam and Leyden. For on these, Dr. Dexter and his son — to mention but two of the workers in this field<sup>1</sup> — may almost be said to have spoken the last word. Nor does it follow the Pilgrims into the new world where they struck root with such heroic fortitude, except so far as is required to correct one or two somewhat inveterate mistakes. It is, in fact, limited to the man who, beyond any one else, was the chief spiritual influence in those earliest pioneers whose character and ideals imparted a permanent direction to the development of New England. At the same time, while relating the substance of what is known of Robinson, I have tried to state the truth with regard to the circumstances in which the Pilgrim movement took its start; and if, in so doing, it has seemed necessary to criticize adversely the conclusions of one writer in particular, my excuse must be that his narrative has been accepted, in some high quarters, as that of an authority on the subject whose word is final. It is not by any means final, as the sequel, I think, will show.

<sup>1</sup> See *The England and Holland of the Pilgrims*, 1906. Bk. VI, chap 3.

## I

It is known that Robinson's early home and probably his birthplace was Sturton-en-le-Steeple<sup>2</sup> — a village on the Nottingham side of the Trent, some five miles south-west of Gainsborough on the Lincoln side, and ten miles southeast of Scrooby. His father, also named John, seems to have been a yeoman, or owner and tiller of his own farm; and from the contents of his will as well as from those of his wife<sup>3</sup> we may judge him to have been fairly well-to-do.

To the same village belonged another yeoman apparently of greater estate, named Alexander White. Thus, the Whites and Robinsons were neighbors, and their young people grew up together. In the case of two of them, at least, companionship produced affection; for Bridget, second daughter of the Whites, became Robinson's wife. Robinson was born about 1575.<sup>4</sup> The first seventeen years of his life are a blank. Nothing is clear before April 9, 1592, the date of his admission to Corpus Christi or Benet College, Cambridge. His status as a sizar would not be free from hardships; but we may presume that he faced them with the cheerful courage of an enthusiast for learning. His career, at any rate, was not undistinguished. It extended over nearly twelve years. Besides proceeding to the usual degrees of B.A. and M.A. he was made Fellow of his college and "Prælector Græcus" in 1598, and "Decanus" in 1600. A fellowship entailed ordination, and by 1602 Robinson had become Priest. After a further two years of college life there

<sup>2</sup> This discovery was made by Rev. W. H. Burgess, B.A. (author of *John Smith the Se-Baptist*) and communicated to the *Christian Life* (February, 1911), London, and to the *Christian Register* (Boston).

<sup>3</sup> Wills in District Registry at York. Vol. 33, fo. 236; vol. 34, fo. 324. Cited by Burgess in his *John Smith, etc.*, p. 317. Mr. Champlin Burrage prints Mr. Robinson's will in Appendix D. Vol. I, pp. 326, 327 of his *Early English Dissenters*, 1912.

<sup>4</sup> An inference from the fact that when admitted to be a member of Leyden University on August 5, 1615, he was in his 39th year.

occurred what seems an abrupt change;<sup>5</sup> he resigned his fellowship and on February 15, 1603, was married to Bridget White at Greasley<sup>6</sup> in Nottingham.

The home to which he took her was in Norwich, where, for some short time before, he had been installed as a minister of St. Andrew's Church.<sup>7</sup> It may be that he was indebted for the appointment to the nomination of Jegon, the Bishop of Norwich, whom he had known as Master of Corpus Christi; but if so, it is not likely that the bishop knew of Robinson's already strong tendency away from the church. Just when and how this originated cannot be traced with precision. There was, however, quite enough to account for it in his Cambridge environment — not to mention the Puritan influences which may have been around him in his home. Thomas Cartwright (1535–1603) though a proscribed man, was still a name of power. Francis Johnson (1562–1618), though now a leader of the Brownists, was not forgotten. The Puritan fervor which conduced to Robert Browne's (1550?–1633) popularity as a preacher in 1579 had by no means died out. It was aglow in Emmanuel College, and, with less heat, in St. John's. William Perkins (1558–1602), moreover, at Great St. Andrew's was a lecturer of uncompromising Puritan temper. So too, on the whole, was his successor, Paul

<sup>5</sup> Might there be a connection between this and the agitation which arose about the Millenary Petition and led Cambridge (June 9, 1603) to pass a "grace that whoever in that University should attack the doctrine or discipline of the Church of England should be suspended from all degrees already taken and forbidden all others"? Dexter, E. H., p. 337.

<sup>6</sup> An extensive parish about ten miles west of Nottingham. Why this place should have been chosen for the marriage seems to be accounted for by the fact (recently brought to light) that one of Bridget White's brothers occupied a farm in the parish. For entry of the marriage, see Phillimore and Blagg's Nottinghamshire Parish Registers. Vol. VIII, p. 99. Robinson and his wife are entered as Mr. and Mistress.

<sup>7</sup> He was not himself a member of St. Andrews "having" (he says) "my house . . . within another parish and my children baptized there." Burrage, N. F., p. 17. For names of his family, see Dexter's E. H. P., p. 632. Two of his six children were born in Norwich, John and Bridget. Isaac, the third, was 92 years old in 1702, which gives 1610 as the year of his birth (Arber, p. 160).

Burgess. Nor must we forget the presence at Cambridge of John Smith (d. 1612) — sizar, graduate, and Fellow of Christ's College. For six years at least he was Robinson's contemporary. He, likewise, was from the north country. Nay, they may have been known to each other as natives of the same village and schoolfellows.<sup>8</sup> Smith, even as late as 1604, was not yet a Separatist; but he was a decided Puritan, and it is most natural to suppose that the two would often, or sometimes, meet and that Smith by reason of his riper knowledge would find in his younger companion a respectful listener. Robinson, in fact, owed much to Smith, and never disowned the debt — however widely or sharply he came to differ. And the debt began at Cambridge. From Cambridge to Norwich was a passage from one Puritan centre to another. There Robert Browne had constituted his church in 1581. There a remnant of that church survived in 1602 and formed a climax to lower degrees of "nonconformity in the city" or its neighborhood. St. Andrew's Church for example, as is evident by the character of its vicars,<sup>9</sup> had Puritan preferences and is said<sup>10</sup> to have purchased the right of presentation in order to indulge them. Robinson calls himself minister, not vicar, though he may have been vicar all the same.

Mr. Burrage suggests that his position was practically Congregationalist. But this is going too far.<sup>11</sup> St. Andrew's by its purchase of the right to present may have been

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Burgess writes in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 2, 1916, p. 176, "I have . . . come to the conclusion that he was the fourth son of one 'John Smyth,' yeoman, of Sturton-le-Steeple. . . . There are several pieces of evidence which point to this young John Smith as being the man, none of them, indeed, decisive but weighty in their cumulative effect."

<sup>9</sup> Mr. John More, vicar in Robert Browne's time, was a Puritan — so was Mr. John Yates, vicar after 1616.

<sup>10</sup> Burrage, *N. F.*, p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Burrage, *ibid.*, p. 21. Robinson himself says: "The way by which the ministers of St. Andrew's enter is not the plain way of the Lord but the crooked path of a Lord Bishop's ordination and approbation and of a Patron's presentation, yea whether the people will or no." *Ibid.*, p. 19.

able to secure members inclined to omit or change some ceremonies and preach sound doctrine, but it was no less a part of the established order and subject to episcopal rule. And Robinson was content to have it so for a time. Joseph Hall (1574–1656) says<sup>12</sup> he took his first avowed step towards Separatism when he “refused the Prelacy” and his second when he “branded the ceremonies.” This might seem an inversion of the historic truth. Usually it had been the ceremonies that were first questioned, then the prelacy. But the tyranny of the prelates had thrust itself to the forefront of the Puritan outlook by Robinson’s time, and so their removal had really come to seem the first step in the way of a radical reform. By the middle of 1604, prelatical influence with the king and in Convocation had brought to pass the new canons — one hundred and forty-one of them — which aimed to reconstruct the church, and incidentally to strangle every sign of dissent. No wonder if Robinson was moved thereby to declare his “refusal of the Prelacy.” Then when he refused subscription to the canons, some time after December, 1604, by so doing he virtually “branded the ceremonies.” He paid the immediate penalty in suspension. As a married man, with one or two children, the consequent suffering could not be simply his own, and he had to seek some other means of living. Mr. Hall reports that he sought it by applying for the mastership of St. Giles’s Hospital, and, failing this, for a lease to serve as city preacher.<sup>13</sup> The same kind pen lays it down as something certain that if the application had succeeded, there would have been an end to his thoughts of separation. This is mere slander. But it is true that failure led to his leaving both city and church.

<sup>12</sup> In his *Common Apologie against the Brownists* . . . Hall, future Bishop of Exeter and Norwich, had probably known Robinson at Cambridge, and was now (1610) vicar of Waltham, Essex.

<sup>13</sup> A *Common Apologie of the Church of England*, p. 145. Cf. the case of John Smith as Preacher to the City of Lincoln, 1600–02.

The landmarks for the next year or two are few and faint. What there are suggest a state of mental strife. Our clearest glimpse of him is at Cambridge, where he had come in hope to find satisfaction for a troubled heart, and where in fact he seems to have found it. For on a Sabbath, going to hear Laurence Chaderton (1536?–1640) at St. Clemens in the morning, and Paul Baynes (d. 1617) at Great St. Andrew's in the afternoon, both these preachers (as he deemed, providentially) so expounded their subjects as to reinforce the "very reasons," which to his mind, made most surely for the last step.<sup>14</sup> Before his visit he had been "amongst some company of the separation,"<sup>15</sup> perhaps at Gainsborough, and in "exercising," or preaching to them, had "renounced his former ministry." But he was still haunted by misgivings, and the Cambridge "experience" may be taken as marking the hour of final decision. Then he returned to Gainsborough or Scrooby. By this time, 1607, the people of the Separation had become "two bands," though still one church. Their accepted pastor was John Smith, late preacher to the city of Lincoln, who had come to Gainsborough early in 1606. His treatment by the High Commission (in 1606) drove him forward,<sup>16</sup> through nine months of doubt, to the conclusion that the Church of England was not the Church of Christ. There were those in the town and district who inclined to the same view. These — at the end of 1606 or in the beginning of 1607 — he gathered together "as the Lord's free people" into a "covenant," viz., "to walk in all his ways made known, or to be made known, unto men, according to their best endeavours, whatsoever it should cost them, the Lord assisting them."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> P. 20 of Robinson's *Maruimission*, 1615.

<sup>15</sup> P. 29 of Ames's *Second Manuduction*, 1625.

<sup>16</sup> Whitley, J. S. Vol. I, pp. lvi, lvii.

<sup>17</sup> Burgess, Smith, p. 85. The terms of the covenant are reported by Bradford (*History*, p. 18). If Smith indited the form, he might be indebted for the substance to Francis Johnson or even Robert Browne.

This broad and simple formula, which certainly emanated from Smith, was the basis of the new movement and its bond of fellowship. Robinson took it gladly, and wished for nothing better. With merely verbal alterations and extensions it served him and his people to the end. Why, on his return, he chose to cast in his lot with the Scrooby rather than the Gainsborough group is not clear. Perhaps because those at Scrooby had most need of him, or perhaps because they were more congenial to him. For it was the group which included William Brewster, William Bradford, and Richard Clifton — “the grave and reverend preacher who by his pains and diligence had done much good and under God had been the means of the conversion of many.” But neither Clifton nor Robinson held office in the group. If the two groups made up the church, with Smith as pastor, there would be no need or desire to elect another. The need only arose at a later time when a cleavage between the two groups took place at Amsterdam. While at Scrooby, Robinson’s relation to the group, as also Clifton’s, was that of an unofficial preacher.

## II

When Smith appeared at Gainsborough and Robinson at Scrooby, the way had been prepared for them. Bradford relates how “by the travail and diligence of some godly and zealous preachers, and God’s blessing on their labours, as in other places of the land, so in the north parts, many became enlightened by the word of God” (*History*, pp. 11, 12). Before 1849, when Mr. Joseph Hunter issued his *Collections concerning the Early History of the Founders of New Plymouth*, the vague statement — “in the north parts” — excited mere conjecture. Bradford’s further statement that the north parts meant “sundry villages and towns, some in Nottingham, some of Lincolnshire and some of Yorkshire where they border nearest



together," narrowed the field, but gave no definite clue. It was Hunter who identified Austerfield in Yorkshire as the native place of Bradford, and Scrooby Manor, in Nottinghamshire, as the home of William Brewster and the Separatist meeting-house (pp. 8-11). Other identifications followed naturally and cleared up the question of locality once for all. It was Hunter also who first illustrated Bradford's incidental reference to Richard Clifton by particulars of his ministerial career and family connections (pp. 18 ff., more fully in the revised edition of 1854, pp. 40-98). It was he again, who annotated the general reference to "godly and zealous preachers" by directing attention to such Puritan preachers of the neighborhood as Thomas Toller of Sheffield (p. 20, and in 1854 ed., pp. 48, 49), Richard Bernard of Worksop (pp. 20, 21, and in 1854 ed., pp. 35-40), Robert Gifford of Laughton-en-le-Northen, adjoining Worksop (1854 ed., pp. 49, 50), and Hugh Bromehead of North Wheatley (1854 ed., pp. 51, 52 and App. No. 4, pp. 163-172). Finally, it was Hunter who drew out the story of William Brewster (pp. 21-39, cf. 1854 ed., pp. 53-88) and of William Bradford (pp. 44-51, cf. 1854 ed., pp. 99-120). At the same time, he depicted the physical features of the country (called the Basset Law) and the general character of its population; the prevalence of Roman Catholic religious houses; and the *a priori* unlikelihood, therefore, that it should be the scene of a Puritan harvest (pp. 15, 16; 1854 ed., pp. 24-28). In fine, Hunter had good right to claim that the new facts which he brought to light have "changed the face of the whole history of the movement, so long as the actors in it remained in England" (Preface to 1854 ed.).

Later research has somewhat enlarged the number of "new facts," particularly in relation to Robinson and Smith; but to him is due the praise of a pioneer who cleared a path where there seemed an impasse, and evoked an impulse to follow it up which accounts for the work of

the Dexters and many another. Among the facts brought to light by Hunter was one which he found in a return made to the Exchequer by the Archbishop of York, Toby Matthew on the 13th of November, 1608, to the effect that Richard Jackson, William Brewster, and Robert Rochester, all of Scrooby in the County of Nottingham, Brownists or Separatists, were liable "for a fine of £20 apiece (p. 131, 1854 ed.).

This he speaks of as the single instance of legal proceedings against the "Basset-Law Nonconformists" which he had come across. Dexter (p. 320, note) cited another from the MS. records of the ecclesiastical court at York. This was the case of Joan, wife of Thomas Helwys of Broxtowe, with regard to whom action was taken on January 26, 1607-8, and again later in the same year. After commitment to York Castle, she was brought before the High Commissioners, and, declining to incriminate herself (by the oath *ex officio*) was sent back to prison in the castle; where probably she remained till in due course she was banished the realm. John Drews and Thomas Jessop, "for refusing to take the oath according to law," were remanded to prison at the same time and with the same fate (Burgess, *Story of John Smith*, p. 116). A further case was that of "Gervase Nevyle (or Nevile) of Scrowbie," described as "a very dangerous schismatical Separatist, Brownist, and irreligious subject." He appeared before the ecclesiastical Court at York, on March 22, 1607-8,<sup>18</sup> and, after refusal to take oath and make answer, or to recognize the authority of the Archbishop,

<sup>18</sup> He was arraigned first, by the High Commissioners on November 10, 1607, and committed "to jail in the Castle of York for trial and further proceedings." These took place on March 22, 1608, and, meanwhile he had remained a prisoner; for the indictment on the latter date runs — "Gervase Nevile of York Castle, Brownist or Separatist." Dr. Usher (*The Pilgrims and their History*) seems not to be aware of the trial on March 22, else he could hardly say (p. 261) "Neville was permitted to testify without taking the oath and though committed to prison for a time was, after no long confinement, released without further examination or trial." "Indeed Neville was handled with considerable charity" (p. 21).

he was delivered by "strait-warrant to the hands, ward, and strait custody of the Keeper of His Majesty's Castle of York, not permitting him to have any liberty or conference with any without special license" (Brown, *P. E.*, pp. 94, 95).

In a book entitled *The Pilgrims and their History* by Roland G. Usher, Ph.D. (1918), the writer says: "It must be owned that from what we know of the activity of the High Commission elsewhere, the treatment the Scrooby congregation received was far from severe." There are a number of slight inaccuracies in the context of this summary judgment which do not predispose the reader to receive it with implicit faith. One has been indicated in a previous note; a second is the writing of Richard Johnson for Richard Jackson, and the adding of Francis Jessop of Worksop to the list of those summoned in December, 1607;<sup>19</sup> a third is the saying that no other persons than the five named were accused of Separatism, Baroism, (*sic?*) — apparently in ignorance of Joan Helwys, John Drews, and Thomas Jessop; and a fourth is implied in the assertion that in these cases (the five), the failure of the authorities to pursue them with "fines, excommunications, and attachments," shows that prosecution was initiated not by them but by some private individual. For there was no such failure, if it be true that an attachment was awarded to William Blanchard to apprehend Richard Jackson and William Brewster, and that each of these was fined £20. True, the authorities did not go the length of excommunication. But what would have happened if Brewster had not escaped? <sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> I find no other mention of him in this connection, nor does Dr. Usher give any reference. According to Hunter, Francis Jessop seems to have resided at Heyton or Tilne, Scrooby. It was his nephew, Wortley Jessop, who resided at Scrofton in the parish of Worksop. *Collections*, ed. 1854, pp. 126, 127.

<sup>20</sup> One or two other slips may be mentioned. Thus (p. 4) Scrooby is said to be fifty miles north of Lincoln instead of about sixteen miles northwest, and (p. 26) it is said, "Two years before (i.e., in 1606) Smyth's congregation had gone from their own little district to Holland," although the church was not gathered before the end of 1606, and

These, however, are trifles compared with the mistake involved in Dr. Usher's general standpoint. He may be said not unfairly to have taken up a brief for the ecclesiastical authorities and against the Puritans, against the Separatists especially. The outcome of this is insistence upon three remarkable propositions. The first is that what persecution befell the Scrooby congregation before 1607 was occasioned entirely by hostile neighbors. "From the authorities at London and from the ecclesiastics at York had thus far come neither reproaches nor interference." The reason for this lay in the tolerant temper of Archbishop Hutton and their own social or numerical insignificance. There came a change for the worse only with the accession of Toby Matthew, 1607. Even then severity began and ended with the five cases aforesaid. So says Dr. Usher. And I do not deny Archbishop Hutton's tolerant temper nor its effect in sparing the Scrooby people. But their comparative immunity had other causes as well. In part, it was due to the fact that the canons were not enforced in the northern province until the Convocation of York had adopted them, and that this was not done before March 10, 1606.<sup>21</sup> So the question is, what did the authorities do after that date? And the answer

Smith could still write himself "Pastor of the church at Gainsborough" in 1607 (see Letter of Smith to Bernard. Whitley, S. Vol. II, p. 331) and both companies were in Holland by August, 1608. Dr. Usher's great learning and competence, as exhibited particularly in his *Reconstruction of the English Church* — a work for which every serious student of the subject is thankful — appear to fail him whenever he touches on the Separatists. For a glaring example I may refer to Introduction (p. xxiv) of his *Presbyterian Movement in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth* (1906) where he says, "It was in 1585-86, when there came a sharp discussion over the details of Church government, that Brown, Harrison, Wright, Greenwood and others whom the Congregationalists regard as their prototypes separated from the movement." The Brown here mentioned is (on p. xxxvi) identified with a member of the Oxford Classis. Evidently there is confusion. Neither this Brown nor Thomas Harrison (the noted Hebraist of Cambridge) nor even Robert Wright was a Separatist. Browne and Harrison the Separatists were named Robert, and the first Separatist church was set up by Robert Browne at Norwich in 1581.

<sup>21</sup> *Synodalis*, Cardwell. Vol. I, pp. 164-166, note; p. 245, note. Cf. Whitley, S., Introduction, pp. l-li.

seems clear that they did their utmost to make the state of Nonconformists unbearable. John Smith (see above) found this and was driven by it to the last extremity of protest; Richard Bernard of Worksop found it and had his spirit broken thereby;<sup>22</sup> while as to the people generally, could words be more explicit than those of Bradford (*History*, p. 14)? "After these things they could not long continue in any peaceable condition, but were hunted and persecuted on every side, so as their former afflictions were but as flea-bitings in comparison of these which now came upon them. For some were taken and clapt up in prison, others had their houses beset and watched night and day, and hardly escaped their hands; and the most were fain to flie and leave their howses and habitations, and the means of their livelehood."

Such was the experience which Dr. Usher calls lenient. Moreover, according to the same unimpeachable witness, it was the climax of what had been going on for years. "The work of God was no sooner manifested in them [the local Puritans] but presently they were scoffed and scorned by the prophane multitude, and ye ministers urged with ye yoke of subscription, or els must be silenced; and ye poore people were so vexed with apparators and pursuivants, and ye commissarie courts as truly their affliction was not small, which, notwithstanding, they bore sundrie years with much patience" (*History*, p. 12).

But Dr. Usher's contention is that all the trouble thus related — except the five cases — was of private origin. It was the work of malicious and treacherous "relatives and neighbors." He asserts this as if he knew, and speaks of it as a most important fact, and dilates upon it in romantic strain (p. 18). But he cites no authority nor does he seem to have any outside the passage last quoted from

<sup>22</sup> He almost "separated" — at first he showed the greatest eagerness to go forward and he actually refused to subscribe — but he soon sued for "reinstatement" in ways which excited Smith's scorn. Whitley, S. Vol. II, pp. 335, 336, 370.

Bradford.<sup>23</sup> Here indeed it is said that the "prophane multitude" scoffed and scorned. It was growing to be a fashion with the "prophane multitude" so to behave towards the Puritan. But was it the profane multitude that urged ministers with the yoke of subscription or silenced them, or vexed the poor people with apparitors and pursuivants and the commissary courts? At any rate, does the profane multitude stand for relatives and neighbours? Are we to imagine these to have been so hostile that there was no living in peace on account of their daily nagging, scoffing, and deriding? Are we to think of them too as traitors, scheming continually to set the officers of law in motion? Dr. Usher would have us think so. But he adduces no evidence — either positive or negative — to bear him out.

2. Even less credible is the assertion that there is no substance in the traditional charge of harshness on the part of the Bishops against the Puritans. "As a matter of fact the Puritan clergy were not persecuted." This categorical reversal of what might have seemed a firmly established judgment is based on facts (says Dr. Usher) which go to show "that the overwhelming majority of the Puritans accepted the established church and remained members of it, read its Prayer Book, and performed voluntarily its ceremonies." Of the sixty Puritan clergy who were temporarily deprived or suspended in 1604-5, "the great majority soon conformed, accepted the tests prescribed by Bancroft and continued to preach in their parishes without molestation." We are asked, therefore, to conclude that Bancroft's régime was not "one of great harshness and injustice." The small number of the ejected proves it, and the Scrooby people in flying to Holland were flying from a shadow. "Indeed the Puritans and Bishops

<sup>23</sup> Unless it be Cotton Mather's *Magnalia*. Bk. II, sec. 3 (as cited by Dexter, E. H. P., p. 391) where it is said that Bradford encountered the "wrath of his uncles" and "the scoff of his neighbours." Mather is not a good witness; but even if he were, what he says refers only to Bradford.

taunted the Pilgrims with running away from a persecution which did not exist."

All this strikes one as a strange misreading of the facts. The king's threat to harry the Puritans out of the land is certain;<sup>24</sup> Bancroft's jubilant sympathy with that attitude is certain;<sup>25</sup> canon thirty-six of the one hundred and forty-one agreed upon by Bancroft and the rest of the bishops and clergy, in their Synod of London in 1603, is certain; the proclamation enjoining conformity to the form of the service of God established (July, 1604) is certain. Bancroft's circular letter (December 22, 1604) to the bishops of the southern province, urging them to a stringent execution of the king's command, is certain.<sup>26</sup> It is certain also that petitions from disaffected Puritans, cleric and lay, beseeching consideration and tolerance, were treated as seditious and their bearers or promoters in some cases imprisoned.<sup>27</sup> No less certain is it that resentment, deep and widespread, was in this way evoked, chiefly against the prelates "who have reviled and disgraced both in Pulpit and in Press, their brethren"; and have "also suspended, deprived, degraded, and imprisoned them, yea, caused them to be turned out of house and home, deny'd them all benefit of law, and used them with such contempt and contumely as if they were not worthy to live upon the face of the earth."<sup>28</sup> Yet there was no persecution!<sup>29</sup> How could there be, argues Dr.

<sup>24</sup> Usher, *Reconstruction of the English Church*. Vol. I, p. 327.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> The circular enclosed a letter from the Privy Council to say that the time of grace notified "the 16th day of July last," for the recalcitrants having now expired, it is the king's firm determination that since advice has not prevailed "authority shall compel."

<sup>27</sup> Whitley, S. Vol. I, p. li.

<sup>28</sup> A Christian and modest offer of a most indifferent conference. Pamphlet by some "of the late silenced and deprived ministers." Imprinted 1606. Rylands Library (uncatalogued).

<sup>29</sup> Dr. Usher's own words may be quoted against him: "The severe penalties attached" (to the canons of 1604) "showed that the canons were meant to be obeyed, that a new day had dawned, when there should not only be law but penalties for break-

Usher, seeing that in a year or two Puritan clamor and revolt died away? One might argue much the same from the effects upon a stricken country of a tyrant's conquest. He makes a desolation and calls it peace. Granted that the Puritans became acquiescent, did they become so willingly? Let their uprising a generation later supply the answer. They became acquiescent because, for the time being, the severity of the pressure upon them was more than they could bear. Only a few here and there disclosed an endurance which refused to be broken, and who were these? They were the people of Gainsborough and Scrooby. Their constancy is glorified by the Puritan surrender. Starting from the same grounds, they advanced to all the successive positions which these involved and took the consequences. That is the plain truth of the matter. Separation was the last step, and its consequences were provided by the act of April, 1593, which decreed that "if any person above sixteen years of age . . . shall obstinately refuse" to go to some authorized church, he, "being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be committed to prison, there to remain without bail or main prize"; shall be kept there three months, and, if still obstinate, shall then "upon his corporal oath" "abjure this realm of England and all other the Queen Majesty's dominions forever"; and if, having so sworn, he "shall not go to such haven and within such time as is before appointed," or, "shall return into Her Majesty's dominions without Her Majesty's special licence," he "shall be adjudged a felon" and die a felon's death. Furthermore, "all his goods and chattels" shall be forfeit to Her Majesty for ever, and "all his lands" during his own life.<sup>30</sup>

ing it and a coercive force sufficient to exact them from the guilty." *Reconstruction of the English Church*. Vol. I, p. 383.

<sup>30</sup> An act to retain the Queen's subjects in obedience. See Prothero, *Select Statutes, 1558-1625*, pp. 89-92. This act was continued by 39 Eliz. 18; 43 Eliz. 9; 1 James I, 25; 21 James I, 28.



The Scrooby and Gainsborough Separatists could evade this act only by secret flight, as those of the London Church had done in the previous decade. Can it be said that if they had chosen to stand their ground the act would not have been enforced? No one acquainted with the facts will so say. The act was enforced — as often as its victims were caught. It might not be enforced to death by public execution; but it was enforced by a slow death in prison.<sup>21</sup> What a flash of light is thrown by the following extract from Thomas Helwys's *Mystery of Iniquity* (1612).<sup>22</sup> It is addressed to the bishops:

“Let us persuade you in fear to God and shame to men to cast away all these courses we shall now mention. Do not when a poor soul by violence is brought before you, to speak his conscience in the profession of his religion to his God — do not first implore the oath *ex officio*. O, most wicked course! And if he will not yield to that, they imprison him closer. O, horrible severity! And if he will not be forced by imprisonment, then examine him on divers articles, without oath, to see if he may be entrapped anyway. O, grievous impiety! And if any piece of advantage (either in word or writing or by witness) can be gotten, turn the magistrates' sword upon him, or take his life. O, bloody cruelty! If no advantage can be found, get him banished out of his natural country and from his father's house; let him live or starve, it matters not. O, unnatural compassionateness without pity! Let these courses be far from you, for there is no show of grace, religion, nor humanity in these courses. This is to lie in wait for blood, and to lay snares secretly to take the simple to slay him.”

3. Dr. Usher's third proposition is that “the Pilgrims *voluntarily* left England” (p. 26). As there was nothing in their treatment which compelled them to leave, why did they go? He answers, because they had reached a state of mind to which “England was unclean” (p. 23). They must, therefore, depart for their souls' sake. “It was

<sup>21</sup> In 1596 (see Preface to the Confession of Faith of certain people living in Exile, of that year) it was recorded that “twenty souls (including aged men and women) have perished in the prisons within the city of London only (besides other places of the land) and that of late years.”

<sup>22</sup> Quoted by Burgess, Smith, p. 284.

dangerous to remain there longer, for those who would worship God in all sincerity and purity must guard against the pollution and contamination of the Beast" (p. 23). Their "vital objection to the Established Church was not so much its activity in persecution as its existence. . . . It was all a relic of Paganism, there was no warrant in Scripture for any of it. . . . To remain in contact with it was to risk defilement" (pp. 23, 24). Dr. Usher confounds physical with spiritual contact. Dr. Joseph Hall, Robinson's first assailant, did the same, and was told by Robinson to realize the difference. There was no reason (said he) to separate from England in order to separate from England's church, any more than to escape from Amsterdam in order to avoid its heresies and immoralities. Merely to be let alone was enough. In Amsterdam they were in the world, but not forced to be of it. Heretics and sinners of every sort might be around them, but they were not made to have fellowship with them in worship. In England it was otherwise. There the laws compelled them to be in and of a church which they adjudged to be Babylon. They could not come out of the church except by coming out of their "dear native land." Just that was the distressing grievance — a grievance which would have ceased at once if persecution had ceased. It is a libel to say that in their eyes "there was no one left in England with whom the Pilgrims might hope to have communion. . . . All was wrong, all was uncongenial, unclean, and from it they fled" (p. 25). They were no such churls or Pharisees. But for the severity of the laws and the rigor with which they were administered, it is past all doubt that Robinson, Brewster, and the rest would have rejoiced to stay at home and to let their witness to the "truth" speak for itself. It is one thing to say that they had no right to expect so much tolerance. It is quite another to suggest that so much was offered to them and spurned. It is not "a great

error to stress the hostility of the church toward them and say that they were harried from the land " (p. 22). It is the simple fact.

### III

By May, 1609, Robinson and his people were settled at Leyden. They had gone there after a few months at Amsterdam — months of disillusionment. For the sister church of Johnson and Ainsworth was not what they had hoped. Its principles were their own, but not its temper. This had become excited by controversy and enflamed by personal quarrels. There was consequently too little scope for that quiet growth of Christian character and life which to Robinson was the church's chief end. In addition, there was John Smith with his ultra-scrupulous conscience, so keen for the truth but so unable (at present) to mark off what really mattered from what was of comparative unimportance. Already (1608) he had stepped forward with his (six) *Differences of the Separation*, and was exalting them into a touchstone of communion. The effect was to kindle a flame in which love and peace could not live. In the particular points at issue Robinson, on the whole, may have agreed rather with Smith than with Johnson. But they were points which he did not wish his people to agitate. They were not trivial, but they were not essential. The essential things were inward and spiritual. He looked round, therefore, for some quiet resting place where the Church in its worship might attend to these without distraction. This, I am sure, is nearer the truth than to say, with Dr. Usher, that Robinson and his people "decided to seek some place where there were neither heretics nor English, some place where they should live as nearly as might be alone and observe together the ordinances of God whose perpetuation was the prime motive of their exodus from Scrooby " (p. 33).

We have no reports of Robinson's ordinary discourses. His literary record is made up for the most part of con-

troversial writings; and this may easily give the impression that controversial topics were those which absorbed his ministry. But the impression is corrected if we bear in mind that the controversies were of strictly occasional origin. Each was called forth by specific attacks which, in justice to his cause and his congregation he did not feel at liberty to ignore. Moreover, it is clear that he felt constrained to put all his strength into the fray when once he had become engaged; and it is not strange if sometimes (in the manner of the day) he wasted his strength and weakened his argument by violent language. But even so moderation was the prevailing note of his writing, nor did he either love or seek controversy. Hence it is difficult to imagine him engaging his hearers week by week with a defense of "ordinances." It is much easier to imagine him taking the "ordinances" for granted as mercies to be enjoyed with thanksgiving, and devoting himself usually to such subjects of moral and spiritual interest as are treated of in his *Essays*. Indeed, every one of these, as to substance, might well have been a sermon, and lets us deeper into the habitual mind of the man than any of his polemical work. "Disputations in religion," he says in one place,

"are sometimes necessary, but always dangerous; drawing the best spirits into the head from the heart, and leaving it either empty of all, or too full of fleshly zeal and passion if extraordinary care be not taken still to supply and fill it anew with pious affections towards God and loving towards men" (*Essays*, VII).

"Pious affections towards God and loving towards men"—this double aim pervades most of his *Essays*. Does it not indicate a true conception of his weekly homilies? The men and women who looked up to him from the benches in the big room of his house were mostly simple laboring folk, laboring and heavy-laden. They looked up for bread of the kind that would turn to inward comfort, strength, and light. Their daily life was hard and made

them hungry for such bread. May we not regard it as a sign of his wisdom and love in breaking it for them that, unlike the bickering church at Amsterdam, they dwelt in peace to the end of his days, and nourished a wealth of manly virtues which enabled them to survive alike the trials of their lot in Leyden and the rigors of their experience in the new world? Sound doctrine was good, right ordinances of worship were good, but both were means to an end, viz., Christian lives, and the Leyden pastor never lost sight of this. His reward appeared in men and women whose Christian lives were of the heroic strain, and became his "living epistle" to the world.

#### IV

Robinson lived at Leyden from May, 1609, to his death on March 1, 1625. On one occasion there is a glimpse of him at Rotterdam along with some other members of the church who attended Mr. Brewer so far, on his ominous journey to England;<sup>33</sup> and of course he may have made many other excursions from Leyden. But the inference *e silentio* is that he "dwelt among his own people" in studious seclusion, except for the pastoral duties which were a part of his proper work. According to Bradford "he taught" his people "thrice a week"; and, if his weekly sermons or lectures brought home to them his "singular abilities in Divine things", they did so because of the many hours of thought and prayer which went to their making. Probably his appointment as pastor took place at Amsterdam,<sup>34</sup> while William Brewster was "called

<sup>33</sup> Sir William Zouche to Sir Dudley Carleton, Rotterdam, Saturday, November 13, 1619: "About ten of the clock (last night) Master Brewer arrived, conveyed hither by the Beadle of the University, Master [John] Robinson and Master Keble [John Keble] accompanied by two other of his friends: their names, I think, are not worth the asking." Arber, S. P. F., p. 224.

<sup>34</sup> See Preface to the Treatise of Religious Communion (Aahton, Vol. III, p. 109), where Robinson says he was "excepted against" by some of John Smith's people, when he was "chosen into office in this (Leyden) Church." This could only have happened at Amsterdam.

and chosen " elder<sup>35</sup> on an early date at Leyden (*History*, p. 24). Under their guidance — double in function but single in aim and spirit — the church " grew in knowledge and other gifts and graces of the spirit of God, and lived together in peace and love and holiness; and many came unto them from divers part of England, so as they grew a great congregation " (*Ibid.*, p. 24).

Moreover, though he never sought great things for himself, great influence came to him in the city. Leyden, with its young university, was the centre of a chronic and bitter conflict between Calvinists and Arminians. Polyander for the former and Episcopius for the latter divided " the students and other learned men " into a mutual hostility so great " that few of the disciples of the one would hear the other teach." Robinson, though a high Calvinist, was not a mere partisan. " He went constantly to hear their readings [or lectures] and heard the one as well as the other." Also, in " sundry disputes " he intervened to such effect that " he began to be terrible to the Arminians." In fine, he was induced — much against his wish — to stand up in set debate with Episcopius, who " put forth his best strength," but, according to Bradford, was put " to an apparent non plus . . . in a great and public audience." This occurred more than once, and " procured him much honour and respect from those learned men and others who loved the truth " (*History*, p. 28). Robinson was already a member of the university, and it is hinted that but for the fear of " giving offence to the State of England " some office, presumably as teacher, might have been found for him.

Thus amid tokens of local favor and the warm affection of his people nine years went by. Then there came a change. The fact had to be faced that the church, though

<sup>35</sup> Deacons also were appointed, but not a teacher nor a widow or deaconess — which is remarkable in view of Robinson's Appendix to Mr. Perkins' six principles of Christian Religion, questions 12-17, Robinson's works. Vol. III, pp. 429, 430, Ashton's ed.

united and prosperous, was suffering a certain loss. Conditions of life were hard and deterred many of the homeland from coming or adhering to them. "Some preferred and chose the prisons in England rather than liberty in Holland with these afflictions." Among themselves also many "in the best and strength of their years," despite "a resolute courage," were sinking into a "premature old age," while the young were robbed of their youthfulness. Worse still, there were some of the latter who, "getting the reins off their necks," ran away from the daily round of "heavy labours." "Some became soldiers, others took upon them far voyages by sea and others some worse courses, tending to dissoluteness, and the danger of their souls, to the great grief of their parents and the dishonour of God" (*History*, pp. 30-32).<sup>36</sup> In short, it seemed probable that continuance at Leyden spelt a gradual approach to extinction. So, warned thus by "the grave mistris Experience . . . those prudent governors [Robinson and Brewster], with sundrie of ye sagest members, begane both deeply to apprehend their present dangers and wisely to foresee ye future and thinke of timly remedy" (*History*, p. 29). There is no need here to recount how the remedy was attempted, delayed, and at length accomplished. It is enough to remark that the final issue from a long series of difficulties was not a little due to the pastor's Christian temper, sagacity, and tact. His

<sup>36</sup> Winslow adds as other reasons of unrest: (1) that they felt it grievous to live from under the protection of the State of England; (2) that there was a likelihood of losing the English language, the English names, and the English type of education; (3) that they were conscious of inability "to do good" among the Dutch, particularly in "reforming the Sabbath." *Young's Chronicles*, p. 381. A final compelling motive was "a great hope and inward zeal they had of laying some good foundation, or at least to make some way thereunto, for ye propagating and advancing of the Gospel of the kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of ye world; yea, though they should be but even as stepping-stones unto others for ye performing of so great a work." *Bradford, History*, p. 32. Dr. Usher (p. 44) takes no note of this strong missionary impulse, and he introduces motives for removal — e.g., "active controversy as to the validity of their own fundamental conclusions" — of which neither Bradford nor Winslow says anything. Nay, this is the very libel against which Winslow wrote to protest. *Young's Chronicles*, p. 380.

"singular abilities in devine things" did not prevent him from being "very able to give directions in civill affaires, and to foresee dangers and inconveniences; by which means he was very helpfull to their outward estats and so was every way as a commone father unto them" (*History*, p. 25). When the time came for leaving Leyden, Robinson spent "a good part of the day" in preaching from Ezra 8 2. The rest of the time was given to prayer — though according to Winslow, space was found for a feast in the pastor's house furnished by those remaining behind for those about to sail. The date was Thursday, July 20, 1620. Next day all (or most) went by canal to Delfshaven (twenty-four miles away), where the *Speedwell* lay ready. "That night was spent with little sleep by the most, but with friendly entertainment and Christian discourse and other real expressions of true Christian love" (*History*, p. 73). On Saturday, July 22, "the wind being fair, they who were to sail went aboard and their friends with them."<sup>37</sup> When at last the tide called those who were not going to leave the ship, "their Reverend Pastor falling down on his knees (and they all with him) with watery cheeks commended them with most fervent prayers to the Lord and his blessing. And then with mutual embraces and many tears they took their leaves one of another, which proved to be the last leave to many of them" (*History*, p. 73).

Robinson stayed with the majority at Leyden,<sup>38</sup> by desire and decision of the church, but much against his own inclination. He longed for the opportunity of reunion, and hoped it would come soon. Individuals of the Leyden remnant went over from time to time. In 1627 many went. His own turn never came. It was not so much the lack of means that hindered as the opposition of certain persons

<sup>37</sup> Winslow says, "We only going aboard" i.e., those about to sail. Young's *Chronicles*, p. 384.

<sup>38</sup> "But take notice — the difference of number was not great." Winslow, Young's *Chronicles*, p. 384.



in England, whom he calls the "forward preachers." These "of all others" — he wrote to Brewster, December 20, 1623 — "are unwilling I should be transported, especially such of them as have an eye that way themselves; as thinking if I come ther, thee market will be mard in many regards" (*History*, p. 199). On the 19th of the same month, in a letter to Bradford, he speaks of the comfort there would be in a talk face to face; "but seeing that cannot be done, we shall always long after you and love you and waite God's apoynted hour. . . . My wife with me re-salute you and yours. Unto him who is ye same to his in all places and nere to them which are farr from one another I commend you and all with you." In April, 1626, the two leaders heard of Robinson's death from a letter written by Roger White, his brother-in-law, and dated Leyden, April 28, 1625. He had died on March 1. His illness began on Saturday evening, February 22. Nevertheless, next day he preached twice. In the days of the week following he grew weaker, but felt no pain. "He was sensible to the very last, and his friends came freely to him. . . . If either prayers, tears, or means would have saved his life, he had not gone hence."<sup>39</sup> His loss, indeed, seemed irreparable. Looking backward from a later time, Bradford wrote that "though they esteemed him highly whilst he lived and laboured amongst them, yet much more after his death, when they came to feele ye wante of his help and saw (by woeful experience) what a treasure they had lost, to ye greefe of their harts and wounding of their sowls; yea, such a loss as they saw could not be repaired" (*History*, p. 25). Some were inclined to think that his death, occurring "even as fruit falleth before it is ripe,

<sup>39</sup> He was buried in St. Peter's on March 4, many university professors and other eminent citizens being present. The church register shows that nine florins were paid for opening the grave. This sum was customary "for burials between the ordinary hours of 12 M. and 1.30 P.M." See Dexter, E. H. P., p. 592. But cf. *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3d series. Vol. IX, 1846. *Memoirs of the Pilgrims of New England*, pp. 55, 56, by George Sumner.

when neither length of days nor infirmity of body did seem to call for his end," should be taken, for some reason, as a sign of the divine anger.<sup>40</sup> At any rate, he passed just when the Leyden section of the church was about to stand most in need of him.<sup>41</sup> This will appear if we glance at the way in which his mind in relation to the matter of Separation had developed.

## V

Dr. Usher says that "Robinson's opinions changed from year to year" (p. 192); and implies that his position at any given time is, therefore, difficult to define. It is a reckless statement. He was the very opposite of John Smith in this respect. Substantially he stood at the end of his course where he stood at its outset — I mean that he still maintained the necessity of separating from the corrupt worship and government of the English Church, and of gathering true believers into a true church-estate. But truth was more to him than consistency. Whether we have his exact words or not in the Farewell Address ascribed to him by Winslow, it is certain that we have his meaning. "He charged us before God and his blessed angels to follow him no further than he followed Christ; and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of his, to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry; for he was very confident the Lord had more truth and light yet to break

<sup>40</sup> Letter of Thomas Blossom to Governor Bradford, Leyden, December 15, 1625. Young's *Chronicles*, pp. 480-483.

<sup>41</sup> Of Robinson's six children (John, Bridget, Isaac, Mercey, Fear, and James), one was buried in St. Peter's, Leyden, on February 7, 1621, and another on March 27, 1623, which of them, does not appear. Bridget was married at Leyden in May, 1629, to John Grynwich, student of theology, and her mother attended as a witness. Isaac went to New England in 1631, and was still living in 1702 — aged 92. Mrs. Robinson "is recorded as in Leyden as late as April 6, 1646, and Hoornbeek states that she and her children, "joined the Dutch church." *E. H. P.*, pp. 591, 592 and Arber, p. 160. There is no good foundation for the Robinson New England pedigree as made out by Dr. Allen. Vol. I, pp. lxxv ff., Ashton. Mrs. Robinson's will, dated Leyden, 1602, has been found.

forth out of his holy word.”<sup>42</sup> His growth toward wider vision was the reward of this attitude.

At first he had no doubt of the absolutely anti-Christian character of the English Church. In his earliest writing entitled *An Answer to a Censorious Epistle* (by Dr. Joseph Hall), 1609, he will not admit that the English Church is in any point “the Temple of God compiled and built of spiritually hewn and lively stones, and of the cedars, firs, and thyme trees of Lebanon,” but, on the contrary, is “a confused heap of dead and defiled and polluted stones, and of all rubbish of briers and brambles of the wilderness, for the most part fitter for burning than building.” It is, therefore, intolerable; and “we take ourselves rather bound to shew our obedience in departing from it than our valour in purging it, and to follow the prophet’s counsel in flying out of Babylon ‘as he-goats before the flock,’ Jeremiah 50 8.” To the like effect he wrote, but more elaborately, in his *Justification of Separation*, 1610. There is no hint of compromise at this stage. He can see nothing to admire or even endure, in the English “State-ecclesiastical.” His invective is worthy of Henry Barrow — whose arguments, indeed, he often repeats.

On February 25, 1610–11, Dr. William Ames wrote to Robinson a brief letter on the question, “Whether there be not a visible communion out of the visible Church.” In other words, is not evident Christian character a sufficient reason for fellowship with a person? The implication is that Robinson denied this, and made it a condition of fellowship not merely that the person should be a member of some visible church but also a member of the true church. Ames rightly describes this as the “very bitterness of Separation,” and urges Robinson to reconsideration. Surely, he pleads, there “can be no other sufficient reason why we should communicate with visible churches but only because we visibly

<sup>42</sup> Young’s *Chronicles*, Winalow’s *Brief Narration*, p. 397.

discern that they have communion with Christ." If Christ owns a person inside or outside a visible church, are you to refuse him, or a church so far as it visibly contains the like of him? Robinson, in a belated reply, showed himself not yet able to appreciate so simply Christian a principle. He is still fettered by the formal logic of Separatism. "External communion is a matter of external relation and order, under which men out of the church are not." For example, Christians outside the church may pray together though it is their duty to come inside; but for members of the church to pray with non-members or with members of a false church is a breach of church order and relation (*vitium ordinis et relationis*). Thus the effect of church membership was a deplorable narrowing of Christian fellowship. But by 1614 when he published the treatise *Of Religious Communion, Private and Public*, his view as regards the former has broadened. He has come to see the distinction there is between personal and church actions. He sees that private communion is a personal action which need not infringe "any set order of any church." He sees further that in a subconscious sort of way he has always been of that persuasion, but that a vehement desire of peace, together with some weakness, has deterred him from making his mind quite clear to himself. Now, however, his mind is clear and his will resolute on the point. He is prepared to practise and defend private communion with all visible Christians to the fullest extent possible (p. 65).

But for a man who cherished the desire "to learn further or better what the will of God is" (p. 103), this could not be the end. There was bound to be a further enlargement of insight and tolerance. When, therefore, such a question as the "lawfulness" of occasional attendance at the services of the English Church for the purpose of hearing the Word was thrown up by the course of events, Robinson was at no loss for the right answer. It is signifi-

cant that the question was thrown up in Henry Jacob's church, Southwark, London, for Jacob (1563-1624) was a liberal spirit. Some of his people had felt no scruple in going now and then to a parish church. On this account they were disowned by a majority, including the teacher, and a young woman who did not at once leave off the practice was excommunicated. Two of the liberal minority, on going over to Leyden, were welcomed by the church there as a matter of course. But on being transferred later to Amsterdam, a small violent party prevailed to get one or both of them cast out. Both sides in both churches appealed to Leyden — the one in protest, the other in self-defence. Robinson (for himself and his people) wrote a letter to each and made it clear that his approval went entirely to those of a generous spirit and against those whose spirit was the reverse. As to the "Ancient Church" at Amsterdam he denounced a judgment of withering severity.

In the same year, 1624, he wrote a treatise on the subject,<sup>43</sup> stating and reasoning the case with his wonted thoroughness and fairness. The concluding paragraph sums up his final attitude. While reiterating an unchanged conviction that he "cannot communicate with or submit unto the [English] church-order and ordinances there established, either in state or act, without being condemned of mine own heart, and therein provoking God, who is greater than my heart, to condemn me much more," nevertheless he can say, "For myself, thus I believe with my heart before God, and profess with my tongue, and have before the world, that I have one and the same faith,

<sup>43</sup> The treatise was found in his study after his death, and held back for ten years because it was perceived that "some, though not many, were contrary-minded to the author's judgment." Then it was published in hope of staying the mischief wrought in the church by four or five men, particularly one, whose obstinate insistence on the same narrow course as Robinson condemned had recently rent the church and even reduced it to a fifth of its former numerical strength. The church still lingered in 1639 and even in 1647. Dexter, E. H. P., p. 593, note. But its members were all gradually absorbed by the Dutch churches or dispersed.

hope, spirit, baptism, and Lord, which I had in the Church of England and none other; that I esteem so many in that Church of what State or Order soever, as are truly partakers of that faith, as I account many thousands to be, for my Christian brethren, and myself a fellow-member with them of that one mystical body and Christ scattered far and wide throughout the world; that I have always in spirit and affection all Christian fellowship and communion with them, and am most ready, in all outward actions and exercises of religion, lawful and lawfully done, to express the same."

## VI

Thus, by 1620, Robinson had risen above mere "negation." It was not of Separation that his mind was full but of communion, as far as might be. Hence the character of his last words to those who in that year were setting forth on their Great Adventure. They were not to go as Separatists, or Brownists, still less as Robinsonians, but as children of light, under the guidance of a living spirit who had already revealed to them a measure of truth, and would reveal yet more if they were faithful to His word. This was the principle — a positive, not a negative, principle — which inspired the Pilgrim movement. On the whole, the men and women who bore it in their hearts to the New World remained true to its impulse, and so bore in them, notwithstanding many temporary failures, the seeds of that comprehensive progress in Church and State, which has been a characteristic feature of the American people. Expressed in terms of the Church it meant that all its members (to use the accepted phrase) were Prophets, Priests, and Kings. In other words, all had direct access to God; all were privileged to learn and speak forth his will; all might be endued with his conquering power. So the Church was a spiritual democracy; and when the men who formed it turned to the task of con-

stituting a political State, inevitably they proceeded on democratic lines. Nor was it strange if, at the same time, they conceived Church and State to be, in like manner, a theocracy, for both alike were to be ruled by God's law. It was in respect of this Divine law — its seat and scope and interpretation — that the Church went astray, and for a time led the State astray. By ascribing to the Scriptures an absolute authority for all things pertaining to the conduct of life, whatever its sphere, the Pilgrims put an embargo on freedom of thought and action. But they were not singular in this. They were only singular inasmuch as they applied the rule of scriptural authority more thoroughly than other Puritans or Protestants. And they were more thorough in applying Scripture because their eye was more single. To believe in anything as a word of God was for them but the first step to obedience. And so unwittingly, they were on the way to that higher standpoint of the modern Christian mind which seeks to sift the chaff from the wheat in the Scriptures *just because of its loyalty to the word of God, and its vision that the word of God cannot be inconsistent with any word of truth.*

In short, the positive principle of unreserved loyalty to the known will of God, on which the Pilgrims based their covenant, was a vital principle out of which in due course, was bound to come the light to see and the power to transcend whatever hindered the normal growth of the church or the individual. And if this was the principle which Robinson's men were the first to plant in the New World, then plainly Dr. Usher is wrong when he speaks of them as "choosing the wilderness because it seemed impossible to find anywhere in England or Holland a body of people who *thought exactly as they did.*"<sup>44</sup> "They maintained unflinchingly at Plymouth an ideal which had long ceased to have a numerous following in England." Hence their "lack of numerical growth at Plymouth." More than its

<sup>44</sup> Italics mine.

isolated position or its economic drawbacks, the ecclesiastical exclusiveness of Plymouth was the "secret" of its failure to grow. They stood for "a negation, nothing more than an uncompromising hostility to the established Church of England and to the ordination of Bishops" (p. 188).<sup>45</sup> Thus the Pilgrims were isolated — one might even say boycotted — because of their exclusiveness. And, proceeds Dr. Usher, "nowhere does this isolation . . . reveal itself more clearly than in their difficulties in finding a minister" (p. 189).

Here at last is a point we can test. His only reference is to the mission of Allerton to England in 1626-27, where "he was to find a clergyman, but experienced such difficulties . . . that he finally brought back with him a man who soon gave clear proof of insanity." Turning to Bradford's account of Allerton's mission we find no mention of any mandate "to find a clergyman"; but we do find that when Allerton arrived with one in 1628 he was severely taken to task for his presumption.<sup>46</sup> In fact, there is not the least proof that the Pilgrims ever went in search of a minister or were "nonplussed" (Usher, p. 190) to find one. So long as Brewster and Bradford lived, they were content with their "ministry of the word," though sorry to miss the sacraments. They were glad of a regular pastor when he could be had, and, if worthy, paid him all due deference. But their church theory did not require him, except for the *bene esse* of a church. The *esse* consisted of the people, and there was nothing of principle to prevent them ordaining Brewster, Bradford, or any other of their

<sup>45</sup> Cf. p. 193, "So far as they [the Pilgrims] could discover after 1630, there was not in all England one man of real ability who believed as they did, nor were there any laymen of real ability who came to Plymouth in any number to strengthen the Pilgrim State."

<sup>46</sup> Not 1626 or 1627 — "This year (1628) Mr. Allerton brought over a young man for a minister to the people here, *whether upon his own head or at the motion of some friends there*" (italics mine) "*I well know not, but was without the Church's sending.* . . . His name was Mr. Rogers, but they perceived upon some trial that he was crazed in his brain. Mr. Allerton was much blamed." History, p. 292.



number to the pastorate. If they looked outside for one, it can only have been from a sense of their own insufficient training.

Passing by some other misconceptions,<sup>47</sup> I will mention what I take to be the greatest — viz., that the Pilgrims and the Puritans who “come to New England in 1630 and after” were sharply antagonistic to each other in their relation to the English Church (Usher, p. 186). For what is the fact? In parting from his friends at Delfshaven, Robinson had said, “There will be no difference between the unconformable ministers and you when they come to the practice of the ordinances *out of the kingdom*.”<sup>48</sup> And so it came to pass. When the first Puritan colonists came to Salem in 1629 they came with a prejudice against the Plymouth Church. It was supposed to be an embodiment of Brownism. But a few weeks sufficed to change their mind. On May 11, Governor Endicott wrote to Bradford a letter of thanks for the service of the Plymouth doctor and deacon, Mr. Fuller, and to say how much he rejoices to have been satisfied by him, “touching your judgments of the outward form of God’s worship. It is, as far as I can gather, no other than is warranted by the evidence of truth and the same which I have professed and maintained ever since the Lord in mercy revealed himself unto me; being far from the common report that hath been spread of you touching that particular.”<sup>49</sup>

This was not mere compliment, for on July 20, the Salem Puritans proceeded to choose a pastor and teacher in a manner nowise different from the Plymouth way —

<sup>47</sup> Thus, we are told that “we have comparatively few reliable indications” of “Pilgrim belief aside from church government” (p. 93), although we know that their theology was Calvinistic, and that they “assented wholly to the 39 Articles and no less to the public confession of Faith put forth by the French Reformed Churches,” see Arber, pp. 280, 294. Stranger still, we are told that “we have no authentic hint” as to whether they knelt to receive (the Lord’s Supper) “or sat” (p. 197); although the idea of them kneeling is unthinkable.

<sup>48</sup> Young’s *Chronicles*, Winslow’s *Brief Narrative*, p. 398 and note.

<sup>49</sup> *History*, pp. 317, 318.

the pastor being Mr. Skelton and the teacher Mr. Higginson, both of whom by submitting to reordination virtually gave up their status in the English Church. Then on August 6, there was a choice and ordaining of elders and deacons, and on this occasion, delegates from Plymouth, including Governor Bradford, were present. Delayed by "crosswinds" they arrived late, but came "into the assembly afterward and gave them the right hand of fellowship, wishing all prosperity and blessed success unto such good beginnings." What happened to this first company happened also to the second which came over in the spring of 1630 led by John Winthrop.<sup>50</sup> So with later companies — though it may be going too far to take it for literal truth "that the rest of the churches in New England came at first to them at Plimoth to crave their direction in church courses and made them their Pattern."<sup>51</sup> It was, indeed, not a case of taking the Plymouth church for a "pattern." There were, from the first, features in the Bay churches more or less peculiar to themselves.<sup>52</sup> But the point is that *so far as the Plymouth Church was Separatist, they too became Separatist* and were moved in that direction rather than deterred by the Plymouth example. Thus not repulsion but convergence is found between the Pilgrims and the main body of the Puritans "who came to New England in 1630 and after" (Usher, p. 186).

And there was convergence because the new comers were at last free to follow the impulse which lay at the heart of Puritanism and had been followed by the Pilgrims all along.<sup>53</sup> Bradford (quoting John Cotton) means

<sup>50</sup> For particulars, see Dexter, C., p. 416.

<sup>51</sup> So W. Rathband in his *Briefe Narration of Some Church Courses*. This was said to him by Mr. W(inslow)?, an eminent man in the church at Plymouth in 1644, and is repeated by Robert Baillie in *A Dissuasive from the Errours of the Time*, 1646 (p. 54).

<sup>52</sup> The Plymouth church, e.g., had no "teacher" and its idea of what belonged to the function of ruling elder was different.

<sup>53</sup> Perhaps the most striking instance of this is John Cotton who before leaving old Boston heard with "grief" and "wonder" of the Puritan decline to Separatist ways in New England, but took to them himself when he got there in 1633. Dexter, C., p. 422.

this when he says, "there was no agreement" (of the two parties) "by any Solemn or common consultation, but it is true they did, as if they had agreed by the same spirit of truth and unity, set up by the help of Christ the same model of churches, one like to another; and if they of Plymouth have helped any of the first comers in their theory, by hearing and discerning their practices, therein the Scripture is fulfilled that the kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven which a woman took."<sup>64</sup> I may restate this important point by saying that the Pilgrims and the immigrant Puritans were able to meet each other half way inasmuch as the former, under the guidance of Robinson, had learned to relax their extreme emphasis on Separation while the latter were driven to become Separatist, notwithstanding their boast of unity with the mother-church, under the influence of a new environment acting upon the inner logic of their creed. And if this be so, then we must say that another view put forward by Mr. Champlin Burrage (*Early English Dissenters*, vol. I, chap. 14), requires considerable qualification. His view is somewhat difficult to summarize; but he seems to maintain that the Puritans went out thinking themselves to be still a part of the English Church. And this may be granted — though the thought was a product of sentiment rather than of understanding. He seems to maintain, again, that they were, at the same time, already Puritan Independents of a presbyterian type. And this also may be granted — though this fact, if they were conscious of it, ought to have suggested to them the absurdity of talking, as some did, of a merely "local secession" from the church. He maintains further that, with the passing years, and even by 1650, the practically congregational, but presbyterianized, churches established by the Puritans had so reacted upon the Plymouth church as to make it "more and more like them." And this too may be granted to some ex-

<sup>64</sup> Young's Chronicles, Governor Bradford's Dialogue, p. 426.

tent—though the Presbyterian element is hardly traceable down to the death of “the good elder Mr. Thomas Cushman” on December 11, 1691.<sup>55</sup> But when Mr. Burrage maintains that “the early Puritan congregations were principally, if not wholly, organized after their own ideals, and owed little or nothing to the Plymouth church, whose “influence was evidently infinitesimal,” he is wrong. For he can maintain this only on the assumption, which he appears to make, that the Plymouth church was still rigidly Separatist. This is the assumption of Dr. Usher, and, as I have pointed out, is contrary to the evidence.

There is one respect in which the Pilgrims, whatever else they may have yielded to the increasing dominance of the Puritans, did not yield without a struggle, if at all.<sup>56</sup> Robinson in one of his essays (the seventh) argues for civil tolerance of error, “considering that neither God is pleased with unwilling worshippers, nor Christian societies bettered nor the persons themselves neither, but the plain contrary in all three . . . and to that of the Father (Augustine) — ‘that many who at first serve God by compulsion come after to serve him freely and willingly’ — I answer, that neither good intents nor events, which are casual, can justify unreasonable violence, and withal, that by this course of compulsion many become atheists, hypocrites, and familists, and being at first constrained to practise against conscience, lose all conscience afterwards. Bags and vessels overstrained break, and will never after hold anything.”

This Christian wisdom of their beloved pastor was not forgotten by those who had known him, and by them, by their leaders especially, the spirit of it became a tradition

<sup>55</sup> He was more than a ruling elder in the presbyterian sense: “it being a profound principle of this Church, in their first formation . . . to choose none for ruling elders but such as were able to teach; which ability (as Mr. Robinson observes in one of his letters) other reformed churches did not require in their ruling elders.” *An Account of the Church of Christ in Plymouth*, by John Cotton, p. 49. Cushman had held office for forty-two years and had been practically pastor for ten or more.

<sup>56</sup> During the first two generations probably not at all.

of the church. Severity exercised, after much patience, towards hypocrites and knaves like Oldham, Lyford, and Morton was no departure from it. Nor is there any proof that difference of religious opinion or practice was visited with harsh treatment unless it issued in conduct dangerous to the common welfare. It would be unfair to expect from even the most charitable of the seventeenth century the same liberal view of supposed heresy and the same degree of leniency we have learned to hold and practise. But judged by the prevailing standard of their age, and, still more, by the example of their Puritan neighbors, the Pilgrims can be seen to have sustained a level of self-restraint in their relation to dissidents which does them honour.

The worst trial arose with the incursion of Quakers in 1656. They "much infested the country between the years 1650 and 1660, and proved very troublesome, and subverted many. The church of Plymouth, in particular, was much endangered by them — several of them wavering and trembling, but only one family wholly led astray." But "it may be observed to the honour of the colony that though the provocation of the Quakers was equally great here as elsewhere, yet they never made any sanguinary or capital laws against that sect as some of the colonies did" (Cotton's *Account of the Plymouth Church*, p. 118 and note).

For the most part this is true — though it is also true that even Plymouth caught fire from the prevailing fierceness and assented to measures unworthy of a noble past.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> There were no Quakers in New England before 1656. The first move toward persecution sprang from the General Court of Massachusetts. At its instance the Commissioners of the United Colonies issued circular letters to the General Court of each colony recommending certain action. Thus in 1658 it was recommended that "members of this cursed sect," "male or female," (1) should be banished under pain of severe corporal punishment; (2) should be punished accordingly if they returned and be banished again, under pain of death; (3) should accordingly suffer death if still they came back — "except they do then and there plainly and publicly renounce their said cursed opinions and devilish tenets." All the colonies agreed, including Plymouth. But in the

But there were those of the Pilgrim churches (for by this time the one had become several) who held by it, and it is a fitting close to mention that one of these was Isaac,<sup>58</sup> John Robinson's son, who let himself be disfranchised rather than be a party to persecution.

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NORF. — Dr. Whitley (in edition of John Smyth's works, Preface, pp. vii, viii) puts forth the startling suggestion that because — according to Morton Dexter — but seventeen of the Pilgrims hailed from Scrooby against thirty-two from Norfolk, the scene of Robinson's activity, the main source of the Pilgrim church has so far been unrecognized; and further that, because most of the emigrants from the North adhered to Smyth, "all the wealth of learning accumulated by Brown, Arber, Dexter, etc., is really introductory not so much to Robinson's story as to Smyth's." Is it not enough to point out by way of answer,

1. That, as a matter of fact, the core of the Leyden church was drawn from Scrooby; and that it was the Leyden church which initiated the pilgrimage to New England.
2. That this fact is not affected by the question how many joined Robinson at Leyden from Norfolk, even if we grant, what is not proved, that these were "mostly" his "relations and connections" — fruit of a problematical Norfolk ministry. Is there any evidence of a Norfolk ministry apart from that in Norwich?
3. That Smith and his group cannot in any real sense be spoken of as Pilgrim Fathers, since the movement they represent drained itself away in Holland. The name can be applied with fitness only to the one or two, like Francis Jessop, who finally joined the Leydenites.

Plymouth Colony, Thomas Hatherly, Captain Cudworth, Isaac Robinson, and some others suffered disfranchisement or "their place in the Government," sooner than consent. Deprived of its nobler element the Court of Plymouth colony passed many laws of great severity but none involving the death penalty. See *History of Scituate*, pp. 47-57, by Samuel Deane, Boston, 1831.

<sup>58</sup> At this time (1656) he was forty-six years of age and had been twenty-five years in the colony.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- Arber, *S. P. F.* ..... Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, 1887.  
 Bradford, *History* ..... History of "Plimoth Plantation," ed. 1910.  
 Brown, *P. E.* ..... The Pilgrims of New England, 1897.  
 Burgess, *Smith* ..... John Smith and the Pilgrim Fathers, 1911.  
 Burrage, *N. F.* ..... New Facts concerning John Robinson, 1913.  
 Burrage, *E. E. D.* ..... Early English Dissenters, 1912.  
 Dexter, *C.* ..... Congregationalism as seen in its Literature, 1879.  
 Dexter, *E. H. P.* ..... England and Holland of the Puritans, 1906.  
 Hunter, *Collections* ..... Collections concerning the Early History of the Founders of New Plymouth, 1849.  
 Hunter, *Collections* ..... Second Edition, enlarged, 1854.  
 Usher, *P. and H.* ..... The Pilgrims and their History, 1918.  
 Whitley, *J. S.* ..... Works of John Smyth, 2 vols., 1915.

BOOK REVIEWS

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HISTORY OF RELIGIONS. GEORGE FOOT MOORE. Vol. II: Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. xv, 552. \$3.00.

With well-timed entrance upon the stage this second volume of Professor Moore's history is synchronous with the reappearance of the first volume in a second edition, an honor of which it was well deserving and which will doubtless come also to its successor. It is six years since the earlier work was noticed in this Review. The author, being as it were more at home in the province now under consideration, has in the reviewer's opinion here surpassed himself; his second volume is distinctly better even than the first. One walks one's own field more securely and works it with truer understanding, perhaps in all senses more happily. As a succinct exposition of the three religions represented, this volume is worthy of high praise. So far as the reviewer is competent to express an opinion, it is as sound in judgment as it is accurate in details. He has even the feeling that the author's style has improved, possibly in lightness of touch, in the course of the half-dozen years since the first volume came out, although one may find a sentence of no less than one hundred and one words, the reputed significance of the number doubtless having escaped the attention of the learned author, who would not otherwise have devoted this particular number of words to the opening paragraph of his chapter on Christianity!

One reason why this volume is excellent is that it treats of only three religions in five hundred pages as compared with nine religions discussed in the six hundred pages of its predecessor. The author is thus able to do justice to his themes, and one wishes only that he had been permitted to give a whole volume to each of the three. As it is, a fair proportion of his book is devoted to Judaism, a somewhat longer exposition covers Mohammedanism, and these two together do not take quite so much space as does Christianity, to which rather more than half the book is dedicated. Albeit Professor Moore has been so generous to the most important religion of the three, one cannot but lament that, especially in this field, he has been forced to confine himself within the bounds of the 280 pages he has allotted to Christianity. One gets the impression often that he had more to say than he has said, and the reader must regret that anything has been omitted.

Professor Moore, who believes that nothing can be learned about a religion "from ignorance and superstition," has not only in his *His-*



*tory of Religions* ignored all lower and middle-class religions, such as those of Peru and northern Europe, but has naturally sacrificed in his account of the selected religions which he discusses those elements which make the foundation of the higher faith. So in Judaism a few general remarks dispose of the remote nomadic phase, and no time at all is lost in discussing the kind of cattle in which the tribes were interested, whence these tribes originally derived, or whether their god was at first the moon, a storm-god, or a tree-spirit. The author is obviously more interested in higher things than legends and surer things than theories. Enough to say that Jehovah (Professor Moore retains this form) was the god who fought for the Israelites and had his seat on some mountain, as contrasted with the local Baals, proprietors of fields and cities. A dozen pages thus sweep the reader on to the prophets, whose ideals are embodied in the institution of Deuteronomy. Here one feels inclined to ask, Which prophets? And at this point, despite the circumscribed space, one would have liked to see a distinction made between the various types of prophets, not only in the stereotyped sundering of the prophet of hope and prophet of love, but between the classes of prophets, those who relied on visions and those who did not, the prototype and the later imitator. Some estimate too of their relative value might have been given, and an answer to the modern question whether the prophets represent spiritual or ethical awakening. Jeremiah, the greatest of all the prophets, deserves at least a posthumous appreciation.

The author in speaking of the Law of Holiness says that the notion of sin as defilement is purely sacerdotal, the most heinous sin to the priestly mind being defilement of holy objects and profanation of the Holy Name. But one does not have to wait for the development of a sacerdotalism to find this attitude; it is inherent in all forms of taboo, and some African savages are as fearful of profaning holy names as were the Jews. Ezekiel represents not advance but retrogression. Monotheism, it is well emphasized by the author, not only differs from monolatry but, among the Jews, owes its being to the conception of history as a moral order; it was not the result of philosophical speculation. The origin of the Pentateuch is sketched briefly, so briefly that an unversed reader would hardly realize its historical background. Perhaps some of the space later expended on the brilliant mediæval scholars might have been utilized to make clearer the component parts of the Old Testament. The historical "strands," though mentioned, are left rather twisted. This may be due to the fact that the author regards purely literary questions as beyond his present mark. But this is not so in the case of "Isaiah," in respect of whom it is

religiously of moment whether (but the author does not touch the topic) he represents a single, duplicate, or triplicate personality. A short and sufficient analysis disposes of the stories of creation, paradise, the deluge, and dispersion of nations as "Hebrew mythology," which found literary expression from the ninth century till the Persian time. Literary dependence on Babylon, in the author's view, is suggested by the story of the flood but not by the story of creation. Jewish eschatology, he opines, was developed into a definite scheme under Persian and (or) Orphic influence, but its premisses are to be found "in the religion itself." One would like to see this thesis stated more definitely. The religion itself scarcely seems to have any eschatology save that of ghosts and graves. Sheol is hardly a premiss of heaven.

The closing chapters of Judaism, discussing mediæval and modern Judaism, are introduced by an account of the protestant Karaites, and then present in masterly fashion a summary of Jewish mediæval scholarship with its galaxy of learned men, such as Saadia, Maimonides, and Mendelssohn. Zionism and its prospects are also included in the general subject of Judaism.

In his account of Islam the author tells us that most prevalent opinions about Islam are wrong, and that, for example, contrary to common belief, the prohibitory laws of the Moslem religion have proved as ineffective as have modern Christian experiments. The Eighteenth Amendment is probably not referred to in this remark; but while it is true that, as Professor Moore states, the intemperance of the Bagdad caliphate clings to later Mohammedan literature and a single verse of the Koran has certainly not made all Mohammedans abstainers, yet the verse and later insistence upon it have had in general a far deeper effect than any Christian mandate. One needs only to contrast the abstemiousness of the Moslem world in India with the self-indulgence of Christians there, not to speak of Hindus, to realize that prevalent opinion in this regard, while it exaggerates, is not wholly wrong.

Professor Moore thinks that Sufism was affected not only by Greek and Christian influences but also by Buddhism; that Fanâ is a form of Nirvana. This, though the latest theory, is by no means certain. It would be safer to say that some form of Fanâ (there are various forms) seems to derive from India. According to Havell, who has lately demonstrated how poor a historian a good artist can be, the only question as to the influence of Buddhism on Mohammedanism is whether the Prophet himself belonged to the Hīna or to the Mahā-yāna! Professor Moore very properly ignores this absurd theory. He

mentions here, rightly to repudiate it, another opinion formerly prevalent but incorrect, that Sufi pantheism was an Aryan (Persian) reaction against the hard Semitic deism of Mohammedan theology. Another "erroneous notion" is that Moslem law is wholly derived from the Koran. This notion is due to a failure to distinguish between civil and religious law.

In "Christianity" Professor Moore has given an unbiased history of the Church, admirable for its objective presentation, fairness, and fulness of detail; less admirable, if with all respect one may so express it, for its careful reticence. It is, however, seldom that one writes a history of Christianity without saying anything to offend anybody, and that alone is a notable achievement. Yet what the reviewer has in mind can be illustrated by the course of the author's history of Jesus. The story, as told by Professor Moore, repeats in abbreviated, one might almost say expurgated form, the Gospel narrative, expanded occasionally by a scholarly aside ("his mother-tongue was the Aramaic vernacular of Galilee"). But there is no intimation that Jesus is reported to have performed any other miracles than those of healing (including expulsion of demons). There is only a deferred and remote hint (by means of a reference to pages in the preceding volume) that the resurrection story is one of a type of resurrection stories. The history of Jesus himself stops short with the crucifixion. This same attitude of silence is maintained through the history of the Church. The ridicule heaped upon Calvin by his own brethren is ignored. In regard to Calvin's part in burning Servetus it is merely said that "when the Genevans burned him" and the Inquisition burned his books, the heresy of Servetus was ended. This, to be sure, is history so far as it goes. Jesus is said to have performed miracles of healing and "the Genevans" burned Servetus. But there seems to be something lacking to completeness. Thus, too, in another matter, it is not even hinted that the Quakers in England and America made themselves a public nuisance and offended decency, but they are charitably (and truly) described as anti-formalists pervaded by a soul of mysticism. Their honesty, simplicity, and philanthropy are apparently the only traits preserved by history. It is not in reference to them or to any other Christian sect that the general observation is made, "Antinomianism is, indeed, inherent in all mysticism."

In regard to the influence of Paul, Professor Moore holds that the main current of Christian thought did not take its rise in him and did not even pass through him: "Rather it flowed by him as around a rock in the bed of a stream." Thus, so to speak, Peter was the rock on which the Church was built and Paul the rock on which it split.

This review cannot do justice to the acumen and erudition with which the work of the Church in its monastic and mediæval phases is presented, the admirable account of the Protestant Reformation, with the added chapter on the Catholic Reformation, and the clear analysis of the hair-splitting symbols which for generations intrigued the bellicose metaphysicians who thought themselves Christians. If the volume as a whole has any defect, it is the one already noticed. The generous desire to bring into light only the unimpeachable side has here and there led to the picture becoming slightly out of focus. The weaker aspects of Christianity, its fables, superstitions, tragedies, indecencies, no one wishes to see emphasized, but they should not be passed over without a word. Discreet reticence has its place in an apologia rather than in a history. Professor Moore has told the truth about Christianity but not the whole truth, and this is a pity because his work is likely to be popular in those institutions where devout minds that turn with horror from "radical" writers need enlightenment from a source they are bound to respect.

As with the preceding volume, the author has added a well-selected bibliography and (a point rarely noticed in reviews) his index is a real index.

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A GRAMMAR OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK. JAMES H. MOULTON. Vol. II. Accidence and Word-Formation. Part I. General Introduction; Sounds and Writing. Ed. by W. F. HOWARD. T. & T. Clark. 1919. Pp. 114. 7s.

The first volume or *Prolegomena* of this grammar was published in 1906, and quickly won recognition as a new departure in the field. The MS. for the second volume was about two-thirds finished ten years later at the time of the author's tragic death. This first installment of it is an earnest that it will be completed and published to the satisfaction and service of New Testament scholars. The subjects with which it deals do not generally secure as much interest as do the matters of syntax treated in the earlier volume. But even the comment on sounds and writing presented in this section is made readable by the easy style of the author and by the interest of his evidence from the papyri. Besides, Professor Moulton did not construe his duty as a grammarian to be the cataloguing of all linguistic phenomena, but merely the elaboration of those questions on which new light is needed or is available.

Fortunately also the author has returned again in an Introductory Chapter to reconsider in the light of recent discussions the language of the New Testament writers, in particular their contact with literary language and their Semitic coloring. The last of these sections will especially interest American scholars on account of the present trend of criticism in this country, as will the special appendix on the same subject by the Rev. C. L. Bedale, which is promised for the last part of the volume.

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THE JESUS PROBLEM. A RESTATEMENT OF THE MYTH THEORY. J. M. ROBERTSON, M.P. Watts & Co., London. 1917. Pp. vii, 264. 5s.

Convinced that Jesus is a purely mythical figure, Mr. Robertson undertakes the ambitious task of presenting "a defensible historical view" of Christian origins to supplant the "mythical narrative of beginnings" contained in the New Testament. Modern critical study upon the Gospels is said to have ended in complete failure. Order can be introduced into the chaos only by recognizing that these documents are a mere tissue of myth. Hence the real problem for the historian is simply to propound a suitable theory regarding the rise of the alleged myth. When approached from this angle Christianity is found to have sprung from a pre-Christian Jesus-cult in which the celebration of a crucifixion and the eating of a sacramental meal were central. The crucified victim in the myth is supposed to have been called "Son of the Father," a title which is equated with Barabbas (Bar-Abbas). The occurrence of "Jesus Barabbas" in some manuscripts of Matt. 27 16 convinces our author that originally Jesus (i.e., Joshua, "Saviour") and Barabbas were rival hero-divinities of the same type. Therefore "the hypothesis forced upon us by the whole history, then, is that there had subsisted in Jewry, in original connection with a sacrificial rite of Jesus the Son of the Father, a sacrament of a Hero-God Jesus, whose Name was strong to save" (p. 81). By the year 70 A.D. the cult had become sufficiently distinctive to initiate a definite propaganda in competition with the rest of Judaism. Its relatively rapid growth is credited primarily to the superior efficiency of its organization. Its earliest literary document was the Didache, an adaptation of an older Jewish work. In the course of time fictitious Epistles and Gospels were produced in support of the practices and teachings of the cult. All the New Testament books belong in this class, except perhaps the Epistles of James and Jude. They alone have even the semblance of genuineness.

The position of those who deny the historicity of Jesus has not been materially strengthened by Mr. Robertson's book. It presents no new data of importance and it follows in general the line of argument commonly employed by representatives of this school. The early Christian writings still extant in the New Testament are set aside without any effort to test their reliability by the application of a modern scientific historical criticism. In place of constructive data drawn from these substantial documents readers are offered a congeries of "inferably" and "manifestly," supported by only intangible evidence often of more than dubious worth and derived from sources that have no actual historical connection with early Christianity.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE.

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#### BOOKS ON BABYLONIA AND ITS RELATION TO WESTERN ASIA:

THE EMPIRE OF THE AMORITES. ALBERT T. CLAY. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. VI. Researches. The Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 192.

RECORDS FROM UR AND LARSA DATED IN THE LARSA DYNASTY. ETTALENE M. GRICE, Ph.D. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. V. Babylonian Texts. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 56. Plates LXXXVIII.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE LARSA DYNASTY. ETTALENE M. GRICE, Ph.D. Yale Oriental Series. Vol. IV, 1. Researches. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 43.

In 1909 Professor A. T. Clay issued *Amurru, the Home of the Northern Semites*, in which he maintained that our whole conception of the cultural relations of western Asia must be changed. The commonly accepted view that the Semitic peoples had their home in the Arabian peninsula from which they spread over the more fertile countries to the east, north, and west, he held to be entirely erroneous. Not only did he maintain in that volume that Israel's culture was not of Babylonian origin, but on the contrary that the culture of Semitic Babylonia either originated in the west or had a long period of development there before it was carried into Babylonia. In other words he maintained that the dissemination of the northern Semitic peoples did not move from the east to the west, but from the west to the east. Now, ten years later, he issues another volume whose avowed purpose is to assemble all the facts that bear upon the history and religion of the western Semites, to substantiate further the claims made for the great antiquity of the Amorites, to show that Ur of the Chaldees was the capital of the Amorite empire, and to demonstrate that the generally accepted theory of the Arabian origin of the Semites is utterly baseless.

With acumen and learning Professor Clay assembles evidence from inscriptions scattered over the whole of western Asia, and conjures up the vision of a great Amorite or western Semitic empire, which he believes extended from the southern portion of the middle Euphrates on the east to northern Syria and the Gulf of Akabah on the west, an empire which immediately preceded Hittite ascendancy, having existed in the third, fourth, and fifth millenniums B.C. He maintains that it was a political unity, in which country and capital had the same name, and with this hypothesis in mind he searches for the center from which it was governed. This he finds in the middle Euphrates kingdom of Mari, or Mara of the earlier inscriptions. The city Mari was, according to Professor Clay, "powerful enough to weld together the Semitic peoples of this region into a great nation and give it the name Amurru"; it was the home of the Chaldean antediluvian mythological kings, at whose head stands Aloras; it was the home of the Biblical patriarch Abraham, for, according to St. Stephen (Acts 7 2, 4), Ur of the Chaldees was in Mesopotamia. The hegemony of Mari or Ur he believes to have been established long before the time of Sargon and to have been brought to an end by Hammurabi.

Evidence for the existence of this empire, its history, and its civilization is sought in the influence which it exerted upon other peoples as revealed in the names of countries, cities, temples, deities, and persons. For example, in the names of the antediluvian patriarchs preserved by Berossus he finds Amorite name-elements and in five or six of them the name of the Amorite deity Uru. It may be remarked in passing that he considers the Babylonian and Hebrew lists of antediluvian patriarchs as having nothing in common except the fact that each list consists of ten names and the tenth is the diluvian hero. The inference that Amurru furnished Babylonia with its early inhabitants rests upon Sumerian and Akkadian inscriptions, in which it is difficult at the present state of our knowledge, and frequently quite impossible, to distinguish with certainty between Sumerian and Semitic names. This difficulty is not minimized by Professor Clay; but the fact that a name is written in Sumerian he does not regard as proof that its pronunciation was Sumerian. Hence he is able to regard most of the names of the earliest kings of Kish, Erech, and Ur as Semitic, or more specifically west Semitic or Amorite. The fact that the name of the fifth king of Erech, Gish-bil-ga-mesh (Gilgamesh) contains "mesh" or "mesh" as a name-element serves in his opinion to identify the Gilgamesh epic with the Lebanon district. Ea-bani or Enkidu he regards as an Amorite; the cedar forest which surrounded the stronghold of Humbaba he locates with "reasonable certainty"

in the Lebanon mountains instead of in Elam; the mountain Mashu he identifies with Mount Hermon; and Humbaba himself he regards as the earliest Amorite known by name. That the Gilgamesh epic had its origin in the west follows necessarily if the above premises could be regarded as substantiated. Professor Clay has long contended that the names of the rulers of the dynasty of Isin show that they were Amorites, and the complete list of the kings of Larsa which has been recently recovered and published by Professor Clay leads to the same conclusion. It is now generally conceded that the rulers of Isin, Larsa, and the first dynasty of Babylon gained their place as the result of a great racial movement which brought western Semites down the Euphrates and into southern Babylonia. Professor Clay's contention that Assyria received its Semitic population at about this same time as an offshoot of the eastward movement of Amorites is gaining general assent. The business and legal documents found in Cappadocia written in a Semitic language and in the cuneiform script are believed by some to be of Assyrian and by others of Babylonian origin. Professor Clay regards most of the proper names in these Cappadocian tablets as Amoritic, but he does not venture to suggest to what extent western Semites moved into Asia Minor. Neither is he able to assert that the Amorites influenced Egypt politically in the early period; but he calls attention to the Semitic loan-words which were introduced into Egypt at the same time that the western Semitic dynasties were establishing themselves in southern Babylonia, and suggests that it is possible that one or more dark periods in Egyptian history are to be explained by encroachments of Amorites.

Since the Amorites left no written records, knowledge of their language is dependent upon a study of personal names preserved in the inscriptions of neighboring peoples. This has convinced Professor Clay that the Amorite language was the parent language of Semitic Babylonian, Aramean, Hebrew, and possibly Arabic. He also maintains that they had a script of their own, which was used upon perishable material. He argues that had they used the Babylonian cuneiform script for writing their Amorite language, as the Hittites, Mitannians, and Vannic people did for their languages, excavations would have yielded some evidence of it — although excavations have not been conducted in the land of the Amorites except in Palestine. In the writer's opinion he might have strengthened his argument for the early appearance of a western Semitic system of writing by referring to the report of Wen-Amon <sup>1</sup> (ca. 1100 B.C.) concerning his journey to

<sup>1</sup> See Breasted, *History of Egypt* (1905), pp. 213-218, and Kittel's discussion in his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*. I, 178.



Byblos, by reference to the fact that Cyprus and Crete had their own system of writing, and that the ostraca from Samaria show that writing in Palestine had a long history before 900 B.C.

A further means by which Professor Clay seeks to substantiate the thesis of the antiquity of Amorite civilization is in claiming that the prehistoric legends which the western Semites and Babylonians had in common originated in the west and that the worship of western gods spread over a wide area but exerted its chief influence upon the Babylonian pantheon. It has long been suspected that such gods as Adad and Dagan are of west Semitic origin; but Anu, Ashur, Ishtar, Ea, Enlil, Marduk, Nabu, Nergal, Nin-IB or Inurta, Shamash, Sin, and many others are likewise claimed for the west, until "it is of course apparent that the trend of what precedes is toward regarding practically everything that is Semitic Babylonian as having its origin in Amurru."

Professor Clay believes that there is no evidence in favor of the theory generally accepted by scholars that Arabia is the center from which the Semitic dispersion occurred. He declines to discuss the hypothesis of the ultimate origin of the Semitic race as being a problem which belongs to anthropology, and chooses rather to confine himself to historical and archæological data and traditions. He points out that Hebrew tradition regards Mesopotamia as the cradle of mankind, and Armenia, the country in which the ark rested, as the second home of the race. The tenth and eleventh chapters of Genesis show that it was the view of the biblical writer that the Arabian nations emanated from the north, and "their opportunity for knowing at least something about the early history of the Arameans — that is, their own ancient history — was at least greater than that enjoyed by those modern scholars who begin the history of Abram and the Hebrews with the exodus of the Arameans from Arabia, or even Egypt, in the latter half of the second millennium B.C." Although he recognizes that the burden of proof rests with those who maintain that the Semitic dispersion occurred from Arabia as its center, his argument against the theory is based chiefly on the following considerations: (a) If in ancient times water was more abundant in Arabia than at present, one can readily understand how tribes with great flocks would pass into it from the north. (b) An examination of the names of gods in Arabic inscriptions and of personal names throughout the Semitic field ought, *ex hypothesi*, to show Arabic influence, which he finds not to be the case. (c) The fact that the Arabic language preserves the characteristics of Semitic speech more fully than other Semitic tongues is taken to indicate that this migration from

the north into Arabia took place before the modifications which differentiate the various Semitic languages from each other had occurred. He concludes therefore that our present knowledge is insufficient for the formation of any theory in regard to the original seat of the Semites.

The present writer is unable to accept many of the conclusions arrived at by Professor Clay. Some of them he himself puts forth as tentative and subject to revision; many are ingenious, and all will stimulate thought and discussion. Doubtless cautious scholars will feel that he has carried his theory much too far, although it is becoming increasingly clear as additional facts are brought to light from excavations that the west influenced the east at an earlier period and more constantly than has been supposed hitherto, and that the cultural relations of the whole of western Asia were more complicated than was formerly deemed possible.

Dr. Grice's publication of the cuneiform text of two hundred and fifty-three tablets of the Yale Babylonian Collection, accompanied by an introduction and the usual indexes, is an imposing volume. About half of the tablets were found at Muqayyar, the site of Ur, and are the "first considerable number to be published from that site." The remainder are from Senkereh, which is the site of the ancient city of Larsa, the biblical Ellasar. They are legal contracts and temple records, written for the most part in the Sumerian language, their chief importance being due to the historical matter contained in the date formulæ. To mention the fact that Miss Grice is an apt pupil of so able an editor of cuneiform texts as Professor Clay is sufficient assurance that the text is a faithful and skillful reproduction of the original. A perusal of the list of personal names might at first give the impression that the inhabitants of southern Babylonia at that time all bore Semitic names; but cross references show that names are to some extent listed under both the Sumerian and the Semitic forms. Tested by a page taken at random from the index, the references are found to be reliable with only an occasional error. It is unfortunate that it is not the fashion to give the figures on the seal impressions of dated tablets, for they are valuable in indicating the style of seal used at the time the document was written, the seal impression being contemporaneous with the writing. Neither time nor pains have been spared in getting out a large piece of work which is exceedingly well executed.

From date-formulæ of texts published in the above mentioned volume, from unpublished texts of the Yale Collection, and from other texts previously published, Miss Grice had collected and arranged

chronologically all of the facts known in regard to the dynasty of Larsa. Just as her work was nearly completed she received an advance copy from M. Thureau-Dangin of a prism in the Louvre containing the date-formulæ of the Larsa dynasty. She had the satisfaction of seeing conclusions at which she had previously and independently arrived confirmed by this new and unimpeachable evidence, but it was no longer necessary to publish the entire study. Since Yale texts furnish some additional material for the restitution of broken formulæ and of the middle portion of the prism covering a period of fifty-four years, she has published "the part of that study which comprises a list of all the formulæ of the dynasty that are known, so arranged that they may be conveniently used by scholars who are using the Larsa Dynasty material."

Her explanation of the difficult phrase *šag-mu ki-18* as a reference to the duration of the long conflict which raged between Rim-Sin and the army of Isin, is both clever and reasonable. A comparison of the transliteration of the date formulæ of the Louvre prism by M. Thureau-Dangin with that of Miss Grice emphasizes the need of a uniform system of transliteration which shall be followed by all scholars. Miss Grice's excellent study of the chronology of the Larsa dynasty is indispensable to any one working in that period.

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THE PEOPLE'S FAITH IN THE TIME OF WYCLIF. BERNARD LORD MANNING.  
Cambridge University Press (England). 1919. Pp. 155. 2s. 6d.

This little book belies its appearance, which is that of the ordinary prize essay published in a university. At best one may expect that such productions contain a certain amount of information collected with or without method, and perhaps a useful bibliography. But Mr. Manning's book is more than this; it is a real contribution of ideas by a thoughtful man. It may be paid the compliment of hostile criticism by those who are unable to accept its conclusions, which is a high commendation for a young scholar to deserve. The merit of a good style, relieved by terse and epigrammatic utterances, adds to the attractiveness of the book, the object of which is to let the popular writers of the age of Wyclif give their testimony as to the religious condition of England at the time. Mr. Manning wisely declines to begin with a pretentious bibliography, containing much that has been written and little that has been read. He prefers to speak of his "List

of Books," of which he says: "It is intended to serve one purpose only — to elucidate the footnotes. It is not a catalogue of books consulted, nor the beginning of a bibliography."

His chief authorities in verse are *Piers Plowman*, Gower, the *Lay Folk's Mass Book*, Robert Brunne's *Handlying Synne*, and John Myre's *Instructions for Parish Priests*. Most of the minor works are easily accessible, being published by the Early English Tract Society. The prose works of which most use has been made are La Tour Landry, Richard Rolle, Julian of Norwich, Wyclif, Grandisson's Register, and above all the interesting dialogue of *Dives and Pauper*, printed by Pynson in 1493. It is from this last named that Mr. Manning has drawn much of his inspiration. He considers that it is an argument between Dives, a man of Lollard or Wyclifite views, with the orthodox Pauper; and in answer to the objections of Dives our author sees a wise and temperate defense of the orthodox doctrine of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with a singular absence of any desire to justify the abuses which had crept into the Church. Indeed, as Mr. Manning himself pointed out in a magazine article,<sup>1</sup> the argument was rather in favor of Pauper than of Dives, whose "protestantism" had nothing constructive about it.

The mediæval church was a marvelous organization, consistent in its aims, its doctrine, and its practice. Its influence permeated the entire population of western Christendom; men, women, and children felt its power as it bore upon every phase of human life. By the time of Wyclif Latin Christianity in England ruled with the prestige and experience of many centuries. The difficulty of today is to look back on this age so remote from us with an impartial eye. It is easy to contrast the merits of our age with the defects of a superstitious one; equally easy is it to regard the days when Christianity ruled through its priests as a halcyon period in which religion triumphed and the world was glad. The difficulty is to enter into the true historic spirit, to study the evidence impartially, and to endeavor to visit the past by its aid as an intelligent traveler does a strange country. That Mr. Manning can accomplish this difficult feat redounds to his credit.

Mediæval religion, as he points out, was neither the religion of a book nor that of family influence. The Christianity inculcated was taught by word of mouth and by appeals to the senses was constantly before the eye. The priest or friar, not the mother, was the first instructor of youth. The Mass, for example, appealed not to the intellect but to the emotion. The worshiper understood little but was taught to feel much. He was given prayers to be used independently

<sup>1</sup> Churchman's Magazine, 1915.

of the service, "admirable" — to quote our author — "for their simple piety. No one could fail to understand them, and the popular religion which they represented cannot be dismissed as a superstition unintelligible even to those who professed it." And he goes on to say, "Not the minutest event in Christ's passion but was commemorated there. From an art symbolism had been transformed into a science. Every faculty of man, every property of nature, had been captured and subdued for that supreme drama of worship." But though he can write thus, Mr. Manning is not blind to the fact that gross superstition was encouraged by the clergy in the interests of the Church. "The Church," he says, "sanctioned any belief, however preposterous, if it tended to exalt the power of the Mass, the dignity of the Host, or the consequence of the priest. . . . To increase the offerings of the devout they were told that a penny offered at Mass would secure an increase of worldly wealth as well as free one from his sins." It is interesting also to note that the sacrament of Extreme Unction was unpopular, because it was a general belief that, if by any chance the recipient should not die, he would have to lead an almost monastic life — an opinion which more than one synod repudiated.

The idea that the observance of Sunday as the Jewish Sabbath was a Puritan innovation is completely dispelled. Till the Lollards began to exalt Sunday as a scriptural festival above others, the tendency was to insist on its sanctity. Sunday traveling was discouraged. Even preachers must beware lest "undre colour of prechying" they were not "to moche about in veyne in the Sunday." Indeed what in England is called "the Continental Sunday" was as abhorrent to the clergy of the fifteenth as to those of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Perhaps the most thoughtful chapter in the book is "The Problem of Free Will." Augustinianism found little favor in the popular religion inculcated by the priests, who rather taught that men could "work out their own salvation." But then came the Black Death, which forced men in their despair to embrace a sort of fatalism. But even Wyclif resisted the doctrine that some men are predestined to damnation, and would not allow to the "elect" the comfortable belief that their salvation was assured.

The conclusion is a really powerful bit of writing and shows the influence of the great modern tradition of the Cambridge school of mediæval historians, of which Maitland was the founder. If the author is spared to do more work on the line on which he has happily begun, he may be the bearer of the torch which Maitland lighted and handed on to Figgis. His last paragraph may justify his claim to seize it:

"The battle with rigid Protestantism and the final discomfiture of the enlightened rationalists a hundred years ago were the necessary preliminaries to the rediscovery of the Middle Ages; but the memory of these historic struggles does not justify the appropriation of mediæval religion by any modern party or the repudiation of it by any other. For the mediæval Church is the mother of us all."

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UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

IDEALISM AND THE MODERN AGE. GEORGE P. ADAMS. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. ix, 253. \$2.50.

Professor Adams finds that modern democracy needs correction by a religious attitude, a devotion to certain objective ideals quite in the Platonic spirit. The gospel of self-assertion, which in our day has led to the extremes of capitalism and pragmatism, should be replaced by the ideal of the "Great Community." For democracy is the doctrine of the "will to power," the apotheosis of "activity and control," "the conscious conviction that the only social order fit for man to live in is one which he himself has made and can control — and which he can unmake if he so desires. This conviction is but democracy come to a full consciousness of its meaning and its power" (p. 7). On the other hand, "Idealism in philosophy *should* connote a wide understanding of and a generous sympathy for the forces — primarily those of common life and labor — which are rapidly gathering strength to challenge the arbitrary 'will to power' lying at the root of so much within the established order" (p. viii). In fact, by democracy Dr. Adams understands a more or less Nietzschean individualism, and by idealism a belief in the social organism — interpretations which seem decidedly questionable when we remember that Germany stood for the former, that current democracy particularly emphasizes the needs of "common life and labor," and that the founder of idealism did not believe in the social organism. Yet though it is not democracy but self-assertiveness that he is arraigning, he does sincerely and properly attempt to restore a lost balance; and allowing for his strange misuse of terms, we must heartily commend the enterprise.

Religion and idealism, if not one and the same, are for our author closely allied. "At its source religion is the felt participation of the individual in a collective consciousness. . . . The vehicle of group emotion, the source and stuff of that which was sacred and supernatural, was no personal god or spirit, but . . . a 'social force trembling on the verge of Godhead'" (p. 51). And Platonism, with its contemplation of the eternal ideas, is "the spokesman for something

which can only go by the name of religion" (p. 11). Over against these Dr. Adams arrays the present-day naturalism, with its Darwinian struggle for existence, its scientific control of nature, its world "to be controlled, to be made and remade . . . in order that our active human interests and impulses shall find release and satisfaction" (p. 10). Tracing the growth of this democratic spirit, he finds it characterized by increasing emphasis on business for its own sake and mechanical efficiency, and by a decreasing valuation of personality. "Democracy, economic rationalism, science, . . . bid us incessantly create, make our world, and all the objects of value which it shall contain" (p. 87). "Behaviorism and pragmatic instrumentalism are philosophies of an age which no longer has significant structures to possess, to contemplate and to enjoy. . . . Pragmatism is the intellectual form of modern capitalism" (p. 112). The subjectivism of modern philosophy, from Kant on, marks the same accentuation of man's activity. "The Kantian insight sums up a world of activity and democracy" (p. 163). Dr. Adams, true to the Platonic tradition, is an epistemological realist. "Consciousness of reality is as much inalienable and elemental as is consciousness of self" (p. 123). The subjective philosophies have but a subjective origin; the economic interpretation of history is only the reflection of the economic bias of the present age (pp. 136, 137). Not only does pragmatism rest upon a realistic basis, to wit, the science of biology, but if pragmatism is true, "there is no intrinsic meaning or value possessed by any one period of time in its own right" (p. 174). "Childhood is not only a precursor and a means to the attainment of adult life. Childhood has its own interests" (p. 175). *"Every behavior interest is surrounded by a cognitive fringe. . . . It is this cognitive . . . fringe, and not the behavior, . . . which is the source of all the meaning which attaches to an object attended and responded to"* (p. 186).

But though democracy is faulty enough, we cannot abandon it. We must look forward to a combination of it with religion and idealism. "And such a . . . type of order surely is to be found nowhere except in . . . a community, a social and spiritual order" (p. 219). True, no doubt, but uninforming; the real question is, how shall we construct this community? Is it to be republican, monarchic, socialistic, or what? Unfortunately, we are not told. And is religion anything more than fervent social reconstruction? Dr. Adams says little if anything about God, the spirits, or aught but the "social problem." Religion is not allowed even a practical quality; it "will always bungle when it competes with the intelligent and the scientific control of life-processes and their environment" (p. 223). What is left but enthusi-

asm for the future social organism, such as might be shared by any atheistic socialist?

Thus after all, our author has not been able to move out of the magic circle of the subjective. The great Platonic idea of the community — what is it but the epitome of the needs of man, such as all pragmatists desire? No objective principles or ideals except this are mentioned; almost all of the book is concerned with epistemological controversy. Yet though he does not specify them, it is a good sign that he hints of ideals to be followed in the making of the perfect society, that he would right the over-balanced cultivation of activity, and that he defends, if in little more than name, the fundamental importance of religion for human progress.

Dr. Adams' diction is rather obscure, and his paragraphs as a rule lack unity. A Platonist should not use nouns as adjectives: e.g., "idea system," "knowledge situation," "behavior interest," etc. Nor should he employ the barbarous "due to" when he means "on account of" (p. 29). Examples, too long to quote here, of English which is no less than slovenly, are found on pp. 44, 59, 113, 166, 229.

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THE RELIGION OF NIETZSCHE. NIETZSCHE THE THINKER. A STUDY. WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER. Henry Holt & Co. 1917. Pp. x, 539. \$3.50.

The key to Nietzsche's theory of life, Mr. Salter thinks, is the conflict in his mind between piety and knowledge. "Being by nature and by force of early training reverent, finding, however, his religious faith undermined by science and by critical reflection, his problem came to be, how, consistently with science and the stern facts of life and the world, the old instincts of reverence might still have measurable satisfaction, and life again be lit up with a sense of transcendent things. He was at bottom a religious philosopher."

This observation, though not new, has never before been so clearly put, and with such a nice sense of the fact that whatever system and poise Nietzsche in thought attained rests upon a conflict of emotions that grew deeper and more tragic with the years. Neither of these facts seems, to most commentators upon Nietzsche, to have been of particular importance. They respond to his emotional qualities — the beat and rhythm of his style, the great hunger and dream-like gratifications in his ideas. They violently agree with him or they violently disagree with him, according as he lifts the lid or clamps it



down upon their own subterranean reserves of feeling; they preach him or they denounce him; they do everything but understand him. The fault is not altogether their own. Nietzsche's temperament, method, and style are not such as to evoke understanding. He is the most personal, the most autobiographical and idiosyncratic of the great thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work is more frequently a soliloquy and a challenge than an analysis and an exposition, and his effect upon his readers corresponds. To understand him requires an impersonality, a scientific self-restraint, difficult indeed for those who are in the least sensitive to the subtle and infectious quality of Nietzsche's *élan*. Yet this is very nearly what Mr. Salter has attained. He has written an exposition of Nietzsche's thought without parallel in English, without parallel perhaps in any language, for impartiality, lucidity, and detail. He has done this by attending objectively to the thought of Nietzsche, without obtruding his own reaction upon it. He has classified, arranged, coördinated. Not a remote whimsy in the collection of apothegms and reflections which so largely make up Nietzsche's works but he has studied, appraised, and set under its appropriate concept, not a nuance that he has not caught and fixed.

Withal, the defects of his method can not be separated from its excellences. Intent upon the last things, the endings, dyings-out, realizations, which all thoughts are, of Nietzsche's mental processes, he sets them in the order of their logic and mutual implications which is appropriate to thought. He provides an architectonic of Nietzsche's mind, the most admirable yet to hand. But he does not provide, nor with his method can he provide, the explanation of Nietzsche's mind which his excellent beginning leads the reader to hope for. Very probably he did not intend to do so. Yet the comprehension of Nietzsche involves very much more than the exposition of him, and in a mind like his, thoughts and feelings are so inextricably interwoven that the gain from a genetic approach can hardly be estimated. Behind Nietzsche's thought, motivating and finding self-fulfillment in it, lie not only the conflict of his temperamental and nurtural piety with his mature knowledge, but the whole aggregate of conflicts that made up his diathesis. The entire history of his life is one of disease, of pain, of unremitting strain of body and mind and of the struggle to conquer them. His change in attitude toward existence and its conditions, his break with the Schopenhaurian system, with Wagner, his bitter denunciations of the great mass-movements of his own time, are all implicated in the alterations of his attitude toward his own existence and his own problem. That absorbed him, as it must have absorbed any man, and its heart and vitals were the mastery of pain.

It is this that makes of Nietzsche a religious philosopher, even though — indeed through the very act — he stands what is customarily called religion on its head. But if he stands it on its head, it is not because he differs with the tradition regarding its ultimate end. He agrees regarding its ultimate end. He differs with regard to its tools and means. For Nietzsche is no cosmological philosopher. He is not concerned with analyzing the world into its elements, with understanding its nature and laws. He has no scientific curiosity, and his spirit is one of assertion, not of inquiry. He is bitterly and tragically concerned with that wherewith all religionists more smugly concern themselves. He is concerned with Salvation, and his system, no less than the Christian system, is a system of Salvation. But where Christianity saves *from* sin and pain and evil, Nietzscheanism saves *in* sin and pain and evil. His system is postulated on making his weakness his strength, on the power of self-mastery, self-transcendence, through self-affirmation. Now escape from self is the aim of all religions of disillusion, whether Asiatic or European. But the escape is a self-negation, a suicide, not a self-affirmation. It is escape through denial. In his early philosophizing Nietzsche accepted this way of escape. Indeed, he experienced it in his own life, and he got corroboration of it from his classical studies and his philosophical discipleship. He followed Schopenhauer and Schopenhauer taught the will and the self-destruction of the will in idea, particularly in idea as art and as religion. In these the will comes to rest from its unhappy strain and turmoil of existence; in these it loses itself in the quietude of non-existence. And such non-existence is the goal of being. Hence man's discipline, Schopenhauer deduced, should be one of relaxation in the struggle for life, of self-surrender, and thus of self-transcendence and salvation. Unreligious though this doctrine seemed, it breathed the esoteric spirit of Christianity, and for a time Nietzsche found repose in it. But for a time only. The pain which opposed itself like a charged wire fence against his every impulse, shut him in and kept him prisoner. His every effort to get beyond it intensified it, and his every labor was not merely an achievement in itself but a mastery over pain. His life, in a word, was not an escape from and assuagement of pain, but an increase and a wrestling with it, like Israel's with the Lord. Such growth as he had attained, came in pain and through pain, and after a time he came to see it as the sole condition of life and achievement, came indeed to have something of a masochistic preference for it, and to see salvation not beyond it but within it.

This realization was of course primarily emotional, not intellectual. But it got rationalized, inasmuch as his feeling sucked into its vortex the substance of all the knowledge which his mind touched, and made of it an aid and a comfort. The knowledge was derived particularly from the world of classical philology and, in a much less degree, from evolutionary science. The modern industrial and economic world he could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and he had a certain emotional blindness to its implications which rendered it irrelevant to him. Indeed, there has rarely been a man of so profound and widespread an influence with so complete an obliviousness to the realities of his time.

But the very emotional blindness which rendered him oblivious on the one side, made him acutely perceptive and original on many others. It enabled his "transvaluation of all values," his postulation of the Superman, his vivid and biting analysis of the "decadence" of Europe. Truth disappeared for him; knowledge became a matter of "vital lies"; morality a question of continental health or of the lack of it; the history of philosophy the history of a misunderstanding of the body; salvation ceased to be vicarious and became a process of painful, self-affirming self-transcendence, ending in an unknown goal — the Superman — and the unknown goal became a substitute for the known God. God, for Nietzsche, died, and his own life became that of an agonist, if we may trust Andreas Salomé, of "emotion over the death of God." The good of life was to be found in an inversion of all things the dead God had been the symbol of — in the repudiation of society, of "morality," of all that relaxation of danger and vigilance which had turned men into a herd and God into a shepherd. Whereas men had anciently been lords, and God an ideal of isolated Epicurean autonomy and self-sufficiency, they are today weaklings and slaves and God is an indulgent master. The future yearns to something deeper, more vital, more tragic, and altogether unprevisible; not the serene divinity of the ancients, but the agonized divinity of the unborn. Says Zarathustra, "Once when men looked on the far-stretching sea, they said God; but I teach you to say, Superman." And since he taught the Superman, who is salvation, he taught also the life which attains to salvation. That life is tragedy and transition. Man is no resting-place but a bridge; as the ape is to man, a reproach and a burning shame, so man is to the Superman. The true duty of man, the right morality, is a duty and morality of pain and struggle, of self-transcendence by pain, of power by self-transcendence. Against the "decadent" and "slavish" "Love thy neighbor as thyself," Nietzsche sets the power-generating "Destroy thyself and the neigh-

bor as thyself," so that the unknown Superman, better than both, may come to be.

That this is an idealism without precedent or parallel can hardly be denied. Nor can it be denied that it is a religious idealism, having its source in the same motives and conditions, autobiographical and social, which the more orthodox religious derive from and gratify. To a large extent it is a simple contradiction of tradition, amplified and given the semblance of reasonableness by a more or less relevant assemblage of observations from history and culture. To this extent it may be dismissed as an idiosyncratic instance of a type of thinking I have elsewhere had occasion to describe as compensatory—i. e., as the mind's projection in idea, in imagination, of a world or system that makes good the felt insufficiencies of reality; a compensation for the shortcomings of reality. And how Nietzsche's philosophy of self-sufficiency was compensatory to his dependent, invalid's life, he who runs may read. In another dimension, however, in the dimension of the dialectic of values, Nietzsche has brought a unique gift to the treasure house of philosophy. He has to some degree exemplified and has powerfully preached a doctrine that envisages an ignored great residue of human life. He has done this out of a love of excellence which led him to the joyous acceptance of the most arduous and cruel of its conditions; he has done this, seeking to spread a firmer pedestal for a perfection, devotion to which is the more remarkable in that it is the most transhuman and undefined perfection which human idealism records. Nietzsche's philosophy is thus a religious philosophy with a vengeance.

H. M. KALLEN.

NEW YORK.

- THE IDEA OF IMMORTALITY, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE. The Baird Lecture. 1917. GEORGE GALLOWAY. T. & T. Clark, 1919. Pp. viii, 234.
- IMMORTALITY, AN ESSAY IN DISCOVERY, COÖRDINATING SCIENTIFIC, PSYCHICAL, AND BIBLICAL RESEARCH. B. H. STREETER and Others. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xiv, 380. \$2.25.
- THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN INQUIRY. SAMUEL McCOMB. Dodd, Mead & Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 240. \$1.50.

Of the many recent books on Immortality, testifying pathetically to the interest in the subject awakened by the tragedy of the war, Dr. Galloway's is the most deliberate, and is likely to prove of most enduring value. "On God and Godlike men we build our trust" is his unannounced text. Science reveals in the world a principle of organization, which, in man, philosophy recognizes as the soul, al-

though at this point the author's thought is highly speculative in character (reminding one of the theological doctrine of the impersonal Logos) and confused in statement. Within the soul arise commanding ideals of justice and perfection, which are not fully realized on the level of this world and hence call for a transcendent world of life and progress which theism alone can assure. If there be a God, the source and guarantee of moral values, then personality, wherein alone such values inhere, becomes supremely precious and individual immortality certain. This follows, however, only if God be conceived of as transcendently personal instead of pantheistically immanent; but such a thought of God is given by Christianity and in religious experience. Only in man's faith in God can his hope of immortality be securely rooted.

It should be evident, although in fact it seems not to be, even to Dr. Galloway, that this argument outflanks the chief obstacle to belief in immortality, which is, of course, the complete dependence within our experience of psychical life upon physical structure. Yet, unless we think of God as having a physical substratum (and who does so think of Him nowadays?), those who believe in Him affirm the actual existence of psychical apart from physical being and thus deny the necessity and the universality of the connection. Accordingly, faith in a spiritual God opens wide the door to hope of human immortality. Since this is not always clearly seen and since there are those who appear to find immortality more credible than theism, those who advocate immortality devote much space to attempts at the removal of the psycho-physical obstacle. One of the most interesting is in the book by Streeter and others, entitled *Immortality*, which contains nine essays of very uneven merit, all of which, however, accept to a greater or less degree the genuineness of the phenomena dealt with by the Psychic Research Society and explain them by the hypothesis of telepathy and the operations of the subliminal mind. Of these essays, the second is by J. A. Hadfield, Surgeon in the Royal Navy, who discusses from the point of view of a surgeon and with professional knowledge the relations between mind and brain; arguing that the progressive emancipation of the former from the latter in the history of development indicates the possibility of its survival when the connection shall be completely broken by physical death. That is to say, the facts of psychic research are interpreted as evidence of extraordinary mental powers, natural to man but as yet only partially developed and in a few individuals, which demonstrate the ability of the mind even here to transcend physical limitations and so promise survival after death.

If, however, the psychical phenomena to which Mr. Streeter and his collaborators refer are indeed genuine, may they not be accounted for in another way and regarded as proofs of the survival after death of those who thus seek to manifest their discarnate existence? This is the view of Dr. McComb, whose book is more popular (in a good sense) than either of the others just mentioned. It presents skillfully and persuasively the arguments commonly urged, but rests the case mainly upon what are deemed the assured results of psychic research. This is the line taken by many recent writers — Lodge, Hyslop, Hill, Doyle, to mention only a few. It seems to depend very largely upon one's habitual temper and attitude of mind whether he gives more credence to isolated psychical phenomena or to considerations based upon the significance of God and Godlike men.

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#### SHORT NOTICES

**A BOOK ABOUT THE ENGLISH BIBLE.** JOSIAH H. PENNIMAN, Ph.D., LL.D. (Religion, Science, and Literature Series.) The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 444. \$2.25.

These lectures to the students of the University of Pennsylvania must have discouraged intelligent interest in the Bible. They show, to the man who is growing away from the traditional attitude towards the Bible, hardly a trace of modern biblical study — the newer theory of the composition of the Pentateuch is not mentioned — and at the same time they do not present the traditional attitude with the glow which alone can give it attraction. The best they do is to furnish a brief summary of the contents of each book of the Bible, and an account of the different English Versions.

**THE BOOK OF GENESIS. A JEWISH INTERPRETATION.** JULIAN MORGENSTERN. Published by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Cincinnati. 1919. Pp. x, 335.

This is a manual for teachers, tracing many of the stories of Genesis back to early folk-tales, giving expository notes on the text, with illustrations of oriental life taken often from the monuments; reverent in treatment; as to the results of modern study, limited; so far as it goes, intelligent.

**WHAT DID JESUS TEACH?** FRANK R. GRAYES. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xii, 195. \$1.75.

The Christian Associations of the University of Pennsylvania recently organized a campaign to induce two thousand students to

read during Lent the life of Jesus, as given in its simplest form in the Gospel of St. Mark. Seventy-two groups, composed of Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and numerous other forms of belief, with some self-styled agnostics, met once a week for discussion. The campaign was thought to have been a conspicuous success.

This book embodies the studies which were followed. It is clear in thought, swift in style, reverent, modern in scholarship, necessarily passing over many grave problems, but excellent as a text-book for thoughtful minds, whether in college groups, Sunday schools, or in individual study. There is much valuable material and stimulus in condensed form.

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## THE EARLIEST MINOR ACCOUNTS OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION

CHAMPLIN BURRAGE

CAMBRIDGE

The story of the voyage of the Mayflower in 1620 and of the Pilgrim settlement at Plymouth has been told again and again, and in this year of the tercentenary celebration will be repeated in still further varying forms; but we are certain that it will never be more graphically narrated than by the Pilgrims themselves and their friends during the twenties, thirties, and forties of the seventeenth century.

In this paper I do not intend to venture to give any new version of that narrative. It is my purpose rather to recall certain phases of the story as they appear in the vigorous and terse English of the earliest accounts, and to note especially also the interesting archæological information concerning the Indians of New England which they furnish.

In recent years Governor Bradford's monumental *History of Plimoth Plantation* has overshadowed these minor accounts, and this is quite understandable, owing to its undoubted value, its comparatively recent recovery, and its publication in several editions. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the *History* has superseded the more fragmentary literature. Quite the contrary is the case, for that work was only commenced in 1630 and was

written with an entirely different purpose in view. Consequently it lacks much of the freshness and detail of the first contemporary narratives, though it also occasionally supplements them with other facts of considerable interest. Sometimes, however, Bradford in the *History* abbreviates, alters, or even passes over in silence incidents or details which at the time of the arrival of the Pilgrims seemed interesting, if not important.

In reintroducing the subject of the early Pilgrim literature I shall consider almost entirely certain documents published in 1622 under the title of *A Relation or Iovrnall*, and Edward Winslow's *Good Newes from New England* issued in 1624. Brief reference will also be made to John Pory's *Description of Plymouth Colony* of 1622, to Captain John Smith's *Advertisements* of 1631, to William Wood's [Sir William Alexander's?] *New Englands Prospect* of 1636, and to Thomas Morton's *New English Canaan* of 1637.

It may be doubted if there is any early document relating to the Pilgrims equal in vivacity and graphic power to John Pory's *Description* of 1622. Pory was a friend of Governor Bradford and one of the best letter-writers of his time; and his quaint and delightful account of Plymouth gives a picture of the infant colony and its neighborhood and of the life there in those early days such as no other known writer of the period has left behind. An occasional touch of humor adds to its readability. The document as a whole furnishes us with the earliest description of Plymouth of any extent which still exists in a contemporary manuscript, and with information on various historical points little or not otherwise known, and clears up one matter which has proved a puzzle to historians and editors for two and a half centuries.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I refer to the word Angoum or Anguam, which is here shown to stand for Anquam (Annisquam) on Cape Ann, and not for Agawam (Ipswich), as heretofore supposed.

As Pory's narrative has recently been published in full,<sup>2</sup> the following extract will suffice here, and will give some idea of the breezy manner in which this debonair adventurer noted his impressions of the new colony and its neighborhood:

"Oysters there are none, but at Massachusett some 20 miles to the north of this place there are such huge ones by salvages report, as I am loth to report. For ordinarie ones, of which there be manie, they make to be as broad as a bushell, but one among the rest they compared to the greate cabbिन of the Discoverie, and being sober and well advised persons, grew verie angrie when they were laughed at or not beleaved! I would haue had Captaine Jones to haue tried out the truth of this report, and what was the reason? If, said I, the oysters be soe greate and haue anie pearles in them, then must the pearles be answerable in greatnes to the oysters, and proving round and orient also, would farre exceed all other jewells in the world! Yea, what strange and pretious things might be found in so rare a creature! But Captaine Jones his imploying his pinnace in discoveries, his graueing of the ship, his hast away about other occasions and busines, would not permit him to doe that which often since he wished he could haue done."

The earliest experiences of the Pilgrim Fathers after their eventful voyage across the Atlantic are first recorded in the previously mentioned *Relation or Iovrnall*, 1622, and Edward Winslow's *Good Newes from New England*, 1624. In America for many years the *Relation or Iovrnall* has been erroneously styled *Mourt's Relation*. Dr. Henry Martyn Dexter was, no doubt, chiefly responsible for perpetuating the title, but recent writers occasionally employ it, in spite of the fact that for more than fifty years scholars have justly suspected and stated, though without perfectly satisfactory evidence in the first instance, that Governor William Bradford and Edward Winslow were the true authors respectively of the two separate Relations really included in that work. Until the publication of Professor Edward Arber's *Story*

<sup>2</sup> Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918.

of the *Pilgrim Fathers* in 1897, indeed, definite proof was wanting to show that Bradford had ever written such a *Relation*. Twenty years and more, however, have gone by since then, and yet our historians and editors are still referring to *Mourt's Relation*.

On pages 506 and 507 of Arber's *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers* will be found the following complaint, of the date 1622,<sup>3</sup> the contents of which when taken in connection with certain well known facts prove that the first (and only real) *Relation* published concerning the Pilgrims in 1622 was written by Bradford, and that there is no reason whatever for attaching to it the name of an unknown person of the period called "Mourt":<sup>4</sup>

"THE COMPLAINT OF CERTAIN ADVENTURERS AND INHABITANTS  
OF THE PLANTATION IN NEW ENGLAND

Sheweth

That a ship belonging to them, named the *Fortune*, of the burden of between 40 and 50 tons or thereabouts, being upon their way homeward, and near the English coast, some eight leagues off Use, called by the Frenchmen Ile d'Use [= Yeu, off the coast of Poitou], was, the 19th of January last [1622], assailed and taken by a French Man-of-War, the Captain whereof was called FONTENAU DE PENNART *de Britannie [Bretagne]*; and carried to the Isle of Use.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Worthington C. Ford reproduces this document in full in his *Massachusetts Historical Society edition of Bradford's History* (I, 268, 269), but fails to draw the obvious conclusion, and (I, 177, note 6) speaks of "Mourt" and of the "authors of the *Relation*."

<sup>4</sup> Consequently, a historical blunder has been made in calling this work *Mourt's Relation*. In the first place, Mourt is a ghost-name, since it never existed except by mistake. In the original printed edition the name stands as "Mourt.", the period at the end naturally indicating an abbreviation by suspension, as well as the conclusion of the preface. The name "Mourton," "Murton," or "Morton" (compare the similar phonetic spellings Crumwell and Cromwell) is manifestly intended, but there is nothing to prove that George Morton wrote much more than the preface. In the second place, according to the printed title-page, the work known as *Mourt's Relation* contains not one *Relation* but two *Relations*, the second chiefly composed, it would appear, of letters or parts of letters written by Edward Winslow. In the third place, we have the best of reasons, both from internal evidence and from the definite statement in the complaint just mentioned, that the first *Relation* was written by Governor Bradford, or perhaps we might say more accurately, was compiled by him from his own observations and possibly the narrative of some eye-witness of occasional events not noted by himself.

That FONTENAU presented the ship, and company thereof, being 18 persons, as prisoners to Monsieur le Marquis DE CERA, Governor of the Isle. . . . That thereupon Monsieur DE CERA kept THOMAS BARTON, Master of the ship, seven days, close prisoner in his Castle, and the rest of the company under guard; and commanded his soldiers to pillage them. . . . That he sent for all their letters, [and] opened and kept what he pleased; especially, though he was much intreated to the contrary, a letter written by [WILLIAM BRADFORD] the Governor of our Colony in New England, containing a general Relation of all matters there.”<sup>5</sup>

Accordingly, we know definitely that about 1621–22, Bradford did write “a general Relation of all matters” pertaining to the colony at Plymouth; that it was carried to Europe in the *Fortune*, which on January 19–29, 1621–22, was captured by a French war vessel and taken to the Isle of Yeu, off the coast of Poitou; that here the ship-master and all on board were kept prisoners for some days.

To supplement this document, we may add a statement from Mr. Ford’s edition of Bradford’s *History* (I, 178), namely, that *Mourt’s Relation* “was carried to England by Robert Cushman, who, sailing in the *Fortune*, did not reach London till February, 1622”; and that on June 29, 1622, the *Relation* was entered in the Stationers’ Register under the title, *Newes from newe England*. Elsewhere (I, 268), in the same edition of the *History* Bradford further gives a letter from Cushman, in which he says that the vessel was kept in France for fifteen days, and that he and his fellow-passengers did not reach home until February 17–27, 1621–22.

Thus we obtain the final link in the chain of evidence which proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that the first section of *Mourt’s Relation* is really Bradford’s Relation, for two distinct Relations treating of exactly the same matters would hardly have been carried from Plymouth

<sup>5</sup> S. P. Colonial, Vol. V, No. 112, E. Arber, *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, 1897, pp. 506, 507.

on the same vessel at one time, one of them by Governor Bradford and the other by an entirely unknown person bearing the ghost-name "Mourt"; and furthermore in case there had by any chance been two such Relations and one of them by Bradford, it is certain that Cushman would have carried that by the Governor and not that by the utterly unknown "Mourt." The same evidence makes it also probable that after the manuscript had been taken away, and very likely some time between February, 1621-22 and June 29, 1622, the first Relation was returned to Cushman or at least sent on to England as the outcome of the Complaint which had been issued. Thus we obtain a better understanding of the wanderings of the manuscript of Bradford's earliest description of the settlement at Plymouth.

The second so-called Relation printed with that by Bradford, as I have previously indicated in a note, is made up chiefly of letters or parts of letters by Winslow, and consequently was also not composed by "Mourt," though in England Morton may perhaps have added the headings to the several sections and may have given the extended title to the book when it was sent to the press.

Unless we are mistaken, the first *Relation or Iovrnall* gains a new historical value by our present definite knowledge that it was certainly written by Governor Bradford himself. Well might Professor Arber, who by the way did not believe that the original document by Bradford had really survived, and who concluded by a rather bad process of reasoning<sup>6</sup> that Edward Winslow was the probable author of the first Relation as printed, assert with much feeling, that "Posterity will always owe a grudge to this noble thief [Monsieur le Marquis de Cera] for his robbery of Governor Bradford's despatch, unless it should happily

<sup>6</sup> *Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, 1897, p. 416, note. If Winslow, or any other Pilgrim besides Bradford, had been the author, he would have written "Master William Bradford," not simply "William Bradford."

be recovered from among the existing French archives; and then posterity would bless him forever";<sup>7</sup> and that "Doubtless, the Marquis kept it in order to send it up to the Court at Paris"! But in this opinion Dr. Arber was certainly wrong, unless indeed the document was sent back from Paris before June 29, 1622.

The Pilgrim Fathers upon their arrival on American shores were very much interested in their natural surroundings and in the neighboring Indians, and fortunately were very keen observers and reporters of the primitive objects and strange customs which they saw. Perhaps, indeed, they might not inappropriately be called the first archæologists of New England, and some of the details noted by them are of value even today. For convenience, I have grouped the subjects treated in this early literature to which I wish to call attention under three main headings, namely, I, The Story of the Voyage and of the Pilgrims' Choice of a Site for their Settlement; II, The Earliest Descriptions of Plymouth Plantation and an Account of its Gradual Fortification; and III, The Pilgrims and the Indians.

## I. THE STORY OF THE VOYAGE AND OF THE PILGRIMS' CHOICE OF A SITE FOR THEIR SETTLEMENT

Bradford's *Relation or Iovrnall*<sup>8</sup> opens with the following familiar but informing account of the arrival of the Pilgrims at Cape Cod and of their search for a suitable site upon which to found their settlement. The description, though wanting the literary charm of a writer like John Pory, is straightforward and graphic, and gives

<sup>7</sup> Story of the Pilgrim Fathers, p. 507, note. Winslow's letter [the second so-called Relation] and Bradford's Relation were no doubt both published without the consent of their respective authors, but that fact would not prove that these were not the genuine and original accounts.

<sup>8</sup> This rare and valuable work as published bore the following title: A | RELATION OR | Iovrnall of the beginning and proceedings | of the English Plantation settled at Plimoth in NEW | ENGLAND, by certaine English Aduenturers both | Merchants and

some archæological details of real interest. For instance, in one place mention is made of the fact that the Pilgrims found in some of the Indian graves quantities of red powder, which had a strong but not offensive odor and was manifestly employed for purposes of embalming. Perhaps, indeed, this is the earliest reference now known to the so-called "Red-Paint People," to whom Mr. Warren K. Moorehead of Andover has paid so much attention in recent years.<sup>9</sup> It would be of considerable value if we could learn whether the occupants of such graves came originally from Maine. Bradford's suggestion that the red powder was used for embalming is of interest, since it readily explains one feature of the so-called Indian Red-Paint burials in Maine which hitherto, I fancy, has not been understood. Some other important characteristics of Indian burials also are given in this narrative which, I believe, may help us to explain certain hitherto puzzling remains of the so-called Mound Builders.

A RELATION OR IOVRNALL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE  
PLANTATION SETTLED AT *Plimoth* IN NEW ENGLAND <sup>10</sup>

Wednesday, the sixt of *September*, the Wind comming East North East, a fine small gale, we loosed from *Plimoth* [England], hauing beene kindly intertained and curteously vsed by diuers friends there dwelling, and after many difficulties in boysterous stormes, at length by Gods prouidence vpon the ninth of *November* following, by breake of the day, we espied land which we deemed to be *Cape Cod*, and so

others. | With their difficult passage, their safe ariual, their ioyfull building of, and comfortable planting them- | selues in the now well defended Towne | of NEW PLI-MOTH. | . . . London, 1622, 4°.

There is evidence in the work as printed to show that Winslow's letters were written in the secretarial hand of the period. Various misreadings by the compositor make this point clear. A statement in Robert Cushman's preface suggests that Bradford may have inserted in his narrative reports by others of certain events, not witnessed by himself.

<sup>9</sup> See his writings entitled *The Red-Paint People of Maine, 1913*; *The Problem of the Red-Paint People, Washington, 1916*; and *Prehistoric Cultures in the State of Maine, Washington, D.C., 1917*.

<sup>10</sup> The punctuation and capitalization of the citations, for convenience in reading, have been to some extent normalized.



afterward it proued. And the appearance of it much comforted vs; especially seeing so goodly a Land and woodded to the brinke of the sea, it caused vs to reioyce together and praise God that had giuen vs once againe to see land. And thus wee made our course South South West, purposing to goe to a Riuer ten leagues to the South of the Cape [i.e., the Hudson River]; but at night the winde being contrary we put round againe for the Bay of *Cape Cod*, and vpon the 2 of *November* we came to an anchor in the Bay, which is a good harbour and pleasant Bay, circled round except in the entrance, which is about foure miles ouer from land to land, compassed about to the very Sea with Okes, Pines, Iuniper, Sassafras, and other sweet wood. It is a harbour wherein 1000. saile of Ships may safely ride. There we relieued our selues with wood and water and refreshed our people, while our shallop was fitted to coast the Bay to search for an habitation. There was the greatest store of fowle that ever we saw.

And euery day we saw Whales playing hard by vs, of which in that place, if we had [had] instruments & meanes to take them, we might haue made a very rich returne, which to our great grieve we wanted. Our master and his mate and others experienced in fishing professed we might haue made three or foure thousand pounds worth of Oyle. They preferred it before Greenland Whale-fishing & purpose the next winter to fish for Whale here. For Cod we assayed but found none; there is good store no doubt in their season. Neither got we any fish all the time we lay there but some few little ones on the shore. We found great Mussles and very fat and full of Sea pearle, but we could not eat them, for they made vs all sicke that did eat, as well saylers as passengers. . . . The bay is so round & circling, that before we could come to anchor we went round all the points of the Compasse. We could not come neere the shore by three quarters of an English mile, because of shallow water, which was a great preiudice to vs, for our people going on shore were forced to wade a bow-shoot or two in going a-land which caused many to get colds and coughs, for it was ny times freezing cold weather. . . .

The same day, so soon as we could, we set a-shore 15 or 16 men, well armed, with some to fetch wood, for we had none left, as also to see what the Land was, and what Inhabitants they could meet with. They found it to be a small neck of Land; on this side where we lay is the *Bay*, and [on] the further side the Sea; the ground or earth, sand hils, much like the Downes in *Holland*, but much better; the crust of the earth a Spits depth excellent blacke earth, all woodded with Okes, Pines, Sassafras, Iuniper, Birch, Holly, Vines, some Ash, Walnut; the wood for the most part open and without vnder-wood,

fit either to goe [on foot] or ride in. At night our people returned, but found not any person nor habitation, and laded their Boat with Iuniper, which smelled very sweet & strong, and of which we burnt the most part of the time we lay there. . . .<sup>11</sup> When we had refreshed our selues, we directed our course full South, that we might come to shore, which within a short while after we did, and there made a fire, that they in the ship might see where wee were (as we had direction), and so marched on towards this supposed River; and as we went in another valley we found a fine cleere Pond of fresh water, being about a Musket shot broad and twice as long. There grew also many small vines, and Foule and Deere haunted there; there grew much Sasafra. From thence we went on & found much plaine ground, about fiftie Acres, fit for the Plow, and some signes where the *Indians* had formerly planted their corne. After this . . . we found a little path to certaine heapes of sand, one whereof was covered with old Matts, and had a wooden thing like a mortar whelmed on the top of it, and an earthen pot layd in a little hole at the end thereof. We musing what it might be digged & found a Bow, and as we thought Arrowes, but they were rotten. We supposed there were many other things [there], but because we deemed them graues,<sup>12</sup> we put in the Bow againe and made it vp as it was, and left the rest vntouched, because we thought it would be odious vnto them to ransacke their Sepulchers. We went on further and found new stubble, of which they had gotten Corne this yeare, and many Wallnut trees full of Nuts, and great store of Strawberries, and some Vines. Passing thus a field or two which were not great, we came to another which had also bin new gotten, and there we found where an house had beene and foure or fiue old Plankes layed together; also we found a great Kettle which had beene some Ships kettle and brought out of *Europe*; there was also an heape of sand, made like the former, but it was newly done. We might see how they had padled it with their hands, which we digged vp, and in it we found a little old Basket full of faire *Indian* Corne, and digged further & found a fine new Basket full of very faire corne of this yeare, with some 36 goodly eares of corne, some yellow, and some red, and others mixt with blew, which was a very goodly sight. The Basket was round and narrow at the top. It held about three or foure Bushels, which was as much as two of vs could lift vp from the ground, and was very handsomely and cunningly made. But whilst wee were busie about

<sup>11</sup> Pp. 1-4.

<sup>12</sup> Dr. Dexter thinks these graves were "somewhere in what is now the village of Great Hollow."

these things, we set our men Sentinell in a round ring, all but two or three which digged vp the corne. We were in suspence what to do with it and the Kettle, and at length after much consultation we concluded to take the Kettle and as much of the Corne as we could carry away with vs, and when our Shallop came, if we could find any of the people, . . . we would giue them the Kettle againe and satisfie them for their Corne. So we tooke all the eares and put a good deale of the loose Corne in the Kettle for two men to bring away on a staffe; besides, they that could put any into their Pockets filled the same; the rest wee buried againe, for we were so laden with Armour that we could carry no more. Not farre from this place we found the remainder of an old Fort, or Palizide, which as we conceiued had beene made by some Christians, . . . so we returned leaving the farther discovery . . . and came that night backe againe to the fresh water pond, and there we made our Randevous that night, making a great fire and a Baricado to windward of vs, and kept good watch with three Sentinells all night, euery one standing when his turne came, while five or sixe inches of Match was burning. It proved a very rainie night. . . . In the end wee got out of the Wood, and were fallen about a myle too high aboue the creake, where we saw three Bucks, but we had rather haue had one of them! Wee also did spring three couple of Partridges, and as we came along by the creake, wee saw great flocks of wild Geese and Duckes, but they were very fearefull of vs. So we marched some while in the Woods, some while on the sands, and other while in the water vp to the knees, till at length we came neare the Ship, and then we shot off our Peeeces, and the long Boat came to fetch vs. . . . This was our first Discovery . . . but the discomodiousness of the harbour did much hinder vs, for we could neither goe to, nor come from, the shore but at high water, which was much to our hinderance and hurt, for oftentimes they waded to the midle of the thigh, and oft to the knees, to goe and come from land; some did it necessarily and some for their owne pleasure, but it brought to the most, if not to all, coughes and colds, the weather prouing sodainly cold and stormie, which afterward turned to the scurvey, whereof many dyed.<sup>13</sup>

When our Shallop was fit . . . there was appointed some 24 men of our owne, and armed, then to goe and make a more full discovery of the rivers [Pamet River and its three branches] before mentioned. Master *Iones* was desirous to goe with vs. . . . Wee made master *Iones* our Leader. . . . When we were set forth, it proued rough weather and crosse windes, so as we were constrained, some in the

<sup>13</sup> Pp. 5-8.

Shallop, and others in the long Boate, to row to the neereſt ſhore the wind would ſuffer them to goe vnto, and then to wade out aboue the knees. The wind was ſo ſtrong as the Shallop could not keepe the water, but was forced to harbour there that night. . . . It blowed and did ſnow all that day & night, and froſe withall; ſome of our people that are dead tooke the originall of their death here. The next day about 11 a-clocke . . . we ſayled to the river . . . which we named *Cold Harbour*. . . . We landed our men betweene the two creekes . . . and our Shallop followed vs. At length night grew on, and our men were tired with marching vp and downe the ſteepe hills and deepe vallies which lay halfe a foot thicke with ſnow. Maſter *Jones* wearied with marching was deſirous we ſhould take vp our lodging, though ſome of vs would haue marched further, ſo we made there our Randeuous for that night vnder a few Pine trees, and as it fell out wee got three fat Geese and ſix Ducks to our Supper, which we eate [= ate] with Souldiers ſtomacks, for we had eaten little all that day. . . . In the morning . . . we turned towards the other creeke, that wee might goe over and looke for the reſt of the Corne that we left behind when we were here before. When we came to the creeke, we ſaw the Canow lie on the dry ground, and a flocke of Geese in the river, at which one made a ſhot and killed a couple of them, and we lanced the Canow & fetcht them, and when we had done, ſhe carryed vs over by ſeaven or eight at once. This done, we marched to the place where we had [found] the corne formerly, which place we called *Corne-hill*, and digged and found more corne, viz., two or three Baskets full of *Indian* Wheat [= Corn] and a bag of Beanes with a good many of faire Wheat-eares.<sup>14</sup> Whiſt ſome of vs were digging vp this, ſome others found another heape of Corne, which they digged vp alſo, ſo as we had in all about ten Buſhels, which will ſerue vs ſufficiently for ſeed. And ſure it was Gods good providence that we found this Corne, for els wee know not how we ſhould haue done. . . . Alſo we had neuer in all likelihood ſcene a graine of it, if we had not made our firſt Iourney, for the ground was now covered with ſnow, and ſo hard froſen, that we were faine with our Curtlaxes and ſhort Swords to hew and carue the ground a foot deepe, and then wreſt it vp with leavers, for we had forgot to bring other Toolles. . . .

The next morning we followed certaine beaten pathes and tracts [= tracks] of the *Indians* into the Woods, ſuppoſing they would haue led vs into ſome Towne, or houſes. After wee had gone a while, we light [= came] vpon a very broad beaten path, well nigh two

<sup>14</sup> That is, a good many faire eares of Corn.

foote broad, when we lighted all our Matches, and prepared our selues, concluding wee were neare their dwellings, but in the end we found it to be onely a path made to driue Deere in when the *Indians* hunt, as wee supposed. When we had marched fīue or six myles into the Woods and could find no signes of any people, we returned againe another way, and as we came into the plaine ground, wee found a place like a graue, but it was much bigger and longer than any we had yet seene. It was also covered with boords, so as [= so that] we mused what it should be, and resolved to digge it vp; where we found first a Matt, and vnder that a fayre Bow, and there another Matt, and vnder that a boord about three quarters [of a yard] long finely carued and paynted, with three tynes or broches on the top, like a Crowne; also betweene the Matts we found Boules, Trayes, Dishes, and such like Trinkets. At length we came to a faire new Matt, and vnder that two Bundles, the one bigger, the other lesse. We opened the greater and found in it a great quantitie of fine and perfect red Powder, and in it the bones and skull of a man. The Skull had fine yellow haire still on it and some of the flesh vnconsumed. There was bound vp with it a knife, a pack-needle, and two or three old iron things. It was bound vp in a Saylers canvas Casacke and a payre of cloth breeches. The red Powder was a kind of Embaulment and yeelded a strong but no offensiue smell. It was as fine as any flower. We opened the lesse bundle likewise, and found [some] of the same Powder in it, and the bones and head of a little childe. About the leggs and other parts of it was bound strings and bracelets of fine white Beads; there was also by it a little Bow, about three quarters [of a yard] long and some other odd [nic]knacks. We brought sundry of the pretiest things away with vs and covered the Corps vp againe. After this we digged in sundry like places but found no more Corne nor any things els but graues. There was varietie of opinions amongst vs about the embalmed person. Some thought it was an *Indian* Lord and King. Others sayd, The *Indians* haue all blacke hayre, and never any was seene with browne or yellow hayre. Some thought it was a Christian of some speciall note, which had dyed amongst them, and they thus buried him to honour him. Others thought they had killed him, and did it in triumph over him. . . .<sup>15</sup>

Others againe vrged greatly the going to *Anguum* or *Angoum*,<sup>16</sup> a place twentie leagues off to the Northwards, which they had heard to be an excellent harbour for ships [with] better ground and better

<sup>15</sup> Pp. 9-12.

<sup>16</sup> Hitherto Angoum or Anguum has been interpreted to mean Ipswich, but Ipswich can hardly be said to have an excellent harbor for ships. Furthermore, it now becomes

fishing. Secondly, for any thing we knew, there might be hard by vs a farre better seate, and it should be a great hindrance to seate [= settle] where wee should remoue againe. Thirdly, the water was but in ponds, and it was thought there would be none in Summer, or very little. Fourthly, the water there must be fetched vp a steepe hill; but to omit many reasons and replies vsed heere abouts, it was in the ende concluded to make some discovery within the Bay, but in no case so farre [north] as *Angoum*. Besides, *Robert Coppin* our Pilot, made relation of a great Navigable River and good harbour in the other head-land of this Bay, almost right over against *Cape Cod*, being a right line, not much aboue eight leagues distant, in which hee had beene once. . . .<sup>17</sup> The narration of which Discovery followes, penned by one of the Company.

Wednesday, the sixt of December, we set out, [it] being very cold and hard weather. Wee were a long while after we launched from the ship before we could get cleare of a sandie poynt, which lay within lesse then a furlong of the same. In which time two were very sicke, and *Edward Tilley* had like to haue sounded [= swooned] with cold; the Gunner was also sicke vnto Death . . . and so remained all that day, and the next night. At length we got cleare of the sandy poynt and got vp our sayles, and within an houre or two we got vnder the weather shore, and then had smoother water and better sayling, but it was very cold, for the water frose on our clothes, and made them many times like coats of Iron. Wee sayled sixe or seaven leagues by the shore, but saw neither river nor creeke. At length wee mett with a tongue of Land, being flat off from the shore with a sandy poynt. We bore vp to gaine the poynt & found there a fayre income or rode of a Bay, being a league over at the narrowest, and some two or three in length, but wee made right over to the land before vs, and left the discovery of this *Income* till the next day. . . . In the morning . . . we found it onely to be a Bay without either river or creeke comming into it, yet we deemed it to be as good an harbour as *Cape Cod*, for they that sounded it found a ship might ride [there] in fiue fathom water. Wee on the land found it to be a leuill soyle, but none of the fruitfullest; wee saw two becks [= brooks] of fresh water, which were the first running streames that we saw in the Country, but one might stride over them; we found also a great fish called a *Grampus* dead on the sands. They in the Shallop

manifest from the recently discovered letters of John Pory, that Angoum or Anguam does not stand for Agawam at all, but for "Anquam, scituate within Cape Anna, aboute 40 leagues from Plimouth," evidently now known as Annisquam.

<sup>17</sup> P. 14.

found two of them also in the bottome of the bay, dead in like sort. They were cast vp at high water and could not get off for the frost and ice; they were some fiue or sixe paces long, and about two inches thicke of fat, and fleshed like a Swine. They would haue yeelded a great deale of oyle, if there had beene time and meanes to haue taken it. . . . We then directed our course along the Sea-sands, to the place where we first saw the *Indians* when we were there. We saw it was also a *Grampus* which they were cutting vp; they cut it into long rands or peeces about an ell long and two handfull broad; wee found here and there a peece scattered by the way, as it seemed, for hast. This place the most were minded we should call the *Grampus Bay*, because we found so many of them there. Wee followed the tract [= track] of the *Indians* bare feete a good way on the sands; at length we saw where they stricke into the Woods by the side of a Pond [Great Pond] . . . so we light [came] on a path, but saw no house, and followed [the path] a great way into the woods;<sup>18</sup> at length wee found where Corne had beene set, but not that yeare. Anone [= Anon] we found a great burying place, one part whereof was incompassed with a large Palazado like a Church-yard, with yong spires [= saplings] foure or fiue yards long set so close one by another as they could [be], two or three foot in the ground. Within, it was full of Graues, some bigger and some lesse, some were also paled about, & others had like an *Indian*-house made over them, but not matted. Those Graues were more sumptuous then those at *Corne-hill*, yet we digged none of them vp, but onely viewed them and went our way. Without the Palazado were graues also, but not so costly. From this place we went and found more Corne ground, but not of this yeare. As we ranged, we light [came] on foure or fiue *Indian*-houses, which had been lately dwelt in, but they were vncovered and had no matts about them, els they were like those we found at *Corne-hill*, but had not beene so lately dwelt in. There was nothing left but two or three peeces of old matts [and] a little sedge. Also a little further [on] we found two Baskets full of parched Acorns hid in the ground, which we supposed had beene Corne, when we beganne to dig the same. We cast earth thereon againe & went our way."<sup>19</sup>

With this account of an Indian burying ground we may compare the description given by Edward Winslow of the house and burial-place of the Indian king, Nanepashemet.

<sup>18</sup> Dr. H. M. Dexter (*Mourt's Relation*, Boston, 1865, note 175) suggests "in the direction of Enoch's Rock and Nauset light."

<sup>19</sup> Pp. 15-18.

It is to be noted that the house was situated on the top of a hill or mound, as was probably the case likewise with the houses of the kings of the Mound Builders in the Mississippi valley. Nanepashemet, we are told, was buried within a circular earthwork forty or fifty feet in diameter, having a trench breast-high both on the inside and on the outside. The enclosure was surrounded by a strong palisade of poles thirty or forty feet long sunk firmly in the ground as close to each other as possible. The only approach to the enclosure was a bridge, and in the centre of the palisado stood the frame of an Indian house, beneath which the king was buried. Had the country not been invaded by European settlers, and had there been time for the last resting-place of the king to become venerated, a mound might later on perhaps have been heaped above the house, and then the fortification would have strikingly resembled some of the mounds in the Mississippi Valley:

"On the morrow we went ashore, all but two men, and marched in Armes vp in the Countrey. Hauing gone three myles, we came to a place where Corne had beene newly gathered, a house pulled downe, and the people gone. A myle from hence [? near Medford], *Nanepashemet* their King in his life-time had liued. His house was not like others, but a scaffold was largely built with pools [= poles] and plancks some six foote from [the] ground, and the house vpon that, being situated on the top of a hill.

Not farre from hence in a bottome [? now near Mystic Pond, Medford,] wee came to a Fort built by their deceased King, the manner thus: There were pools [= poles] some thirtie or fortie foote long stucke in the ground as thicke as they could be set one by another, and with these they inclosed a ring some forty or fifty foote ouer. A trench breast high was digged on each side. One way there was to goe into it with a bridge. In the midst of this Pallizado stood the frame of an house, wherein being dead he lay buried.

About a myle from hence, we came to such another [? house], but seated on the top of an hill. Here *Nanepashemet* was killed, none dwelling in it since the time of his death.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> A Relation, 1622, p. 58 (in the second so-called Relation which was not written by Bradford but which consists of several sections probably for the most part written



## II. THE EARLIEST DESCRIPTION OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS GRADUAL FORTIFICATION

The following descriptions of Plymouth (formerly Patuxet) by Bradford and by Winslow respectively may very fittingly be compared with Pory's similar description of 1622.

[Bradford]

"On the fifteenth day we waighed Anchor to goe to the place we had discovered, and comming within two leagues of the Land we could not fetch the Harbour, but were faine to put roome againe towards *Cape Cod*, our course lying West; and the wind was at North west, but it pleased God that the next day being Saturday, the 16 day [of December, 1620], the winde came faire, and wee put to Sea againe, and came safely into a safe Harbour; and within halfe an houre the winde changed, so as [= so that] if we had beene letted [= hindered] but a little, we had gone backe to *Cape Cod*. This Harbour is a Bay greater then *Cape Cod*, compassed with a goodly Land, and in the Bay 2 fine Islands vninhabited, wherein are nothing but wood — Okes, Pines, Walnut, Beech, Sasifras, Vines, and other trees which wee know not. This Bay is a most hopefull place, [containing] innumerable store of fowle, and excellent good, and [there] cannot but bee [an abundance] of fish in their seasons — Skate, Cod, Turbot, and Herring. Wee haue tasted of abundance of Musles, the greatest & best that ever we saw, Crabs and Lobsters, in their time infinite. It is in fashion like a Cikle [= sickle] or Fish-hooke.

Monday, the 18 day [of December], we went a-land, manned with the Maister of the Ship and 3 or 4 of the Saylers. We marched along the coast in the woods, some 7 or 8 mile, but saw not an *Indian* nor an *Indian*-house, only we found where formerly had beene some Inhabitants, and where they had planted their corne. We found not

by Winslow). In this connection we will add the following instructive passage from Winslow's *Good Newes*, p. 58, which shows how the sachems were buried:

"When they bury the dead, they sow vp the corps in a mat and so put it in the earth. If the party bee a *Sachim*, they cover him with many curious mats, and bury all his riches with him, and inclose the graue with a pale. If it bee a childe, the father will also put his owne most speciall iewels and ornaments in the earth with it. . . . If it be the man or woman of the house, they will pull downe the mattes and leaue the frame standing, and burie them in or neere the same, and either remoue their dwelling or giue ouer house-keeping."

any Navigable River, but 4 or 5 small running brookes of very sweet fresh water that all run into the Sea. The land for the crust of the earth is a spits depth excellent blacke mold and fat in some places. [There are] 2 or 3 great Oakes but not very thicke, Pines, Wal-nuts, Beech, Ash, Birch, Hasell, Holley, Asp[en?], Sasifras in abundance, & Vines euerywhere, Cherry trees, Plum-trees, and many other which we know not. Most kinds of hearbes we found heere in Winter as Strawberry leaues innumerable, Sorrell, Yarow, Caruell, Brooklime, Liver-wort, Water-cresses, great store of Leekes and Onyons, and an excellent strong kind of Flaxe, and Hempe. Here is sand, gravell, and excellent clay (no better in the Worlde), [which is] excellent for pots and will wash like sope, and great store of stone though somewhat soft, and the best water that ever wee drunke, and the Brookes now begin to be full of fish. That night many being weary with marching, wee went abourd againe.”<sup>21</sup>

[Winslow]

“[As] for the temper of the ayre here, it agreeth well with that in *England*, and if there be any difference at all, this [country] is somewhat hotter in Summer. Some thinke it to be colder in Winter, but I cannot out of experience so say. The ayre is very cleere and not foggie, as hath beene reported. I neuer in my life remember a more seasonable yeare then we haue here enioyed, and if we haue once but Kine, Horses, and Sheepe, I make no question but men might liue as contented here as in any part of the world. For fish and fowle, we haue great abundance; fresh Codd in the Summer is but course meat with vs. Our Bay is full of Lobsters all the Summer, and affordeth varietie of other Fish. In September we can take a Hogshead of Eeles in a night with small labour, & can dig them out of their beds all the Winter. We haue Mussells and Clams<sup>22</sup> at our doores. Oysters we haue none neere, but we can haue them brought by the *Indians* when we will; all the Spring time the earth sendeth forth naturally very good Sallet Herbs; here are Grapes, white and red, and very sweete and strong also, Strawberies, Gooseberies, Raspas, &c., Plums of three sorts, with blacke and red, being almost as good as a Damsen; abundance of Roses, white, red, and damask, single, but very sweet indeed. The Countrey wanteth onely industrious men to imploy, for it would grieue your hearts (if as I) you had scene so

<sup>21</sup> Bradford, *Relation*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>22</sup> Printed text, “Othus.” Dr. Dexter suggested the reading, *clams*, as is certainly correct. This part of the MS., therefore was manifestly written in the secretarial or decadent Court Hand of the period, which was in this case misread by the compositor.

many myles together by goodly Riuers vninhabited, and withall to consider those parts of the world wherein you liue to be euen greatly burthened with abundance of people.”<sup>23</sup>

The Pilgrims planned their settlement with great speed when once they had chosen a suitable site. And haste was necessary, for it was already almost Christmas time, and they were faced by the rigors of a New England winter. By combining these first accounts of Plymouth we may obtain an excellent idea of the appearance and life of the little colony in its earliest days, and various interesting details concerning its defense and enlargement during the first two decades of its history:

“That night [December 19–29] we returned againe a-ship-board, with resolution the next morning to settle on some of those places; so in the morning [of December 20–30], after we had called on God for direction, we came to this resolution, to goe presently ashore againe and to take a better view of two places which wee thought most fitting for vs, for we could not now take time for further search or consideration, our victuals being much spent, especially our Beere, and it being now the 19 of *December*. After our landing and viewing of the place so well as we could, we came to a conclusion by most voyces, [namely,] to set[tle] on the maine Land on the first place,<sup>24</sup> on an high ground, where there is a great deale of Land cleared, and hath beene planted with Corne three or four yeares agoe, and [where] there is a very sweet brooke [i.e., Town Brooke] [which] runnes vnder the hillside, and many delicate springs of as good water as can be drunke, and where we may harbour our Shallops and Boates exceeding well, and in this brooke much good fish in their seasons. On the further side of the river also much Corne ground [has been] cleared; in one field is a great hill [i.e., Burial Hill], on which wee poynt to make a platforme, and plant our Ordinance, which will command all round about. From thence we may see into the *Bay*, and farre into the Sea, and we may see thence *Cape Cod*. Our greatest labour will be fetching of our wood, which is halfe a quarter of an English myle [distant], but there is enough so farre off. What people inhabite here we yet know not, for as yet we haue seene none, so

<sup>23</sup> Relation, p. 58 (second Relation, written not by Bradford but evidently by Winslow).

<sup>24</sup> That is, Patuxet or Plymouth.

there we made our Randevous and a place for some of our people, about twentie resolving in the morning to come all ashore, and to build houses. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Thursday the 28 of *December* [or January 7, 1620–21], so many as could went to worke on the hill where we purposed to build our plat-forme for our Ordinance, and which doth command all the plaine and the *Bay*, and from whence we may see farre into the sea, and [which] might be easier impayled, having two rowes of houses and a faire streete. So in the afternoone we went to measure out the grounds, and first we tooke notice how many Families they were, willing all single men that had no wiues to ioyne with some Familie as they thought fit, that so we might build fewer houses, which was done, and we reduced them to 19 Families. To greater Families we allotted larger plots, to every person half a pole in breadth, and three in length, and so Lots were cast where euery man should lie, which was done, and staked out. We thought this proportion was large enough at first for houses and gardens, to impale them round, considering the weaknes of our people, many of them growing ill with coldes, for our former Discoveries in frost and stormes, and the wading at Cape *Cod* had brought much weakenes amongst vs, and after[wards] was the cause of many of their deaths.<sup>26</sup>

Tuesday, the 9 [or 19] January [1620–21], was a reasonable faire day, and wee went to labour that day in the building of our Towne in two rowes of houses for more safety. We devided by lott the plot of ground whereon to build our Towne. After the proportion formerly allotted, we agreed that every man should build his owne house, thinking by that course men would make more hast[e] then working in common. The common house, in which for the first we made our Randevous, being neere finished wanted onely couering, it being about 20 foote square. Some should make mortar and some gather thatch, so that in four days halfe of it was thatched. Frost and foule weather hindred vs much; this time of the yeare seldome could wee worke halfe the weeke.<sup>27</sup>

Munday, the 22 [January or February 1], was a faire day. We wrought on our houses, and in the after-noone carried vp our hogsheds of meale to our common store-house.<sup>28</sup> Saturday, the 17 [or 27] day [of February], in the morning we called a meeting for the establishing of military Orders amongst our selues, and we chose *Miles Standish* our Captaine, and gaue him authoritie of command in affayres; and as we were in consultation here abouts, two Savages

<sup>25</sup> Bradford, *Relation*, p. 23.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 25.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 27.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

presented themselves vpon the top of an hill over against our Plantation about a quarter of a myle and lesse [distant]. . . . This caused vs to plant our great Ordinances in places most convenient. Wednesday, the 21 [or 31] of *February*, the master came on shore with many of his Saylers, and brought with him one of the great Peeces, called a *Minion*, and helped vs to draw it vp the hill, with another Peece that lay on shore, and mounted them, and a saller [= saker] and two bases. Saturday, the third [or thirteenth] of *March*, the wind was South, the morning mistie, but towards noone warme and fayre weather. The Birds sang in the Woods most pleasantly; at one of the Clocke it thundred, which was the first wee heard in that Country. It was strong and great claps, but short, but after an houre it rayned very sadly till midnight. Wednesday, the seauenth [or seventeenth] of *March*, the wind was full East, cold, but faire. That day Master *Carver* with fiae other[s] went to the great Ponds, which seeme to be excellent fishing-places; all the way they went they found it exceedingly beaten and haunted with Deere, but they saw none. Amongst other foule, they saw one, a milk white foule, with a very blacke head. This day some garden seede were sown.<sup>20</sup>

Referring you for further satisfaction to our more large Relations (of which the greater part of this book is composed), you shall vnderstand that in this little time that a few of vs haue beene here, we haue built seauen dwelling houses, and foure for the [common] vse of the Plantation, and haue made preparation for diuers others. We set the last Spring [1621] some twentie Acres of *Indian Corne* and sowed some six Acres of Barly & Pease, and according to the manner of the *Indians* we manured our ground with Herings or rather Shadds [*i.e.*, alewives], which we haue in great abundance, and take with great ease at our doores. Our Corne did proue well, & God be prayed, we had a good increase of *Indian-Corne*, and our Barly indifferent good, but our Pease [were] not worth the gathering, for we feared they were too late sowne. They came vp very well and blossomed, but the Sunne parched them in the blossome. Our harvest being gotten in, our Governour sent foure men on fowling, that so we might after a more speciall manner reioyce together, after we had gathered the fruit of our labours. They foure in one day killed as much fowle, as with a little helpe beside served the Company almost a weeke, at which time amongst other Recreations we exercised our Armes, many of the *Indians* coming amongst vs, and amongst the rest their greatest King *Massasoyt*, with some ninetie men, whom

<sup>20</sup> Bradford, *Relation*, pp. 31, 32.

for three days we entertained and feasted, and they went out and killed five Deere, which they brought to the Plantation and bestowed on our Governour, and vpon the Captaine, and others. . . . Wee haue found the *Indians* very faithfull in their Covenant of Peace with vs; very louing and readie to pleasure vs. We often goe to them, and they come to vs; some of vs haue bin fiftie myles by Land in the Country with them. . . . They are a people . . . very trustie, quicke of apprehension, ripe witted, iust. The men and women goe naked [with] onely a skin about their middles.”<sup>20</sup>

Apparently it was only gradually that a sense of insecurity became keenly felt by the Pilgrims, for it was not until February, 1621–22, that the little plantation was impaled and fortified, while the fort was not made fit for service until March 25, 1623. On that day a watch was first kept:

“In the meane time, knowing our owne weaknesse, notwithstanding our high words and loftie lookes towards them [the Indians], and still lying open to all casualty, hauing as yet (vnder God) no other defence than our Armes, wee thought it most needfull to impale our Towne, which with all our expedition wee accomplished in the moneth of February [1621–2] and some few dayes, taking in the top of the Hill vnder which our Towne is seated, making foure bulwarkes or ietties without the ordinarie circuit of the pale, from whence wee could defend the whole Towne; in three whereof are gates, and the fourth in time to be. . . .”<sup>21</sup>

Now [*i.e.*, March 25, 1623] was our Fort made fit for seruice and some Ordnance mounted; and though it may seeme long worke, it being ten moneths since it [was] begun, yet wee must note that where so great a work is begun with such small means, a little time cannot bring [it] to perfection. . . . Thus was our Fort hanselled, this being the first day as I take it that euer any watch was there kept.”<sup>22</sup>

Captain John Smith gives the following singularly complete though brief, description of Plymouth in 1624:<sup>23</sup>

“In this Plantation [of New-Plimouth] there is about an hundred and fourescore persons, some Cattell, but many Swine and Poultry.

<sup>20</sup> Relation, pp. 60, 61 (section by Edward Winslow).

<sup>21</sup> Edward Winslow, Good Newes, 1624, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 39, 40.

<sup>23</sup> Advertisements, London, 1631, pp. 18, 19.

Their Towne containes two and thirty houses, whereof seven were burnt, with the value of five or six hundred pounds in other goods, impaired about halfe a mile,<sup>24</sup> within which a high Mount, a Fort, with a Watch-tower, well built of stone, lome, and wood, their Ordinance well mounted, and so healthfull, that of the first Planters not one hath died this three years; yet at the first landing at *Cape Cod*, being an hundred passengers, besides twenty they had left behind at *Plimoth* for want of good take heed, . . . [they] spent six or seven weekes in wandring up and downe in frost and snow, wind and raine, among the woods, cricks, and swamps, forty of them died, and three-score were left in most miserable estate at *New-Plimoth*, where their Ship left them, and but nine leagues by Sea from where they landed, whose misery and variable opinions, for want of experience, occasioned much faction, till necessity agreed them."

As the settlement of the colony became better established, the inhabitants naturally, for their own convenience, began to occupy new land and to build new houses, so that apparently even as early as 1636 some of the families owned more than one house, as the following passage shows:

"And whereas some gather the ground [of New England] to be naught, and soone out of heart, because *Plimouth* men <sup>25</sup> remove from their old habitations, I answer, they do no more remove from their habitation, than the Citizen which hath one house in the Citie and another in the Countrey, for his pleasure, health and profit. For although they have taken new plots of ground, and build houses upon them, yet doe they retaine their old houses still, and repaire to them every Sabbath day; neither doe they esteeme their old lots worse than when they first tooke them. What if they doe not plant on them every yeare? I hope it is no ill husbandry to rest the land, nor is alwayes that the worst that lies sometimes fallow. . . . This ground is in some places of a soft mould, and easie to plow; in other places so tough and hard, that I have seen ten Oxen toyled, their Iron chaines broken, and their Shares and Coulters much strained; but after the first breaking up it is so easie, that two Oxen and a Horse may plow it; there hath as good *English* Corne growne there, as could be desired; especially Rie and Oates and Barly; there hath been no great triall as yet of Wheate, and Beanes."<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> John Pory says that the palisade about the plantation in 1622 was "2700 foote in compasse" (John Pory's *Lost Description*, 1918, p. 42).

<sup>25</sup> Text, *meu*. <sup>26</sup> William Wood, *New Englands Prospect*, London, 1636, p. 11.

### III. THE PILGRIMS AND THE INDIANS

During their first years in America the Pilgrims were more troubled by a shortage of food supplies than by the Indians. Indeed, the Pilgrims were not much disturbed by them until the spring of 1621, when they began to receive visits like the following. These descriptions seem to us of importance, since they show that the Indians known to the Pilgrim Fathers must have dressed and painted themselves in a manner very similar to that practised by the Aztecs in Mexico, whose surviving manuscripts in brilliant colors still preserve for us their general appearance and dress, together with some of their peculiar customs. Conversely, our partial understanding of the significance of the dress and of the colors of paint employed by the Aztecs suggests the possibility, if indeed not the probability, of a similar or even identical meaning for the same dress and the same colors of paint as used among the Indians:<sup>37</sup>

"Thursday, the 22 of *March*, was a very fayre warme day. About noone we met again about our publique businesse, but we had scarce beene an houre together, but *Samoset* came againe, and *Squanto* [= *Tisquantum*], the onely native of *Patuxat*, where we now inhabite, . . . with three others, and they brought with them some few skinnnes to trucke, and some red Herings newly taken and dried but not salted, and signified vnto vs, that their great Sagamore *Masasoyt* was hard by, with *Quadequina* his brother, and all their men. They could not well expresse in English what they would, but after an houre the King came to the top of an hill over against vs, and had in his trayne sixtie men, [so] that wee could well behold them, and they vs. We were not willing to send our governour to them, and they vnwilling to come to vs, so *Squanto* went againe vnto him, who brought word that wee should send one to parley with him, which we did, which was *Edward Winsloe*, to know his mind,

<sup>37</sup> One may most conveniently consult the so-called Codex Nuttall for comparison. Here, together with an excellent facsimile of the codex, one finds discriminating suggestions by Mrs. Zelia Nuttall upon the significance of dress and colors among the Aztecs.



and to signifie the mind and will of our governour, which was to haue trading and peace with him. We sent to the King a payre of Kniues, and a Copper Chayne, with a Iewell at it. To *Quadequina* we sent likewise a Knife and a Iewell to hang in his eare, and withall a Pot of strong water, a good quantitie of Bisket, and some butter, which were all willingly accepted. Our Messenger made a speech vnto him, [saying] that King JAMES saluted him with words of loue and Peace, and did accept of him as his Friend and Alie, and that our Governour desired to see him and to trucke with him, and to confirme a Peace with him, as his next neighbour. He liked well of the speech and heard it attentiuely, though the Interpreters did not well express it. After he had eaten and drunke himselfe and giuen the rest to his company, he looked vpon our messengers sword and armour which he had on, with intimation of his desire to buy it, but on the other side, our messenger shewed his vnwillingness to part with it. In the end he left him in the custodie of *Quadequina* his brother, and came over the brooke, and some twentie men following him, leaving all their Bowes and Arrowes behind them. We kept six or seaven as hostages for our messenger. Captaine *Standish* and master *Williamson* met the King at the brooke with halfe a dozen Muskietiers. They saluted him and he them, so one going over, the one on the one side, and the other on the other, conducted him to an house then in building, where we placed a greene Rugge, and three or foure Cushions. Then instantly came our Governour with Drumme and Trumpet after him, and some few Muskietiers. After salutations, our Governour kissing his hand, the King kissed him, and so they sat downe. The Governour called for some strong water and drunke to him, and he drunke a great draught that made him sweate all the while after. He called for a little fresh meate, which the King did eate willingly and did giue his followers. Then they treated of Peace, . . . all which the King seemed to like well, and it was applauded of his followers. All the while he sat by the Governour he trembled for feare. In his person he is a very lustie man, in his best yeares, an able body, graue of countenance, and spare of speech. In his Attire little or nothing differing from the rest of his followers, only in a great Chaine of white bone Beades about hie necke, and at it behinde his necke hangs a little bagg of Tobacco, which he dranke [*i.e.*, smoked] and gave vs to drinke. His face was paynted with a sad red like murry, and [he was] oyled both head and face, [so] that hee looked greasily. All his followers likewise were in their faces in part or in whole painted — some blacke, some red, some yellow, and some white, some with crosses and other Antick workes, some had skins on them,

and some [were] naked, all strong, all men in appearance. So after all was done, the Governour conducted him to the Brooke, and there they embraced each other and he departed. We diligently keeping our hostages, . . . expected our messengers comming, but anon word was brought vs, that *Quaddequina* was comming, and our messenger was stayed till his returne, who presently came and a troupe with him. So likewise wee entertained him, and conveyed him to the place prepared. He was very fearefull of our peeces, and made signes of dislike, that they should be carried away. Whereupon Commandement was given [that] they should be layd away. He was a very proper tall young man, of a very modest and seemely countenance, and he did kindly like of our entertainment. So we conveyed him likewise as wee did the King. . . . When hee was returned, then they dismissed our messenger. . . . One thing I<sup>28</sup> forgot. The King had in his bosome hanging in a string a great long knife. Hee marveled much at our Trumpet, and some of his men would sound it as well as they could. *Samoset* and *Squanto*, they stayed al night with vs, and the King and al his men lay all night in the woods not aboue halfe an English myle from vs, and all their wiues and women with them. They sayd that within 8 or 9 dayes they would come and set corne on the other side of the Brooke and dwell there all Summer, which is hard by vs.<sup>29</sup>

Saturday and Sunday [March 17–27 and 18–28, 1621–22], reasonable fayre dayes: On this [Sun]day came againe the Savage, and brought with him fve other tall proper men. They had every man a Deeres skin on him, and the principall [one] of them had a wild Cats skin, or such like on the one arme. They had most of them long hosen vp to their groynes, close made; and aboue their groynes to their wast another leather. They were altogether like the *Irish* trouses. They are of complexion like our English Gipseys — no haire or very little on their faces; on their heads long haire to their shoulders, onely cut before, some trussed vp before with a feather broad wise like a fanne. . . . These left . . . their Bowes and Arrowes a quarter of a myle from our Towne. . . . They made semblance vnto vs of friendship and amite; they song & danced after their maner . . . they brought with them in a thing like a Bow-case (which the principall [one] of them had about his wast) a little of their Corne powned to Powder, which put to a little water they

<sup>28</sup> The word "I" suggests that one person wrote this narrative, and the word "Squanto," instead of *Tisquantum*, a line or two below indicates that that person was William Bradford.

<sup>29</sup> Bradford, *Relation*, pp. 35–38.

eat. He had a little Tobacco in a bag, but none of them drunke [= smoked] but when he listed. Some of them had their faces paynted black from the forehead to the chin foure or five fingers broad; others after other fashion, as they liked.”<sup>40</sup>

Winslow, who had been a printer in London, seems to have been known as a physician among the Indians and to have become rather better acquainted with them than the other colonists. His book, *Good Newes*, 1624, indeed, is very largely taken up with picturesque and entertaining accounts of the life of the Indians and of the Pilgrims’ experiences among them. The following incident may be cited here:

“After[ward] wee came to a Towne of *Massasoyts*, where we eat [= ate] Oysters and other fish. From thence we went to *Packanokick*, but *Massasoyt* was not at home. There we stayed, he being sent for. . . . *Massasoyt* being come, wee discharged our Peeeces and saluted him, who after their manner kindly well commend vs and tooke vs into his house and set vs downe by him, where having delivered our foresayd Message and Presents, and having put the Coat on his backe and the Chayne about his necke, he was not a little proud to behold himselfe, and his men also to see their King so brauely attyred. . . . This being ended, he lighted Tobacco for vs and fell to discoursing of *England* & of the Kings Maiestie, marvayling that he would liue without a wife. . . . Late it grew, but victualls he offered none, for indeed he had not any, [the reason] being [that] he came so newly home. So we desired to goe to rest. He layd vs on the bed with himselfe and his wife, they at the one end and we at the other, it being onely plancks layd a foot from the ground and a thin Mat vpon them. Two more of his chiefe men for want of roome pressed by and vpon vs, so that we were worse weary of our lodging then of our iourney.

The next day being Thursday many of their Sachims or petty Governours came to see vs, and many of their men also. There they went to their manner of Games for skins and kniues. There we challenged them to shoote with them for skins, but they durst not. . . . About one a-clocke *Massasoyt* brought two fishes that he had shot. They were like Breame but three times so bigge, and better

<sup>40</sup> Probably not as they liked, but according to their rank or standing in the tribe. Bradford, *Relation*, p. 34.

meate. These being boyled there were at le[a]st fortie [that] looked for [a] share in them [and] the most eate [= ate] of them. This meale onely we had in two nights and a day, and had not one of vs b[r]ought a Partridge, we had taken our Iourney fasting. Very importunate he was to haue vs stay with them longer, but wee desired to keepe the Sabbath at home, and feared we should . . . be light-headed for want of sleepe, for what with bad lodging, the Savage barbarous singing (for they vse to sing themselues asleepe), lice and fleas within doores, and Muskeetoos without, we could hardly sleepe all the time of our being there, we much fearing that if wee should stay any longer, we should not be able to recover home for want of strength, so that on the Fryday morning before Sun-rising we tooke our leaue and departed, *Massasoyt* being both grieved and ashamed that he could no better entertaine vs.”<sup>41</sup>

One's interest is always aroused by the early statements concerning the primitive religion of the Indians. Winslow appears to have devoted some time to the subject. According to his later statements it would seem that they were familiar with the idea of one supreme God above all their minor gods, whom they called Kiehtan. Thomas Morton in his *New English Canaan* (Amsterdam, 1637) presents still further particulars as to the native religion, and by giving a different spelling for the name of this divinity, Kytan, makes its certain how it should be properly pronounced. According to his belief, the Indians were also familiar with the tradition of a flood, and were “perswaded that Kytan is hee that makes corne growe, trees growe, and all manner of fruits”:<sup>42</sup>

“A few things I thought meet to adde hereunto which I haue obserued amongst the *Indians*, both touching their Religion and sundry other Customes amongst them. And first, whereas my selfe and others in former Lettres (which came to the Presse against my will and knowledge) wrote that the *Indians* about vs are a people without any Religion or knowledge of any God, therein I erred, though we could then gather no better, for as they conceiue of many

<sup>41</sup> Relation, pp. 44-46 (section by Winslow).

<sup>42</sup> By this last statement it might appear that the Indians worshipped the sun under this name; but Winslow says that no man had ever seen Kiehtan.

divine powers, so of one whom they call *Kiehtan* to be the principall and maker of all the rest and to be made by none. He (they say) created the heavens, earth, sea, and all creatures contained therein; also that he made one man and one woman of whom they and wee and all mankinde came; but how they became so farre dispersed, that know they not. At first they say, there was no *Sachim* or *King* but *Kiehtan* who dwelleth aboue in the Heavens, whither all good men goe when they die to see their friends and haue their fill of all things. This his habitation lyeth farre Westward in the heavens, they say. Thither the bad men goe also and knocke at his doore, but he bids them *Quatchet*, that is to say, Walke abroad, for there is no place for such, so that they wander in restles want and penury. Never man saw this *Kiehtan*; onely old men tell them of him and bid them tell their children, yea to charge them to teach their posterities the same and lay the like charge vpon them. This power they acknowledge to be good, and when they would obtaine any great matter, meete together and cry vnto him, and so likewise for plentie, victorie, &c., sing, daunce, feast, giue thanks, and hang vp Garlandes and other thinges in memorie of the same.<sup>43</sup> Although these Salvages are found to be without Religion, Law, and King (as Sir William Alexander hath well observed,) yet are they not altogether without the knowledge of God (historically) for they haue it amongst them by tradition, that God made one man and one woman, and bad them live together, and get children, kill deare, beasts, birds, fish, and fowle, and what they would at their pleasure; and that their posterity was full of evil, and made God so angry that hee let in the Sea upon them, & drowned the greatest part of them, that were naughty men (the Lord destroyed so.). And they went to *Sanaconquam*, who feeds upon them (pointing to the Center of the Earth, where they imagine is the habitation of the Devil); the other, which were not destroyed, increased the world; and when they died (because they were good) went to the howse of *Kytan* (pointing to the setting of the sonne), where they eate all manner of dainties, and never take paines (as now) to provide it.<sup>44</sup>

*Kytan* makes provision (they say) and saves them that labour, and there they shall live with him forever voyd of care. And they are perswaded that *Kytan* is hee that makes corne growe, trees growe, and all manner of fruits.

Many sacrifices the *Indians* vse, and in some cases kill children. It seemeth they are various in their religious worship in a little dis-

<sup>43</sup> Edward Winslow, *Good Newes*, pp. 52, 53.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas Morton, *New English Canaan*, Amsterdam, 1637, pp. 45-50.

tance and grow more and more cold in their worship to *Kiehtan*; saying in their memory hee was much more called vpon. The *Nanohiggansets* [= Narragansetts] excede in their blinde devotion and haue a great spacious house wherein onely some few (that are as wee may tearme them Priests) come. Thither at certaine knowne times resort all their people and offer almost all the riches they haue to their gods, as kettles, skinnes, hatchets, beads, kniues, &c., all which are cast by the Priests into a great fire that they make in the midst of the house and there consumed to ashes. To this offering euery man bringeth freely, and the more hee is knowne to bring hath the better esteeme of all men. This the other Indians about vs approue of as good and wish their *Sachims* would appoint the like." <sup>45</sup>

The fact that the Indians, like the Aztecs, sometimes sacrificed human beings suggests that their traditions must have descended to them from a very remote period.<sup>46</sup> The account of the "spacious house" mentioned in the last passage, wherein the priests of the Narragansetts were accustomed to build a great fire, into which the people cast at certain times as offerings of sacrifice their kettles, skins, hatchets, beads, knives, etc., reminds one also of the charred and broken remains of similar articles found in recent years beneath certain of the Ohio mounds constructed by the so-called Mound Builders.

Here we may conclude our study of these early accounts of Plymouth Plantation. Other points, indeed, relating both to the Pilgrims and to the Indians might be discussed, but I shall be satisfied if this paper shall once more call attention to, and stimulate interest in, the valuable archæological information contained in these narratives, and the desirability of undertaking further archæological investigations, before it is absolutely too late, in the neighborhood of Plymouth and upon Cape Cod.

<sup>45</sup> Edward Winslow, *Good Newes*, p. 55.

<sup>46</sup> One is reminded of the frequent references by classical authors to the fact that Kronos or Saturn, the reputed father of Zeus or Jupiter, ruled in the West; and that he is said to have required human sacrifices in his worship.

## PLYMOUTH'S DEBT TO THE INDIANS

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In considering the relations of the early settlers of Massachusetts and the Indians it is greatly to be regretted that the Red Men possessed no civilized method by which they could leave a record of their own ideas, their own thoughts, and their own reasons for their actions, and that consequently nothing has survived except through tradition or through the medium of records compiled and written by the invaders of their country. All that we really know is the White Man's version; he has always been the judge, the jury, and the advocate for the plaintiff, all in one. The defense has had no means of being heard except through the plaintiff's lawyers, whose knowledge, even of the Indian language, was very slight. Certainly a unique trial. When we stop for a few minutes in our present energetic, busy, hurrying everyday life, and consider the luxury in which we now live, our comfortable homes, our variety of food, our steam cars, our motor cars, our telegraph and telephone, all of which we now demand as necessities and as our lawful rights, it is almost impossible to realize that three hundred years ago in this same land, in our own Massachusetts, for one winter and more or less for two years, our ancestors were absolutely dependent on the Indians for food sufficient to sustain life.

An anecdote from Mr. James Fletcher's *History of the Town of Plymouth*, which I quote, is perhaps the Indian idea of the earliest relations between the two races.

"In the year 1789 a number of Indians, assembled in New York on a mission to President Washington, were invited to dinner by General Knox, Secretary of War. A little before dinner two or three of

the Sachems, with their chief or principal men, went into the balcony at the front of the house from which they had a view of the city, the harbor, Long Island, and the adjacent country. They appeared dejected, and General Knox noticing this said to the Chief, 'Brother, what has happened to you? You look sorry. Is there anything here to make you unhappy?' He answered, 'I will tell you, Brother. I have been looking at your beautiful city, the great water and rivers, your mighty, fine country, producing enough for all your wants. See how happy you all are. But then I could not help thinking that this fine country and this great water was once ours. Our ancestors once lived here, they enjoyed it as their own possession in peace; it was the gift of the Great Spirit to them and their children. At length the white people came here in a great canoe. They asked only to let them tie it to a tree, lest the waters should carry it away. We consented. They then said some of their people were sick, and they asked permission to land them, and put them under the shade of the trees. The ice then came, and they could not get away. They then begged a piece of land to build wigwams for the winter; we granted it to them. They then asked for some corn to keep them from starving; we kindly furnished it to them, they promising to go away when the ice was gone. When this happened and the great water was clear, we told them they must now go away with their big canoe; but they pointed to their big guns around their wigwams and said they would stay there and we could not make them go away. Afterwards more white people came. They brought spirituous and intoxicating liquors with them, of which the Indians became very fond. They persuaded us to sell them some land. Finally they drove us back from time to time into the wilderness, far from the water and the fish and the oysters. They destroyed the game; our people have wasted away, and now we live miserable and wretched, while you are enjoying our fine and beautiful country. This it is that makes me sorry, Brother, and I cannot help it.'

The earliest relations established between the Indians and the colonists had, from the standpoint of the settlers, only two objects in view — self-protection and personal gain; personal, as applied to the various units of colonization as they were attempted. When the welfare and prosperity of the Englishman had been practically assured, then the spiritual welfare of the Indian became an important factor in the relation between the two races; but



the material welfare alone of the Indian was not then considered, except by comparatively few, and it never has been otherwise.

Although the Pilgrims came to the new world for the freedom of worship, even their relations with the Indians were founded, through necessity, on personal gain, as well as on personal safety. Their leaders possessed little worldly wealth, and they had committed themselves to send back to England the valuable commodities which were supposed to be obtained easily in the "Paradise of all these Parts" — so called by Captain John Smith — in order to compensate those from whom they had been obliged to seek financial aid and who had given it only from speculative motives. Without this aid from the "Merchant Adventurers" (and the name itself defines their understanding of the situation), of whom Thomas Weston was the treasurer, the whole project would necessarily have been abandoned, at least for the time being. Their creditors were hard taskmasters, as is shown by a harsh, unjust letter written by Thomas Weston about seven months after their landing, stating that "the life of the business depends on the lading of this ship." Governor Carver, to whom this letter was written, had died some months before its arrival at Plymouth, and the reply which Governor Bradford wrote shows how pitiful was the whole situation of the colonists. The result, however, was that still harsher terms were insisted upon by the business partners of the enterprise.

Pilgrims, freedom of worship, merchant-adventurers, beaver skins, sassafras, and codfish — and the Indians! No ideal situation, surely.

It would almost seem that Plymouth was predestined to become the Mecca of the New World (to which all good Americans make pilgrimage), and that the Pilgrims were the chosen people, so many apparently accidental events occurred many years before their landing which

were of vital importance to the survival of the colony, and during the first two years such critical situations owed their fortunate solutions to apparently accidental causes. It was the result of accidental events, which took place before 1620, that made it possible for the Pilgrims to come to a better and more equitable understanding with the Indians than was obtained by any of the other early colonists, and also made it possible for a longer continuance of this relationship.

Plymouth owes its existence, in my opinion, to two Indians, and possibly to a third, Massasoit, Tisquantum (or Squanto as he is more generally known), and Hobomok. They have never been given their rightful place in the history of our country. Of Tisquantum Charles Francis Adams wrote, "If human instruments are ever prepared by special Providence for a given work, he was assuredly so prepared for his." It was through the influence of these three men alone that any mutual understanding or relationship was created and maintained between the Indians and the Pilgrims, and to the three the Pilgrims were indebted, certainly during the early years, for their food, their existence, and even their lives. Something of Indian history must be told in order to understand how events had shaped themselves or fate had intervened (call it what you will) to achieve the desired end.

For some years before and at the time of the Plymouth settlement, five different confederacies, each having its own territory and each governed by its own chiefs, occupied a large part of New England, not including Maine. The Pawtuckets peopled southern New Hampshire, the Pequots the eastern part of Connecticut, the Narragansetts Rhode Island and certain islands, the Massachusetts the country about Massachusetts Bay, and the Pokanokets a large part of the counties of Bristol, Plymouth, Barnstable, and a part of Worcester county and exercised some authority in Nantucket and Martha's

Vineyard. The Pokanokets included at least nine separate tribes, each governed by its own Sagamore, but all subject to one grand Sachem who was also the principal chief of the Wampanoag tribe, living about Mount Hope (Montaup), and he was Massasoit. The principal occupations of the Indian men were hunting, fishing, and fighting, while the women cultivated the fields. And there was no continuance of peace in the whole land.

Four or five years before the coming of the Pilgrims the Indians suffered terribly from a strange and unidentified epidemic which spread over a large part of the Massachusetts coast and was felt most severely in Cape Cod Bay. It was so very fatal among the Indians of the Pawtuxet tribe, a tributary of the Pokanokets, who inhabited the land in and about Plymouth, that they were practically annihilated, leaving their land vacant and uninhabited, ready and waiting for new inhabitants. It was this land that Massasoit practically gave to Governor Bradford for the new colony.

Two months elapsed after the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth before they came into close contact with any large number of the natives. The Indians, however, had been keeping close watch, and it is believed from circumstantial evidence, had been consulting together on what course to pursue and what relationship on their part should be established. Governor Bradford states in his *History of the Plymouth Colony*, "Before they" (the Indians) "came to ye English to make friendship they gott all the Powachs of ye cuntrie for 3 days together in a horid and devellish maner to curse & execrate them with their conjurations, which asembly & service they held in a darke & dismale swampe." This was the colonists' version of what probably was a Grand Council of all the tribes of the Pokanoket Confederacy, for before deciding any question pertaining to peace or war it was the custom among the Indians to call such a council. In the "dark

and dismal swamp" was assembled probably the first Congress of Americans to consult on foreign relations.

No record of what actually took place was ever written or known, but imagination can paint the picture: A forest council-chamber of which nature alone was the architect, with wigwams scattered among the tall pines, and the light of camp fires partially dispelling the almost impenetrable darkness of the woods and swamps and making weird shadows of the swaying branches of the leafless trees; the Indians wrapped in their blankets seated as age or rank prescribed around a great fire, passing the ceremonial pipe, and harkening to the conjurations and lurid spells with which their medicine men exorcised the Pale Faces, and then listening to the advice of their Sachems and their Sagamores. Neither they nor their chiefs could realize or even imagine the fateful consequences of this decision to themselves as well as to the colonists.

Massasoit was the great Sachem ruling over all that part of Massachusetts. He was a noble and wise chief, and on his decision and action depended the relations which should prevail. His ability, his wisdom, his justice, and his loyalty were always acknowledged by the Pilgrims, and as good a relationship and friendship as could possibly exist between two races whose objects were so diametrically opposed, was created and established by him. I believe that during the two months of apparent inactivity on the part of the Indians, Massasoit knew well all that took place among the Pilgrims, as well as among the Indians, and before that memorable first meeting on Watson Hill, he had decided what course he thought best and wished to pursue.

That first meeting was too important in respect to what its consequences might be not to have been in a measure previously conceived by the Indians. The terms of the treaty then signed, that embryo League of Nations

between the nine Indian tribes owning Massasoit as their Sachem, and the Pilgrims, subjects of King James, was so Indian-like, so simple and yet so powerful in its material, direct conditions, that although it may have been indited by Governor Carver it must have been conceived, although perhaps vaguely, by Massasoit. It was completed, agreed to, with no reservations, and executed in half a day. But that was three hundred years ago.

I think we have always underestimated the mental capacity of many of the great chiefs of the American primitive race before it was "civilized." How would a desired understanding of like nature be conceived or consummated today? There would be more diplomacy, more necessary safeguarding, more controversy and less sincerity, less honor and more delay, but the same fundamental ideas and methods would prevail.

Samoset, as a messenger, appeared with his salutation of welcome to the strangers, and remained a whole day and night, giving and obtaining all possible information. The next day he returned with five companions, subjects of Massasoit's own tribe, possibly to confirm the reports of the first messenger, for Samoset was of a northern tribe and was probably selected on account of his rank, although not of the Wampanoag tribe, and for his partial knowledge of the language of the white men. These messengers announced the near presence of their King and made way for his coming, and then four or five days later Massasoit himself appeared with a retinue of sixty subjects, bringing with him Squanto, an Indian who knew the English language and the English people better probably than any Indian in the whole country. Presents were exchanged, and after some ceremonies were observed a treaty was confirmed, and a peace and a friendship were established which lasted more than fifty years and as long as Massasoit lived.

The treaty is impressive in its simplicity and brevity, and yet it contains all necessary provisions for good relationship and states clearly in seven short articles all that was required. Only two of these articles stipulated any reciprocal action on the part of the Pilgrims, but one of these, the fourth, read as follows: "That if any did unjustly war against him [Massasoit], they [the Pilgrims] would aid him; and if any did war against them, he should aid them" (A requirement in most treaties, but seldom so plainly understandable).

This was probably the one essential condition that influenced Massasoit, for his confederacy had been much weakened, having been reduced by the epidemic, as is supposed, from three thousand fighting men to five hundred, and with the neighboring confederacy on the west, the Narragansetts, he was continually at war. They had escaped the ravages of the plague and were stronger than ever, and he recognized, to a certain extent, the power of the English and wished to seize the opportunity of obtaining so promising an ally; also he may have had ambitions for a greater and more extended power.

Fortunate it was for the Pilgrims and fortunate it was for the Indians that the new colony possessed such men as Carver, Bradford, Miles Standish, and Winslow. They understood and respected Massasoit, and by their personality were able to make Massasoit respect and partially understand them. He admired and approved of their stern and harsh justice, and was impressed by, although not understanding, their many merciful actions and decisions. Through this mutual friendly relationship the colonists probably escaped a massacre similar to that which befell the Virginia Colony in 1622, in which nearly four hundred white men were killed in a single day, and probably postponed until 1665, several years after Massasoit's death, a King Philip's war, which the united colonists were then strong enough to defeat.

Although Massasoit himself was never a convert, to a certain extent he prepared the ground unconsciously for Reverend John Eliot and Daniel Gookin, who many years after the making of the treaty attempted their good work of converting the Indians. In 1639, when renewing the compact and bringing his oldest son, Wamsutta (Alexander), to join with him in the renewal, he endeavored to make his allies agree to leave to his people their own religious faith. As the English expressed it, "He wished to bind us never to draw away any of his people from their old pagan superstition and devilish idolitry to the Christian religion." He died faithful and loyal to his allies, to his religion and his God.

Although the story of Tisquantum (Squanto) has often been told, I must refer briefly to several incidents in his life and recall a part of his history, in order to make clear the process of the shaping of the corner stone on which rested, certainly at first, the desired relationship between the Pilgrims and the Indians. His mission in life seems to have been the welfare of the colonists, and his training to prepare him for this work apparently began fifteen years before the arrival of the Mayflower. His adventures and narrow escapes are almost incredible. He was a native of Patuxet, the Indian name of Plymouth, and he belonged to the Pokanoket tribe. If we are to believe Sir Ferdinando Gorges, he was kidnapped by Captain Weymouth, who happened to come into Plymouth in 1605 on his voyage to the Penobscot, "from whence he brought five of the natives, one of whose names was Tisquantum"; and Sir Ferdinando Gorges also states that he had Tisquantum with him for three years in London.

Captain John Smith in his *Second Voyage to New England* writes: "The main assistance, next God . . . was my acquaintance amongst the saluages, especially with Dohoday, one of their greatest Lords, who had liued long in England, and another called Tantum I (had) carried

with mee from England and set on shore at Cape Cod." Among historians Gorges' statements in regard to Squanto have created much controversy as to their accuracy; but Captain John Smith's narrative appears partially to confirm them, for other notes seem to identify Tantum with Tisquantum. We know certainly that in 1614 he was kidnapped (for the first or second time) by Captain Thomas Hunt with a number of other Indians and taken to Malaga, where Captain Hunt tried to sell his captives for slaves, but was prevented by the priests, who took possession of the savages in order to convert them. It is not known how Squanto got to England; but in the beginning of 1615 he was living with a Mr. John Slany in Cornhill or Cheapside and remained two years, and then in some manner found his way to Newfoundland and there met Captain Thomas Dermer. Dermer was impressed by his account and his knowledge of Cape Cod and Plymouth and wrote to Sir Ferdinando Gorges, in whose interests he was associated, "of the good use that might be made of his employment"; with the result that Captain Dermer took Squanto with him again to England. Gorges almost immediately sent Squanto with Captain Dermer back again to New England, wishing to use him in his own colonization scheme, and the "Saluages own country" was their destination. So after many years' wandering Squanto was returned to his native place, Plymouth. It was a sad home-coming, for not one of his own tribe was alive. All had been swept away by the plague.

This was the summer of 1619, and Squanto probably passed the following winter on the coast of Maine. But in the summer of 1620 he was again at Cape Cod; for according to Bradford he was with Dermer at Martha's Vineyard when in a conflict with the Indians Dermer was mortally wounded and all in his party killed, with the exception of one man. Bradford does not state that this one survivor was Squanto, but from inference it must have



been he. This was only a few months before the landing of the Pilgrims, and there are reasons for believing that under instructions from Sir Ferdinando Gorges Captain Dermer and Squanto were in this locality in order to intercept them, for if the plans of the Pilgrims had not miscarried, they would have reached their destination in the autumn.

In March, 1620 (o. s.), Squanto came with Massasoit as an interpreter, probably the only Indian who, prepared as he was by strange experiences, could convey to both parties a clear understanding of what each desired. It is natural to suppose that Massasoit would take advantage of Squanto's knowledge of the white man, for Squanto was one of his own subjects, and could tell him much of their numbers, of their power, and of their habits, and it must have influenced him somewhat in regard to the relations best to be established.

After the treaty was made Squanto remained with the Pilgrims, either by order of Massasoit or by his own wish, and became an indispensable factor in the life of the little colony, for, quoting Governor Bradford again, "Squanto continued with them and was their interpreter, and was a speciall instrument sent of God for their good beyond their expectation. He directed them how to set their corne, wher to take fish and to procure other commodities, and was also their pilott to bring them to unknowne places for their profitt, and never left them till he dyed. He was a native of this place, & scarce any left alive besides him selfe." Corbitant, a Sachem, an ally of the Narragansetts and an enemy of the English, wishing to kill him, said, "If he were dead, the English had [*i.e.*, would have] lost their tongue."

Squanto lived less than two years after his coming to the Pilgrims, and died in their service on an expedition to procure corn, of which the colony was in sore need. When dying he "desired the Governor to pray for him that he

might go to the Englishman's God in heaven, and bequeathed sundry of his things to sundry of his English friends as remembrance of his love; of whom they had great loss."

It would almost seem that Squanto's whole mission in life was fulfilled in these two short years, by giving that service which he alone could render to the founders of New England. When we remember that to prepare this savage for his task he was the only one of his whole tribe to escape death from the plague, that he was sold as a slave and was obliged to live in a strange land for many years, that he was sent back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean, and that he was saved from violent death at the hands of his own kindred, we stop and consider and ponder, and cannot help but realize that in this world of ours a guiding hand directs.

A few months after the treaty was made and before the death of Squanto the Plymouth colony was joined by Hobomok, an Indian from Massasoit's own tribe, the Wampanoags, who was held in high esteem by Massasoit. His coming proved to be of great value to the Pilgrims in maintaining the established relations, especially after Squanto's death. Much jealousy always existed between Squanto and Hobomok, which although very beneficial to the colonists, because each of the twain was striving ambitiously to make himself the more important, nearly resulted in costing Squanto his life. Hobomok was able apparently to prove that Squanto had made false statements in regard to Massasoit's loyalty, and Massasoit, learning of this, declared Squanto to be his enemy and demanded that by the terms of the treaty he should be delivered to him to be dealt with as he thought best. This meant that Squanto would be beheaded. Governor Bradford endeavored in vain to evade this demand, for he appreciated to how great an extent the colonists were indebted to Squanto and that they could ill spare him;

but finally, true to the spirit of the contract, he agreed to accede.

Squanto, knowing this decision and his probable fate, then proved his strong character. He went to the Governor, not attempting to flee, "and accused Hobomok as the author and worker of his overthrow, yielding himself to the Governor to be sent or not, as he thought meet." But at the instant he was to be delivered to his executioners, a boat was seen outside the harbor, and deeming that it might be a vessel from France Governor Bradford told the messengers who had been sent for Squanto he must first know what this boat was before delivering him into their custody. The Indians, angry and impatient at the delay, departed, and thus once again Squanto's life was spared. For some unexplainable reason the demand was not repeated, and Winslow states that before September of the same year peace had been wrought between Massasoit and Squanto. As an Indian characteristic is never to forgive or forget an injury, this occurrence remains still more unexplainable.

One of the most critical periods in the life of the colony was in the winter and early spring of 1622-23 (o. s.). The Plymouth colony in aiding the Weston colony at Wessagusset (Weymouth) had depleted its own stores and was obliged to depend largely on the Indians for its supply of corn. The relations between the Wessagusset colony and the Massachusetts Indians had always been antagonistic, and now, through that colony's own evil doing, was nearly at the breaking point. The Massachusetts tribe and the Narragansett tribe, realizing the weakened condition of the Weston colony, were endeavoring to influence some of the Pokanoket tribes to unite with them and massacre all the white men in both colonies.

At this time two incidents occurred, very dissimilar in their nature but each of vital importance, which serve as faithful witnesses to testify to the true relationship and

even friendship which existed between the Pilgrims and the Indians who acknowledged Massasoit as their Chief.

In March, 1622 (o. s.), news came to Plymouth that Massasoit was very ill. The Pilgrims, knowing it was a custom among the Indians that all who professed friendship to a dying chief should visit him in person or send some accredited messenger, decided it would be a friendly and humane act to observe the custom and possibly render aid. Therefore Winslow and one companion, with Hobomok as a guide, started immediately for Packanokik where Massasoit was. It was a long, hard journey of forty miles over the frozen forest trails and through swamps and streams, and was taken with the knowledge that probably they would be too late. They found, however, that Massasoit was still alive but unable even to recognize them. Fortunately Winslow had brought with him remedies which he thought might be of service, and he sent back a messenger to Plymouth for other medicines. By his prompt action and skilful treatment he undoubtedly saved Massasoit's life and he remained with him until he was entirely out of danger. Massasoit, before Winslow's return to Plymouth, expressed himself in these words, "Now I see the English are my friends and love me; and whilst I live I will never forget the kindness they have showed me."

This good action on the part of the Pilgrims received its own reward much sooner than experience has taught humanity to expect, for on their journey back to Plymouth Hobomok delivered to Winslow a message of advice which Massasoit had instructed him to give, in order that Governor Bradford should be informed immediately on their arrival at home. This message revealed the plot of the Massachusetts Indians, before spoken of, against Master Weston's colony and so against the Pilgrim colony. He [Massasoit] named seven tribes who had joined with them, and also said that he himself "was earnestly so-

licited, but he would neither join therein nor give way to any of his." He advised Governor Bradford, if he respected the lives of his countrymen or his own safety, to kill the men of the Massachusetts who were the authors of this intended mischief. He also advised him to strike first and not wait until they began, or Bradford would rue the delay.

Governor Bradford, on receiving this message, called the Pilgrim company together and informed them of Massasoit's message and advice. It was decided that Captain Miles Standish should go immediately to Wessagusset with as many men as he might select but enough to make the Massachusetts tribe powerless, to strike first and to bring back the head of Wituwamat, their Chief, as a warning to the other hostile Indians. No other than Miles Standish could have been entrusted with this all-important undertaking. He was their military commander, and no man could have been better equipped for it. Charles Francis Adams, analyzing his character, says, "He seems to have been gifted by nature with a quick ear as well as eye. . . . His instinct told him, and told him correctly, how a savage should be dealt with, and he seems never to have made a mistake. . . . Seeing what the occasion called for, he did not hesitate." He took with him eight of the Pilgrim company and Hobomok.

It is needless to repeat the happenings of these eventful few days, for Edward Winslow in his *Relation* has vividly depicted the minute details. But I will recall that scene of the final encounter, when with about an equal number of men Miles Standish and Wituwamat, the Sachem of the Massachusetts, met in a small room of one of the log cabins at Wessagusset. Miles Standish with his few followers, all brave and determined, although weakened by a winter of hunger and privation; Wituwamat, who only a day or two previously had audaciously sharpened his knife before Standish, and flourishing it, had pointed to

a woman's face carved on the handle and had boasted that he had another knife on which a man's face would soon be carved and the two would marry; and Peksuut, an Indian who, boasting of his great size and strength, had taunted Standish with his small stature — the Indians in their picturesque costumes, and the Pilgrims in dilapidated and worn clothing — all watching for that favorable moment which, although unrecognized, was so momentous in deciding the fate of the colony. It made a historic picture to be remembered by all Pilgrim descendants.

Miles Standish followed Massasoit's advice. He struck first. No guns were used, only the familiar weapon of the savage, the knife. No quarter was asked nor given. The English knew they were fighting for the future existence of the whole colony, and the Indians, although they did not know, were fighting for their homes and for the lands that Manito, their God, had given them. It was the old story of the progress of civilization, the survival of the fittest; and the Englishmen won. Wituwamat, Peksuut, and another Indian were killed, a brother of Wituwamat was taken prisoner and immediately hung, and the next day the remainder of the Massachusetts tribe either fled or were killed.

That "first stroke" delivered by Standish was a bold, hazardous stroke. It was as essential as the kindly visit to Massasoit in order to make secure the foundation upon which was being laid the structure of peace and understanding and friendly relationship between the Pilgrims and the Indian Pokanoket confederacy. The treaty had been sanctified by blood and by mercy, and it endured for almost fifty years, until many of those who had made it had gone to the Happy Hunting Ground.

Such is the history, briefly told, of the relations of the Pilgrims and the Indians for the first two years of the life of the Pilgrim colony. On a tablet at Plymouth should be

written the names of Massasoit, Squanto, and Hobomok, Indians only, but men worthy to be in company with Carver, Bradford, Miles Standish, and Winslow. Squanto died in their service, Hobomok remained faithful and devoted to their welfare until his death, and Massasoit, living many years, was true and loyal to the last.

## THEOLOGY AND ROMANTICISM

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The widespread reaction towards the Church of Rome by which the first half of the last century was marked, has been subjected to a multitude of more or less intelligent explanations. It was to be expected from poor human nature that each critic should explain in accordance with that law of human development which he had himself embraced, and in illustration of that moral which he deemed it most salutary to draw. In this field the disciple of Bossuet will be forever at issue with the disciple of Comte. From the one we hear how the eyes of Europe had been providentially opened by long years of anarchy and bloodshed, how the spirit of schism had been at length unmasked, how the exhausted nations were taught once more to value a unified spiritual control, and how amid the wreck of thrones and the desolation of kingdoms the very dullest of mankind must have been awed by the spectacle of the Chair of Peter standing fast, an authentic token of the Mighty Hand and the Outstretched Arm. From the other side we listen to the cold comment that world disasters are apt to drive back the less robust sort of mind to the solace of old superstition, that mental progress like all things human has its ebb and flow, and that we need not be surprised if a season of shivering credulity alternates with a season of fearless rationalism. The philosophic historian may well be left to wear himself out in this profitless debate with the brethren of his own craft. *Non nostri est tantas componere lites.*

But there is a side to the question which should repay more serious thought than it commonly receives. The recoil towards Rome was not merely a fact of history. It



was associated with a new and very suggestive type of theological and philosophical thinking, a type which extended itself far beyond the bounds of the Roman communion. Histories of literature dismiss the subject with the abrupt remark that we have here yet another aspect of the many-sided "Romanticism." But historians of literature are too seldom either philosophers or theologians, and they have left this very fruitful germ of thought quite undeveloped. No one could fail to suspect a common principle in two movements that were so nearly contemporaneous, that left so deep a mark upon just the same quarters of Europe, and that in so many cases were promoted by precisely the same men. Yet the common principle needs to be defined and limited with great care, unless it is to confuse rather than illumine the twin impulses, literary and religious, which it thus brings into relation.

For the *prima facie* resemblances are not more striking than the *prima facie* differences. For example, one could not select three men more typical of the Romantic spirit than Rousseau in France, Frederick Schlegel in Germany, and Coleridge in England. The religion of Jean Jacques was changed more than once, and whether we take as its characteristic expression the mystical reverences of the Savoyard vicar or the proposed State establishment of deism in the *Contrat Social*, we can detect little sign of renewed homage to the Holy See. It was as the author of *Lucinde*, the companion of the divorced Dorothea, and the bold apologist of *mariage à quatre*, that Schlegel was acclaimed by the Romanticists of Jena; not an auspicious beginning, one would say, for him who would re-subjugate the moral disorders of Protestantism to the government of an infallible Church. And if there is one tenet which, more constantly than any other, was proclaimed and emphasized by Coleridge, it was that of England's unique blessing among the distracted peoples of the Continent,

in her spiritual heritage of the Reformed faith. Nor does the later growth of the Romantic school in any one of these countries lend unqualified support to the view that it made for religious reaction. If in France it was championed by a Chateaubriand, it also found representatives in a de Musset, a Lamartine, and a Hugo. If in Germany it explains Stolberg and Tieck, it must also bear the load of Heine and Schopenhauer. If in England we count in its train a Wordsworth and a Keble, we must not omit a Shelley and a Swinburne.

Not less notable is the fact that Romantic influence was at work in the so-called "Broad" section of the Protestant churches. Schleiermacher was at least as much determined by it towards his religious individualism, his suspicion of mere intellect, and his reliance upon the data of feeling, as de Maistre towards a system of spiritual authority, under which the individual is controlled, reason monopolized, and the feelings often held in such restraint as to be virtually suppressed. A hundred years ago in the English Church the heresy that looks towards Rationalism was far oftener traced to Romantic sources than the heresy that looks towards Rome. The new ideas by which Maurice and his circle appalled one side and revived another within the Anglican establishment had been mediated to themselves by Coleridge, but Coleridge's ultimate inspiration was in Königsberg and Jena.

Thus the threads are obviously tangled. At first sight it seems no less easy to maintain that a Romanticist as such would favor the liberal than that he would favor the conservative side in theological development. And if any general conclusion is to be reached, it must be by way of a very cautious analysis. One might almost predict that two results will follow: first, that Romanticism will reveal within itself elements not all of which were found in any single Romanticist, and of which some tended to reaction while others tended to progress; and, second,

that the common element, present in all Romanticists alike to whom the name is properly applied, acted in furtherance of that which modern liberal and modern conservative theology cherish alike. This may sound a truism. But I trust to be able to show that the historical considerations by which it is confirmed, so far from being truisms, are as yet quite insufficiently recognized as truths.

## I

Romanticism had its birth before the eighteenth century closed; yet if we describe it as "the revolt of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth," we shall have spoken with a larger degree of justice than is usually compressed into an epigram. No doubt nature never makes a leap, and the zealots for continuity can point to many a foreshadowing of what was to come in the spiritual tendencies that were passing out of sight. But the passage marked by the calendar has seldom corresponded with such exactness to a real change of epoch. Three new ideas were especially in the air, and each of them was represented in some form by writers of the Romantic school. There was a startling and widely prevalent distrust in the strength of human reason. There was an immensely deepened interest in the past, and at least the beginning of a far more adequate appreciation of history. And there was the assertion as a definite principle of the trustworthiness of feeling, of instinct, of the "impulses of the heart," against dialectic, ratiocination, intellectual "proof" or "disproof."

In 1829 Carlyle wrote *Signs of the Times*, in which he reproached his age as having become utterly mechanical, as having lost its capacity for wonder, and as pinning its faith to empirical science. But John Stuart Mill had a far deeper insight into the time when he declared two rival forces to be working in English thought — Jeremy Bentham as the apostle of progress, and Coleridge as the

exponent of the "wisdom contained in the sacred traditions of the race." In the end the conservative influence proved no less significant than the radical. The two great Romantic poets who collaborated in the production of *Lyrical Ballads* were at once the representatives and the stimulators of a profound disbelief both in the perfecting of the world through science and in the salvation of souls through philosophy.

The general literature of the period has an unmistakable tone of despair both about the possibilities of higher knowledge and about the value of knowledge for life. Multitudes felt with Coleridge that metaphysic had become like the trees in the shadowy world of Vergil, bearing a dream upon every leaf.<sup>1</sup> Byron laughed at the builders of a new Babel, who were so much less honest than the builders of the old that they would not disperse even when no man could understand his neighbor.<sup>2</sup> Again and again in his poetry we meet with such laments as that all science is but the replacing of one sort of ignorance by another,<sup>3</sup> that the tree of knowledge has not fulfilled its promise,<sup>4</sup> that happiness can be the lot only of those like the sleeping babe in *Cain*, who have not plucked the fruit and know not they are naked. Such ideas of the so-called "Satanic" school are echoed by others with a very different purpose. Wordsworth would abjure imaginations high on questions deep,<sup>5</sup> bids us trust the simplicity of the child on whom those truths do rest which we are toiling all our lives to find,<sup>6</sup> and reminds us that wisdom is oftentimes nearer when we stoop than when we soar.<sup>7</sup> The advance of chemistry seems to have filled some minds a hundred years ago with just the same dread of *abiogenesis* which investigators such as Tyndall and Sir William Schäfer were destined to arouse among ourselves. Shel-

<sup>1</sup> The Statesman's Manual.

<sup>2</sup> The Deformed Transformed. Vol. II.

<sup>3</sup> Manfred. Vol. II, p. iv.

<sup>4</sup> Cain. Vol. I, p. i.

<sup>5</sup> Excursion. Vol. III.

<sup>6</sup> Intimations of Immortality.

<sup>7</sup> Prelude. Vol. II.

ley's furtive research with test tubes was spoken of as a presage of his atheistic future, and his wife's *Frankenstein* was composed with the avowed object of horrifying. The myth about the gift of fire to mankind and the consequences for both weal and woe that had resulted from it, began again to haunt the imagination. Rousseau's first *Discours* on the uselessness of the arts had no more suggestive page than that presenting an emblematic vignette — the torch of science being handed to men by Prometheus, who warns a satyr that it burns.

In France also philosophic enthusiasm in the old sense was waning. The return of the Bourbons had indeed been followed by a relaxation of that iron censorship upon literature which Napoleon, who did nothing by halves, had used to entrench his own authority. Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert might be read again. But those who continued the traditions of the *Encyclopédie* were men like Cabanis, reducing thought to a secretion of the brain and poetry to a function of the smaller intestines, or missionaries from outside like Gall and Spurzheim, preaching the significance of bumps on the skull as a clue to capacities of character. One here and there, like Maine de Biran or Jouffroy, attempted a more adequate account of consciousness than had satisfied a D'Alembert and a Condillac, and for a time it seemed possible that psychology was about to lead its investigators beyond itself. But on the whole, French thought avoided the ultimate issues, limiting itself to such work as the empirical tabulation of correspondences between mental and neutral phenomena.

In Germany alone, as has been so often pointed out, the fine frenzy of metaphysic survived. There the ampler philosophic minds retained a faith in the competence of intellect for ultimate problems, and there for at least a few pioneers Romanticism and Intellectualism were not found incompatible. In 1807 Hegel published his *Phaenomenologie des Geistes*, in 1816 his *Logik*, and in 1817 his

*Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. Probably never before or since has the complete adequacy of reason for any task that might fall to it been asserted at once so explicitly, so daringly, and on the whole so productively. "Metaphysic," said Novalis, "bakes no bread, but it can give us God, Freedom, and Immortality." It was the supposed allegiance of Fichte and Goethe to the same conviction which misled Carlyle into acclaiming them as the restorers to mankind of a faith which the Encyclopædists had almost destroyed. Whether Hegel rendered a real service of this kind to the church is still matter of dispute between the Hegelian "Right" and the Hegelian "Left." And as early as 1811 in Germany itself the school of Jacobi was in revolt against transcendental idealism, declaring the intellect forever incompetent when acting alone for those problems which it most concerns us to solve.

A second main idea to which the men of the Romantic impulse gave expression was a deepened feeling for history. The hard rationalists of the classical tradition had been far too contemptuous of the past to be at any pains in understanding it. It had been a time when Pope's *Homer* was much admired, with its chariot of Priam conceived like the equipage of an English noble, and when formal French tragedy had its Iphigeneias and its Andromaches decked out in the mode of the Rue de la Paix. Glib talk had gone round about a social contract in which primitive men had decided after public debate that Civilization should now incorporate itself, and the articles of indenture which bound the individual to the State had been so drawn that no attorney could find a flaw. Such anachronisms could have had no vogue at all except at a time of profound historical ignorance and no historical sympathy. The life and ideals of one period were freely projected into another, and bygone ages were reconstructed with the utmost arbitrariness to buttress some

favorite dogma or programme. As Lord Morley says in speaking of Rousseau, history was less a teacher than the meagrely nourished handmaid of the imagination.

The revulsion from a period in which men spoke of believing only what they could see produced a new sympathy with that long-derided time when it was the pride of faith to leave evidence far behind. Imaginative writing which brought back again donjons and cloisters, crusades and troubadours, was welcomed with an almost childish delight. The rage in England for Scott's mediæval romances and Byron's pictures of life under a Venetian Doge was typical of the time, though it was no less typical of the prosaic English mind that such a mood passed rapidly away. In France an Alfred de Vigny revived once more the faded glories of the old feudal aristocrat, and a Hugo denounced the profane modernizers of the fabric of Nôtre Dame. Carlyle complained that even German literature had come to be thought of as dealing only with wizards and ruined towers, with mailed knights, secret tribunals, monks, spectres, and banditti.<sup>8</sup> Yet even this extravagance was symptomatic of a nascent feeling for history. For it implied a broader conception of the possible sources from which the past could be recovered, and a truer standpoint from which its movements could be appreciated.

This discord between the tone of the two centuries, appearing almost at the moment of transition from the one to the other, is among the great significant things in the history of thought. We must not, indeed, fall into the error of giving the whole credit to Romanticism, least of all if we take the type of all Romanticists to have been Rousseau. It would be a strange estimate of historical progress which should find in the author of *Contrat Social* an improver of the historical blemishes in Robertson or Gibbon. But the sympathetic feeling for mankind as such

<sup>8</sup> State of German Literature (1827).

by which that famous book was inspired was destined sooner or later to make the past an object of more searching scrutiny, and to outlive its own first blundering embodiments. The word "romantic" is perhaps ill chosen to describe the new spirit that spread over Europe just one hundred years ago, but it has the sanction of long usage, and for want of a better it may still serve. Alike in art, in literature, in philosophy, in religion, a single impulse had revealed itself. It was the impulse to look backward rather than forward, reverence for the primitive, distrust of "march of intellect," a dim yet insistent faith that there had been no age of darkness towards which a philosophic age of light could rightly be contemptuous, a suspicion that science was about to overleap its limits to the eternal undoing of the human spirit, a passionate return to the natural instincts against the artificial contrivances of an arrogant Reason.

## II

How did these tendencies act upon theology? When one's despair of human knowledge is intensified, his appreciation of history deepened, and his new respect for feeling supersedes his old respect for reasoning, will he become more amenable or less amenable to the direction of the church? The result is sure to vary in part at least with individual temperament.

We know how Shelley used to speak about the disappointment of the friends of intellectual progress. But Shelley was not typical. There was a widespread belief that authority is mankind's sole refuge, and it was inevitable that in France return to authority should mean return to Rome. Some of the leaders of this movement were priests, and — at least until the July Revolution of 1830 — the sacerdotal hand is conspicuous in French politics. Monasteries were restored, sacrilege was punished with a rigor almost unknown since the Middle



Ages, even the applicant for poor-law relief was required to produce his certificate of attendance at confession. The divine right of the monarchy was reasserted by Polignac, the last minister who served the ill-fated Charles X, and whose constantly recurring visions confirmed his faith that he was himself appointed by God to restore the kingship and the Church. It is an obvious suggestion that all this was the work of Jesuits, and we know well that the Jesuits as usual were busy. But the two most important figures for our present purpose were both laymen, one a cultivated diplomat of the old *noblesse*, who for fourteen years represented the Sardinian kingdom at the Russian capital, the other a man of letters, formerly an emigrant of the Revolution, but afterwards high in favor at the restored court of Louis XVIII, and for many years French Minister of Public Instruction. Both were reactionary in politics, eager to reestablish autocratic rule in things spiritual no less than in things temporal, and ready to take advantage of that failure of public nerve which gave its chance to the propaganda of absolutism.

De Maistre is very generally known to all students of the period, and it is needless to recall his famous argument in *Du Pape* or in the *Soirées de Saint Petersburg*. We have the usual picture of that moral anarchy which calls for a supreme spiritual head, even as political anarchy can be dealt with only by a supreme head of the state. We have the usual arraignment of that whole theory of life which, according to the Roman view, had begun at the Renaissance, developed in Lutheranism, found its expositors in the *Encyclopédie*, and reached its practical culmination in the September massacres.<sup>9</sup> But, although

<sup>9</sup> How persuasive this line of thought appeared, even to some thinkers who never joined the Roman Church, may be seen from A. W. Schlegel's letter to M. de Montmorency: "The Protestant system does not satisfy me any longer. . . . I am convinced that the time is not far off when all Christians will reunite in the old faith. The work of the Reformation is accomplished, the pride of human reason which was evident

much less familiar than these books by De Maistre, the *Recherches Philosophiques* by the Vicomte de Bonald can cast more significant light on the movement of thought that was in progress. The author concentrates attention on two facts, of which each taken by itself is quite intelligible but whose combination is a curious enigma. The first is the prolonged failure of philosophy to reach any secure solution of its cosmic problems, a failure which in the hopeless discord of philosophers from Thales to Kant seemed long since as well attested as historical evidence could make it. The second is the unquenchable ardor with which, despite the disappointments of two thousand years and the demonstrated impotence of our intellectual machinery for the task, mankind refuses to draw the inference that seems so obvious, and the fruitless effort continues to be tried again. The rolling of the stone of Sisyphus was no mere poet's dream; it was rather a quite inadequate parable of the metaphysician's sublime folly.

How is this persisting impulse to be explained? De Bonald suggests that the human mind had imprinted upon it at the beginning certain truths of capital importance for moral and social development. Providence, duty, future rewards and punishments, were ideas not reached by reasoning, but implanted — as Descartes said about the notion of an Infinite Being — by God Himself upon our race at the first. The mythopoetic imagination corrupted them, and the grotesque legends by which they became overlaid called for that repudiation with which philosophy has been so copious. But philosophy destroyed good and evil alike. It discredited not only the myths but the principle round which the myths had grown up. It presumed, for example, to demand proof

in the first Reformers, and still more in their successors, has guided us so ill, especially during the last century, that it has come into antagonism with itself and has destroyed itself. It is perhaps ordained that those who have influence on the opinions of their contemporaries shall publicly renounce it, and then assist in preparing a union with the one Church of former days."

for that purposive structure of the universe which must be assumed as often as we prove anything, and which consequently cannot itself be proved at all. Small wonder then that *petitio principii* should abound in theistic argument. "We take within ourselves the resting-place on which we want to climb up; in a word, we gauge our own thought by itself, which puts us in the position of a man who wished to weigh himself without scales or weights. Playthings of our own illusions, we interrogate ourselves, and we take the echo of our own voice for the response of truth." Thus for De Bonald the spiritual anarchies of private judgment are like the social anarchies of individualism. In speculations purely theoretical, like some parts of astronomy for instance, each inquirer has to depend on his own gift of reasoning. But in ascertaining the truths by which we have to *live*, no such desperate task is laid upon us. We are not forced to make an independent chemical analysis before we eat our food, and neither have we to conduct for ourselves a logical investigation into the ultimate things we are to believe. The Most High has implanted convictions in mankind for the life of the spirit, just as He has made the earth yield her fruit for the life of the body. In each case tradition, common consent, verification by long trial, are our sufficient guides.

De Bonald is a most persuasive writer, and, if he were better known, much of his argument would have a cordial reception from the anti-intellectualists of our own time. Mr. A. J. Balfour's defense of authority, for example, is at many points almost indistinguishable from it. Ten years after the publication of *Recherches Philosophiques*, and probably in complete ignorance not only of its tenor but even of its existence, the youthful Newman hit upon just the same line of thought. A speculative system of Traditionism became elaborated. And it was but natural that where reason fell into such disrepute credulity should

advance by leaps and bounds. The view that the Most High looks with disfavor upon mental shrewdness, that He has actually taken means by frustrating the struggles of intellect to drive us back upon a higher oracle, had the result of re-establishing the mediæval notion of belief as a virtue, and of the mind's virtuousness as proportioned to its receptivity. It is not strange, of course, that in Catholic countries a hundred years ago the illiterate and the unscientific should have been willing to accept every sort of marvel. But it does seem a little odd that in Paris itself, as late as the middle of the last century, educated people should have had no critical sense at all when a saint's wonder-working was reported. Mark Pattison found on a visit there in 1843 that in religious circles every miracle was believed just because it was miraculous, that the idea of truth seemed to have vanished, that whatever tended to the Church's glory was taken as self-evident, and all else dismissed as "a fiction of the Voltairians."<sup>10</sup> Minds of the highest training and of the finest endowment among the Catholic laity had abjured the whole lesson of the French and German Enlightenment, and had reopened to all kinds of ecclesiastical myth with a readiness like that of the Channel Islanders in Hugo's *Travailleurs de la Mer*. The reaction in England was no less striking. It was actually the same man who wrote *The Idea of a University* and who defended the tale of the liquefaction of St. Januarius's blood; the same who produced *A Grammar of Assent* and who gave thanks for the *grazia* that had been vouchsafed in the healing of disease through the relics of St. Philip Neri; the same who shivered Charles Kingsley to fragments in one of the keenest of dialectical encounters and who exulted in the thought of the Virgin's joy in Paradise when she knew that her immaculate conception had been decreed by Pius IX. In these matters Newman was no extremist, rather a moderate Catholic, the culti-

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Pattison's *Memoirs*, pp. 211, 212.

vator of a "wise and gentle minimism." Compared with men like Louis Veuillot he seems almost a freethinker. And he had certainly none of the diabetic thirst for the supernatural which marked such a zealot as W. G. Ward.

Herein a problem confronts those who would explain so curious a union of mental strength and mental subservience. Its strangeness is immensely reduced when we remember that the presupposition which for most of us renders at least a modern miracle wholly incredible had been swept out of sight for the men with whom we are here dealing, and that they were thoroughly logical in pursuing their new view to its last consequence. That the sun should have stood still on Gibeon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon had scarcely for them any greater antecedent improbability than that an earthly monarch should suspend a law by order in council. If such things were done for Joshua, why should not similar interference be witnessed still? If Ward and his friends had been as muddle-headed as the average, they would no doubt have taken refuge in the very popular expedient of first acknowledging a principle and then ignoring it. What Matthew Arnold called the withering of miracle at the breath of the *Zeitgeist* had no existence for them. They had faced the *Zeitgeist*, had definitely repudiated it, and were resolved that it should not further influence them unawares. To a Frederick Schlegel or a Tieck what we call marvels were common occurrences. They had brought back again into the atmosphere they breathed that vision of Moore:

"When earth was nearer to the skies  
Than in these days of crime and woe,  
And mortals saw without surprise  
In the mid air angelic eyes  
Bending upon this world below." <sup>11</sup>

Again, a deepened historical imagination, combined with relaxed severity of historical criticism, obviously

<sup>11</sup> Loves of the Angels.

favored a new view of the old Church. This revealed itself in one respect which strikes the observer now as supremely absurd. The Reformation began to be resented on purely *artistic* grounds, for it had broken the spell under which the finest æsthetic masterpieces had been achieved. It had been lacking in that "sweetness" which Matthew Arnold demanded as the accompaniment of "light." Franz Horn roundly declared that no one can be a poet unless he is a Christian, nor does he condescend even to explain away the somewhat plausible poetic claims of a Sophocles or a Lucretius.<sup>12</sup> The natural inference was drawn by those artists who were by nature far from religious but who thought of Catholicism as Christianity raised to its highest power. Heine tells us with a savage sneer that swarms of German painters were turning papists because they felt that the greatness of a Fra Angelico depended on his belief in the sacred objects he depicted, and they hoped that if they too could school their souls to a Roman devoutness they might recover the lost secret of mediæval art.<sup>13</sup> Such a variation of the "will to believe" was probably never contemplated by William James, but the craftsmen of the brush have seldom been careful about their logic. The *Aufklärung* was condemned as philistinism, and recoil from the *Aufklärung*, with whatever intellectual change this might involve, became the artistic creed.

One is struck too with the discontent with traditional histories of the Protestant Reformation that began to spread so rapidly in England. It appeared in many a surprising quarter, it was expressed by men who had not the least dogmatic sympathy with the Church of Rome,

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Carlyle's comment in *State of German Literature*: "The meaning here is very good; but why this phraseology? Is it not inviting the simple-minded (not to speak of scoffers, whom Horn very justly sniffs at) to ask when Homer subscribed the Thirty-Nine Articles; or whether Sadi and Hafiz were really of the Bishop of Peterborough's opinion?"

<sup>13</sup> Essay on "The Romantic School" in the *Review Europe Littéraire* (1833).

it began even to be turned to purposes of political intrigue by those who cared nothing for it in itself but whose choice of it as a weapon attests its congeniality with the mood of the hour. William Cobbett cannot be suspected of having been — in Charlotte Brontë's bitter phrase — a "tool of the Propaganda,"<sup>14</sup> for Propaganda would have found reason for sore offense in many a passage of the *Political Register*. Nor can Benjamin Disraeli have been such, as *Lothair* is enough to remind us, for he was much more given to fashioning a tool for himself out of whatever popular sentiment his lynx eye detected, and he must have seen a real chance in the anti-Reformation spirit which he voiced in the years of his political apprenticeship. And if anyone suspects a leaning to Romanism in Thomas Carlyle, it will be enough to refer to his *Cromwell* or to his *Historical Sketches* in almost any chapter which one opens by chance. Yet these three so widely different men began to celebrate once more the blessings of monastic rule, to set it in favorable contrast with the age of brass in which they were themselves so unfortunate as to live, and thus indirectly to win a new respect for the sort of faith under which monasticism had been possible. *Sybil* suggests to us a most unorthodox view of the glorious Revolution of 1688. The Lord of Marney Abbey is there spoken of as having joined with other Whig nobles to call over the Prince of Orange, because of a general alarm among the aristocrats that their landed interest was in peril. There was "a prevalent impression that King James intended to insist on the restitution of the Church estates to their original purpose, to wit, the education of the people and the maintenance of the poor."<sup>15</sup> Cobbett, filled with the idea that in the good old days tithe had been applied to the relief of distress, that under feudalism the lords spiritual and lords temporal had cared for those whom *laissez faire* would permit to starve, and that in

<sup>14</sup> Shirley. Vol. I.

<sup>15</sup> Sybil. Vol. I, p. iii.

particular the abbots and priors had acted as a kind of earthly providence to their children, produced a *History of the Reformation* at which men like Thomas Arnold stood aghast.<sup>16</sup> Its burden, to use the lurid language of the author, was that the change in the sixteenth century had been "engendered in beastly lust, brought forth in hypocrisy, cherished and fed by plunder and devastation and by rivers of English and Irish blood." Even Carlyle, in fierce disgust with the radical poor-law, the gospel of unrestricted competition, and the creed of "No Government," set up in contrast the benevolent régime of an old Catholic monastery, with a real governor of men at its head: "This is Abbot Samson's Catholicism of the twelfth century; somewhat like the *ism* of all true men in all centuries, I fancy! Alas, compared with any of the *isms* current in these poor days, what a thing."<sup>17</sup>

None of these authors, except the last, can be definitely classified as a Romanticist, but they had caught the spirit which the Romantic movement had diffused. The Industrial Revolution was typical of an age of contract and individualism, just as feudal manners belonged to the age of status and the clan. The new-born middle class marked that breach with the past which no good Romanticist could bear, and it found its natural defenders in men like Mill who inherited the tradition of the *Encyclopédie*, just as it found its natural assailants in men like Carlyle to whom the *Encyclopédie* was anathema. What Disraeli called the "spirit of rapacious covetousness"<sup>18</sup> and "the Altar of Mammon blazing with triple worship"<sup>19</sup> stimulated comparison with a remote golden age of priestly benevolence that was, no doubt, largely mythical. Charles Kingsley, though he had no patience with compliments to pre-Reformation days, did not scruple to join in the onslaught upon the "Fathers of the Scrip Church"<sup>20</sup> who

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Stanley's *Life of Arnold*, p. 59.

<sup>17</sup> *Past and Present*.

<sup>19</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> Sybil. Vol. I, p. iii.

<sup>20</sup> The phrase is from Dickens.



were leading modern industrialism, and declared his own to be perhaps the most sensual generation since Alaric sacked Rome.<sup>21</sup> Mill felt impelled to insert in his *Principles of Political Economy* a reference to the "would-be revivers of old times which they do not understand," pointing out that the fabric of patriarchal and seignorial influence which it was proposed to restore would be shattered against the necessity of enforcing a stringent Poor Law.<sup>22</sup> Even Macaulay was so moved by Manzoni's picture of the ancient church as to record in his diary that he had read it with tears, and that if he could believe it to be a true representation of what the Roman communion had been, he should be tempted to follow Newman's example.<sup>23</sup> We realize perhaps best of all how keen was the new antagonism, and how strangely it affected historical judgments, when we find so fanatical a Protestant as the editor of *Cromwell's Letters* turning aside to glorify the government of a mediæval monk.

### III

But there was another and a very different side to Romanticism, a side so prominent that the historians of literature dwell upon it almost to the exclusion of the tendencies we have mentioned. It was the glorifying of impulse as against reason, of the individual as against controlling authority, of self-fulfilment and self-expression as against self-denial and self-restraint. Not all the Romanticists had this spirit in equal degree, and Goethe, who in some of his work may be looked upon as its prophet, had that other mood at times in which he counseled *Entsagung*, and led some admirers to mistake him for a preacher of the Cross. Nor did the Romanticists originate, they rather developed and insisted upon that apotheosis of the feelings which we can trace back to the moral-sense school of the

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *Life and Letters of Charles Kingsley*. Vol. I, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> *Pol. Econ.* Vol. IV, p. vii.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Trevelyan's Life*.

eighteenth century. A few of them, like Coleridge, were even keenly alive to its dangers, regarding the sentimentalism of Sterne as more likely to corrupt the conscience than the materialism of Hobbes.<sup>24</sup>

Strange as it may sound to us now, Germany was once the special home of this law-defying individualism, with all its merits and all its faults. Professor Georg Brandes in a very memorable passage written almost twenty years ago, and whose poignant truthfulness we have had sad reason to appreciate, called attention to the contrast between the Berlin of 1900 and the Berlin of a century earlier. He observed that the capital in our own time was crowded with men in uniform, the literature in its book-shops was intensely practical, the very furniture and ornaments on display spoke of the flowing tide of militarism. Clocks were decorated, not as of old with knights kneeling to kiss a lady's finger-tips, but with uhlans and cuirassiers clicking their heels together on parade. The pendant of a watch-chain was a conical bullet, and candelabra were formed of piled muskets. "The metal in fashion is iron," said Professor Brandes; "The word in fashion is also iron."<sup>25</sup> Yet this regimented nation once gloried in the boast of *Freigeisterei*. The circle of Goethe and Schiller at Weimar believed in nothing so much as in the defiance of restraint and the exalting of "nature" above "convention." Jean Paul, Wieland, and a host of others preached the same gospel with their pens, and did not scruple to set the new example in their practice. Carlyle's strange delusion that the German people was to become Europe's regenerator in virtue may be met by a far more

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Aids to Reflection*. Vol. I, p. 26. "All the evil achieved by Hobbes and the whole school of materialists will appear inconsiderable if it be compared with the mischief effected and occasioned by the sentimental philosophy of Sterne and his numerous imitators. The vilest appetites and the most remorseless inconstancy towards their objects acquired the titles of *the heart*, *the irresistible feelings*, *the too tender sensibility*; and if the frosts of prudence, the icy chains of human law, thawed and vanished at the genial warmth of human nature, who could help it? It was an amiable weakness!"

<sup>25</sup> *Main Currents of Nineteenth Century Literature*. Vol. II, p. 17.

plausible argument that that race was to illustrate in turn the diverse excesses of immoralism — first the variety which springs from a frantic assertion of the personal ego, then the variety which comes from a cringing submission to the dominant *Reich*. If Treitschke was to be the apostle of the latter, Max Stirner was the apostle of the former.

Yet enthusiasm for what was called “return to nature” is perhaps the most characteristic common element in the Romanticists, and “nature” was curiously identified with the emotional rather than the ratiocinative impulse in mankind. It was an odd reaction against a still odder myth, the myth endorsed by Warburton when he said that “the image of God in which man was at first created lay in the faculty of reason only.” The prevalent view that Rousseau was responsible for all the absurdities of this contrast between the “natural” and the “developed” does far less than justice — as can be easily shown — to the teaching either of *Emile* or of the *Contrat Social*. Yet Rousseau’s recurring doctrine, that the kindly tendencies of nature are thwarted and perverted by artificial restraint, lent itself to that ideal of wayward autonomy which his successors and imitators were so keen to recommend. Not only positive codes, but every sort of agreed convention became an object of contempt. The vagaries of what is now called “free love” acquired a sort of sentimental sanctity. The English reader of Swinburne and of Oscar Wilde will recognize at once how this side of the Romantic movement developed.

Perhaps Wordsworth affords the clearest illustration from our own literature of that winsome Nature-cult in which the first Romanticists delighted, a cult which has always such seductive appeal for the young, and which is so apt to persist in those whose advance in years has been accompanied by no corresponding advance in thought. Nature was for Wordsworth in early life the one instruct-

ress in virtue; the world of sense, whose glories were welcomed with a childlike responsiveness, had no need of being interpreted by reason, and those who tried to prescribe for the developing mind its course in books were like sham physicians who pretend to teach the body how to grow. The "speaking face of earth and heaven" was man's all-sufficient guide. The poet himself had been allowed in childhood to cull such flowers of learning as might tempt a random choice. He was contented if he might enjoy the things which others understand. And his programme for Lucy in *Lyrical Ballads* was formed on a like principle. The floating clouds and the bending willow and the motions of the storm should be her training school; she should learn composure from the silence and the calm of mute insensate things; the stars of midnight should become dear to her, and among winding rivulets the beauty born of murmuring sound should pass into her face. Twenty years afterwards Wordsworth explained the wickedness of Peter Bell by the fact that "Nature" could never find her way into that young reprobate's heart, that the changes of the seasons somehow conveyed to him no moral truth, and that to his seared soul a primrose by the river's brim was nothing more than a yellow primrose! He was led to wonder whether the waywardness of mankind did not spring less from the fact that we are poor observers than from the misfortune that the things we have a chance to observe are often insufficient for our education. Was Peter so evil because he was divorced in spirit from what he saw, or because he saw Nature's less inspiring moods, for "Peter Bell and she had often been together"? Perhaps his savageness even arose from the savage character of mountains and of dreary moors? And the poet confesses that he has himself come to look on Nature, not as in the hour of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes the still sad music of humanity. He throws out a hint that many of us need a direction

from stern conscience as well as the genial influence of earth and heaven. This is just the imposed morality that Romanticists had so derided, but for most of them return to Nature did not thus eventuate in return beyond Nature. Shelley's mocking voice in *Peter Bell the Third* warned us not to exchange the buoyant inspiration of wood and stream for the things that "old parsons say in burying-grounds."

#### IV

To ground the church's authority upon the failures of unassisted intelligence is a form of apologetic that has been much abused. Theologians have again and again bethought themselves that the impotence of reason might thus be exploited. That ignorance can be made the mother of devotion is a tenet widely imputed to the Church of Rome. Most of us, however, have heard many a Protestant sermon in which the disappointments of philosophic inquiry were not less exultantly emphasized, and the inference of an infallible Book was drawn with just the same logic that led Manning to an infallible pontiff. An Anglican divine of great note some sixty years ago had even the daring to deride the moral consciousness itself, to parade the antinomies as a schoolmaster to bring us back to faith, and to find in the hopelessness of agnosticism a basis for Christian humility. Edward Caird used to warn us against this sort of argument. He called it seeking a place for religion in the *lacunae* of science. In our own day we have met with those whose reply to the evolutionists has consisted only in dwelling upon the notorious "gaps," and we have seen such ground often crumble beneath their feet. The satisfaction with which men once noted the fact of a "missing link" and the alarm with which the possibility of its appearance was anticipated, find a parallel just now in the anxiety with which the rumor of a chemical production

of life is still whispered among the fearful. To rejoice in the break-down of the human mind as it labors unhelped, and to expect from its humiliation a mood of deeper submissiveness to external control, is to forget that reason and faith are alike sons of God, and that disrespect to either is disrespect to both.<sup>26</sup> Theological champions who thus plan their campaign might well lay to heart the aphorism of Coleridge, that the same truth is at once shield and bow, and that as a disputant plucks the weapon from his wound he has often to recognize an arrow from his own quiver.<sup>27</sup>

Yet there was a value in that same Romantic distrust of intellect, just as there is a value in Professor Bergson's similar scepticism about reasoning at the present day. Adverse and often exasperated critics see nothing in either but a new credulity. But to a great extent it is the critics rather than the criticized who are credulous. Men may, indeed, still think that the sole road to truth was that of the *Encyclopédie*, and that — as Carlyle put it — there is in reality "no truth except that which can be argued of."<sup>28</sup> They may think that there are no ultimate convictions necessary to man's life and thought, attested by that very necessity as trustworthy, unless we are to suppose the universe a chaos and our own quenchless belief in its order an inexplicable delusion, yet incapable of proof just because all proof begins there and so cannot lead thither. Or they may think that these indispensable convictions can still be securely held and confidently acted upon without any preference for that cosmic scheme which is alone reconcilable with them over other cosmic schemes which undoubtedly contradict them. That there are minds of this cast is a fact of which philosophy must take notice, somewhat sadly. But they are credulous minds, and they are a little too apt to measure the develop-

<sup>26</sup> Cf. A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Aids to Reflection*. Vol. I, p. 182.

<sup>28</sup> *Essay on Diderot*.

ment of others by their own capacity for incoherence. They have still need to learn that new and deeper psychology of belief so admirably summarized by Dean Church, and for which many had to thank the men of the Tractarian Movement: "that not arguments only, but the whole condition of the mind to which they are addressed — and not the reasonings only which could be stated, but those which went on darkly in the mind, and which 'there was not at the moment strength enough to bring forth,' real and weighty reasons which acted like the obscure rays of the spectrum, with their proper force yet eluding distinct observation — had their necessary and legitimate place in determining belief." <sup>29</sup> For this idea the Oxford men owed, through Coleridge, more than they themselves knew to the Romanticists.

Again, we have long been accustomed to hear from Protestant quarters that the greatest enemy of the Church of Rome is the impartial historian. One cannot help feeling, for example, that if Lord Acton had known less history than he did, so devoutly religious a mind would have been less recalcitrant when the pontiff so long held in reverence imposed as *de fide* an acceptance of the Vatican Decrees. But the judgment of historians upon the claim of the Holy See has been found as variable as Bacon found the judgment of science upon Christian faith. To adapt the famous aphorism, we may admit that a little history inclines one to Rome, while we insist that more history drives one far from her.

The present writer, at least, has long looked with a measure of sympathetic appreciation upon those for whom, one hundred years ago, the glamor of the Papacy was restored. De Maistre was a witness as opportune as Dante five centuries before, to the spiritual independence of the Church. The Concordat by which Pius VII purchased imperial favor at the price of conceding the Gal-

<sup>29</sup> Church, *The Oxford Movement*, p. 256.

lican liberties may be excused as a yielding to *force majeure*, but on the face of it looks as simoniacal a transaction as ever disgraced the administration of Boniface VIII. It may be incredible that the Most High has appointed a human vicegerent to bear spiritual rule from a single centre to the ends of the earth. But it is at least not more absurd, and it is vastly less incoherent, than to think of "national" Churches, each one of which has been endowed with the awful power to bind and to loose, but each one of which must at the same time exercise its solemn function in strict subservience to the temporal authority of the State.<sup>30</sup> Against such a travesty of sacred things every word that was spoken by Lammenais, by Montalembert, by Lacordaire, was a word for truth and earnestness. We see the same healthy resentment in Schleiermacher's protest against a State-imposed Prussian liturgy. If there is an apostolic succession — as Lambeth no less than Rome maintains — then the apostles who transmit it are surely no mere subordinates of the discordant civil powers, or mouthpieces of the dominant national feeling. Something quite different from either loyalty or patriotism must be the first of their concerns. How sorely a counteractive was needed for the Erastianism of the hour may be seen from some ecclesiastical arrangements recorded in the contemporary literature. The practice of the fallen French Empire had become a model in many things, and beyond doubt Napoleon had his national clergy well in hand. We hear, for example, of one preacher who was supposed to be delivering lectures on theism, and who was specially expert in devising the *double entendre* by which compliments to the emperor might be insinuated in the language of devout-

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Thackeray's extraordinary outburst in the Irish Sketch Book against the Pope's appointment of an English bishop to the see of "Aureliopolis," and his query about what His Holiness would think if the Archbishop of Canterbury nominated a bishop of the Palatine or the Suburra! It illustrates the mood in which Churches were regarded as pieces of national organization.



ness. Even he, however, failed to come up to the standard, for Fouché, acting on Napoleon's behalf, pointed out that a really patriotic address on the existence of God should contain some words in support of military conscription. The catechism was recast by imperial order, questions were inserted on the duty of Frenchmen to the chief of their State, and it was intimated in the answers that he who failed not only to obey but to "love" Napoleon would be eternally damned! When in defiance of the Holy See all manner of State-nominated bishops were thrust into dioceses, the clergy were forbidden to express the smallest disapproval, and on one occasion two hundred and thirty-six seminarists who had refused to assist at the mass of an imperial bishop were at once unfrocked and drafted into a regiment. Priests, like all others, were to be "hundred-per-cent Frenchmen, Frenchmen first, last, and all the time." Such records help one to understand the strange declaration of that other "constitutional priest," Cimourdain in Hugo's *Quatre-vingt-treize*, "je suis prêtre, mais je crois en Dieu."<sup>31</sup> It was surely time for ultramontanism, or any other *ism*, to reassert that the Church of God is not a branch of the national civil service varying with each change from the Assembly to the Consulate, from the Consulate to the Empire, and from the Empire back to the house of Bourbon.<sup>32</sup>

As we attempt to estimate the loss and gain which have resulted from all these tendencies, we must feel that neither has been the monopoly of one school, but that the imprint of the Romanticists, for both good and evil, is

<sup>31</sup> *Quatre-vingt-treize*. Vol. II, p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> The almost forgotten novels of John Galt have some sly hits at the same sort of State-sustaining religion in England. Cf. the complaint of the Rev. Micah Balwhidder that smuggling continued to flourish, though he had preached sixteen times from the text "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's (*Annals of the Parish*, p. 10); and Mr. Cayenne's request that his doctor should summon a clergyman to his death-bed, because, "you know, that in these times, doctor, it is the duty of every good subject to die a Christian" (*ibid.*, p. 151).

still on each branch of Christendom. Neither the Roman nor the Protestant communion has quite failed in our day to advance beyond the hardness of the old intellectualist apologetic, to realize that the basis of religion is no mere assent — however vigorously coerced — to the formulæ of a creed, and that the value-judgments of the heart rather than the cogency of a syllogism are the source of saving faith. As they think of the universe testifying to its Creator, neither can now much appreciate Addison's lines about the spacious firmament and the blue ethereal sky proclaiming their great Original, and rejoicing in Reason's ear. For they have alike come to acknowledge that external Nature taken alone seems to proclaim many different things, and that Reason without moral feeling is a poor guide. They are alike attracted rather by Wordsworth's simile of the child who holds to his ear the convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell, who hears those sonorous cadences which suggest mysterious union with its native sea, and who symbolizes that faith in a moral order which yields "authentic tidings of invisible things."

Enlightened men of all Christian creeds now alike look back with sympathetic reverence to the generations inspired by the same faith as themselves, though the dialects in which that faith expressed itself show a limitless variety, and they have alike become alive to the indecent outrage of examining with kindly appreciation the religious *nisus* in all the ethnic cults of the world while a cold and scornful glance is turned upon a thousand years of Christianity. They alike increasingly turn aside from perhaps the grossest of all ecclesiastical corruptions — the attitude of those to whom the Church meant no more than a department of the State, a more or less serviceable agency of moral restraint, a handmaid of government and a prop to those "powers that be" which, whatever their character, churchmen were once prepared to sanction as ordained of God. For this new spirit which the Romantic

impulse did so much to foster, the liberals and the conservatives in theology must be alike thankful. But, like all other reactions, the reaction from the eighteenth century has shown itself a fresh cause of discord among the very men who are most indebted to it, separating those who fear the excesses and those who are impatient with the limits of the new traditionism, marshaling in one camp those to whom the backward movement seems always in danger of going too far and in another those to whom it never seems to have courage for going far enough. The elements are now so intermingled that it has become difficult to say who is a Romanticist and who is not. For the heirs of that impulse in our own time are to be seen exalting Reason or denouncing it, despising history or appealing to it, finding in "the witness of the heart" an authentication of the things unseen and eternal or sufficient authority for each vagrant passion of the "natural" man. There is, in truth, no single movement of thought in these high fields whose fruit is not thus liable to manifold variation. As in the great parable, we must still be content to see tares and wheat growing together until the harvest. But neither must we forget the point at which that analogy stops. For the harvest of thought is one that ripens from year to year, and it is the office of successive critics, according to such light as may be in them, to wield the sickle fearlessly.

## A NEGLECTED PRINCIPLE OF LITURGICAL REVISION

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The Second Report of the Joint Commission on the Book of Common Prayer is an interesting document, not only for the history of liturgy in the American Church but also in showing, perhaps more by implication than by direct statement, the lines along which thought in the Episcopal Church is at present moving.

The resolution of 1913 which created this Commission provides that "no proposition involving the faith and doctrine of the Church shall be considered or reported upon" by it. Yet no far-reaching change in liturgy can be made without reference to theological considerations, and many of these come out clearly in the Report. The main points where doctrinal influences are apparent are in connection with (1) the revision of the wording of certain Collects, with a tendency to eliminate or soften some of the harsher elements of the old doctrine of God's providence; (2) the Holy Communion; (3) the visitation and healing of the sick. These are scarcely questions to be settled without serious discussion of their theological implications, and it is difficult to imagine any previous generation supposing that they could be regarded from an exclusively liturgical point of view.

I. *The doctrine of God.* In the prayer "For Fair Weather," among the Prayers and Thanksgivings upon Several Occasions, it is suggested to change the reading so as to omit the bracketed portions:

"Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee of thy great goodness, to restrain those immoderate rains wherewith [for our sins] Thou hast afflicted us. And we pray Thee to send us

such seasonable weather, that the earth may in due time yield her increase for our use and benefit [And give us grace that we may learn by thy punishments to amend our lives, and for thy clemency to give thee thanks and praise;] through Jesus Christ our Lord."

Still more striking is the substitute offered for the prayer "In Time of great Sickness and Mortality."

*Present Form*

O Almighty God, the Lord of life and death, of sickness and health, regard our supplications, we humbly beseech thee; and, as thou has thought fit to visit us for our sins with great sickness and mortality, in the midst of thy judgment, O Lord, remember mercy. Have pity upon us, miserable sinners, and withdraw from us the grievous sickness with which we are afflicted. May this thy fatherly correction have its due influence upon us by leading us to consider how frail and uncertain our life is; that we may apply our hearts unto that heavenly wisdom which in the end will bring us to everlasting life; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

*Proposed Form*

O most mighty and merciful God, we flee unto thee for succor by reason of the grievous sickness that has come upon us. Deliver us, we beseech thee, from our peril; give strength and skill to all who are engaged in the care of the sick, and prosper the means which shall be made use of for their cure; and grant that, perceiving how frail and uncertain our life is, we may apply our hearts unto that heavenly wisdom which in the end will bring us to everlasting life; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The conclusion of the prayer "For a Sick Person" reads at present, "And in thy good time restore him to health and enable him to lead the residue of his life in thy fear and to thy glory. Or else give him grace so to take thy visitation, that after this painful life ended, he may dwell with thee in life everlasting." It is revised to read, "in thy fear and to thy glory; and grant that finally he may dwell with thee in life everlasting."

Very similar in idea is the change made in the prayer "For a Sick Child."

*The Old Form*

Almighty God, and merciful Father, to whom alone belong the issues of life and death, look down from Heaven, we humbly beseech thee, with the eyes of thy mercy upon the sick child for whom our prayers are desired. Deliver him, O Lord, in thy good appointed time from his bodily pain and visit him with thy salvation; that if it be thy good pleasure to prolong his days here on earth, he may live to thee and be an instrument of thy glory, by serving thee faithfully and doing good in his generation. Or else receive him into those heavenly habitations where the souls of those who sleep in the Lord Jesus enjoy perpetual rest and felicity. Grant this, O Lord, for the love of thy Son, our Saviour, Jesus Christ. Amen.

*The New Form*

O Heavenly Father, almighty and merciful, who lovest all children, and hast filled the world with gladness, pour out thy blessing, we beseech thee, upon the sick child for whom our prayers are offered. Guide by thy wisdom the efforts made for his cure, and mightily increase our confidence in thy love; that he, resting in our faith and sustained by thy power, may be made well and may live to thee in the joy of thy service; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

In the prayer "For a Person Under Affliction" the bracketed portions are to be omitted:

"O Merciful God and heavenly Father who hast taught us in thy holy Word that thou dost not willingly afflict or grieve the children of men, look with pity we beseech Thee upon the sorrows of thy servant, for whom our prayers are desired. [In thy wisdom thou hast seen fit to visit him with trouble and to bring distress upon him.] Remember him, O Lord, in mercy; [sanctify thy fatherly correction to him;] endue his soul with patience [under his affliction, and with resignation to thy blessed will]; comfort him with a sense of thy goodness; lift up thy countenance upon him and give him peace, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen. "

The present prayer for Malefactors is to be dropped and a substitute is provided under the title "For Prisoners."

*For Malefactors*

O most gracious and merciful God, we earnestly beseech thee to have pity and compassion upon those persons recommended to our prayers, who now lie under the sentence of the law and are appointed to die. Visit them, O Lord, with thy mercy and salvation; convince them of the miserable condition they are in by their sins and wickedness; and let thy powerful grace produce in them such a godly sorrow and sincere repentance as thou wilt be pleased to accept. Give them a strong and lively faith in thy Son our blessed Saviour, and make it effectual to the salvation of their souls. O Lord, in judgment remember mercy; and whatever sufferings they are to endure in this world, yet deliver them, O God, from the bitter pains of eternal death. Pardon their sins and save their souls, for the sake and merits of thy dear Son, our blessed Saviour and Redeemer. Amen.

*For Prisoners*

O God who sparest when we deserve punishment, and in thy wrath rememberest mercy, we humbly beseech thee of thy goodness to comfort and succor all prisoners who are under reproach in the house of bondage (especially those who are condemned to die). Give them a right understanding of themselves and of thy promises; that trusting wholly in thy mercy, they may not place their confidence anywhere but in thee. Relieve the distressed, protect the innocent, awaken the guilty; and forasmuch as thou alone bringest light out of darkness and good out of evil, grant to these thy servants that by the power of thy Holy Spirit their souls may be set free from the chains of sin, and they may be brought to newness of life; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The "Thanksgiving for Deliverance from Great Sickness and Mortality" is to be dropped from the Prayer Book.

All these proposed emendations and omissions are directed against a theory of God and man which was fundamental to the authors of the Prayer Book. Our ancestors interpreted human life from an almost exclu-

sively moral point of view. Every man was a fallen creature, raised from complete corruption only by the grace of God working in him from the time of his baptism. His goal was heaven, his peril hell. The thing needful was to find the way of life which led to the one and avoided the other. For this purpose a moral economy existed in the universe which left no event without retributive or disciplinary effect on man. The apparent evils of life were notes of warning, its joys were messages of encouragement from the Power that worked in this world for the salvation of men's souls in the world to come. This theory was absolutely complete and compact, leaving no event unexplained or unrelated to the moral purpose of God.

The objection felt by moderns to this view was that a God who was responsible for many of the painful incidents of this life was neither lovable nor respectable, and that to save the Divine character it was necessary to sever from God's immediate control events which before had been regarded as his special instruments for realizing his purpose of bringing men to himself. The origin of this objection is to be found in the steady decline of the theory of man's corruption through Adam, and the fading of definiteness in the belief about the future. Late in the nineteenth century the biological doctrine of evolution was taken over into sociology and given a mystical turn by theologians who traced philosophical descent from Schelling and his school. The prevailing view of the conditions and destiny of humanity was completely changed; the joys of heaven and horrors of hell ceased to be factors in modern life; and this reacted on the ideas of God in that the feeling for the immediate practical necessity of adapting life to a fixed and known retributive system disappeared. It was felt that God in the rôle of a stern judge and wise disciplinarian of his fallen and worthless creatures could be held responsible for many things which, in



his new rôle of guide and support to humanity evolving from primitive savagery to ordered moral society, he could not assume without serious loss of respect.

It was the boast of modern liberal Protestantism that it set Christianity free from the fearsomeness and awe of the Calvinistic universe by reviving the primitive doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. The primitive character of the form in which this doctrine has been revived and popularized may be questioned, but its practical effect in sentimentalizing and weakening the ancient conception of God is unmistakable. God has been removed from the realms of the unpleasant, but the removal has been one of fiction and not of fact. Suffering and evil are still facts of life and form a problem for the theologians, the importance of which the war has not tended to minimize. The essence of theism is the attempt to interpret the behavior of the universe, taken as a whole, in its relation to human life. No theology can hope for permanent support which closes its eyes to all but one aspect of the world's behavior.

II. *The Holy Communion.* In the revision of the Order for the Holy Communion several important changes have been suggested. The title of the service is changed to "The Divine Liturgy, being the order for The Lord's Supper or Holy Eucharist, commonly called The Holy Communion." The Ten Commandments may be read in a shortened form. The Summary of the Law is changed to read, "with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength." The *Dominus vobiscum* is introduced before the Collects of the day. An anthem or hymn is admitted between the Epistle and Gospel. "Praise be to thee, O Christ," may be said after the Gospel. A rubric authorizing the celebrant to ask for "the secret intercessions of the congregation for any who have desired the prayers of the Church" is introduced before the prayer "For the Whole State of Christ's Church."

The word "Militant" no longer appears after "Christ's Church" in the invitation to that prayer, and the wording of the prayer is somewhat changed. The last of the "Comfortable Words" is amended to read, "If any man sin, we have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the Righteous, and he is the Propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world." The *Dominus vobiscum* is inserted before the *Sursum Corda*. The *Benedictus qui venit* is authorized after the *Sanctus*. Proper prefaces are inserted for the Epiphany, for the Annunciation, Purification, and Transfiguration, and for All Saints' Day. The Prayer of Humble Access is transferred to a place immediately after the Prayer of Consecration; the Lord's Prayer is placed before the administration of the elements and is introduced by the sentence, "As our Saviour Jesus Christ hath commanded and taught us, let us say —." Provision is made for the *Agnus Dei*, or for some other hymn or hymns, to be sung during the Communion. The Lord's Prayer before the Thanksgiving is dropped, and the latter is introduced by: "Having now received the Precious Body and Blood of Christ, let us give thanks to the Lord our God." A rubric is admitted authorizing a Deacon to read the ante-Communion service. The ablutions rubric is amended so as to provide for reservation: "If any of the consecrated bread and wine remain after the Communion, it shall not be carried out of the church, but shall immediately after the blessing be reverently consumed. But *Note*, That subject to the regulation of the Ordinary, the Priest may reserve so much of the consecrated bread and wine as may be required for the Communion of the Sick." Another important rubric is the following: "When for any reason it is deemed inadvisable to use the common cup in the administration, the Bishop may authorize the Priest to use the method of Intinction." The general impression given by these changes is an increase of emphasis on the

doctrine of the Real Presence. The admission of the *Agnus Dei* and the *Benedictus qui venit* are certainly in this direction, and the provision for reservation, though put in the form of a provision for the Communion of the sick, is really the legalizing of the long-continued practice in the American Church of reserving the sacrament for adoration as well as for use in Communion.

The provision for intinction would seem at first a triumph for the Broad Churchmen, but this is doubtful. Nothing has been more distracting from the service than the expedients which many of the clergy have adopted to preserve their congregation from the danger of infection through the chalice. Purificators, sometimes dipped in alcohol or water, have been flourished before the communicants between each communication. Elaborate announcements explaining the method of intinction and its necessity have been introduced into the service. It is not inconceivable that congregations will prefer to adopt the Roman method of communication in one kind to these odious interruptions of devotion.

More important than any change made in the service of Holy Communion itself is the introduction into the body of Collects, Epistles, and Gospels of a special Collect, Epistle, and Gospel for the Solemnization of Matrimony and for the Burial of the Dead. No special provision for the use of these is made in either the office for the Burial of the Dead or the Marriage Service. They could find natural place only in Nuptial and Requiem Masses.

The intellectual issue raised by the admission of Requiem Masses is apparent. For the Roman Church this practice has been a natural expression and outgrowth of the teaching of the sacrifice of the Mass. The Episcopal Church, however, following the Church of England, has always set itself against this teaching. The objection received classic form in the thirty-first of the Articles of Religion:

"The Offering of Christ once made is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual; and there is none other satisfaction for sin but that alone. Wherefore the sacrifices of Masses, in the which it was commonly said, that the Priest did offer Christ for the quick and the dead, to have remission of pain or guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits."

If the practice of Requiem Masses is to be revived and authorized by the Church, some statement is surely called for, expressing either agreement or disagreement with Roman teaching on this subject and declaring the grounds on which a custom so long disused and disliked is revived.

This point has, of course, frequently been the subject of sharp controversy; but it is to be feared that the motive which has influenced both sides has been ritual rather than theological interest. It has become fashionable to have Requiem Masses, just as it has become fashionable to import many other Roman practices into the services of the Church, and those who favor these importations naturally desire support in the Prayer Book for what they do. The spirit of these men is very different from that of Newman and his followers, with whom theology was primary. Their object was to influence the mind of the Church to a fuller acceptance of what they believed to be Catholic teaching, and their weapons and defense were logic and argument. Their successors do not understand their theology, and endeavor to perpetuate their work by the revival of ceremonies rather than the discussion of principles.

III. *The Healing of the Sick.* In the office for the Visitation of the Sick, besides several changes of the same general nature as those proposed for the occasional prayers and thanksgivings, there is a cautiously worded rubric providing for auricular confession: "Then shall the sick person be moved to make a special confession of his sins; if he feels his conscience troubled in any matter; after

which confession, the Minister shall assure him of God's mercy and forgiveness."

More important is the Appendix inserted after the service of Visitation:

"Following the teaching and practice of Our Lord and his Apostles, the Church from the beginning hath exercised the Ministry of Healing, always with a prayer of Faith, often accompanied with anointing with oil or with the imposition of hands. When any sick person shall in humble faith desire this ministry through anointing or laying on of hands, the Minister may use such portion of the foregoing Office as he shall think fit, and the following form:

'O blessed Redeemer, relieve, we beseech thee, by thy indwelling power the distress of this thy servant; release him from sin and drive away all pain of soul and body, that being restored to soundness of health he may offer thee praise and thanksgiving; Who livest and reignest with the Father and the Holy Ghost, one God, world without end. Amen.

I anoint thee with oil (lay my hand upon thee), in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, beseeching the mercy of Our Lord Jesus Christ, that all thy pain and sickness of body being put to flight, the blessing of health may be restored to thee.'"

It must be admitted at once that the revival of this custom has behind it the support of apostolic authority. Healing by the imposition of hands was an important feature of the ministry of Jesus, a feature which he strove to make subordinate to his preaching without much success so far as the multitude was concerned. The practice was continued by the apostles and was one of the recognized signs which witnessed the Divine power which possessed them. Exorcism by the use of various formulæ, by the imposition of hands, and with anointing of oil, was a recognized function of the Catholic ministry throughout the Middle Ages. Yet the fact that the healing ministry has existed in Christianity does not mean that it was distinctively Christian. It was the universal accompaniment of a particular theory of disease, viz., that disease is the result of demonic influence or possession. Jesus

claimed no exclusive power either for himself or his followers in effecting these cures. The whole point of the Beelzebub controversy is lost if others did not perform cures in the same way: "If I cast out demons by Beelzebub, by whom do your sons cast them out." Every cure was a struggle of supernatural forces, in which the holy (or friendly) spirit permitted itself to be used by the healer to overcome the influence of an evil (or hostile) spirit.

What can be said, however, in defense of the revival of these practices without the revival of the theory of disease which gave them birth? An intellectual difficulty of some proportions faces the Church if it is to revive the healing ministry of apostolic times. Is the Church to reaffirm the doctrine of demon possession, or is some new theory of diagnosis to be proposed as a complement to the revival of ancient therapeutics? The objection to a skeptical attitude in regard to faith-healing will always be raised, that these cures often really work and that many people are actually made better. It is quite true that a healthy equilibrium may be restored to an overwrought nervous system by the removal of worry, and that this can be achieved by the states of faith and hope induced by the faith-cure. It is also true that other methods of removing worry are equally successful. It has been found that many troubles which have been regarded as organic are really due to disturbances in the nervous system. These can be cured by an improvement in the nervous condition of the patient, which may be effected by a faith cure. These faith cures are in all cases dependent, as the name suggests, on the belief in their effectiveness. Without this nothing can be accomplished. The real harm in the faith cure is not that it works by virtue of convincing people that their condition is other than it is, but because it tends to depreciate the accurate investigation of disease and its cure by science. People are always ready to welcome short cuts to knowledge, and religion has been the most

attractive of all. In none of the spheres in which it has been applied has the method of observation and investigation yielded more fruitful and beneficial results than in medicine. To attempt to depreciate this work or to offer substitutes for it that are not founded on fact is to stand in the way not only of scientific progress but of the preservation and advancement of human life.

As a piece of liturgical reconstruction the Report is undoubtedly admirable. The Church will, however, be making a serious error if it accepts or rejects its suggestions merely on that basis, and permits the theological issues raised by many of the proposed changes to escape, if not settlement, at least a more general fruitful discussion than they have yet received. The whole question of prayer could profitably be opened, and the propriety considered of having petitions to change the weather and the states of people's health used by a generation which believes neither change capable of being made by supernatural interference with the course of nature. This suggests the still wider question of whether the Church ought any longer to teach prayer as a species of contract, in which man induces God, as it were against his better judgment, to manage things differently from the way in which He had originally intended. It is hardly possible to see how this view can be reconciled with the modern idea of nature as a fixed sequence of events. Questions like these are fundamental "modern needs," which the Church cannot afford to neglect if she is any longer to pretend to minister to the educated. Liturgy, to be a real aid to devotion, must express the experiences and aspirations of its users. It cannot do this if it exalts flagrant misrepresentations of facts and embodies anciently respectable but really untrue views.

## BOOK REVIEWS

**MY GENERATION. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION. WILLIAM JEWETT TUCKER.** The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1919. Pp. xvi, 464. \$4.00.

President Tucker explains in the Preface the signification of the title:

"There must be, of course, some reason for that backward errand of the mind which is implied in autobiography; 'Confessions,' maybe they frequently are, the work of the imagination; but when genuine they have their justification in the unburdening of a mind of its past. 'Reminiscences' of lighter vein are the recreation of the mind; in more serious vein, its revaluation of men and events according to the appraisal of the memory. 'Interpretation' represents most nearly the unfinished works of a lifetime. In its more personal use it offers to the individual worker a just relief from his frequent sense of the incompleteness and the impermanence of his work, by allowing him to relate it to things which have in themselves fullness and stability, movements, causes, institutions. Applied in its larger relations, it may make some unfinished work of a generation, through the better understanding of it, the special task of the next, and so maintain that continuity of purpose among like-minded men which is the essential element in social progress."

This retrospection is arranged by periods — the Personal Background of Ancestry, Early Home, School and College; the Environment of a Civil War; the Profession of the Ministry; the Andover Period; the Dartmouth Period; the New Reservation of Time. While divided into periods chronologically, it is really the evolution of a life from youth to manhood, and in settings of office which were places of influence — preaching, teaching, administering, and at last prophesying.

He says of his upbringing in what might be called a Puritan home at Plymouth, New Hampshire, the home of his uncle, Rev. William R. Jewett: "As I recall my own experiences in a Puritan home and those of my mates, I have little sympathy with the men of my generation who attribute any subsequent licence on their part in morals and religion to the strictness of their early training. The home life of that period, as I saw it, had found the normal balance between authority and indulgence. There were exceptions, but I am inclined to think that a good many of the uncomfortable experiences which linger in the minds of some men should be charged to the narrowness



or temper or obstinacy of individual parents rather than to Puritanism. And due account should be kept as we grow older with the results of our own youthful mischiefs and follies. Whatever the Puritan home may have been aforetime I know only by report, but when it became the home for my generation, it stood for a material, intelligent, and reasonably free approach to a world."

He prepared for college at the County Academy, was graduated from Dartmouth College in 1861, taught for a time in Columbus, Ohio, entered Andover Theological Seminary in 1863, served a year in the United States Christian Commission, caring for the wounded in hospitals and on the march to Atlanta, and returned to Andover, graduating in 1866.

He writes of the teaching of the Andover professors at that time, particularly of that burning and shining light, Professor Edwards A. Park: "As theology was treated by Professor Park, the lectures became the attraction and stimulus of the seminary course. I can hardly go further and affirm with equal assurance their inspirational quality. . . . It (Andover) represented an advanced theology, keen intellectual life, and the spirit of devotion for service at home and abroad. What was lacking, and the lack was serious, was some fresh, more direct, and penetrating approach to the heart of Christianity. The theological advance from Old to New School had created an unmistakable feeling of satisfaction. The 'New England Theology' was quite too near the finished article. Like every great religious holding of the truth, it was vitalized at times by spiritual quickenings, but the continuous struggle after truth, the tremendous earnestness of search rather than of inquiry, the conflict with doubt, the baffled but determined demand for personal assurance and personal possession, were not conspicuously in evidence."

Then came his pastorate of eight years at Manchester, New Hampshire, a manufacturing town, and at the Madison Square Church, New York, continuing five years. He was called to Andover Theological Seminary in 1879 to be professor of Homiletics.

More than a hundred pages of the book are given to the Andover Movement and the trial of five of its professors — Smyth, Tucker, Churchill, Harris, Hincks — on charges of heterodoxy, that is, of departure from the Creed of the Seminary, which the professors were required to subscribe, not only at their inauguration but again every fifth year. Although there were sixteen specific charges, the attack was at two sensitive points — probation after death or second probation, and the real authority of the Bible. The attention of a religious world was caught. Not only the religious press but also the secular

press gave large space to the discussions. It is thirty-four years since the trial was instituted by the Board of Visitors, and twenty-eight years since the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reversed the verdict. It is not easy now to make the younger generation, or indeed anybody, understand what it was all about. Yet the Andover Movement was on the line of theological and religious progress.

The Constitution of the Seminary provides two Boards: the Trustees, twelve in number, the majority laymen, who administer the affairs of the Seminary and elect professors; the Visitors, three in number, two clergymen and one layman, to be guardians of the Foundation, to interpret the Creed as occasion might require, to examine the professors elected by the Trustees, to take care that the duties of every professor are intelligently and faithfully discharged, and to admonish or remove, either for misbehavior, heterodoxy, incapacity, or neglect of the duties of his office — That was the situation when the five professors who were editors of the *Andover Review* were charged by a few of the older alumni with heresy, and before the Visitors the charges were brought. Each side had counsel; the courtroom — a dining-room in the United States Hotel, Boston — was thronged for five days. Professor Smyth made a convincing defense, the other four professors made brief addresses, the lawyers stepped in with able arguments, and the trial was over. The evidence of heterodoxy adduced by the complainants consisted of editorials in the *Andover Review*, for which, being unsigned, all the editors were responsible. The Trustees' request that they might be a party to the trial was refused by the Visitors.

Six months later the decision of the Visitors was given. Professor Smyth was removed and the others were not removed, although the evidence was precisely the same for all. Two Visitors voted for Professor Smyth's removal; one (President Ledge of Amherst College, the President of the Board), for acquittal. When the other professors were considered, one of the Visitors did not vote; and since in that case, two voting, one for and one against — the vote of the President of the Board determined — they were not removed. Appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, as provided by the Constitution, and five years later, the Court ruled that the decision in the case of Professor Smyth was invalid, because the Trustees, whose agents the professors are, were not allowed to be a party to the trial. Later the composition of the Board of Visitors having changed, they reversed the decision to remove Professor Smyth.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions took up the issue of what was popularly called future probation. The

Prudential Committee would not appoint as a missionary any one who even said that he did not know the fate of the heathen. There were animated discussions at the annual meetings of the Board. The Congregational churches were involved. Councils were ordaining young men who entertained the opinion for holding which the Board was rejecting them. Finally at the Worcester Meeting in 1893, the Board was given over to the control of the churches, which thenceforth were to elect members of a Board.

"The result which was most definitely secured through the protracted trial, the result, that is, which was actually reached, and which could only have been reached through conflict, was a reasonable assurance of theological freedom. The result was the answer to those who deprecated the fight and would have been willing to divert the issue. It represented something achieved, something won. Between the original judgment and its reversal, public sentiment had grown into an almost unanimous approval of the freedom secured. Very few feared any danger from it. The long struggle had familiarized the public mind with the spirit and intent of a larger freedom. . . . The great struggle within the field of doctrine has always been to break the hold of fettering and restrictive dogmas. These dogmas have been the obstructive forces in the way of a working Christianity — the dogma of a particular election, the dogma of a limited atonement, and last, the dogma of a restricted opportunity. It was a sad comment on the assumed and even boasted freedom of the New England theology, of which Andover was a chief exponent, that a theology which had won the conflict for a universal atonement should surrender to the dogma of a restricted Christian opportunity, and that the missionary organization called into being to carry out the motive of a universal atonement should shift its motive of action to this same dogma of a restricted Christian opportunity. . . . The greatest advance of Christian doctrine within this generation has been in its humanity. The humanizing process has been at work in many ways, but, in all those ways that are most accessible and most easily recognized, it has been stimulated by that larger hope for humanity which is the outcome and the expression of the newly-acquired freedom of Christianity. . . . Is there a larger work in human redemption going on out of sight, but not out of the reach of faith? The Christian heart and the Christian mind and more and more the Christian conscience have contended for the right to believe in this unlimited work of Christ."

More than one hundred and fifty pages of the book are given to the Dartmouth period. Dr. Tucker was President of the college from

1893 to 1909, when he retired on account of impaired health. The years of limited activity which might follow he has called "The New Reservation of Time," the title of an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1910. "In this article," he says, "I endeavoured to show the changed attitude in which it is possible under this restriction to approach that un hoped serene that men call age." His reservation is already more than ten years, in which he has done a surprising amount of literary work.

The Dartmouth period witnessed the development and enlargement of the college, in numbers from four hundred in 1893 to fourteen hundred in 1909. Dr. Tucker presents his theory of a liberal education, of a democratic college, touches on athletics and the many "outside interests," and gives the history of the college, with a full account of the Dartmouth case and the famous plea of Daniel Webster. While this survey of collegiate education and collegiate life is of special interest to Dartmouth men, it is significant to all who are concerned with the higher education needed and demanded in our time.

President Tucker's predominant interest, as he himself says, is the social, the humanitarian. He was the first, I think, to introduce social ethics in the instruction of a theological seminary — at any rate, among the first. He lectured on Social Economics, the Social Evolution of Labor; and kindred subjects. He established the Andover House, a social settlement in Boston, in 1892, later called the South End House.

In general, he says: "In the estimation of the causes which affected the fortune of my generation according to its place in the order of time, I put without hesitating the incoming of the new social order, consequent upon the rise of industrialism. The incoming of the new social order was in reality a social revolution, though lacking most of the usual signs of violence. For it was nothing less than the change from the individualistic basis of society to the collective basis, or if we do not allow the political implication of the term, to the socialistic basis. This revolutionary change reached far beyond the limits of industrialism. Still the results were most quickly and most extensively manifest within those limits. Capital rapidly passed from the hands of the individual into the control of the corporation, and thence into the control of the trust. Labor passed in like manner and with equal steps from the control of the individual to that of the Union, and on to that of the federation. Capitalist and workman alike placed themselves under self-imposed limitations. They allowed themselves to disappear as individuals to reappear as members of

organizations. Business in general passed from the stage of individual control to that of collective bargaining."

"The political effect of the change in the social order has thus far been much less than was thought probable, much less in fact than might have been expected. The advance on the socialistic basis has stopped far short of socialism. . . . Our government has gradually become more socialistic in its working without making any appreciable approach to Socialism. . . . The religious effect of the social revolution was in some respects deeper and more far-reaching than the political effect. It changed the prevailing type of religion. Individualism had been the foundation of the Protestant faith. Now, men began to think in terms of social Christianity. . . . The Church became as conspicuously the agency for 'social service' as it had been the 'means of grace' in the work of individual salvation."

President Tucker's book is a clear exposition of the tendencies — religious, educational, social, political — of his generation, on all of which he was influential. The personal touch is felt in the characteristic, elevated style, and in the appraisal of those movements in which he bore a conspicuous part.

GEORGE HARRIS.

NEW YORK.

**DICTIONARY OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.** Edited by James Hastings, with the assistance of John A. Selbie, and John C. Lambert. 2 vols. 1916, 1918. Charles Scribner's Sons. Vol. I, pp. xiv, 729; Vol. II, pp. xii, 724. \$12.00.

The resemblance of this new dictionary, in inner and outer appearance, to the same editor's previous dictionaries of the Bible is not deceptive. It is a similar work. Together with the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* this new work forms with some overlapping a complete dictionary of the New Testament in four volumes — the same space that Dr. Hastings originally devoted in the first work to the whole Bible. This larger scale of treatment is shown not only by the length of the articles but by the greater inclusiveness of the new work.

Besides the canonical writings of the New Testament, the Apocryphal Gospels and Acts are dealt with, and a separate article is given to most (why not all?) of both the Apostolic Fathers and the principal Jewish apocalypses. The latter are written mostly by pupils of R. H. Charles and reproduce unchanged the master's positions, but Burkitt on the "Apocalypse of Baruch" is independent and almost polemic, while Moffatt writes with his usual encyclopædic knowledge upon

the "Sibylline Oracles." This same writer supplies also what is perhaps the most remote excursus from the limited field of the Apostolic Church in the article on "War." This long monograph (it is exceeded in length only by the article on the "Resurrection of Christ") is a fascinating study, rich in literary allusion, of the relation to war of Judaism, of the teaching of Jesus and the apostles, and of the teaching and practice of the ante-Nicene Church. It is almost a pity that it is buried in a dictionary, for at least at the time of publication the subject was of special interest. It is also a pity that the author should in this and even in his other article have embodied the spirit of the time and should not have made a somewhat more impartial presentation of the position of the Christian Fathers. The monograph by C. J. Cadoux, which appeared at about the same time, endorsed by Professor Harnack as settling the case, should be read as a corrective with this article.

One very satisfactory series of articles deals with contemporary secular history. The main articles, on the several Emperors, on "Roads and Travel," etc., are by Alexander Souter, the rest by James Strahan. They are complete, succinct, and accurate. For "Hellenistic and Biblical Greek" the late Professor Thumb of Strassburg was requisitioned, and he has provided here a summary of the status of the linguistic problem in a fuller and more judicial fashion than is done by any other English writing.

A series of long and important articles discusses questions of New Testament theology, as Atonement, Conversion, Eschatology, Grace, Inspiration and Revelation, Law, Love, Perseverance, Preexistence, Righteousness. Some of those by better known writers are Inspiration and Revelation by W. Sanday, and Righteousness by J. Moffatt. No doubt the contributors to the *Dictionary* represent nearly as much variety of viewpoint as existed in the Apostolic Age itself. One gets, however, from these articles an impression of less conservatism than in the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*. Under the timeworn rubrics of theology the qualities of Christian experience and the teaching of the New Testament often receive a fresh and vigorous presentation. This impression of liberalism is confirmed by the attitude toward questions of authorship. In the articles on the several New Testament books traditional authorship is emphatically stated only in the case of Paul's main letters; elsewhere the writer either gives fairly the arguments on both sides or plainly opposes the traditional view.

The writers in the main are in British colleges and pulpits. A striking proportion represent the Free Churches; but a considerable use

has been made of American scholars. Perhaps the comparative lack of continental contributors was due to the difficulties of language and, in the case of the second volume, to the war. The articles, however, by Pierre Batiffol on "Ignatius" and "Polycarp" and of Ernst von Dobschütz on "Josephus" and "Philo" show that French and German scholarship have not been overlooked.

It is a fault, however, that the bibliographical material from Germany has sometimes been neglected. There is, for example, no reference to Norden's *Agnostos Theos*, *s. v.*, "Unknown Gods," nor to Böhlig, *Geisteskultur von Tarsus*, *s. v.*, "Tarsus," (both published in 1913). There is no reference to Wendland's important article on *σωτηρ* (ZNTW, 1904, 335 ff.) *s. v.*, "Saviour," nor to Schürer's article in the same periodical (ZNTW, 1905, 1 ff.) on *Die siebentägige Woche in der christl. Kirche des ersten Jahrhunderts*, *s. v.*, "Week" or "Sabbath" or "Lord's Day." There is apparently no reference to the Göttingen monographs on the *Book of Acts* by Schwartz (1907) and Wellhausen (1914). There is no suggestion *s. v.* "Assumption of Moses" that Schürer's view that the author was a zealot was subsequently (1909) abandoned by him. Similarly the article on the "Resurrection of Christ," already mentioned, fails entirely to use or even mention the most able liberal book in English on the topic — C. R. Bowen's *The Resurrection in the New Testament*.

These and some other minor faults that could be mentioned (omissions, misprints, and especially contradictions due to composite authorship) do not, however, invalidate the great value of this work of reference for scholars and particularly for ministers and laymen generally. Of course it is no substitute or short cut for solid and direct study of the Apostolic Age. The wide use of such material as is here both presented and referred to would create the intelligent and well-founded Christian knowledge which is often so woefully lacking in the present-day ministry and teaching of the Bible. It is, of course, difficult to give more than a fragmentary impression of so extensive and varied a production. But if the reviewer's impression is accurate, we have before us a new monument to the accumulated scholarship of the past and a landmark of progress toward an untrammelled historic reconstruction of the thought and spirit of the Apostolic Age.

HENRY J. CADBURY.

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

**PREHISTORIC RELIGION, A STUDY IN PRE-CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY. PHILO LAOS MILLS.** Capitol Publishers, Washington. 1918. Pp. xix, 600.

This book, the result of ten years of labor on the part of the author, is issued under the imprimatur of the learned and saintly Cardinal Archbishop of Baltimore. Its six hundred pages, containing an examination of the religious beliefs of the Oceanic, Central African, and Amazonian Primitives, are rich in material which may throw light backward on the earliest religion of mankind. One may well find oneself unable to agree with the author in certain views which he holds in common with many of his Communion, that "primitive man was undoubtedly an ideal and unique being," and that "hence all the existing savage beliefs are more or less tainted, but exhibit greater or less approximations to absolute truth in proportion to their antiquity or to the purity with which the primitive revelation has been handed down." Yet the book being preëminently a thesaurus, a source-book on social and religious origins, made up largely of well-selected quotations from and references to the works of Tylor, Frazer, Lang, Cumont, Dhorme, Codrington, Chamberlain, Howitt, Schmidt, Jastrow, Maas, LeRoy, and a host of others, the views of the author, cited above, sink into the background. Over one hundred illustrations add to the interest and value of the book.

MAX KELLNER.

THE EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

**SELECTED TEMPLE DOCUMENTS OF THE UR DYNASTY. CLARENCE E. KEISER.** Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts, Vol. IV. Yale University Press, 1919. Pp. 54. Plates xc.

**PATESIS OF THE UR DYNASTY. CLARENCE E. KEISER.** Yale Oriental Series. Researches, Vol. IV, 2. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 34.

Professor Clay and his students are continuing their praiseworthy task of presenting the texts of the Yale Babylonian Collection to scholars as quickly as possible, without waiting to translate them and comment upon them in detail. In this, the fourth, volume of Babylonian Texts from the Yale Collection, Dr. Keiser has published a selection of those inscriptions which contain material of the greatest value for the reconstruction of the political and civil life of the southern Babylonians of the thirtieth century before Christ. He has autographed three hundred and twenty-three texts, covering ninety plates, and has done so in such a way as to reproduce as nearly as possible the form and character of the original script. The texts are excellently copied. In his fifty-four pages of introduction, the author



has discussed the provenance of the texts, has collected many new and variant date-formulae for the Dynasty of Ur, and in a series of indices has collected the personal names, the names of deities, the names of temples, houses, sacred objects, places, canals, and gates; after which follows a useful catalogue with a summary of the contents of the various texts.

Dr. Keiser has divided his texts into groups: contracts and loans, those relating to patesis, those containing chronological data, those containing orders, those concerning temple business, and those of a miscellaneous character. Individually these tablets are not very interesting. They belong to the well known Business Contracts. But now and then very valuable material is found. This is especially true in chronological and linguistic matters. New dates, new names, and new signs are constantly arising.

The chronological material in these tablets has been found in such abundance that Dr. Keiser has thought it desirable to write a separate monograph on the patesis of the Ur Dynasty, arranging them in a chronological manner. He has also brought them into synchronistic relationship with the patesis of Umma, Nippur, and Lagash, making some interesting additions to our extant lists of patesis. This becomes evident if one compares his table at the end with that in King's *Sumer and Akkad*, p. 362.

But what is of more general importance is the conclusions which Dr. Keiser has arrived at in his study of the status, duties, and nature of the patesiate. He finds that the patesis of the Ur Dynasty, unlike those of earlier periods, did not recognize a dynastic succession; that the office of patesi had waned in influence since the time of Gudea, when the patesi was supreme ruler; that the patesi could be transferred or deposed; that he was not exempt from tithes, and from supplying animals for sacrifice; that he became a temple functionary; that he assumed, on occasions, the character of a magistrate; and that he carried on various relations, commercial and otherwise, with the patesis of other cities. Dr. Keiser does not say so, but the chances are that in the earlier periods, such as in the time of Eannatum, the patesi was really king, but that with the amalgamation of certain cities and the increased power of certain great patesis, the patesis of smaller towns became dependent and lost much of their original power, being reduced to the status of governors or temple functionaries. However this may be, Dr. Keiser has again placed all students of early Babylonian history and linguistics in his debt by the clear and scientific way in which he has presented this new batch of cuneiform material. The time is fast approaching when a fairly well

constructed chronology of the early Babylonian dynasties can be presented. One misses a reference for comparative purposes to F. Thureau-Dangin's recent and excellent study, *La Chronologie des Dynasties de Sumer et d'Accad* (1918), as well as a sufficient use of G. Contenau, *Umma sous la Dynastie d'Ur* (1916).

Many of these texts throw confirmatory light upon the social and ethical ideas of early Babylonia. Text No. 6, of the first year of Ibi-Sin, is a document in which a father takes oath in the presence of the patesi concerning the selling of his son to another person. The father has complete authority over his children, authority of the same nature as that over his cattle or real estate. No. 67 shows the way in which slaves were procured and set aside for the use of temples,

In a series of appendices to the monograph, Dr. Keiser collects the names of *Shakkanakku* of the Ur Dynasty, arranging them according to place and time; and enumerates the names of the princes and princesses of the reigns of Dungi, Bur-Sin, and Ibi-Sin, there being recorded no children of Gimil-Sin. The long chronological list of patesis of the Ur Dynasty adds much to our knowledge of the political life of early Babylonia. In his Synchronistic List it is worthy of note that Dr. Keiser makes Gudea a contemporary of Bur-Sin. This is much later than King's date for him.

It is now the privilege of the student of cuneiform to make use of these many texts so generously made accessible to him by the Yale authorities.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER.

WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE SOURCES OF THE HEXATEUCH. EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. The Abingdon Press. 1918. Pp. 395. \$3.00.

Scholarship has been at work for about a century and a half on the problem of the composition of the first six books of the Old Testament, the Hexateuch. An enormous amount of writing has been done and many widely differing views have been set forth during those years; but out of the debate there has come forth a constantly increasing body of facts on which there has been a consensus of opinion. The result attained has been that today not only the scholars in the field of Old Testament learning but also a large majority of the more scholarly clergy are convinced by the evidence adduced that the documentary hypothesis is the only solution of the problem. Almost thirty years ago George Foote Moore wrote to Benjamin Wisner Bacon (Bacon: *Genesis of Genesis*, p. xxix), "There is no reason to think

that the general results on which critics now agree will be overturned." They have not only not been overturned, but their foundations have been strengthened and made more impregnable. But this acceptance of the more scientific view has been largely confined to the scholars and the more carefully trained ministry. The laymen have as a rule been too lacking in scholarly equipment and too busy to sift the more or less confused evidence involved, to be converted to a general acceptance of the new view. The consequence has therefore been a gap between the pulpit and the pews. It is just such books as this of Dr. Brightman's on the sources of the Hexateuch that are adapted to relieve this unfortunate condition. The book is especially felicitous in its presentation of results and in a form easily understood. The three large documents are given in their entirety: the Judæan or Jahvistic document, dating from about the middle of the ninth century B.C., the Ephraimitic or Elohist document, dating from about a century later, and the Priestly Code, from about 500 B.C. To each of these the author gives an introduction, descriptive of its literary characteristics, its ideals, and the home of its author or editors. Thus the reader is prepared to note how characteristically the earlier two differ from each other and how radically these two earlier accounts, which had their origin in prophetic circles of thought, differ from the theocratic tone and presentation of the later Priestly Code. Dr. Brightman's book is commended to those who are really anxious to see what the modern critical method has done for the Hexateuch. From the introduction, in which is given a brief but valuable outline of the history of the criticism, to the bibliography with which it closes, the book is marked by good scholarship and wise restraint.

MAX KELLNER.

THE EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL.

THEOLOGY AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. D. C. MACINTOSH. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xvi, 270. \$2.00.

This is an exceptionally fresh and stimulating book on theology written by the Dwight professor of Theology in Yale University. Not that its conclusions are novel, for they are substantially those of so-called Liberal Orthodoxy more squarely stated and consistently held, but it is the way of reaching them which is noteworthy. There has been much loose talk of late about experience as the basis of theology, and the empirical method as alone valid for theological construction; but little definite work of the sort indicated has actually been attempted save in the psychology of conversion. Moreover, the

use of the term has been painfully vague; where reason failed, it has sometimes been deemed sufficient to pronounce that blessed word "experience," with hushed voice and awful mien, for the exorcism of a doubting or denying spirit. But Dr. Macintosh cannot away with such nonsense, and the distinction of his book is that it does undertake to define the data and apply the methods of experience with accuracy and thoroughness. As a theologian Dr. Macintosh has at hand certain presuppositions — the existence of God as object of religious dependence, the reality of freedom, the possibility of immortality — and certain data of revelation in the person and work of Christ and in personal salvation and support, together with the laws which may be formulated on the basis of these experiences. Thus equipped, he proceeds to a closer definition of the idea of God, and to a study of providence, eschatology, and theodicy in the light of this more developed concept. Probably most readers will feel, and rightly, that the last chapter, on the problem of evil, containing the substance of an earlier publication entitled *God in a World at War*, is a remarkably vital and original contribution to theological thought.

The book is open to criticism at several points, but there is space here for only a few fundamental doubts and suggestions. Is there not just a little too much flourishing of the words "science" and "scientific"? One need not be an anti-intellectualist to wonder whether science exhausts reality and a scientific method is the only way to truth. On the other hand, a thoroughly shut-in man of science (if such a creature be not as mythical as the economic man) might fairly protest that when God (however imperfectly defined), freedom, and immortality are accepted as presuppositions, there has been a begging of the question at the outset. Perhaps a mathematician would gloat over the author's formula for determining moral value with reference (1) to the isolated wrong act, and (2) to the man as a whole, "The numerator of the fraction represents . . . the factors according to which the guilt varies directly, and the denominator the factors according to which it varies inversely," (p. 85); but a reader whose

$$(1) \frac{(EI) \cdot (EM) \cdot (PF) \cdot (SD) \cdot (gi) \cdot (gm) \cdot (GHU) \cdot (GHC) \cdot (GTU) \cdot (GTS)}{(GI) \cdot (GM) \cdot \dots \cdot (ei) \cdot (em) \cdot (EHU) \cdot (EHC) \cdot (ETU) \cdot (ETS)}.$$

$$(2) \frac{(EI) \cdot (EM) \cdot (PF) \cdot (SD) \cdot (gi) \cdot (gm) \cdot (GHU) \cdot (EHC) \cdot (GTU) \cdot (ETS)}{(GI) \cdot (GM) \cdot \dots \cdot (ei) \cdot (em) \cdot (EHU) \cdot (GHC) \cdot (ETU) \cdot (GTS)}.$$

interests are moral and religious asks in bewilderment what has become of the traditional doctrine of the simplicity of moral action, and what is the use of a formula which enables no one, least of all the sinner himself, to estimate blameworthiness? Dante's Minos would

have to be an advanced mathematician and work overtime, in order to assign the damned to their appropriate circles in hell.

How is it possible to justify the assumption constantly made that we must believe in a God adequate to the religious needs of man? Those needs are so diverse that a god adequate to them all would seem to be in danger of having no character at all. Nor is the difficulty removed by prefixing such adjectives as "real," "valid," "deep," "legitimate," which in fact simply exclude all religious needs with which the author does not sympathize. Besides, is it not possible that the need has been created by long-continued belief in a supply? Taught to rely on divine aid, men easily formulate their craving for assistance against the hostile forces of nature into an imperative need of God as all-powerful helper. There may easily be "the upbuilding of a need" by the promise of a supply. At any rate, to assume that there must be satisfaction for all the "deepest" needs of man is quite too much of a presupposition to be thoroughly scientific.

The chief criticism, however, concerns the transition from psychology to ontology. In the intricate and baffling complex of religious experience, can it be positively affirmed that elements are included which demand an objective factor for their explanation? It may be true that in ordinary experience, objects and not ideas are immediate data, or that it is sufficient to plead an "ontological consciousness" in proof of an external world, but in religious experience the case is not so clear. As the author often says, right relations must be established if the experience is to ensue; but such a right relation is of course a psychological state, and a psychological condition as predisposing cause may turn out to be a sufficient effective cause of the experience which follows. One is tempted to employ the author's method in other ways and with respect to other experiences. To say nothing of the help and healing which often follow prayers directed to the Virgin or the saints, there are experiences of temptation in which one seems beset by an alien power enticing, even compelling, to evil. Shall we argue from such experiences to the reality of evil spirits and of Satan? Dr. Macintosh recognizes this peril at the very close of the book but does not offer a satisfactory reply. Perhaps those who accused disbelievers in the devil with atheism could have made out a good case on the basis and by the methods of empirical theology.

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

**THE PROGRESS OF CHURCH FEDERATION.** CHARLES S. MACFARLAND.  
Fleming H. Revell Co. 1917. Pp. 191. \$1.00.

This small volume contains a brief record of the proceedings and activities of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, boiled down by the General Secretary of the Council from the earlier volumes which describe the origin of the Federation and from its annual reports.

Though the work of the Federal Council has not gone very far, it may at least be said that it is a step in the right direction, and that the method of federation is sound in principle, even if in practice it has not been carried out in as catholic a spirit as the writer of this book would have one believe. The Massachusetts Federation of Churches presents a better example of inclusiveness. Taken as a whole, however, the Council has perhaps accomplished quite as much as it is reasonable to expect. Its best work — up to the time of the publication of this volume — has been that outlined in the chapter on "The Development of Federation in Nation, State, City, and Town," which summarizes the result of various investigations conducted under the auspices of the Council. The best known of these is that which resulted in the volume on "The Country Church" by Messrs. Gill and Pinchot. But other investigations uncovered equally interesting situations, as, for example, the fact that in San Francisco a larger percentage of Chinese than of Caucasians are communicants in evangelical churches.

Since the publication of this book the Federal Council has done an important war-time service which some future volume will doubtless report. It is to be hoped that in addition to the bibliographies which the present book contains such future reports may also be indexed.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

**THE CONSCIENCE AND CONCESSIONS. HOW MAY THE INDIVIDUAL BECOME RELATED TO THE MANY?** ALFRED WILLIAMS ANTHONY. Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 370.

This book contains an interesting though somewhat discursive treatment of the tendencies of our time towards coöperation and federation, social, political, and religious. Most of the chapters have grown from lecture-courses and still bear the style of the lecturer. They contain many statements of obvious facts, often skim the surface of the subject, and never go into too great detail or display reasoning too

profound to be grasped by a popular audience. The author nevertheless comes at times to close grips with vital points of the crucial problems and always treats them in sane and helpful ways.

The scope of the book is indicated by the titles of the chapters, which are: "The Historic Movement towards Unity," "The Unifying Tendencies of War," "The Protests of Individualism," "The 'Dead Hand' of Organization," "The New Testament Balance between the Individual and Society," "The Broad Basis of Brotherhood and Social Obligation," "National Unity from the Christian Point of View," "The Social Assimilation of Christianity," "Protestant Excursions in Christian Solidarity," "A Practical Program of Valid Concessions."

The emphasis throughout is placed on the tendencies which make for unity. It is, however, recognized that there is a danger that the movement toward unity may go so fast as to be superficial. In the last chapter the fact that the concessions necessary to unity involve a recognition of the varying mental processes of different people and their right to different expressions of conscientious conviction, is well stated. Without this recognition no toleration is possible. It is well said by the author that such recognition is one of the most difficult steps for many to take.

Especially felicitous is the analysis on pp. 63, 64 of the way many persons confuse facts and principles with obligations; on p. 70 of the necessity of fidelity to conscience; on p. 108 of the preëminence of the Christ; on pp. 167-173 of the relation of conscience to government; on p. 192 of the impossibility of confining Christianity to peculiar forms or convictions; on p. 259 of the occasions which impose restraints upon the free expression of conviction; and on p. 269 of the necessity of socializing the individual.

But one misstatement has been noted in the book. That is on p. 38, where it is said of the recent war: "No nation on the side of the Allies set out for the annexation of territory, not even to rectify a boundary or straighten a border." Strongly pro-Ally as the reviewer is, he must protest that there was on the side of the Allies at least one exception to this statement.

To the reviewer it appears that Dr. Anthony's program does not go far enough, admirable in many ways as his statement is. A program for Christian union should have in view as a goal — at least a distant goal — the union of all Christians of whatever name. It should, he thinks, be sufficiently flexible to include people of every stage of culture and scientific or unscientific point of view. It should aim to preserve the variety of types and tastes that are now included in various

branches and sects of the Eastern, the Roman, and the Protestant branches of Christianity. For this ever to be accomplished, it will be necessary for all Christians to come to the point where they can accept something like the famous Quadrilateral of the Lambeth and Chicago conferences as a working basis of general organization. It will be necessary, on the other hand, for those Christians who delight to call themselves "Catholic" or "Orthodox" to cease to insist that any particular theory of the bishopric, the Church, or any particular interpretation of the creeds is necessary. Men who hold the scientific views of the twentieth century must be permitted to understand these things in a way consistent with their intellectual outlook, just as really as those who still occupy the intellectual standpoint of Thomas Aquinas, Radbertus, or of the Second Council of Nicæa. In a Church so constituted and so liberally conducted, the different types of Protestantism could be included as religious orders. Liberty could be accorded these orders for the type of worship that best ministers to the taste and temperament of its members; but there would be a sense of unity and oneness from the fact that all belong to the same Church. It seems to the reviewer that some such approach as this to the problem might in time be fruitful, but in view of the deep convictions of many that they and they only are right, he is aware that for a long time to come such a program has little chance of success. A long period of education in toleration is necessary. It will take a good deal of what James Russell Lowell once called "settin' up and wootin'" to bring such a program within the range of possibility.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

BETN MAWR.

**MIND AND CONDUCT.** HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. x, 236. \$1.75.

This volume contains the Morse Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in 1919. Dr. Marshall divides his argument into three parts. The first, on *The Correlation of Mind and Conduct*, contains chapters on "Consciousness and Behavior," "Instinct and Reason," and "The Self." The second, on *Some Implications of the Correlation*, deals with "Creativeness and Ideals" and "Freedom and Responsibility." The third, on *Guides to Conduct*, examines "Pleasure and Pain," "Happiness," and "Intuition and Reason," along the general lines with which students of philosophy have been made familiar in Dr. Marshall's previous books on *Pain, Pleasure, and*



*Aesthetics*, and on *Instinct and Reason*, just as the first part is based on his *Consciousness*. There are, lastly, two Appendices, on "The Causal Relation between Mind and Body," and on "Outer-World Objects."

Laboratory-psychologists, averse to all speculative flights and anxious only to keep their psychology within the sober limits of a natural science, will probably look askance at Dr. Marshall's book. But for students of human conduct who are not afraid of viewing man in a cosmic context there is much in these lectures to arrest attention. I would point especially to the following doctrines which are fundamental for Dr. Marshall's whole argument.

1. There is his outspoken panpsychism: "As a logical extension of our habitual mode of attribution of consciousness to animals by the interpretation of animal behavior, we are not only forced to grant some form of consciousness to all forms of living matter, but we are led to look upon the Universe as itself pulsating with psychic life" (p. 89). I must confess that Dr. Marshall's very brief argument in support of this position carries no conviction to my mind. The only promising way, it seems to me, of reaching the conclusion that the Universe is pulsating with psychic life, is not to stretch analogy far beyond the breaking point in a *descent* from man through animal and plant to inorganic matter, but to *ascend* from the human mind, or, to speak more precisely, to develop the metaphysical implications of knowledge, morality, and religion.

2. Not only is the Universe a single psychic life, but every self is part of that life and determined within it. "We perceive that in holding that our acts are governed by the laws of Nature, the mechanist is really stating that the acts of the self are such as force us to believe this self to be part and parcel of Nature. And this notion we have seen to be eminently satisfactory; first, because we cannot without dismay look upon ourselves as stray waifs in this vast Universe; and especially because it means that the interpretation of Nature must include the interpretation of consciousness" (p. 101). Thence Dr. Marshall derives his theory of freedom. The self is always free, for it acts always in accord with its own nature. There are not, and cannot be, any forces "external" to it, to the compulsion of which it is subject. For the self "must be what it is because of the whole situation in the great system of Nature, of which great system it is a minor part. . . . The conditions of this system are thus of the essence of its [the self's] nature" (pp. 102, 103). To put it quite simply: the self is free because, as a part of the Universe, it must be what it is. If this seems an outrageous verbalism, it is only

because Dr. Marshall does not go the whole length of the Spinozistic position which, in effect, he adopts. Instead of saying that to be free is to be what one must be, I wish he had said, with Spinoza, that to become free, or to achieve freedom, is to recognize, accept, nay *love*, this "must," which is the evidence of union with the All, *Deus sive Natura*. And as for Nature and consciousness, I should again reverse the method of the argument, and, instead of interpreting consciousness as a minor system in Nature, interpret Nature as one system in, or aspect of, the total world of our experience. Dr. Marshall, *malgré lui*, is in the fetters of Naturalism.

3. Concerning consciousness and self, Dr. Marshall advocates doctrines which the limits of his time compel him to expound and defend with tantalizing brevity. He clings to the distinction of consciousness as mental and behavior as physical, the familiar psychophysical parallelism reappearing as "the hypothesis of a thoroughgoing noetic and neururgic correspondence." In consciousness, elements attended to are distinguished as "presentations" from the "field of inattention," which latter Dr. Marshall identifies with the *self*. It follows that the self of any one moment is neither presented nor presentable. In self-consciousness, no doubt, we have a presented self, but this presentation is either the "image" of a past self or the "simulacrum" of the moment's real self. In either case, the presentation, or "empirical ego," is sufficiently like the unpresentable original, to make it possible for us to study the latter "by indirection" through its reflections in the former. Dr. Marshall is skating here over very thin ice, as every student of this problem of self-introspection will recognize. It would have been well if he had found time to discuss how to distinguish the presentation which is my empirical self from my other presentations, or how we can be sure that this presented ego is a sufficiently faithful likeness of the unpresented self to justify the description of the latter as "that undifferentiable mass of unemphatic elements within the whole of consciousness." It is to be noted in this connection that Dr. Marshall himself claims that the empirical ego changes so little from moment to moment as to beget the illusion of the unchanging identity of the self, and thus to *mask* the constant mutation of the real self.

4. This mutability of the real self is a fundamental point in Dr. Marshall's argument. He uses it to assert the "creativity" of the self, and, thence, "objective creativity" as a "general characteristic of Nature." At any rate, the self creates ideals of progress, purpose, and good, and in some measure effects their realization in Nature. Again, a creative self is "new and unique" at every moment,

and thence Dr. Marshall infers that all volitional acts are rational acts *at the moment of their occurrence*, and that, consequently, we never do actually err or sin. It is only from the point of view of a later self, in turn new and unique, that, retrospectively, we recognize that we *have* erred or sinned. In short, he sides with Socrates in holding that no one sins or errs willingly, *i.e.*, knowing what he does. This in turn, furnishes a basis for an exceedingly interesting distinction between responsibility, accountability, and guilt. This is, I think, the most original portion of the book, and well worthy of careful study.

In Part III, we may note as helpful the view that morality is a "process of experiment, of adaptive adventure" (p. 184), and that it must needs be exposed to frustrations. But there is a consolation for these. "If we could look upon Nature as a whole, we should see ourselves as elemental parts of it, whose frustrations, as we call them, are merely situations necessary to the continued existence of the organic unity of the whole of Nature" (p. 141). If we could! Happy those upon whom life does not put a strain greater than the faith in this tantalizing "If" is able to sustain.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

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THE REFORMATION IN IRELAND. HENRY HOLLOWAY. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. 240. \$2.75.

A work on the Reformation in Ireland might almost rival the brevity of the famous chapter on Irish snakes, if by Reformation be meant any change in the thought and religion of the people. In this sense there was no spiritual revolution in Erin; the cult of the nation remained just the same after Luther that it was before him, only — if a bull may be pardoned in this connection — "more so." One need not draw the parallel with England, so rich in versions of the Bible, in prayer-books and tracts and a great Protestant literature, to be astonished at the barrenness of Irish religion. She produced no great Catholic doctors or saints — no Loyola, no Cajetan, no Neri, no Borromeo, no Canisius, no Xavier. Ireland had already begun to live in and on her past; without seeking fresh acquisitions she eked out her spiritual livelihood from the usufruct of her great age of religion, when Irish monks evangelized the world and Irish scholars disputed with Aquinas the palm of philosophy.

But though there was no Reformation in Ireland, there was a shadow of one, and it is this that Mr. Holloway now traces. It was

the shadow of England. Every great act passed by Henry VIII and his immediate successors relating to religion, was extended to the sister isle. First, the Royal Supremacy was asserted, and in its train followed a swarm of ancillary statutes intended to enforce it. The monasteries were attacked in Erin, as they had been dissolved in Britain. The liturgy was standardized according to the English models; the articles of faith were revised by Anglican canons.

Why then did not the people embrace Protestantism? Mr. Holloway's answer is that the government was insincere in its profession of zeal and awkward in the application of means to the avowed end. For example, when Latin was abandoned in the churches, not Erse but English, then understood by only a small minority of the people, was substituted for it. "Such enactments witness that the Government considered it more important to anglicize than to provide for the progress of religion, and the pastors of souls were to be the agents in this policy." The means taken to forward the cause of the gospel were the best way of killing it. The reaction against the superimposed policy was opposite to that desired by the king, and was very great. From this time forth Irishmen clung to Catholicism as one more relic of nationalism, and resented intrusions of English religion as part and parcel of a policy of hateful conquest. Finally, one aspect of the subject suggested by this thorough little book is that of the relation of the government to the changes in English religion. It is sometimes said that the British changed their faith at the beck and call of their rulers. But had it not been for a deep popular undercurrent, would not the efforts of the Tudors have been as futile in London as they were in Dublin?

PRESERVED SMITH.

CAMBRIDGE.

**PROPHECY AND AUTHORITY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE AND INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.** KEMPER FULLERTON. The Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. xxii, 214. \$1.50.

Professor Fullerton's book may be most warmly commended to all readers, whether lay or clerical, of this Review. It will not be of equal value to all. Scholars, and readers who have accepted without independent investigation modern theories concerning the Bible, may feel that its thesis requires no proof; but the historical course of events is so clearly and pointedly presented that all will find the book interesting and instructive. The early Christian Church accepted the authority of the Old Testament as an inheritance from

Judaism, and also because it was required by the argument from prophecy, which played an important rôle in its apologetic, and with it accepted also contemporary methods of interpretation. But by the same methods, particularly the allegorical, heretics also defended their opinions; hence, with the growing organization of the Church, there developed reliance upon baptismal confessions, councils, apostolic succession, until the full-blown theory of Church authority appeared, which thrust the Scriptures into the background. With the Reformation, however, the Bible again came to the front, and the influence of Humanism favored the rise of a genuinely historical method of exegesis. This was aided also by the necessity of finding clear and explicit Biblical authority for definite doctrine, as against the subjectivism of allegory; but, unhappily, the same reason led to a demand for intellectual consistency in Scriptural teaching, which was fatal to historical interpretation.

The interesting story is traced by means of the clue afforded by the interpretation of prophecy, and the author, bringing his account up to the present time, shows how the premillennial excitement, of which Bishop McConnell wrote in a recent number of this Review, is due to the erroneous conception of prophecy as prediction. Two quotations will indicate the character and conclusions of the book:

"The new view of prophecy does not concentrate its attention upon a series of unconnected predictions whose truth depends upon their minute literal fulfilment, but it looks upon prophecy as a great organic movement in the history of Israel, extending through the centuries, and in its moral power and grandeur presenting a phenomenon absolutely unique in the ancient world, and most easily explicable upon the assumption of a supernatural guidance" (p. 199).

"Just as Jesus fulfilled the Law, not by emphasizing the letter of its observance but by pointing out its wider reach and deeper import, so he fulfilled prophecy, not because he is the fulfiller of prophetic predictions, but because he is the fulfiller of prophetic ideals" (p. 197).

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

**THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY. Part I. The Acts of the Apostles.**  
 Edited by F. J. FOAKES JACKSON and KIRSOPP LAKE. Vol. I. Prolegomena I. The Jewish, Gentile, and Christian Backgrounds. The Macmillan Co. 1920. Pp. xii, 480. 18s.

This is the first volume of a monumental work in three volumes to be issued in continuation of Bishop Lightfoot's great series on the Pauline Epistles and later Christian literature, in which he combined commentary with historic criticism. Of the two volumes which are to follow in the present series, the first will deal with the literary criticism of the Acts, its authorship, sources, grammar, its character as history. The second — the third volume of the series — will contain the text of the Acts and a commentary. The editors have not merely edited papers prepared by others, but have themselves written most of the book. But they include a chapter on the Spirit of Judaism by C. G. Montefiore, one on the Roman Provincial System by H. T. F. Duckworth, and one on Life in the Roman Empire at the Beginning of the Christian Era by Clifford H. Moore. The subjects treated by the editors are the Background of Jewish History; Varieties of Thought and Practice in Judaism; the Dispersion; the Public Teaching of Jesus and his Choice of the Twelve; the Disciples in Jerusalem and the Rise of Gentile Christianity; the Development of Thought on the Spirit, the Church, and Baptism; and Christology. Of the five Appendices two are by Professor G. F. Moore on Nazarene and Nazareth, and the People of the Land. There are two maps and two excellent indexes.

No one hereafter can have a critical opinion in regard to the Acts which does not take account of this book. Not that it in any way claims to be the last word on the subject. The scholarly editors are far too scholarly to make such an assumption. Their pages, they say, (p. 417) "are designed to assist the attempt rightly to understand the development of thought and practice which produced the Christian Church of the middle of the first century. They are intended not as a finished picture of every element in it, but of those which certainly formed part of the stream of thought to which the writer of Acts belonged. That there were other elements in other streams is proved by the survival of the Pauline Epistles."

The book is divided into three parts. The first part — The Jewish World — in its first section does not avoid that difficulty of tending to become a catalogue which handicaps every attempt to condense much history into small space. But the general effect of the wide range of knowledge shown and the constructiveness employing it, is to create for the reader a world which is vital, rational, and

therefore real. The second part — The Gentile World — is naturally briefer than the others; though one could wish that even fuller treatment had been given to the oriental religions and their influence on Christianity. But limitations of space, like charity, must always cover a multitude of omissions.

The third part — Primitive Christianity — is the most important section of the book. It endeavors to analyze the contributions of this and that redactor of the early sources, to discover the genuine utterances of Jesus, to lay bare the historical fact underlying the accretions in our accounts, to reconstruct thus a complete organism, as it were, from a fossil or a bone. This is necessarily to some extent a matter of subjective criticism; to which, as the editors warn us, "it is a mistake to attribute a so-called objective value" (p. 268). This careful study of details often has a scrappy effect; more attention being given to reconstructing a fact than to showing its value when reconstructed. The style therefore of these parts is heavy; the bricks for the building are shot at the reader with little artistry, and the construction — even of a sentence (p. 159, l. 14) — is left to him. Yet the mass of profound learning which the book throughout contains is not without the exhibition of its relation to life. The section by the editors on the Apocalyptic Thought and Literature gives a full and vivid picture of a remarkable literary movement.

The chapter by Professor C. H. Moore — Life in the Roman Empire at the Beginning of the Christian Era — is noteworthy on account not only of its mastery of the subject but also of its style. It has definite construction, clearness and felicity of expression; it marches surely and swiftly, and is full of imaginative insight. Many such excellences appear also in the chapter by C. G. Montefiore on the Spirit of Judaism. This contains the most beautiful passage in the book (p. 60); where the writer, himself a Jew, answers the objection that the observance of the many details of the Law must be burdensome. Such observances he likens to the customs of a loving family, which carry with them a joy in compliance. "To lovers every order of the Beloved is dear. . . . The joy is in the Law, and even in the performance of the most trifling Misvoth."

The make-up of the book shows great inconsistency in typographical usage. Thus book titles are sometimes in italic (pp. 119, 233, 318, 355), sometimes in roman (pp. 56, 128, 354); sometimes with quotation marks, sometimes without (pp. 92, 354). The same word is used both with and without quotation marks — "the Seven" (p. 308); "Luke" (pp. 302, 303). Double quotation marks and single are employed without distinction of function (pp. 47, 269, 365).

The colon is used, not, as in the best American usage, to anticipate the explanation of a previous statement, but without difference from a semicolon (pp. 325, 326). Capitals appear, as in "Age to Come" (pp. 277, 278), yet the same word has elsewhere lower case (pp. 342, 365). Foreign words in English letters are sometimes in italic (pp. 69, 79), sometimes in roman (pp. 230, 424). The proof-reading is often defective (p. 106, l. 18; p. 174, l. 17; p. 320, l. 10; p. 323, l. 25; p. 339, l. 3). But quite apart from its dress the book marks a most important stage in the critical study of the New Testament.

FREDERIC PALMER.

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#### BOOKS OF SERMONS:

ADDRESSES AND SERMONS TO STUDENTS. DAVID M. STEELE. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1919. Pp. 257. \$1.25.

CITIZENS OF TWO WORLDS AND OTHER SERMONS. C. B. WILLIAMS. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1919. Pp. 214. \$1.25.

THE BREATH IN THE WINDS, AND OTHER SERMONS. FREDERICK F. SHANNON. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1918. Pp. 173. \$1.00.

THE SWORD OF THE SPIRIT: BRITAIN AND AMERICA IN THE GREAT WAR. JOSEPH FORT NEWTON. George H. Doran Co. Pp. 241. \$1.50.

YALE TALKS. CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN. Yale University Press. 1919. Pp. 156. \$1.00.

WHAT THE WAR HAS TAUGHT US. CHARLES EDWARD JEFFERSON. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1919. Pp. 258. \$1.50.

Here are several recent volumes of sermons varying greatly both in type and excellence.

The rector of the Church of St. Luke and the Epiphany in Philadelphia has brought together a number of Commencement orations and baccalaureate sermons delivered to students in institutions varying from a girls' boarding-school to the University of Pennsylvania. It is easy to understand why he should be in demand for such occasions. He is breezy and outspoken, provocative in his love of epigram, and not too profound in his thought to enable the young ladies to follow him readily. His sermon on "The Privilege of the Strong" to Bryn Mawr students, and on "The Chemistry of Souls" to the graduating class of the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, are excellent examples of popular preaching adapted to special occasions. His address on "Why is a Seminary?" to the alumni of the Philadelphia



Divinity School, with its pointed and not altogether just criticism of theological education, illustrates his somewhat Chestertonian quality. But when, in a later address, we find him referring to "the *Imitatione de Christi*," and classing "the rhapsodies of Benvenuto Cellini" with the *Confessions of St. Augustine* as devotional literature, one wonders less at his complaint that he feels that his own Alma Mater did not do all she might for him.

Dean Williams of the Southwestern Baptist Seminary at Fort Worth presents what is really rather a series of sermon outlines than a volume of finished addresses. In many instances they are running commentaries on Scripture passages, with frequent references to war-time duties of Americans thrown in. They read as though they had been taken down stenographically and had been printed without sufficient revision. It is difficult to explain otherwise how an undoubtedly orthodox Dean of a theological seminary could make the following slip: "So the whole triune God is committed, in their (*sic*) infinite resources, to the preservation and security of the believer."

Very different in quality is Dr. Shannon's volume. Here is a vigorous preacher, who uses a noble style to deal with great themes. He is a writer of marked individuality, and his thought flows broad and deep between borders made rich and lovely by apt illustration. His sermons read so well that one wonders how they sounded — whether they flew low enough to the ground for his hearers. However that may be, they are delightful and stimulating reading.

Dr. Newton made his reputation as a preacher in Iowa before he was called to be the American minister of the City Temple in London. In the present volume he has printed a collection of sermons delivered in London during the Great War. They are words of courage and of consolation, free from bitterness and hate, looking through the gloom of the war to the brighter days beyond. If he has something less of literary quality than Dr. Shannon, he has perhaps more directness of appeal, more immediate application to the occasion. It is good to know that a sermon like his on "England and America" was preached in London in 1918. But there is little to choose among them, for all alike are the words of a straightforward, undogmatic preacher, whose feet know the common ways of life but whose eyes are lifted to the eternal hills.

"Talks" is an accurate title for the little volume of addresses delivered in Battell Chapel at Yale by Dean Charles R. Brown, of the

Yale School of Religion. They are brief, direct, pithy sometimes to the verge of slang, well calculated to hold the attention of young men not too much given to close thinking about sacred themes but ready enough to listen to practical, stimulating, sagacious advice about clean and honorable living. For there is, in these talks, genuine power and a burning moral passion which kindles the reader. But one wonders if it is no longer possible, even in our University chapels, for the preacher to deal with the profounder intellectual aspects of the religious life. In such institutions, if anywhere, there ought still to be a hearing for the sermon which seeks to go to the root of our ethical problems and of our intellectual questions regarding faith and life.

We could wish with all our hearts that the world had really learned "What the War has Taught Us," as expounded by Dr. Charles E. Jefferson of the Broadway Tabernacle. But these discourses, though delivered only a short time ago, speak of truths already half forgotten. The war did indeed teach us afresh "the meaning of sacrifice," "the might of the spirit," "the progressive brutality of war," and many other things set forth in the volume with vigor and a considerable measure of insight. But we have already experienced a considerable "slump" in our idealism, perhaps because humility was not one of the things we learned, perhaps because America actually suffered so little and realized in so small measure what the war really meant to Europe. The theme of the volume is one which many a preacher might use to advantage in keeping before his people the moral and spiritual lessons which they are prone speedily to forget.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE.

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